

THE MEMOIRS
OF
RAYMOND POINCARÉ

1915

NUNC COGNOSCO EX PARTE



TRENT UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY

*Dup
of*

THE LIBRARY
BROCK UNIVERSITY
ST. CATHARINES
ONTARIO

DUPLICATE

FEB 2 1968

THE MEMOIRS
OF
RAYMOND POINCARÉ

THE MEMOIRS
OF
RAYMOND POINCARÉ

1915

P 751

TRANSLATED AND ADAPTED BY
SIR GEORGE ARTHUR

MAR -- 1931



LONDON
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LTD
1930

DC 385. A63 [v. 6]

First published 1930

*Printed in Great Britain at
The Windmill Press, Kingswood,
Surrey.*

FOREWORD

THE Memoirs of M. Raymond Poincaré for the year 1915 are so rich in detail that two volumes are required for publication of the French text. In translating and adapting M. Poincaré's work care has been taken to omit only some of the passages which deal with French politics, the President's visits to the Armies, military factories, and other occasions of interest chiefly, if not entirely, to his compatriots.

For the first part of the year the author did not keep his journal in the exact diary form which he observed in later months, when troubles at home and abroad thickened and incidents of international consequence crowded in on one another, and it is obvious that much to be found in the book is to be traced to the reports which M. Poincaré received, and must not necessarily be accepted as the expression of his own opinion. Neither he nor anyone else could, for instance, attach much credence to the foolish story that Lord Kitchener took the Great Seal (sic) to the Dardanelles, and few would believe that, so early as 1915, Mr. Lloyd George was seeking to displace Mr. Asquith from office.

The statement that Sir Douglas Haig, on assuming command, told the President of the French Republic at Chantilly that he considered himself under the orders of General Joffre is open to comment, and the suggestion may well lie that the British Commander-in-Chief said—or intended to say—that he would be always ready to follow the initiative of the French Generalissimo and to conform as closely as possible to his general directions. The terms of the instructions issued to Sir Douglas Haig, which varied little from those laid upon Sir John French, can have left him in no doubt that his command was essentially an independent one.

His own account of the meeting, in a New Year letter to Lord Kitchener, ran :—" As directed by you I have done my best to start on friendly terms with the French. I think I have made a good beginning. I visited Chantilly ten days ago and got on so well with Joffre that he invited me to a sort of family gathering with his three Army Group Commanders and the President, Gallieni and Briand. The meeting came off last Wednesday: we parted great friends."

How, and why, the expedition to Salonika—which absorbs so many entries in the President's diary—was undertaken will always remain a fruitful theme for controversy. Anyhow the views of the French Ministers are fully set out in the present Memoir, and the point is not shirked that the Government were anxious to find employment for General Sarrail, it being highly desirable to placate certain political leaders of the Left whose powerful, and vocal, support that rather difficult Officer largely enjoyed; and nothing more than justice is done to General Joffre's loyalty in coming to England to insist on a course with which he himself was by no means in sympathy and which was viewed askance by several of his chief subordinates.

General Joffre when in London reduced his demand for 250,000 to 150,000 men, but reinforced it by the positive threat that unless British co-operation were forthcoming he would resign the command of the French Armies. Such a step at such a moment might have spelt disaster for the Allied cause and as a result there was drawn up the memorandum of the 30th October which emphasized the strictly limited role that General Joffre and the French General Staff desired British troops to fulfil. At the end of the year, a pencil was drawn through the memorandum and it was decided to retain in Greece, British Divisions and assign to them the duty of defending the town and harbour of Salonika. What real purpose this policy served was not then specified and was perhaps never determined, but the actual effect was that a large body of troops remained in Greece until the end of the war. They endured much and suffered much without ever being able to give anything like an adequate

return for the expenditure of man-power and transport involved.

There are many who will rightly say that to agree quickly with our Friends, while in the way with them was a matter of such vital importance as to make almost every other consideration subject to it, but there will always be some to accept the dictum of a famous military authority that, commencing with the belated attempt to succour Serbia, the expedition did very little in a purely military sense, while it deprived the Armies in France of reinforcements which, quite arguably, might have turned partial successes into decisive victory earlier than November 1918.

In their successful attempt to over-ride British official opinion it must be borne in mind that French Ministers never seemed quite to grasp the fact that British sea-power was one of our most important factors in the war, and that a dissipation of our naval and maritime efforts might prove a source of peculiar danger to us. Nor must it be forgotten that restlessness and anxiety in France—engendered by the unhappy war conditions—was not nearly so well controlled as in England.

The story of the early mishaps to the French guns recalls the fact that in September, 1914, General Deville produced at the War Office the design of a shell which could be manufactured with great economy of time. Everyone present was impressed except the then Master General of the Ordnance, who pronounced it dangerous; and on his advice Lord Kitchener refused to entertain the pattern. It is significant that a few months later came the bursting of the French guns and the derangement of Joffre's offensive.

Lastly little documentary evidence is available to exhibit how the misunderstanding occurred as to the admission of Russia's claim to Constantinople at the end of the war. It is somewhat difficult to believe that a highly trained Ambassador like Count Benckendorff should have translated a friendly remark which may have fallen from the King of England's lips into an official recognition of his country's claims. It is even more puzzling to understand why M. Delcassé did not inform the French Government of the conversation between the Tsar

and M. Paléologue in the month of November, 1914, as one can hardly suppose the latter functionary—even if he may have at times been lacking in precision—did not report at once to the Quai d'Orsay so grave an observation of the Sovereign to whom he was accredited. But however unwarranted, and anyhow premature, the Emperor's demand may now seem—and however impossible it might have been to indulge it even in the hour of conquest—it is not amiss to recall that at this juncture both England and France were fully alive to the vast sacrifices which Russia was being called upon to make, and fully recognised the imperishable contribution which she was rendering to the Allied efforts in the early stages of the war.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

	PAGE
New Year's Day—The telegram from the Pope—Joffre and the proposal for a diversion in the Near East—At Cassel, St. Omer, Hazebrouck and Arras—Battle of Soissons—The Duc de Guise and Ferdinand of Bulgaria—Proposed Operations in the Dardanelles	1

CHAPTER II

Cardinal Amette—M. Bark, Russian Finance Minister—Mr. Lloyd George—Financial Agreements of the Allies—General Pau <i>en mission</i> —Ricciotti Garibaldi—In the Vosges—The Schlucht—At Wesserling and St. Amarin—At Dannemarie and Masevaux—Uncertainty at Bucharest and at Athens—New offensive in Champagne—Marcel Sembat at the Socialist Congress of London—Joffre and the Senators—Bombardment of the Dardanelles .	25
--	----

CHAPTER III

Differences of opinion between the Allies—The British front—Constantinople and the Narrows—The Adriatic and Admiral de Lapeyrère—Resignation of M. Venizelos—The Gounaris Cabinet—Italy's wishes—General Maunoury wounded—Fate of St. Sophia—Conversations in London and Vienna about Italy—Zeppelins over Paris—Joffre confers with the Ministers—Pierre Loti and the King of the Belgians—Visit to the 4th and 3rd Armies—General Langle de Cary and General Sarrail .	50
--	----

CHAPTER IV

The 1917 Class—A telegram from the Crown Princess—Italy—A German Easter Egg—The King and Queen of the Belgians—Morocco and Spain—Sofia—Telegram to the Tsar—What Italy secures—Asphyxiating gas—The London Agreement signed—Irishmen at the Elysée	74
--	----

x THE MEMOIRS OF RAYMOND POINCARÉ

CHAPTER V

	PAGE
A Report of the Army Committee of the Senate—Naval Negotiations with Italy—The <i>Lusitania</i> torpedoed—The Battle of Arras—Prince George of Greece—Resignation and return to office of the Salandra Cabinet—Russia and Roumania—Greece and Bulgaria—What Austria offered to Italy—Pierre Loti as diplomatist.	93

CHAPTER VI

New Secretaries of State—Visit to the 2nd and 10th Armies—General Gouraud is awarded the Military Medal—14th July—General Lyautey in Paris—General Sarrail is replaced in the command of the 3rd Army—Parliamentary difficulties	122
--	-----

CHAPTER VII

Visit to the 1st Army—Verdun—Constitution of the Groups of Armies—Conference at Chantilly—The Army Committee of the Senate—Rheims and Betheny	152
---	-----

CHAPTER VIII

On the Franco-Belgian front—Visit to King Albert and Queen Elizabeth—Sarrail and the Dardanelles—In Alsace with Pierre Loti—The Government and the Parliamentary Committees—The Ministers and General Joffre—The King of the Belgians on the French Front—The Tsar thinks of assuming supreme command	178
---	-----

CHAPTER IX

Preparations for a new offensive in Artois and Champagne—General Sarrail and the Dardanelles—The Military, and Political, Situation in Russia—In Alsace—King Ferdinand of Bulgaria shows his hand—Venizelos and King Constantine—Tactical success, but no strategic decision, in Champagne—Bulgaria mobilises—Servia appeals to the Allies for help—M. Delcassé ill and speaks of resigning	210
---	-----

CHAPTER X

Telegram from the Tsar—M. Delcassé on the sick list—Landing at Salonika—Operations in Champagne suspended—Interview with General Joffre—Bulgaria at war—M. Venizelos replaced by M. Zaïmis—Resignation of Delcassé—Viviani ceases to be President of the Council—The Briand Cabinet	247
---	-----

CONTENTS

xi

CHAPTER XI

	PAGE
The former Khedive and his intrigues in Switzerland—The Zaïmist Ministry defeated and replaced by a Skouloudis Cabinet—Denys Cochin in Greece—Conference with Mr. Asquith, Sir Edward Grey, Mr. Balfour and Mr. Lloyd George—General Galliéni and General Joffre on the conduct of the war—Defeat and retreat of the Servian Army—Kitchener and the defence of Egypt—First Appearance of Bolo Pasha	273

CHAPTER XII

General Plan of G.Q.G.—Joffre Generalissimo of the French Armies—Difference of Opinion between Kitchener and the British Cabinet—Military Conference of Allies at Chantilly—Pourparlers with the British Government—Servian retreat and famine—King Constantine and the Defence of Salonika—Sir Douglas Haig replaces Sir John French—The Year finishes in a fog of uncertainty	307
INDEX	333

THE TRENCHES, 1915

CHAPTER I

New Year's Day—The telegram from the Pope—Joffre and the proposal for a diversion in the Near East—At Cassel, St. Omer, Hazebrouck and Arras—Battle of Soissons—The Duc de Guise and Ferdinand of Bulgaria—Proposed Operations in the Dardanelles.

JANUARY

1st.—The Old Year with its tale of suffering and sorrow is past and gone ; and, in this new year, victory and peace are surely within view.

Custom prescribes certain time-honoured duties for the 1st of January but to-day no ceremonial can attach to them. There was no sort of procession, no escort, and Viviani and I drove unnoticed to pay our visit to the Presidents of the two Chambers. The Prime Minister was obviously very disturbed and unhappy about the operations of the last ten days in Champagne ; his nerves are all on edge, and as he was alone with me this morning, he made no effort to conceal his sense of depression. He does not believe in the success of these last offensives, and goes so far as to reproach Joffre for having no plan and for waiting on events instead of making events wait on him.

Briand joined us at breakfast at the Elysée and expressed, though in more guarded terms, much the same opinion as Viviani. Both ask whether it would be possible to prepare, jointly with the English, an Expeditionary Force of 400,000 or 500,000 men and set them to take Austria in rear through Servia. The idea would be to land on the coast of the Adriatic or at Salonika, march on Buda-Pesth and Vienna, and on the move try to gather up all the Slavs of the Dual Monarchy.

The notion is attractive enough and Franchet D'Espérey suggested it to me when I saw him with his army; I then talked the thing over with other Generals, most of whom however raised grave objections; they questioned the feasibility of establishing bases for an Expeditionary Force and of supplying the troops, if they marched inland. According to "Galliéni Parle," for which members of the Secretariat were responsible, the Military Governor of Paris in 1914 proposed to Briand a diversion by Salonika, first on Constantinople and then on the Danube, and M. Gheusi in his book* is explicit that it was in January 1915 at a breakfast party this advice was given. Personally I remember nothing about these conversations, but in October, Franchet d'Espérey certainly seemed to favour an expedition of the sort, and now in January 1915, Briand, Viviani and I, fretting over the stagnation of our line, turn our minds to a plan which anyhow appears to offer some prospect of renewed action. Joffre is to confer with us as soon as possible on the subject but nothing is to be said or done to trespass on the authority of the High Command; no strategic plan is to be imposed on the Commander-in-Chief; we will merely exchange views with him as to the possibility and advisability of this dash to the Near East.

In the afternoon the formal reception of Government officials, magistrates and military officers was of course dispensed with as most of them—especially the soldiers—have something more important to do than to get into uniform or their best clothes and file past the President at the Elysée. The protocol, however, allows no evasion of the Diplomatic circle who assembled as usual in the big Salle des Fêtes; there were missing only the representatives of Germany, Austria and Turkey, and Sir Francis Bertie, rosy cheeked and curly haired, addressed me in a few guarded words to which I replied with the same reserve, but reiterating my belief that a glorious peace is in store for us. Just while I was voicing these hopeful words four shells fell on the open town of Commercy from which place no sort of projectile has been fired on the enemy; five houses have been smashed, one being

* "Galliéni."

a maternity home. These New Year gifts of the enemy do nothing whatever to upset the equanimity of the brave folk there, but it is hard to think of the dear old place being turned into a battlefield.

5th.—The communiqués from General Headquarters are more and more monotonous and the same names crop up daily : Bois le Prêtre, Bois de la Gruzzié, Fontaine Madame, Perthes, Ménil les Hurlus, Notre Dame de Lorette. There is the same dead uniformity in the telegrams from Russia : the Grand Duke Nicholas must possess his soul in patience, as, from lack of rifles and munitions, the contemplated great offensive on the Russian front cannot take place for several months. On the 2nd January, the Grand Duke pronounced himself as ready to resume his forward march as soon as the 4th Siberian Corps and the Guard should have arrived somewhere near Warsaw. Two days later the Russian Commander-in-Chief, who had himself been badly deceived, betrayed his perplexity by asking Joffre : “ Does the French Generalissimo think it would be better for Russia to remain generally on the defensive with just such activities as it would be possible to engage in, and to let the French Army have all the available resources of munitions, or shall Russia at once assume the offensive and be given, so far as possible, some of the ammunition destined for the Western front ? ” We have no choice ; our reply is dictated by our own necessities ; we can give nothing because we have not sufficient even for ourselves. Paléologue and General Laguiche* hint that the Russian War Minister, the enigmatic Soukhomlinoff, and the Central Administration have lied to the Grand Duke about the quantity of ammunition in reserve and the amount of material to be relied on. In France anyhow there has been no attempt to deceive anyone ; before the war our Budgets were perhaps framed for economy rather than efficiency, and there was an unjustifiable optimism as to maintaining peace ; since the fighting began there may have been some extravagance in the expenditure of ammunition. Hence, for widely different reasons, we are suffering from the same penury as Russia and can offer her no substantial help ; on both fronts we shall have to stand

* Military Attaché to Russia.

on the defensive punctuated by local attacks.

In his anxiety about a situation likely to be indefinitely prolonged, with the consequent postponement of any decision in the field, Paléologue has of his own accord advised Sazonoff to turn over in his mind whether it would not be possible for Russia to conclude a separate peace with Austria, and then direct all her efforts against Germany. Sazonoff quite saw that if Austria were to give up Galicia and Bosnia-Herzegovina something valuable would have been achieved, and thought that the idea of a special peace with the Hapsburg Monarchy was worthy of consideration. But the Ministers and I were quite clear that any separate peace between Austria and Russia might well damp down Russian activity, deflect Italy from any intervention, and leave England and France to face Germany by themselves. With Russia annexing Galicia, and Servia taking over Bosnia-Herzegovina, M. de Witte and his Germanophile friends would certainly intrigue at Petrograd to prevent the Tsar from continuing the war against our principal enemy. The Government therefore has telegraphed to Paléologue with instructions to see Sazonoff again and say that he spoke entirely in his private capacity and without any authority from Paris.

At our meeting to-day I was also able to read out a telegram which I received last night from the Pope and which runs: "Relying on the feelings of Christian charity with which Your Excellency is inspired, we beg you to make the New Year in some degree a happy one by giving favourable consideration to our proposal that the belligerents shall exchange such prisoners as are wholly unfit for further military service. We are sure that the Chief of the noble and generous French nation will be willing to follow the example of other Sovereigns of belligerent nations who have all acceded to our proposition." So the Holy See and the Republic are not altogether estranged from one another, and this time no Minister raises the least objection to my acknowledgment of the Pontifical message. I can therefore telegraph: "In reply to the benevolent proposal which Your Holiness has done me the honour to convey to me your in

telegram of yesterday I hasten to give you every assurance that France, faithful to her traditions of generosity, has always treated prisoners of war with perfect humanity and that we are now considering the best means of exchanging all prisoners who can be reckoned as definitely unfit for further military service." The details of these exchanges are as a matter of fact now being worked out under the auspices of the Red Cross of Geneva, and we have every reason to think that they will soon become effective.

6th.—The project of a diversion in the Balkans seems to appeal to a good many of our friends. Colonel Rousset, one of our most distinguished military writers, has just been talking to me about the stagnation of our armies. He thinks that an offensive in the Near East against Austria-Hungary will quite possibly lead to renewed activities. Again M. Bénazet, one of Franchet d'Espérey's Staff officers who has had to come to Paris for his Parliamentary duties, brings me a very interesting memorandum that his General has drawn up and which embodies the advice that we should try and take the enemy in reverse in the Balkans. The main features of this idea are to direct an expeditionary force through Belgrade on Vienna and Berlin and incidentally to make use of the Servians now flushed with success; to concentrate a sufficiently large French force on the Danube to drive in a wedge between the Turks and their allies; to join hands with Russia through Roumania.

7th.—Joffre was asked to come to breakfast at the Elysée to-day and give us his opinion as to an expedition of this sort; and our simple meal over, we had a long talk within closed doors. Viviani thought—as did Briand—that, to put an end to this stagnation, we might make ourselves felt in the Balkan peninsula and without bringing in Franchet d'Espérey's name I could suggest the plan of campaign he sent me. But all to no avail. Joffre is dead against any operations in the Near East, and tells us that he requires all the men that we can possibly send him. According to him the decision will be registered on the Western front, and he has good reason to think that, a little sooner or a little later, we shall pierce the German lines. A week, a couple of months, six months, a

year, nobody can say exactly when, but the result is sure as soon as the crucial question of munitions is answered. Joffre also thinks that it would be very difficult, not to say impossible to supply a French force even of 100,000 men through Salonika, especially if the troops were to go far from the coast and push on inland. His tone is as creamy as ever, but he speaks his mind very distinctly and leaves us in no sort of doubt as to the fixity of his conviction; and Viviani, Briand and I feel that for the moment we can do and say no more.

Ribot again brought up the question as to what is to be done with Galliéni. Joffre had thought of giving him the command of the army in Alsace, but had to give up the idea as he no longer proposes to occupy the Alsatian plain but only to hold the debouchments from the Vosges. Steinbach has just been taken; we shall not go any further towards the Rhine, and Joffre is going to restore ten battalions of Chasseurs to General Pütz who has done very well and whom he does not think it possible to put under the orders of Galliéni. The Commander-in-Chief again complained of the former civilian entourage of the Military Governor; he spoke without bitterness but with the cut-and-dried precision of a soldier who knows what he is talking about, and with that placid obstinacy of a man who has thoroughly made up his mind. Gaston Thomson* questioned Joffre as to the possibility of forming a second line army and a manœuvring force. "Impossible," was the reply. "Between now and the end of the war I shall require all the men who are in the depôts, and besides which we shall have neither officers nor non-commissioned officers nor guns nor transport with which to form new units." Jules Guesde† is quite won over and this apostle of socialism is a fervent patriot. When he came into the room he said to Joffre: "You are the organiser of victory," and as he left he murmured to me, "The man is wonderful; he has thought out everything and seen through everything." Millerand, as usual, listened intently and said very little; he has at last come back from Bordeaux, and the Bulletin des Armées announces to-day that "the Minister for War is now

* Minister for Commerce.

† Minister without Portfolio.

reinstalled in the Rue St. Dominique.”

10th.—Two brothers, Bruno and Costante Garibaldi, have been killed in the Argonne where, at the head of a handful of Italian volunteers, they were fighting bravely for France. I am sending a telegram of sympathy to General Garibaldi, and Colonel Bonel, who is on my Staff, will go to Rome, where the bodies of the boys have been conveyed, to offer my condolences to the family and lay wreaths on the two graves. For the moment Italy is not thinking of imitating the example of the little Garibaldian battalion but contents herself with occupying Valona, and watching Albania, where a revolt has broken out against Essad Pasha, and where Durazzo has nearly been taken by the rebels.

11th.—I left Paris last evening with Augagneur* to take to the Marine Fusiliers the new colours which their exploits on the Yser have so richly merited. The railway lines are so blocked with military transport that it took us twelve hours to get to Dunkirk; I used for the journey the very soberly furnished saloon which the Compagnie de l'Est built for me in 1913 and which is much more appropriate just now than the highly decorative carriage Félix Faure bequeathed to his successors. We talked almost without ceasing during the journey; the Minister of Marine, formerly my very tough adversary in Parliament, is now correctitude itself in his attitude towards me. He is a man full of energy, an excellent patriot, a little “cutting” in expressing his ideas, but full of intelligence and with delightful manners.

Dunkirk was again bombarded yesterday, this time by a squadron of a dozen aeroplanes, but thanks to the precautions taken by the Mayor there have happily been few casualties. The Brigade of Marine Fusiliers, which has suffered terribly while so greatly distinguishing itself, was drawn up on a piece of waste land a few kilometres from the town. The wind blew very hard, and two French aeroplanes, while hovering overhead in order to ward off any Taubes, tossed and rolled in the air as upon a rough sea. Whether it was the cold or the wind or my emotion, I could scarcely hold on to the staff of the new flag while I said a dozen words to the

* Minister of Marine.

men who then filed past us ; they were admirably turned out, and considering they have had but a couple of days' rest, they looked fit and well.

At Cassel, Foch, as impetuous as Joffre is serene but equally confident, gave us breakfast ; he thinks that as soon as the requisite munitions are forthcoming and the ground has dried up, we can push forward again with a good chance of breaking through.

From Cassel we went on to St. Omer where, like the other day, I find all the hum and stir of a British camp. We were greeted by Sir John French, and by the Prince of Wales whose bright boyish face beamed out among the British uniforms. At Joffre's request, a request which the Government has strongly endorsed, I bestowed the Order of Grand Officer of the Legion of Honour on two of Sir John's Generals who have highly distinguished themselves in the fighting, Sir Douglas Haig and Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien. I have heard a great deal of the outstanding military merits of Haig who is a Scotchman by birth ; tall, very good-looking, with frank, open countenance, he speaks French quite fluently and seems to appreciate thoroughly the absolute necessity of a close liaison between the Allied Armies. Sir John told me that he is anxiously, and somewhat impatiently, waiting for the reinforcements which Kitchener has promised him. He seems to think that these may not come up to time and he is also afraid as to whether the British Government is not contemplating an attack through Servia, an operation to which he is no less vehemently opposed than Joffre. Having drunk the conventional glass of champagne with the British Field-Marshal, we motored on to Hazebrouck where, to receive us, the Mayor had apparently collected all the inhabitants who are not at the front. The bells of the church of St. Eloi rang a peal while I made the Mayor a little gift for the poor, said—and listened to—a few words and noted the unflinching courage of people living in daily peril.

From Hazebrouck the road to Aubigny has some very sharp turns, and near Aubigny in a dreary little house General Maud'huy has his Advanced Headquarters. Maud'huy is far less optimistic than his superior officers and thinks that even

when the weather is dryer any offensive will be attended with very considerable risk ; the more junior the General, the less rosy is his outlook. Maud'huy accompanied us to Aubigny itself where Foch, who is as careful of my safety as he is careless of his own, had told the Prefect of the Pas de Calais to meet me so as to prevent my going on to Arras. But one had neither right nor desire to shirk a simple duty ; the Bishop and the Prefect, the latter thin in his person and dry in his talk, while Monseigneur Lobbedey is expansive in both, also tried to dissuade me ; but I told them it is for me to go to them at Arras and not for them to come out of their way and see me here. So as the evening was closing in we made our way along roads which receive their daily ration of German hate to the capital of the Pas de Calais. Arras is indeed a dead city, and the silence is only broken by the moan of the guns ; the streets are dark and deserted, just here and there one sees a bakery, a grocery, miserably lit with a little oil lamp or a couple of candles, and a few shadowy figures pass now and again along the pavement. The Prefect and the Bishop did us the mournful honours of the devastated city ; the Hôtel de Ville, that jewel of architecture, is desperately knocked about by bombs and fire ; the Gothic façade and the wonderful Renaissance decorations are ruined, and the building has been robbed of all its treasures of wood and ironwork. The Salle des Gardes is in strips, and the neighbouring belfry is frightfully damaged ; the Lion of Flanders is fallen on the ground and lies among heaps of stones ; Arras in the darkness is a more lamentable sight even than Rheims. After wandering about the ruins we paid a visit to the Prefecture and the Bishop's Palace which have been a good deal shelled but have suffered less than other buildings. Having offered my mite for the poorest families, I went back with Maud'huy to Aubigny, and, through a bitterly cold night, journeyed to Paris.

13th.—On my return came an interlude in the shape of the famous Spanish novelist, M. Blasco Ibañez, who, in warmest sympathy for France, is writing an illustrated history of the war which our propaganda service will propagate wherever Spanish is understood. He expresses with great

emphasis, rolling all his "r's" and perpetually glancing at the huge rings which he wears on his fingers, his good wishes for our country; he would like Spain to come in on our side but he does not think that his views are shared by many of his compatriots, and he speaks of the others who have no desire to take up arms, with such an ebullition of anger that one cannot help being amused by him.

14th.—The liaison officers tell me that on the 12th and 13th, we have had some local successes in the fighting in the Aisne and Champagne. The methods of attack have been perfected; the artillery preparation is now very long and very careful. An intense bombardment blows up the enemy trenches and destroys any other defence, then as soon as the guns cease our infantry assault the German lines attacking with the bayonet. But having secured their objective, the difficulty is to keep it under murderous fire of the German guns to which our own guns must reply, and these bloody struggles with all their desperate gallantry seem to result in very little gain whether strategic or tactical. To think of the sum of human energy in this life, half underground, of our troops in those trenches drenched with rain, carpeted with snow, knocked about by hand grenades and bombs; in those—so-called—shelters without light or air, in those support trenches cruelly exposed to deadly fire, in the communication trenches constantly torn by shell, in the listening posts where the watcher at any moment may catch the first growl of a coming assault! How can we—we who are sitting and eating and sleeping comfortably behind the lines—continue to experience hours of apparent calm and quiet whilst thousands of our fellows are entrapped in that hell?

It is on Soissons just now that our eyes are fixed. Early on the 8th we attacked the enemy between Cuffies and Crouy; the Germans counter-attacked and the battle went on for the next two days; we clung on to our position until the 13th, when a deadly tussle suddenly broke out round the Spur 132; the Germans were strongly reinforced, and though we could still just hold our own on the top of the slopes to the west of the Spur, our troops further east had to give way; the fighting is still going on between Crouy and Chives across the

whole plateau, and our front has had again to be withdrawn to the edge of the slope north of Moncel and Buci le Long.

Joffre telegraphs to us that for reasons still unknown a perfectly fresh Division brought up in the night near Soissons, did not intervene, as it should, in the nick of time, nor with the vigour that was expected. A flood on the Aisne has carried away the bridges leaving only available those at Soissons and Vénizel which the Germans, who are masters of the height on the right bank, are in process of pounding with their field artillery. There was some danger of the troops on the north being cut off from their supplies, especially as they could no longer be covered by our 75's which, badly placed at the foot of the slopes, must recross the Aisne. The Generalissimo has therefore approved Maunoury's decision—and he has told us so—to bring back to the left bank the troops who have been roughly handled, and only to leave a *tête de pont* north of Soissons. This retirement, Joffre says, has been "decided on," not "forced on" us; and he adds that the unfortunate incident, which is purely local, will have no effect on the general scheme of operations. In Council, however, the question is uneasily asked, why the Division was late, and languid, in attack. Have the cold and mud done something to damp the spirits of our soldiers? One or two officers have expressed some fear as regards this, and others have told us that these disjointed offensives cost very dear and are very delusive. What one would like to see is a closer contact between G.Q.G.* and the regiment in the line, and that the thick screen between Joffre and the front should be pulled away.

At the Palais Bourbon, Paul Deschanel just re-elected, almost unanimously, President of the Chambre, has declared that one of the chief lessons to be derived from the fighting is the necessity for stronger and more energetic control. "If Parliament," he exclaimed, "had been bolder and more far-seeing, France would to-day be under better conditions." Yes and no. For Parliament to usurp the functions of a professional soldier would be to assume an authority impossible to exercise, and do less than nothing to win the war. But as regards the Government keeping vigilant control over the

* G.Q.G. (Grand Quartier Général) Headquarters of the French Army.

requirements of the Army, and as to the responsibility of the Government to Parliament Deschanel is perfectly right and every day renders this more necessary.

15th.—To-day the 28th British Division sails for France ; these are the only troops whom Lord Kitchener can for the moment send us, but before the end of February the Canadian Division and the 29th Division will come out. The British War Minister is scrupulously keeping the promise he made to us at Dunkirk, but whatever his zeal and whatever his good faith, our patience is sorely tried and we find the time very long. And while we are awaiting these expected reinforcements some of our troops appear to be exhausted by the efforts which have been imposed on them. The Germans announce that on the 13th at Soissons they took fourteen officers and 1130 men prisoners, and captured four heavy guns and four machine guns. Added to their account of the day before they total their prisoners at 3050, their guns at eight and their machine guns six. This news we hear from Berne, and however exaggerated, is causing great consternation among our partisans.

And just now Jusserand* telegraphs from Washington that President Wilson, who has a great liking for special missions, is sending to Europe a Colonel House, one of the few men on whose opinion he sets any real value. Colonel House is of a certain age, with the reputation of being deliberate but very courteous in manner, and despite his military title he holds no military position. While visiting the different countries he will enjoy a status quite apart from that of the various American Ambassadors and Ministers, and anyhow Jusserand has already primed him as to our dogged determination to go on with the war until victory is secured.

I have seen the Duc de Guise who has behaved admirably since the outbreak of the war, and who wanted to say a few words about Ferdinand of Bulgaria. On the New Year's day of the Orthodox Churches I telegraphed to the rulers of Russia, Servia and Bulgaria ; the two former replied in the warmest terms, while the third thanked me politely but said no word as to the well-being of France. The Duc de Guise

* Ambassador to Washington.

thinks, however, that we should not despair of bringing Ferdinand round to another point of view ; he is quite ready to do what he can to influence his relative, and will draw every advantage possible from their cousinship ; but the part played by the Bulgarian ruler in 1912-13 does not suggest his being, politically, very straight.

In the evening, Millerand telephoned that he has been to Chantilly ; it appears that he addressed to the Commander-in-Chief some rather sharp words about the battle of Soissons, that Joffre was a little upset by this, and therefore the Minister had repaired to G.Q.G. to explain what he meant to say as also to find out the exact reason for our set-back.

16th.—At our meeting, Millerand gave us particulars of what happened and why our abrupt retirement was necessary. General Feysse, commanding the 14th Division, had received orders from Maunoury to counter-attack the German right wing ; all through the night Feysse was in communication with General Buisson d'Armandy, who had charge of the Reserve Division and who was emphatic as to the danger of allowing himself to be cut off by the flood on the Aisne. At the beginning of the attack the 14th Division got on pretty well and made 100 prisoners, but among the prisoners were found men belonging to seven or eight different German regiments, and Feysse was led to think that he had in front of him a very large force, and fearing a disaster he broke off his offensive. The Germans at once flung themselves on him, handled him pretty roughly and now flatter themselves they have scored a great victory ; they have taken the opportunity to redouble the bombardment of Soissons. Anatole France, whose scepticism of the other day has given place to ardent chauvinism and who has just published an exhortation as to perseverance with the war, has protested with open-mouthed indignation against the brutal and stupid destruction of monuments consecrated " by Art and by Time." One recalls a charming line of a dear college friend André Hallays about Soissons : " White, smiling, peaceful town, which on the bank of a gently flowing river amid a ring of green hills, raises aloft her tower and pointed steeples."

17th.—The version which G.Q.G. gives of our reverse is

contested by a good many officers who have rather heedlessly told Members of Parliament that in their opinion the offensive was incautiously planned.

Messimy, who is on short leave from the Army to make an appearance in Parliament, has given me his impressions of the war, which are not very encouraging. He has been promoted Lieut.-Colonel and has received the Cross of the Legion of Honour as a reward for his bravery, but he says the officers of the Head Quarters Staff are complete strangers to the regimental officers. At Chantilly they are living in a glorified fools' paradise, and know little of the actual happenings in the firing line. Local offensives are ordered to feed the communiqués, and these offensives are costly in life and foredoomed to failure. No really appreciable success will be obtained until we are able to deliver a concerted attack in well selected sectors and with fresh troops. I told Millerand of this conversation, and he gave me to understand that although Joffre persists in thinking it would be very difficult to constitute an army of manœuvre, he has for the last few days given the matter some careful thought. Joffre will probably decide not to incorporate the fifty battalions we are trying to raise with the first line troops, but will form with them a general reserve. For the moment, he has not quite come round to the idea, but he no longer opposes it; he is weighing the pros and cons and will not declare himself until he has mastered the whole subject.

I am told by experts there is a great danger of Germany going ahead of us in the case of fast aeroplanes, and General Hirschauer, our Director of Aviation, thinks that our G.Q.G. does not seem sufficiently alive to this possibility. I asked him for some details, and then when I mentioned the matter to Millerand he complained that I have again consulted independently one of his Ministers. So it comes to this that if in the course of the war I want to know something about our means of defence, the War Minister, who is also one of my oldest friends, denies me the right enjoyed by any Senator or Deputy; I am not to confer, without his leave, with any Head of Department. If our positions were reversed, Millerand would, I think, put quite a different colour on our respective

parts ; but we are in mid war and for the good of the country one must put up with anything, even with being fettered as I am.

18th.—There comes some foreign news of interest. In a recent conversation the Tsar reaffirmed to Paléologue his determination to fight to a finish and to crush the military forces of Germany, but he also repeated that Russia could not resume any forward movement before the beginning of April. Unfortunately the one statement does less than nothing to help the other. According to Sazonoff's last intimation from Bucharest, Roumania has made up her mind that before long she will draw the sword against Austria. But here in Paris we begin to think that the Russian Minister's wish is often father to his thought and hope deferred is making us feel rather hopeless. Count Berchtold, the great Austrian nobleman, whose haughty nonchalance has done so much since 1912 to trouble international relations, has just resigned his portfolio for Foreign Affairs. Curiously enough the Roumanians are uneasy rather than happy over this step ; some of them think that Austria will very soon ask the Cabinet at Bucharest to say one way or the other what they are going to do, and that they must make up their minds at once ; others fear some sort of attempt at negotiations which would adduce a separate peace for the benefit of Hungary and the consequent detriment of Roumania. But Sazonoff is sure that with Baron Burian at the Foreign Office instead of Count Berchtold, Austria, feeling herself at bay on account of her internal divisions, will cling tighter than ever to Germany. We are reduced to pure guesswork.

Joffre has made up his mind in favour of forming a reserve, or manœuvre, army ; he has written to-day to Sir John French to say he will relieve in succession the French troops engaged in the North as soon as the British reinforcements arrive, and he has put down on paper that the second line army will consist of ten Regular Divisions, four Territorial Divisions, and seven Cavalry Divisions. Moreover, despite the checks inflicted on us on the 20th December and 8th January, his instructions of the 8th December regarding an offensive in Champagne will stand, and with his usual un-

ruffled composure he adds : “ The offensive of the 4th Army, which is the main movement, will be carried out as rapidly and as energetically as possible with all available means, and every success will be exploited by Divisions which can be drawn from the General Reserve ; ” but with respect to these local attacks I am receiving from all quarters some very sharp criticisms, and Messimy,* in a letter which I showed to Viviani and Millerand, declares that the operations of the end of December cost us as much as the Battle of Flanders cost the enemy ; he tells me that the German communiqué of the 18th gives our losses from the 17th December to the 17th January as 26,000 killed, 80,000 wounded, and 18,000 prisoners. Messimy does not think that these figures are exaggerated, and again says that the offensive was everywhere undertaken quite haphazard without proper co-ordination and without strategic plan ; he adds that before leaving Paris for the front he is determined to underline the vehement indignation no less than the grief which the events of the last month have caused him. The writer may express himself a little too strongly, but unhappily what he says has a good deal of truth in it.

19th.—As a brief and delightful change from the war, one or two of my colleagues in the Academy, who are doing all with their pen to sustain the moral of the country, and who are anxious for correct news, dined quietly at the Elysée. Alfred Capus, Frédéric Masson, Francis Charmes, and Maurice Barrès are delightful as ever in conversation, but Maurice Barrès gives us new details as to the unfortunate measures, which the military authorities have thought necessary to take in Alsace against real or alleged suspects ; there have been some quite unjustifiable evacuations, and too many people have been interned, without proper examination, in concentration camps. At my request the Government has deputed two or three Alsatian gentlemen who are refugees in France, to visit the camps and give identity cards to any Alsations as to whose sentiments there can be no doubt, and whom one can safely allow to go about where they please. But a bad blunder may leave a nasty taste in the mouth of Alsace ; we have gone

* Minister for War in 1914.

back into a country which has unlearnt much of our language ; could we not be wise enough not to judge them by appearance?

20th.—The Duc de Guise has just started for Sofia, travelling through Greece. He is accompanied by a French friend who is in Ferdinand's confidence, and Delcassé has told our Minister, M. Panafieu, to let the King know that his cousin is on his way to him. The Duc de Guise will try to persuade the King that his personal interests, no less than those of his kingdom, lie in his taking sides with the Triple Entente. Germany and Austria, he will say, can only lavish empty promises on Bulgaria; as allies of Turkey they could not tear Thrace away from the Porte, and nursing, as they do, the desire to go down into the Ægean Sea, they would never allow anyone to occupy Macedonia through which lies the road to the shore. On the other hand the Triple Entente, having no design on Thrace nor on Macedonia, is quite able to give Bulgaria all that she can reasonably want in both countries; the Duc de Guise will bring to bear on his Mission all the authority of his name and race, and is unquestionably inspired by real patriotism; but has Ferdinand still a free hand, or has he not committed himself to some secret engagements with the Central Empires?

21st.—Sir Francis Bertie, who since his return from Bordeaux has recovered his fine good humour, has been to the Elysée to present to me the Maharajah of Bikanir, a splendid Hindu, with hair black as ebony and teeth of dazzling whiteness, whose principality is one of the most important in India. He served in China fourteen years ago, with the British force and commanded the Bikanir Camel Corps; he has now arrived from the front where he is attached to the Head Quarters Staff, and, clad in military uniform, he speaks of the war, like a true British subject, with grim determination. India, like the Dominions, is making common cause to-day with the Mother Country.

22nd.—M. Caillaux, still on tour in South America, has asked that his mission to Brazil, for the purpose of acquiring submarine cable lines, shall be extended to the Argentine and Monte Video. The Ministers are a little divided in their opinion, but finally consent; their concession is perhaps

coloured by the desire to keep M. Caillaux away from France for a little while longer.

23rd.—Briand tells the Council that certain documents of very suspicious origin, and probably German-inspired, are being scattered over certain quarters of Paris. These tracts bear the title : “ We are being deceived ; they are telling us lies,” and are full of abuse of the Government, the military leaders and myself. The general feeling of uneasiness engendered by our recent reverse creates an excellent culture in which to develop virulent microbes.

Millerand who has gone to London to confer with Lord Kitchener, telegraphs to the War Office that as soon as he returns he will come to some arrangement with the Commander-in-Chief as to utilising with the least possible delay the men in the depôts, and thus constituting a second line army. A very wise move, for the longer men remain more or less idle in the depôts, the more likely they are to deteriorate. Discipline is bound to get lax and the civil population is viewing the thing with increasing disfavour. It is high time that something should be done. The Army Committee of the Senate has moreover taken the matter in hand and M. Clémenceau has alluded to it with some sharpness in the *Homme Enchaîné*.

Augagneur informs us that the British Admiralty is organising, independently of ourselves, an operation in the Dardanelles. Now by virtue of Anglo-French naval agreements the right to command in the Mediterranean attaches to France and therefore our allies cannot do anything without previous reference to ourselves. It is decided that the Minister for Marine shall go to London in a day or two to discuss with Mr. Winston Churchill a proposal which must be closely studied before being accepted.

24th.—Some former Ministers, Etienne, Leygues and others at dinner here last night were outspoken as to the necessity of forming immediately an army of manœuvre. Doumer, they say, does nothing but criticise Joffre in the Senate, and Deschanel is at times very pessimistic ; and moreover it seems as if there were brewing in the couloirs of the Chambre a movement in favour of a premature peace, and

it is highly advisable that an early term should be set to the Session. The Government has no right of closure, but the Chambres are quite at liberty to adjourn. They are not, however, very likely to take this step as they might not think it compatible with the exercise of control which they enjoy. I must try and see as many Senators and Deputies as possible and put them on their guard against this sinister propaganda which has been reported to me.

25th.—I have had to receive Prince Youssoupoff who has been deputed by the Tsar to bring some bundles of Russian decorations to our armies. He has arrived in Paris with a quantity of large boxes full of ribbons, stars, and baubles of all sorts. To meet him I asked Isvolsky, whom I scarcely ever see though he is scarcely ever out of the Quai d'Orsay, the personnel of the Russian Embassy, Delcassé, Millerand, Joffre and Pau, the last named General being just under orders to carry a consignment of French decorations to Russia. The Prince is a tall, fine-looking man who talks volubly and not too discreetly. He told me that in Russia German influence is at work everywhere, that at Moscow the police are in the hands of Germany, that they dare not turn the Germans out of commerce or public functions, because they have protection at Court with the Grand Dukes and indeed in every milieu. It is thus that an emissary of the Tsar actually allows himself to speak. As a sort of set-off he did say that the Tsar is determined to go on with the war to the bitter end and that "Holy Russia has risen, and she will go forward as one man." Unfortunately Russia just now is limping very badly and not shaking off the parasites which cling to the folds of her garments.

While General Youssoupoff was with us, we got some particulars of the great naval battle which Sir David Beatty has fought at the entrance to the Bay of Heligoland. The enemy has lost one light cruiser and six destroyers, while three of his battle cruisers have been badly injured.

26th.—In Council to-day the War Minister gives us an account of his visit to London. He was received by King George and saw Lord Kitchener—who gave a dinner party in his honour—Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Winston Churchill.

It appears that Lord Kitchener had thought of keeping back some of the units he is forming and training, either to try and get behind the Germans on the Belgian coast or so as to be able to send a Division to Servia ; for either plan he will however only employ about 30,000 men. Millerand thought it right to urge that the new Kitchener armies should, agreeably with Joffre's earnest desire, be sent as soon as possible to France. Kitchener has finally agreed to this, and between now and the 20th of February he will send us three Divisions, that is to say, nearly 80,000 men. Millerand went to Aldershot and saw some of the new troops now under training ; they seemed to him to be very fine men and splendidly keen. Nearly 2,000,000 men have now joined up but they are far from being armed ; only about 10,000 rifles are being turned out weekly and there are not nearly enough guns. British industry is being speeded up, but only the guns ordered first since the outbreak of the War are emerging from the workshops. The Cabinet in London want to have Dunkirk as well as Havre and Boulogne as a naval base, but Joffre thinks this might be very inconvenient for our own armies and so Millerand has made no promise. From what our War Minister tells us it is quite obvious that even if England is still not quite ready, she is anyhow going to keep scrupulously to the promises she has made to Belgium and ourselves. Up to now she has only been able to put into the field a comparatively small force and, however brave the British troops, France, for nearly six months, has borne the principal heat and burden of the war. For the sake of her Allies as well as herself France has sacrificed her children, her homes and her soil, but the hour is drawing near when she will be less lonely and more effectively supported. We must refuse to be in the slightest degree discouraged, we must hold on, and day in day out equip ourselves for the decisive struggles ahead.

Millerand tells us also of two letters from Joffre, in one of which the General complains rather bitterly of frequent Parliamentary interventions and asks that the Government should protect him by directing public opinion ; in the other letter he is uneasy about the constant goings and comings of

members of Parliament between the Chambre and the battlefield. He would like them to choose once and for all which of the two parts they would like to play, and that they should no longer have the right to double them. If Parliament remains in session, the members who are also serving officers will have to ask themselves whether they prefer to stay in the Palais Bourbon or retain their military posts; they can decide between the two duties but they cannot perform them both at the same time.

The month of January peters out without producing any appreciable change in the military situation; a little set-back for the Germans at La Bassée, some fighting at Blangy, La Boisselle, Berry au Bac, Perthes, a little progress of our troops in the Bois le Prêtre, a fine episode of war at the top of the Hartmannsweilerkopf—this is about all that we can gather from the communiqués, and the liaison officers don't tell us very much more.

30th.—Augagneur on his return from England seems highly satisfied; he has arranged that the command of the armed fleets in the Mediterranean and especially on the Syrian coast shall remain in our hands. He did not make any allusion to the proposed expedition to the Dardanelles, of which our Naval Attaché in London had told him last week; but after the Council had broken up, he came to my room and gave me some more particulars. He showed me a confidential letter which Mr. Winston Churchill had written to him after the interviews he had with him, and the First Lord of the Admiralty undertakes to make no independent landing at Alexandretta. As to this Augagneur has invoked the spirit of our Agreement of 1912, but nevertheless he had some little difficulty in obtaining his point; it may be that England, uneasy about the German and Turkish activities in Egypt, wishes to retain the right, if the moment should come, of making a dash at Alexandretta, or it may be that she specially hankers after that port. On the other hand Mr. Churchill has been emphatic as to France associating herself in some degree with the operations which the Admiralty are diligently planning against the Dardanelles. Mr. Churchill, who asks that this matter should be kept a profound secret, says that

the attack should take place about the 15th February, and that the Navy are prepared to dedicate, or really to sacrifice, some old armoured ships. They hope to destroy without any difficulty the forts at the entrance, and with the trawlers we shall lend them they will try to sweep the mines. The thing is going to be thoroughly done, but there is considerable risk and no great certainty of success. However, as there is to be no announcement, if the attempt does not come off it can be said out loud there was no question of forcing the Dardanelles and that the only object was the bombardment of forts. Augagneur, who has no great faith in the scheme, did not think it was his business to do anything to dissuade England, as it is England who is taking almost all the risk.

The Cipher Section of the Ministry of War sends me every day the wireless telegrams which we intercept ; these messages make sometimes rather tedious reading, but one learns of military happenings of which the Censorship does not allow the Press to speak, and anyhow, one sees how wonderful is the German genius for propaganda.

At the end of the month comes a letter written on pale canary-coloured paper in which I at once recognise the writing of Pierre Loti. But to be exact, it is not my illustrious confrère who addresses me, but the Captain of the *Viaud*. Galliéni, on the 13th, asked the Minister of Marine to recall Loti to active service and to antedate him to the 20th September from which day the Military Governor had begun to employ him on different jobs. Augagneur replied rather drily on the 18th that the Captain of the *Viaud* had been retired on the 1st of September, and that since then there had been no official decision which could authorise him to resume his active duties, and that there must be one rule for everybody. The sailor poet is dreadfully upset and appeals to me : “ The letter which you kindly wrote to me in September stated formally that the Minister of Marine gladly authorised me to come and serve under the Governor of Paris ; has he the right to go behind his own words and to do so in so rude a letter, a copy of which I enclose. Several Captains of ships who have been on the retired list far longer than myself have been called back to serve in the war. Why refuse me, whose case

is really rather different from the others, as I am the only one not to ask for any pay? As a matter of fact I am not asking to be regularly mobilised, only that my unpaid post under the General shall not be taken from me and that I shall be no longer at the mercy of an official whim; also of course I must retain my uniform as otherwise I should be good for nothing, not even to be a liaison officer. You may imagine with what anxiety I await the answer which you have been good enough to promise me as soon as the Minister returns." Augagneur, whom I begged to arrange matters, replies that he is a great admirer of Loti and that he will do what he can to satisfy him, and that if he wrote rather sharply to Galliéni it was because he thought that the Military Governor, in forming his military and civil staff, had been rather too independent and fanciful. Millerand's observations bring to mind those sulky conferences held at the Préfecture of the Gironde, the misunderstandings, sometimes very disagreeable and sometimes very ridiculous which existed between Bordeaux and Paris, the feverish telephone messages which Galliéni and Viviani sent to one another, as also the tour of inspection which "the two swallows" Briand and Sembat were lucky enough to be able to make while I was tied down to Bordeaux as a sort of registry office for the decisions of the Government.

The term, "union sacrée," which I used in my message to Parliament last August, remains the "mot d'ordre," in the Press and with the public, but now and again little slips occur. A devout Catholic from Lyons, Pierre Jay, has tried in a rather inopportune article, to identify Protestantism with Germanism. The *Temps* quickly took up what they considered an offence both against the spirit of general agreement and of the truth. Charles Maurras has now reproached the *Temps* for the tone of its article and has dragged in Voltaire and Joseph Reinach. The Royalist author has taken advantage of the incident to extend the field of argument and has protested quite arguably that unity of action does not exclude diversity of points of view and that this diversity should only be limited by strict observance of discipline, both military and civil. In the General Manual of Instruction, M. Ferdinand Buisson, my old colleague of the

Rue de Grenelle, has rallied to the side of M. Maurras. In spite of these little outbreaks, one and all are steadfast as to making everything subject to the will to win, without which all would be lost, but with which everything will be saved.

CHAPTER II

FEBRUARY

Cardinal Amette—M. Bark, Russian Finance Minister—Mr. Lloyd George—Financial Agreements of the Allies—General Pau *en mission*—Ricciotti Garibaldi—In the Vosges—The Schlucht—At Wesserling and St. Amarin—At Dannemarie and Masevaux—Uncertainty at Bucharest and at Athens—New offensive in Champagne—Marcel Sembat at the Socialist Congress of London—Joffre and the Senators—Bombardment of the Dardanelles.

1st.—Cardinal Gasparri, Secretary of State to the Holy See, has just published a Pontifical decree, under date of 10th January, which prescribes that “throughout the Catholic world humble prayer should be addressed to God to obtain of His mercy the peace which is so much desired.” All the French Bishops have communicated this document to the faithful in their dioceses and the Bishop of Vannes, in a pastoral letter, has underlined the pacific character of the Encyclical. The Government is a little disturbed by a publication which might prejudice the whole-heartedness of national confidence. The Censorship, as to whose composition and functions I am quite ignorant, has forbidden the newspapers to publish the mandate of the Bishop of Vannes and others of the same kind, and has, for some unknown reason, laid the same veto on an absolutely irreproachable letter of the Archbishop of Paris. Monseigneur Amette of his own accord had taken care only to order prayers in favour of a “solid and durable peace,” of a peace based on “the triumph of the right.” As soon as Jules Cambon told me of this strange blunder of the Censor, I asked M. Malvy to speak to Viviani and to have it corrected which has been done. And to-day the Archbishop, clad in his scarlet and carrying his biretta in his hand, came to see me. It is many years since an Archbishop of Paris

has crossed the threshold of the Elysée. Mgr. Amette very frankly told me that the prayer which the Pope composed seemed to him to require some addition, and that he had not concealed his opinion from the Vatican. "But," he said to me, "it is rather unfortunate that France has no Ambassador at the Vatican; had she been represented there, the Holy Father would have been put on his guard against issuing a prayer which might be interpreted amiss." The Archbishop gracefully admitted my suggestion that it might be difficult to renew relations in mid war without stirring up rather dangerous polemics, and he assured me the Catholics, who are one and all good patriots, would not wish to cause any embarrassment to the Government, that they "want" nothing, and that their only thought is to save the country; he expressed himself very simply and very nobly, and on leaving me he said: "My most earnest desire is that our country shall be victorious, and I hope that when victory has been secured I may ask you to come yourself and assist at the Te Deum." I could say quite honestly in reply I hoped sincerely that after our victory the Government would raise no objection to my accepting his invitation, and I added: "I earnestly hope that the present unanimity of purpose will issue in a lasting will for real national unity."

2nd.—While these prayers for peace are being offered, trench warfare goes on and on, punctuated by costly local offensives. Diplomacy also is still bent on bringing about a more effective co-operation on the part of Japan, and on trying by means of a neutral Bulgaria to draw Roumania and Greece definitely to our side. Promises and substantial offers to each and all are multiplied; would not Bulgaria like to have Servia and Macedonia up to the line of the Vardar? Would Servia, in compensation, accept a large accretion on the Adriatic, the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, part of the Banat of Temesvar and a common frontier with Greece? To Greece and Roumania proposals are made which vary from day to day according to the caprices of Sazonoff, the arguments of Delcassé, or the reflections of Sir Edward Grey.

But in England there is a growing conviction that the best way to attach Roumania, and perhaps Bulgaria herself,

would be to send an Anglo-French corps to the Near East, and the British Government is inclined to reproach Millerand for having opposed this project when he was in London. At least this is what was said to Ribot by Mr. Lloyd George, Chancellor of the Exchequer, who has come to Paris to discuss things with the French and Russian Ministers of Finance. When Ribot told us this in Council to-day, Millerand replied that he had tried to point out to Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Winston Churchill the impossibility of taking troops away from our front; Ribot and Briand agree with me, that the presence of French and English soldiers in the Near East might have very happy consequences, both moral and diplomatic. M. Bark, the Russian Finance Minister, whom I have just seen, also tells me that, according to Lloyd George, Asquith and Grey think it necessary to send one or two Allied corps to Servia in order to bring Roumania to a decision and, anyhow, to immobilise Bulgaria; M. Bark even hints at an expedition in which the Russian Army would take part. He is a fine-looking man, still quite young, with a pleasant smile; his French is fluent, and he seems to have finance at his fingers' ends. But when I spoke to him about rifles and munitions he professed entire ignorance of the subject.

The Russian War Minister has never said one word as to these which could give his colleagues any anxiety; he has never told them that the Grand Duke Nicholas and the Russian General Staff were importuning us to send them arms and M. Bark is only instructed to ask England and ourselves to give Russia some financial help. I could remind M. Bark that neither the text nor the spirit of our alliance had led us to foresee that Russia would ask us at some time to lend her our credit or that she would implore us to put our resources of military material at her disposition. Of course we will do what we can, but we must insist on having the full information, for which we have hitherto asked in vain, as to what is now available and what is being turned out in the matter of Russian armament. While fully recognising the justice of my remarks, M. Bark does no more than promise that he will report them to his Government,

3rd.—Sir Francis Bertie brought Mr. Lloyd George to see me. Just as in the days immediately before the war the Welsh Minister showed little favour for the Triple Entente, so to-day he is heart and soul for it. He has adapted himself to the happenings of the hour with a mental agility which is extraordinary. I was greatly struck by his mobile features which betray strong feeling and are those rather of an artist than of a statesman ; with his long and wavy hair, his bright eyes, and his pink and white complexion, he looks rather like a musician about to appear on the platform to play on the violoncello. He seemed anxious to fascinate us ; he is intelligent, and his energy seems to be inexhaustible ; but one does not know whether, under this brilliant surface, he may not be rather shallow, and his adversaries certainly reproach him for being superficial and fickle. For the moment I yielded myself to the charm that radiates from his person, and as he knows no French, Sir Francis kindly acted as interpreter. Mr. Lloyd George says that the War Council, composed of Asquith, Grey, Kitchener, Churchill and Balfour—the last representing the Opposition—is unanimous in thinking it indispensable to send an English Division and a French Division to Greece and Salonika ; the British Government evidently shares this opinion. One might begin by asking Roumania this question : “ Will you come in on such and such a date if we send you an Anglo-French corps ? ” If Roumania were to reply in the negative, one could give up the idea. In the talk which Lloyd George had just now with Viviani, Millerand, Delcassé and Bark, our War Minister again contested the British idea simply because, like Joffre, he continues to think that these two Divisions are absolutely required on our front ; but would it not be possible for us to form a Division with the troops of the Interior and for Kitchener to make up another in addition to the four which are due to arrive before the end of February.

Ribot has also had a financial talk with Bark and Lloyd George ; and the Chancellor of the Exchequer will not hear of a collective loan to be issued for the benefit of the three allied nations, but would prefer that the reserve of bullion in the Bank of France should be put at the service of

England if her reserve of gold were to fall low. Ribot is very reasonably opposed to an arrangement which might depreciate our own standard, and at the utmost he thinks should any danger arise we might lend England a fixed sum, say 150 millions. In return England should consent to open her market to us or at any rate not to forbid her banks to accept our National Defence Bonds. Ribot would also like the Triple Entente to agree to issue jointly the loans necessary for Belgium, Servia, Greece and Roumania, or anyhow to guarantee them. As to these last points nothing is yet decided but certain principles have been laid down and some measures have been adopted. On the initiative of Mr. Lloyd George the Conference has proclaimed the financial and economic solidarity of the Allies and consequently until circumstances permit Russia to borrow money on the French and English markets, the two Governments have promised that each of them will make advances to Petrograd up to 25 millions sterling. The first credit to be opened by France in favour of Russia in 1915 has thus been fixed at a maximum sum of 625 million francs, and up to now Mr. Lloyd George's solidarity only operates against ourselves. Can we never invoke it in our own favour?

General Pau who, in his turn, is going to take French decorations to the Russian and Servian armies, has just been to take leave of me, and I have begged him to try and obtain precise information in both countries as to guns and ammunition, for up to now what we know is as vague as it is far from reassuring.

4th.—A decree was signed to regulate public administration in the future matter of damages of war, and there comes up again in Council the English proposal of an expedition to the Near East which Briand, Doumergue and others, including myself, warmly support. If the expedition is, as Lloyd George says, dependent on Roumania's decision, it will coincide with the entry into line of a new army of 500,000 or 600,000 men; as against the despatch of a couple of Divisions we should receive a very important increase of troops. The Government finally agrees that France shall share in the expedition, but England is to be asked to form a new Division in addition

to the four she is on the point of sending us ; Bark and Lloyd George came to breakfast and we told them of this decision. Ribot says that the Chancellor of the Exchequer has been to see Clémenceau and found him very bitter and especially irritated against Delcassé. The Tiger is also still very displeased at our not having brought Japanese troops to Europe ; “ We tried the same thing ourselves at Tokio,” Lloyd George said to him, “ and got no further.” Clémenceau is no less convinced that if he had been in office he would have got all he wanted out of the Mikado.

5th.—The Press publishes a very optimist official communiqué as to the Ministerial Conference in which it is said that “ The three Powers are resolved to combine their financial, no less than their military, resources so as to prosecute the war to final victory ; the delegates will therefore propose to their respective Governments to undertake, in equal shares, the advances made or to be made to the countries who are actually belligerent with them or to those who are disposed to take the field in the near future for the common cause . . .” This note notwithstanding, very difficult negotiations have been going on all day and some pretty sharp words have been exchanged. Bark was again insistent that either the French and English markets should be open for a large loan, or that upwards of two-and-a-half milliards should be advanced to him, but he finished on a rather more reasonable note. Then Lloyd George asked for a sort of pool of reserves of bullion, but it was only agreed that the Banks of France and Russia should each send 150,000,000 francs worth of gold to the Bank of England if the reserve in London were to fall below a certain figure. In the end everything was settled but the uncompromising attitude of Bark made a very bad effect on Ribot who speaks of the Russian Minister with curled lip. Ribot then told me that Clémenceau has now directed his wrath against Millerand. “ He was quite pitiful on the Army Committee. It can't last. The President has already changed his War Minister, and he can quite well take a third.” This was what Clémenceau said to Ribot in the Senate, and the latter replied quickly : “ A third, and then perhaps a fourth.” Ribot told me he wanted to make it quite clear to Clémenceau

that if he were the third, the thing would not last any longer. "He is much too impulsive and would be sure to have rows with Joffre; he told me that he went to see him at the G.Q.G. and found him much too worried to have any outside authority or influence brought to bear on him."

In spite of, or perhaps because of, his attacks on Millerand, Clémenceau has just been nominated Vice-President of the Army Committee of the Senate. Freycinet is the President of this Committee, and he too seems to have come rather to loggerheads with the War Minister. I asked Millerand about this, and he admitted that he could not satisfy the Committee which asked him to create new units and to reinforce our line before the spring. "This demand," Millerand says, "is based on an error. Freycinet does not know the real number of men who are at the front. He and his colleagues think that the figure is 1,200,000; it is far less than this but for fear of indiscretions I thought it better to hold my tongue."

6th.—I went this afternoon to Auteuil to see the hospital, which has been opened by the Italian Colony in a very pretty nursing home; M. Tittoni, smiling but enigmatic as ever, is there to receive me, and I find among the wounded a large number of Garibaldians in their red shirts, who are as jovial as they are picturesque.

7th.—Millerand has seen Joffre again and has told him of our decision with regard to an expedition to Servia; the Generalissimo has allowed himself finally to be won over.

8th.—General Ricciotti Garibaldi hobbled into my room on crutches and he was at once all over me with his flowing grey beard and his highly polished phrases. He declares that if Italy does not rally to our side he will stir up a revolution, but he is quite sure she is coming in. Individually all the members of the Government are disposed to take the field, and it is only collectively that they hesitate. "My friend Salandra, my friend Sonnino . . ." After having trotted out all his friendships, the General unfolds to me at great length his three wishes: first, that we shall give pecuniary assistance to Italy who is incapable of furnishing a war chest by herself; secondly that our fleet shall be more active in the Adriatic; thirdly that we shall allow him

personally to raise a corps of 30,000 Garibaldians among the Italians resident in France. He would like this corps to be sent to the Balkans and is sure that Servia will not take offence ; he has, so he says, given Servia an assurance that Italy has no eye on Dalmatia, and that all she would ask would be a special régime for Zara and Spalato. Nothing for Ragusa, nothing for Cattaro. But in whose name does the General speak ?

13th.—With Millerand I have spent the last four days with the Army of the Vosges, and no sooner back in the Elysée this morning than our Council is held when Delcassé tells us, in rather mournful tones, of his visit to London whence he has just returned. He has come to terms with the British Government as to sending an Anglo-French-Russian force to Servia, but it is Greece, not Roumania, who is to be addressed. In a note of the 26th January, M. Venizelos had indeed asked for an expedition of this sort as a rider to the advice, offered by the three Powers, that Greece should throw in her lot with us ; M. Venizelos had been careful in this Note to say also that his country would only actively support us if Roumania did the same. He would undertake to sound the Cabinet at Bucharest, and therefore we shall not run the risk of getting a direct refusal from the Roumanian Government who seem now rather indisposed to take any action on account of the Russian reverses ; for the matter of that all diplomatic efforts are for the moment paralysed by the inertness of Russia. I then had to report to the Council a step the Army Committee have taken. It is the first time, I think, that a Parliamentary Committee has addressed itself directly to a President of the Republic, who can only communicate with the Chambre by messages which their Presidents have to read aloud, but a state of war may well brush aside many rules and conventions. M. de Freycinet, President of the Committee, now forwards me a Resolution adopted on the 9th February, and in his covering letter he adds a few personal remarks and asks me to receive him with Léon Bourgeois, Clémenceau and Doumer.

The Resolution is very lengthy and recites the note presented to the War Minister on the 3rd February which ran :

“ For four and a half months the French and German Armies have sat down facing one another on a front of more than 400 kilometres ; a series of local engagements, many of them very costly, have done scarcely anything to shift the line which divides the opponents. This situation cannot be allowed to go on. It is more than likely that the German Army, with the help of reinforcements, will try and break down our resistance and pursue the plan of invasion ; if at that moment the French Army has not been correspondingly reinforced, there will be a great chance of our being over-run, and anyhow, even if the enemy does not take the initiative, the French Army must be reinforced, for our ultimate object is not to pin down our enemies on our own ground but to thrust them back across the frontiers, and experience goes to show that this object cannot be secured with the means now available ; it follows therefore that in any case reinforcements are an absolute necessity. Has the country the requisite man-power ? The War Minister has given us to understand that the dépôts can furnish more than 1,200,000 combatants ; and after making full allowance for the normal upkeep of regular units and calculating the men required to fill by degrees the gaps for at least six months, there would remain available nearly 500,000 men. . . . This main object, the reinforcement of our Army, will now have one advantage which is by no means negligible : it will relieve the dépôts of the men who are there, and who are often there to the detriment of discipline and of good example.” The Commission went on to say that they had nothing to alter in their former remarks, and that further examination of the question only confirmed them in their conviction. They urged therefore in the most emphatic manner that reinforcements up to 400,000 or 500,000 men should be organised without an hour’s delay and held at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief, and that anyhow part of these reinforcements might with advantage be trained in the camp outside Paris. “ The Committee is so impressed by the gravity of the circumstances that they are determined to leave no stone unturned and agree that a copy of the Resolution, and of the motives which determined it, shall be forwarded to the President of the Republic in his capacity as

President of the Superior Council for National Defence." So concluded the paper and after reading it to the Ministers, it is decided that I shall at once see the officials of the Army Committee in the presence of Viviani and Millerand.

The Council and I have long since agreed there should be a second army : Millerand, who—no less than Joffre—has been opposed alike to a second army and to an expedition to the Near East, now takes our view ; but there appear to him so many difficulties of detail to overcome that he has not dared as yet to give an absolute promise to the Committee : hence the incident which occurred and of which I have been informed. There arrived Léon Bourgeois and his colleagues ; Clémenceau made a rather sulky entrance and gave a very limp shake to the hand I held out to him. I began by telling my visitors that the step they have taken is quite unusual, that normally I have not the right to confer with the Chambres or their Committees, but that in the very exceptional circumstances I am quite prepared to listen. The reply is that as there are no facilities for interpellation, direct appeal to my jurisdiction, when they are in conflict with the Government, is their only resource. This is what Freycinet said ; Clémenceau less amiably declared that he only wants to discharge his responsibility, that is—if I rightly understand—to put the responsibility on me, and he muttered something about my having changed the War Minister without reference to Parliament. To this, I can truthfully answer that the change was made not by me but—with my approval no doubt—by the President of the Council and the Government, and at their entire responsibility. Having made this point, I left it to the others to talk. I could not say outright how much I agree with them and I was determined they shall not see I have had any difference of opinion with Millerand. The War Minister invoked rather sourly what he terms the prerogative of the Government and certainly did not give his interlocutors the impression that he has decided on forming a second army. Freycinet, in dulcet tones and with infinite tact, urged the point ; Clémenceau did the same but in sharp, cutting phrases, and Doumer followed suit rather imperiously, not to say a little roughly. I tried to convey to the Senators, without committing

Millerand, that the Government is of their opinion, but their final impression evidently is one of uncertainty, and what aggravates this is that Millerand has, this very day, written Freycinet a rather evasive, and apparently an altogether unsatisfactory letter. When my visitors left, I told Millerand that he keeps things too much to himself, to which he answers that he can put matters right. In the hope of adjusting the situation I let Freycinet know I would like to see him again and, despite his graceful protest, I insisted, on account of his age, on calling on him in the Rue de la Faisanderie. I then told him in confidence that Millerand and the Cabinet have not seen eye to eye with Joffre who does not want his dépôts to be tampered with. The Generalissimo is afraid of there being taken away the reserves which he requires to relieve the men in the line, and especially the cadres which he may well require in view of continued fighting and casualties. Freycinet quite appreciates this difficulty but believes that some of it arises because Joffre thinks any new army will be put under the command of an independent General, whereas the Committee have it clearly in mind that the complementary army shall also come under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief. I repeated that anyhow the matter of the second army is decided on, but that Joffre must be humoured as he has already hinted at resigning. This, Freycinet said, would be a fatal step, but he added: "Joffre has been mistaken several times. He was mistaken at Charleroi; he was mistaken in Alsace; one or two things must be urged on him." Freycinet assures me that the Committee has no ill feeling towards Millerand and reminds me of the stagnation of our front line, and of the costliness of our local attacks; as to this our tediously monotonous daily communiqués leave no sort of doubt. To escape from this static warfare the Government is not only aiming at a second army but is persisting in the idea of making a side stroke through Salonika. When Delcassé was in London, Kitchener promised a Division, but it seems to him and to Sir Edward Grey that, though the advent of an Anglo-French corps will persuade Greece to intervene on behalf of Servia, it will require the presence of Russian troops to bring in Bulgaria, and to force

Ferdinand's hand and that of M. Radoslavoff's Government. Roumania would then find herself obliged to follow their example. The Grand Duke Nicholas first began by saying he cannot spare a Russian contingent for the Balkan Peninsula ; he then spoke of a regiment of Cossacks, and it has required the same pressure which was brought to bear on Joffre for him to agree so far as to send us an Infantry Brigade.

Meanwhile, Sazonoff's fertile brain is as busy as ever, and Athens, Bucharest and Sofia in turn receive his pressing attentions. But Bratiano puts off from day to day his decision, and Venizelos roundly says : " Either Bulgaria will arm against Turkey, in which case Greece will go to Servia's assistance ; or else Bulgaria will, contrary to M. Radoslavoff's statements, maintain her somewhat malevolent attitude, in which case Greece will only consent to attach herself to the Entente, if Roumania does the same." Delcassé therefore thinks we should hearten Venizelos and tell him of the impending expedition of an Anglo-French force.

Other questions claim the care of the Allied Governments : Sir Edward Grey has been asked in the House of Commons if the letters exchanged between King George and myself have been communicated to the Cabinet and if they will be made public. The Foreign Secretary replied that he knew of the letters but had not so far been authorised to publish them. Sir Edward, however, thinks it would be well to do this, as the letters testify anew to the pacific intent of the two Governments up to the very outbreak of hostilities ; His Majesty's permission has therefore been obtained for this purpose and I, also of course, gladly agree. A more difficult matter arises in that Germany declared on the 4th February that the Channel, the northern and western coasts of France and the waters washing the British Islands are part of the " war zone " ; she has officially notified the Government of the United States that " all enemy vessels encountered in this zone will be destroyed, and that neutral ships, if there, may be in danger." Thus there is asserted a right to torpedo at sight, without any regard for the safety of the crews and passengers, any merchant ship whatever flag she may fly. President Wilson on the 13th protested very strongly against this and declared that if the

case arose he would hold the German Government responsible for such acts and would take the necessary measures to safeguard the lives and property of Americans. English feeling is also greatly stirred. As the German Admiralty cannot maintain in the waters of which she speaks any surface ships, she can only attack with submarines. England might well be disposed to profit by the threat which Germany directs against neutral navigation to organise a regular blockade of the Central Empires. Delcassé would prefer that France and England should first ask the neutral Powers to undertake to make their own rights respected, and to say to them that if they have not the means to do this, we shall be compelled to consider as invalid existing international arrangements regarding maritime warfare and consequently we shall have to reserve complete liberty of action. The method advocated by the Quai d'Orsay, which has two distinct stages, seems better than that indicated in London, and between us we shall arrange to come to some agreement. We are also in accord with our Allies as to the purchases we are making in America for the provision of our army; the idea here is to prevent a competition in the American market which would be sure to force prices up and prejudice our common interests. A Committee is therefore to be set up in New York on which will serve representatives of the three chief Allies.

16th.—Colonel Pénélon tells me that Langle de Cary and Sarrail have just set afoot a joint offensive under conditions which are considered favourable; it is thus a new battle in Champagne which has begun. With the forces concentrated on these two portions of our front together with their reserves, we have, so the liaison officer tells me, a numerical superiority of three to one; we have also a large amount of heavy artillery and field guns and the Ist and XVIIth Corps are attacking from Perthes to Beauséjour. But just as Joffre is trying to raise our hopes, we hear from Paléologue the most distressing news as to the state of the Russian Army after the evacuation of Eastern Prussia and the retreat on the Niemen.

15th.—Marcel Sembat has gone to London, but as a member of the Socialist party, not as Minister for Public Works. In

company with a handful of his compatriots, a Russian and M. Vandervelde, he has taken part in a Congress where the Germanophiles have exercised a rather baneful influence. The British delegation, headed by Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and Mr. Arthur Henderson, contains six members of the House of Commons, of whom more than one did their utmost last year to retain their country as neutral. To attain unanimity as to a proposed resolution it was necessary to insert phrases like these: "This Conference cannot ignore the general and deep-lying causes of the European conflict, which is in itself the monster product of the antagonism which is rending capitalist Society, of the policy of Colonial conquests, and of aggressive imperialism." And, "The Socialists are not at war with the peoples of Germany and Austria, but only with the oppressive Governments of those countries. They desire that, throughout Europe, the populations which have been annexed by force shall have the right to dispose of themselves freely. . . . They protest against the arrest of members of the Douma, the suppression of Russian Socialist newspapers and the sentences on the editors, and the oppression of the Finns and Russian Jews" and so forth. This interference in the affairs of Allied countries, illusions as to the immediate divorce between the Germans and their Emperor, the right of France over the provinces annexed to be subject to the necessity of a plébiscite, public condemnation of an Allied Government—that is how the Congress in London has thought—in face of the enemy—to promote the military operations of the Triple Entente. French opinion is a good deal fluttered by this highly inopportune manifesto and Jules Guesde himself thinks it regrettable.

16th.—Delcassé has deemed it right to warn Paléologue by telegram of the observations which the Russian Government may be led to make about the London Congress. "If you are questioned about Sembat taking part in the Congress—or better still, before you are questioned—please say that Sembat is there purely as a delegate of the Socialist party in France, that his object was to prevent any divergences arising as to the necessity of fighting to a finish (one or two of the representatives of British Socialism being apparently a little

shaky on this point) ; that as a matter of fact unanimity has been secured as to "crushing Prussian militarism" ; that Sembat would most certainly regret not having been able to forestall the resolution of the Congress, which was due to the initiative of the Russian delegates, as just before the Congress met he was at pains to emphasise at a preliminary meeting in Paris how much depended on the efficacy of Russian support, his actual words being : " Say openly that without Russia we should have been overrun. Never forget this when you are upset by some incident in the inherent régime of that great country." Sembat who is not yet back from London, would be the very first against any idea of his going to London in any capacity other than that of a Socialist or against any suggestion that he had, in the slightest degree, involved the responsibility of the Government." Needless to say, the *Homme Enchaîné* does not let slip so good an occasion to have another fling not only at Sembat, but at Viviani, Delcassé and the President of the Republic, the " pompous prig oscillating between the extreme of grandeur and the extreme of misery, indebted for his cardboard throne to the Clericals."

Worried and annoyed by several deputies, who are shocked by the Socialist motion, Viviani comes to show me a statement he is going to make on the 18th in which the Government reaffirms its entire unanimity on certain essential points. France has only, in the matter of armaments, followed the Powers of the Triple Alliance ; she multiplied her efforts to avoid war, but as war was forced on her, she will prosecute it to the end, nor will she consider it as finished until the day when German Imperialism is crushed, Europe liberated, Belgium reconstituted, Alsace-Lorraine restored, and complete solidarity with our Allies assured. Viviani's paper is a little bombastic in style, but it gives just the right answer to the uneasy feelings which the Socialist conferences have evoked, and I ask the President of the Chambre to read it to his colleagues on Thursday morning ; Guesde makes no difficulty about this. Sembat on his return from London, ignorant of the storm which he has raised, asks that there shall be contemplated the possibility of a plébiscite in respect of Alsace-Lorraine or that anyhow there shall not be an *a priori* refusal

to consider this. It was pointed out that it would be impossible to refuse the vote to immigrants, and eventually Sembat agreed that Alsace, having proclaimed her attachment to France in 1790, having protested in 1870 against German annexation, never having been called upon to rectify it, and never having accepted, the resumption of the Province would be a simple restitution. No change is therefore made in Viviani's text which he reads in the *Chambre* and which serves to allay any excitement.

But while the Deputies calm down, the Senators are again vocal. Léon Bourgeois tells me that the Army Committee has once more been put off by Millerand, who declined to say anything about the numbers of men under arms and would only reply as to questions about guns and ammunition, and that here also his reticence gave the impression that there had been serious miscalculations as to manufactures. He refused to say how many rounds are in reserve, and this very much upset the Committee. I know that Millerand mistrusts one or two of the Committee and that he is very much afraid of bad indiscretions being committed. But he ought then to give information to those on whom he can rely and not treat everyone to a sullen silence which gives rise to very malevolent suppositions.

In order that I may understand exactly what are the demands of the Army Committee and the objections of the Commander-in-Chief, I have asked the War Minister our precise war strength as on the 1st February. The total of troops in the war area, to include men in the firing line and in the various branches of the Service, men in the *depôts* and on the lines of communication, is 56,020 officers, and 2,417,600 men. Then behind the lines there are 35,979 men in the regular instruction camps and 95,327 men in the temporary camps of instruction. In the *depôts* outside the zone of the armies there are 12,552 officers, of whom 9,033 are wounded, unfit for active service or engaged as instructors, and 1,158,793 men, of whom 428,399 are untrained, 173,200 wounded, sick or convalescent, 43,564 unfit for active service, 92,673 forming the cadres of the *depôts* or acting as Instructors, and 21,533 detailed for work in the factories. To these one must add the

forty battalions and two Territorial divisions which it is proposed to create. With these figures it does not look as if we yet have enough men available to constitute an important army of manœuvre.

Joffre, for want of something better, has gone on with offensives in Champagne and Argonne which have again been very costly and little other than fruitless ; we have progressed to the north of Perthes and in the Grurie Wood ; we have taken a few hundred prisoners and captured several trenches, but at no point have we broken through.

We are therefore brought back to the idea of a side coup in the Balkans. The Grand Duke Nicholas has now promised to send us a contingent of his best troops ; but while he is coming round to this idea, the English have given it up. M. Venizelos has been so dilatory in his reply that they have put off any idea of an expedition to Salonika, and as the Navy want the Army to help them in their attack on the Dardanelles forts, they propose that we should send as soon as possible a Division to Lemnos. This Dardanelles adventure, which Mr. Winston Churchill has conceived, will become a mirage in which the Allies will think they detect victory, and it would seem that the idea of renewing overtures to Sofia and Bucharest has been set aside, until the Narrows have been forced.

The British Cabinet also lets us know that they have decided not to approach the neutral countries in reply to the German declaration of the 4th February. It is thought that Great Britain must take immediate steps to defend herself without discussing the matter with a third party. There will therefore be generally notified the procedure of submarine warfare to which Germany has recourse, and England will declare that, as a matter of reprisals, she will prevent all sea-borne merchandise from entering, or leaving, Germany. This will be done, we are assured, without any risk either for neutral ships, or for the lives of neutrals or non-combatants, and will strictly conform with the principles of humanity. The British Government consider themselves at liberty to arrest and tow into ports ships carrying German goods of any sort. Our Allies have so thoroughly made up their minds on this point that we do nothing but agree to it.

In America these German claims have infuriated public opinion which the German Ambassador, Count Bernsdorff, has tried to cool down by saying that his country is fighting for her very existence and that she is trying to re-establish the freedom of the seas for which she has always striven ; the American newspapers, however, are emphatic that if the Germans sink a single American ship, they will suffer all the consequences of it.

On the afternoon of the 19th, M. Devalle and M. Cauvin, Senators respectively for the Meuse and the Somme, bring sixty men to see me. These poor fellows were carried off into Germany as hostages or prisoners and have just been sent back here through Switzerland ; they are pale and thin as well as in rags and tatters, having been miserably fed during the time of their internment : they do not complain of any specific ill-treatment, only of semi-starvation, and as they have been constantly told that the President is " Capout " and that Paris has been captured, they are the more delighted to find Paris and myself safe and sound. On this afternoon also, we learn that the bombardment of the Dardanelles has begun. The Allied forces there are under the command of Admiral Sir Reginald Carden, and their main object is to destroy the Turkish forts at the entrance ; that done the trawlers will sweep away the mines and the battleships will go in and deal successively with the European and the Asiatic coasts. The success of the enterprise will depend on being able to destroy the mines. It is of course quite possible that Turkish troops, with field guns, will be posted on the shore and play havoc with the trawlers, and when once the forts at the entrance are smashed, we shall have to take care that everything is clear and sweep the further end of the Peninsula, if it is occupied. Sir Edward Grey thinks that a contingent of Australians and New Zealanders will be sent to the Dardanelles and he says that the co-operation of French troops will be warmly welcomed.

21st.—The Prince Regent of Servia telegraphs to me : " I have just received from General Pau the Military Medal and I am anxious to express to you at once my heartfelt thanks. I am much touched by this new mark of Your

Excellency's friendship, and I would assure you of the affection and esteem which my country and I have for our noble ally, and for her admirable army."

Condemned as he is, from lack of ammunition, either to stand still or go back, the Grand Duke Nicholas begs Joffre to be as active as possible in Champagne, so as to pin the Germans down to our front, but we are suffering from the same complaint as the Russians, and our attacks, however well delivered, are quickly held up by the enemy.

22nd.—I asked Joffre, Freycinet, Etienne, and Léon Bourgeois to breakfast in order that they may have a heart to heart talk together. The Commander-in-Chief, who has perused the resolution of the Army Committee, explains things with imperturbable good humour and with a delightful, if assumed, air of innocence. He is highly pleased that we have been able to put forty more battalions into the field. "I only hope," he says, "the good work will go on. The more troops I have, the better I shall be able to fight. But I don't think you can form divisions, or even brigades, as there would not be the establishments or the Staff officers. Send me as many regiments as possible, and I will absorb them into divisions at the front: the brigades will consist of three regiments or the division of five regiments. My Army Corps being thus materially strengthened can hold a more extended front, and I shall then be able to withdraw from the line, taken as a whole, one, two, three or four corps which will swell the reserve, consisting of four and a half Army Corps which I have just constituted." In a word, Joffre has completely come round to the notion of an army of manœuvre, and is basing his calculations on it. He then complains that they are not converting enough 1874 into 1886 rifles, and that they are not turning out new model rifles. He is also outspoken as to the slowness of our output of explosives and suggests that the English are rather grudging in their supplies to us of phenol and benzol. The Generalissimo hints that he will very soon be obliged to call a halt to the operations in Champagne, so as to husband his munitions; the reserve of shells which he had in hand when he started the new offensive is beginning to run out, and he

will not allow this to fall below 400 rounds per gun. If we have not broken through before this minimum figure is reached he will, for the moment, break off the battle. In the course of conversation, Etienne said to Joffre: "Galliéni has seen Doumer; he has reproached him for his campaign against you, and has begged him to stop it, which Doumer has promised to do. Perhaps you had better send a word of thanks to Galliéni." Joffre was quite willing to do this and said that he knew Galliéni to be quite loyal himself, and that one must not hold him responsible for the conduct of his friends. As Viviani and Millerand have to be heard two days hence by the Army Committee, I have told them of the interview which Freycinet and Bourgeois have had with Joffre. Millerand only remarked that he was quite sure Joffre would soon believe he had been the one to urge the creation of new units, but Viviani burst out with: "Joffre wants people to believe it was our fault that his offensive failed; when he started it, he knew perfectly well what supplies he could depend on; he wants to saddle the Government with his own imprudence." I did my best and was able to calm down Viviani's nerves.

23rd.—Both Ministers accounted for themselves admirably before the Committee. Viviani spoke for over an hour with admirable clearness and logic; he marshalled his figures as regards the output of munitions at the beginning of the war and now with perfect precision, and he demonstrated to the satisfaction of his hearers what had been sought for and what had been secured. Viviani tells me that everyone was greatly struck, and that when Clémenceau tried to raise objections he was at once cried down.

24th.—To-day Colonel Pénélon has told me that the operations in Champagne are developing, that all the Army Corps on that front are to make a concerted attack, and that Joffre is not without hope that they will break through. But if this does not come off within twenty-four hours, the attack will be called off so as not to use up ammunition fruitlessly. The Colonel confided to me that G.Q.G. had thought it would be an easier and a quicker job, and never reckoned on so long-drawn-out a fight, still less on

such an enormous expenditure of shells. To-day I have also an American visitor, one Mr. Beveridge of Indiana, a former Senator, who brings me a letter from Mr. Roosevelt and tells me he has come to Europe to take stock of the war on behalf of *Collier's Weekly*. He has begun by a tour of Germany and has rather light-heartedly accepted some German theses : I have done my best to prove to him that Germany, by neglecting to restrain Austria, by stirring up Turkey with a military mission, and by precipitating declarations of war, rendered absolutely inevitable the great catastrophe. And I told him very distinctly that having been attacked and, with the violation of Belgian neutrality, invaded, we are determined to go on fighting till we win.

M. Quinones de Léon, who has come to say good-bye before going to Madrid, confides to me that Germany has offered Portugal and Gibraltar to Spain, that King Alfonso has brushed aside these ridiculous proposals, but His Majesty wished me to know of them. A good many of his subjects blame the King for allowing his friendship for France to prevent his grasping so glittering an opportunity. I tell M. Quinones what he has already heard from Delcassé that, when we have won the war, we shall not forget the friendly attitude of the King of Spain and his people, and I beg him to believe how grateful France is to Spain for taking under her protection the French, and especially the French prisoners who are in Germany. From what one hears, these unhappy prisoners of war are more than half starved, but whenever the Spanish Ambassador at Berlin visits the prisoners' camps the real conditions under which they live are carefully camouflaged.

25th.—The news from Champagne yesterday evening was more cheerful, but to-day we hear that we have been counter-attacked, and unable to hold on to some of our positions. But Joffre now tells Millerand that he has changed his mind and is not going to break off his offensive. These variations are very trying, and the Ministers are urging Millerand to ask Joffre, as soon as the battle is over, to furnish them with a detailed report as to the causes and the consequences of the set-backs we have suffered. They want

to know whether, with another offensive of the same sort, there is any real chance of breaking through, or whether the idea should be given up. Or should some other manœuvre be tried? A massed attack, for example? Or some demonstration by the army of manœuvre or a powerful side-stroke in the Near East? Ribot thinks the Government is abdicating its prerogative, to which Viviani retorts that if we keep on worrying the Commander-in-Chief, he may very likely tender his resignation, which would upset the army and the country alike. Viviani's equanimity is indeed daily put to the test. He is now being badgered by Freycinet who, as President of the Army Committee for Foreign Affairs, asks as to why we handed over to England the command of the operations in the Dardanelles and as to what the Allies propose in regard to the future régime in Constantinople. Viviani says we might as well try to carry on negotiations in the open street. The Senators for the moment are worse than the Deputies; egged on by Clémenceau they are perpetually trying to pick a quarrel with the Government and to encroach on the functions of the Executive power. The truth is that as the public sessions are infrequent, the Committees are taking upon themselves more and more the prerogatives of Parliament. Viviani however, who was very much worried, now that his interrogation is off his mind, is quite happy again. The explanations which he, Augagneur and Delcassé have given to Freycinet have been quite well received, and in future they will simply say that Russia and England are agreed as to the freedom of the Narrows; for the moment it suffices that the object is to force the Dardanelles and that this object will be pursued up to the gates of Constantinople. Freycinet will not admit any suggestion of defeat, but I warn Viviani against indulging in anything like optimism, as the British Admiralty is not too confident as to the result, and Churchill is by no means blind to the possibility of having to abandon the task, so much so that it might be well for us to arrange that a British Admiral shall not be entitled to break off operations without reference to the two Governments. Viviani recognises that he has painted the picture for the Committee in rather too glowing colours

and that their hopes may be subjected to a severe blow, but he is often the slave to his feelings and when he has scraped out of a difficulty, with the airiness in which he excels, he breathes all the more freely and goes back to his work with renewed vigour and alertness. Moreover, the first news from the Dardanelles is quite satisfactory; two forts have been destroyed on the European and two on the Asiatic coast, and the mine-sweeping has been started under the protection of battleships and cruisers. One of the four forts had been manned by the Germans and a German Admiral is in command of the Turkish naval forces. We are letting Sir Edward Grey know that the French contingent, under General d'Amade, will be ready to start on the 2nd March and will consist of two infantry brigades, a cavalry regiment, two groups of 75's and one group of 65's, 18,000 men and 5000 horses.

General Pau, who is taking French decorations to Russia *via* the Balkans, has been rapturously greeted at Sofia by the people and quite politely welcomed by the War Minister, General Fitcheff, but King Ferdinand, who had been told of his coming, carefully refrained from giving him any audience. At Bucharest, the General's reception was really enthusiastic; the town was decorated with flags, over 200,000 people turned out to cheer him, the King and Queen entertained him, two big dinner-parties were given in his honour and the Government, without committing themselves officially, did all they could to make things pleasant. M. Bratiano has said again to M. Blondel that Roumanian intervention is a certainty, but that the attitude which Bulgaria has taken up, coupled with the Russian reverses, has made it necessary for them to wait till circumstances are more favourable.

Meanwhile Germany's mind is as busy as her fist. She is trying to arrange at Washington some plan by which her civilian population shall be victualled under American control. In return for this incalculable benefit she is willing to renounce her systematic destruction of trading vessels. On the night of the 23rd—24th February, she sank outside Boulogne, without notice or previous capture, the postal boat *Victoria*, and among the victims were four American citizens.

America would of course like to put a stop to conditions which are highly injurious to her, and the American Ambassador in London has asked that the German proposal shall be entertained. But England and France know that Germany's economic difficulties may do much to shorten the war and are determined to thwart their enemy's clever manœuvre. We have the mastery of the seas, and nothing is more natural than that Germany would like to wrest it from us. But the United States can scarcely do this themselves and still remain neutral.

26th.—Baron Guillaume comes, on behalf of the Belgian Government, to ask if I have any objection to his inscribing in the *Livre Gris* the minutes of two conversations I had with him at the Quai d'Orsay in June and November, 1912. This edition which he is preparing is to contain certain pre-war documents which are now in German hands at Brussels. Although these minutes may have trifling inaccuracies I see no harm in publishing them, but the Ministers prefer that they should not be textually reproduced. What I said in 1912 was that from the reports of our General Staff I fully expected, in the event of war, that Germany would violate Belgian neutrality. I then told the Belgian Minister that France would never trouble peace, and would assuredly never infringe the neutrality of his country, nor was there a single Deputy who would vote for a war of aggression. According to Baron Guillaume's notes I added: "I have the utmost confidence in the Emperor's pacific intent, but I note with regret that since last autumn, the Pan-Germanists are very vocal and very busy with their propaganda. If Germany were to declare war against us, it would certainly be against the personal wish of the Emperor, and it would mean that he had been carried off his feet by public opinion." And evidently I went on to say that in the event of a Franco-German war, the first move of the Germans would be to enter Belgium by Aix-la-Chapelle and Liège and that it might be well for the Belgian Government to take some precautionary measures. There was nothing I said which was not justified by later happenings, and from my own point of view I would have liked my remarks to be

put on record. But the Cabinet think that politicians might thereupon attach blame to the General Staff for not having, in their XVII plan, made better provision for an eventuality which they had clearly foreseen. I yielded to this argument, but the fact remains that if France erred on the side of too implicit belief in the loyalty of another country, she never entertained bellicose thoughts or imperialist ambitions. Baron Guillaume's letters add to all the documentary evidence of our desire for peace, and they are the more significant on account of other reports, trumpeted by the Germans, in which the Belgian Minister delivered himself of some fantastic remarks belied alike by rock facts and by his own correspondence taken as a whole.

CHAPTER III

Differences of opinion between the Allies—The British front—Constantinople and the Narrows—The Adriatic and Admiral de Lapeyrère—Resignation of M. Venizelos—The Gounaris Cabinet—Italy's wishes—General Maunoury wounded—Fate of St. Sophia—Conversations in London and Vienna about Italy—Zeppelins over Paris—Joffre confers with the Ministers—Pierre Loti and the King of the Belgians—Visit to the 4th and 3rd Armies—General Langle de Cary and General Sarraill.

MARCH

The struggle in Champagne is fiercer than ever. Fighting is going on in the Argonne : round Boureuilles and on the heights of Vauquois. We capture some trenches, and they are re-taken ; we counter-attack and think ourselves fortunate if we can just cling on to the strip of shell-torn and blood-soaked ground. Of " getting through," up to now there seems no hope. Joffre has written a long letter to Millerand and again complains of the British Commander-in-Chief. Acting apparently under Kitchener's orders, Sir John French will not extend his front nor relieve the French corps on either side of him although we need the men for our army of manœuvre. Yet Sir John has received three of the four Divisions promised to him, and can therefore slightly widen his field of action. Kitchener says that as we have been able to take a Division away and send it to the Dardanelles we are evidently keeping troops unoccupied and therefore under no necessity to withdraw the corps on the British flanks. The argument is unsound simply because the Division detailed for the Near East is made up of men who are serving behind the lines. The truth is that Kitchener does not pin much faith to the offensive Joffre has set afoot ; he does not think we shall pierce the German lines and he would not himself be sorry to keep a few Divisions

in reserve and to send them, if necessary, to the Balkans or the Dardanelles.

Anyhow, Sir John, who lately has had the courtesy to allude to Joffre as the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, never shows very good grace as to accepting the French Generalissimo's orders, nor does he pay very much attention to Joffre's instructions or advice ; and this lack of good will may well have sinister consequences. At my request the Government have desired Delcassé and Millerand to remind England what risks are incurred with the existing conditions ; they are to endorse strongly Joffre's protest, and to try and obtain unity of command under Joffre in France, the last item especially as our people are to come under British command in the Dardanelles.

But far from having unity of command in the field, we have little coherence in our diplomacy. Paléologue telegraphs : " Sir Edward Grey's ambiguous words in the House of Commons about the future of Constantinople have produced a bad effect in Russia. Public opinion fears that England may at the last moment bring about some arrangement which will fail to satisfy Russia's historical ambitions. Sazonoff, for some days, has been strongly urged to declare publicly that the Turks will be expelled from Europe, and that the Russian flag will for the future float over the Golden Horn. This morning Sazonoff has expounded to Buchanan and myself the state of Russian feelings. ' A few weeks ago,' he said, ' I could think that the question of the Narrows did not involve the permanent occupation of Constantinople. To-day, I am positive that the country will be satisfied with nothing less. Up to now, Sir Edward Grey has only told us that the question of the Narrows must be settled with the full agreement of Russia. It is true that King George went further in saying to Count Benckendorff, " Constantinople is yours." But the time has come to be more explicit.' Sazonoff begged Sir George Buchanan to press Sir Edward Grey to secure the British Government's assent to Russia's design, and he asks Your Excellency to further the request."

This is the first time Russia has put forward her claim to Constantinople ; she has always said that she had no hanker-

ing of this sort, and, since the war, she has only asked for the freedom of the Narrows, the neutralisation of Constantinople and a point on the Bosphorus ; moreover, she has not wrung any promise from France. And so far Russia has not lent a hand in the Dardanelles : the troops she promised have not made their appearance and if Constantinople were to fall, it would be no thanks to Russia. Nor must she forget that Roumania would never allow herself to be bottled up and that the Greeks would rather see the Turks than the Russians at Constantinople. Russia is going to irritate two countries whose goodwill is not only important, but necessary, for her ; and once assured of Constantinople she might be indisposed to take any further active part against Germany. Delcassé has drafted a telegram to suggest that before deciding as to what is to happen to Constantinople, the Allies must first declare themselves as to the freedom of the Narrows, the principle of which the Imperial Government has hitherto clearly recognised. But it is difficult to reconcile the freedom of the Narrows with Russia's expressed determination to occupy a fortified point on the Bosphorus. Here is a matter which must be cleared up and Delcassé, instead of only alluding to the freedom of the Narrows, will stipulate that this must be absolute, for all time and for everybody, and must apply to the Bosphorus as well as to the Dardanelles.

The question as to Constantinople can only be decided after that of the Narrows, and Sazonoff is to be asked to make no pronouncement on the subject, Delcassé telegraphed accordingly on the 3rd, but it so happened that on the same day General Pau arrived in Petrograd and the Tsar asked him and Paléologue to breakfast ; as soon as he had risen from table the Tsar took the ambassador aside and said to him : " You remember my conversation with you here last November ? I have not changed my mind at all since then, but on one point I must be definite. I allude to Constantinople. The question of the Narrows is one as to which my people feel more and more strongly every day, and I cannot feel myself justified in inflicting on them the terrible sacrifices which this war has entailed without allowing them to realise the dream in which for centuries they have

indulged. My mind is entirely made up: the only solution to the problem of Constantinople and the Narrows is the one which I held out to you last November. The town of Constantinople and southern Thrace must be incorporated in the Russian Empire."

Paléologue then reminded the Emperor that France has economic and moral interests, privileges and traditions both in Thrace and Constantinople, to which the reply was: "Your interests, your privileges and your traditions will be thoroughly safeguarded." The Emperor then added these words: "You know that King George not long since declared to my Ambassador, 'Constantinople is yours.' This is quite enough to make me sure of the good will of the British Government. If, however, some difficulties of detail should arise, I rely on your Government to smooth them away." Paléologue then proceeded: "With regard to matters directly concerning France, may I assure my Government that Your Majesty's aims are wholly unchanged?" "Yes, certainly," was the reply. "I want France to emerge from this war as great and as strong as possible. I will subscribe in advance to anything your Government may ask. Take the left bank of the Rhine; take Mayence; take Coblenz; and go further still, if you think well. I should be happy and proud for your sakes." The telegram is really amazing, and one's first thought is why Paléologue did not say something to the Emperor about the novelty, the eccentricity and the danger of his ideas. True, in November at Tsarskoe Selo, Nicholas made some rather unexpected remarks to our Ambassador, but he was then careful to say he was only speaking for himself and that in due course he would confer with his Ministers; then also he specifically said—and this was the essential point—that the conditions of peace must be thrashed out between England, France and Russia, and he said also: "In Asia Minor I shall have to look after the Armenians, I cannot let them go back under Turkish yoke. Ought I not to safeguard Armenia? I shall only annex the country if the people ask for it; otherwise I shall set up autonomous rule. Anyhow, I must ensure the freedom of the Narrows for Russia. As to this one has to be more

explicit. I have not quite made up my mind as the question presents so many difficulties. But two things are certain. Turkey must be expelled from Europe, and Constantinople for the future must be a neutral town under international control; thus the Mussulmans will be sure of due respect being paid to their holy places and their tombs. Thrace will go to Bulgaria up to the Enos-Medea line, the rest from that line to the shore will belong to Russia, except, of course, the outskirts of Constantinople; Servia will acquire Bosnia-Herzegovina, Dalmatia and the north of Albania; Greece may take the South of Albania, except Valona, which will be Italy's. Bulgaria, if she behaves herself, will get some compensation from Servia in Macedonia." The Emperor's proposals were certainly very frank and perhaps a little over-bold, but anyhow Russia was not then claiming Constantinople. Now on the contrary she has taken advantage of a word dropped by King George to fasten on the Ottoman capital and thus to infringe seriously the political traditions of France. It would seem that quite at the beginning of the year Russia's intentions as to Constantinople and the Narrows were still in doubt, and sharp discussions had taken place between Sazonoff, the Grand Duke Nicholas, the War Minister, General Daniloff and Admiral Nenyukoff. But Paléologue's information was sufficiently disquieting for Delcassé to beg me to take an unusual step and write myself to our Ambassador. I told Paléologue that, although my letter would be submitted to Delcassé, I was writing thus to him as a personal friend. "We have been indeed surprised at the suddenness and sharpness with which Russia has formulated her new claims, at a moment too when an important operation is about to be set afoot. . . . If Constantinople should fall into the hands of the Allies, it would be a victory for all of us and would only be an episode in the war which the Allies have pledged themselves to prosecute together until the day when they mutually agree to sign a peace. Certain Russians of the school of M. de Witte would be only too pleased to take over Constantinople and take no further action against Germany and Austria. I feel sure the Emperor would altogether decline such underhand measures. Let us, however,

beware of any imprudence which might favour or further their intrigues. One precaution seems to me indispensable ; not to discuss openly the future fate of Constantinople and to keep Roumania, Italy and all the neutrals ignorant of Russia's designs, for to show these up would be to prejudice good understandings which, to my mind, M. Sazonoff holds much too cheaply. Let us confine ourselves, France, England and Russia, to confidential, and wholly amicable, communications with one another. Russia cannot fail to see that she is asking us to open up separately and prematurely a matter which forms part of a whole and which cannot be detached from that whole. When it comes to a general settlement this question can be solved ; it is a factor in the whole sum of questions which will then have to be dealt with and the solution of which will itself depend on the extent of our common victory. We know what Russia's aspirations are, and we would like her to realise them, but we cannot sacrifice to them our own.

“ To assign to Russia Constantinople, Thrace, the Narrows and the coasts of the Sea of Marmora would simply be to divide up the Ottoman Empire, and we have no good reason to want this. If it is inevitable, there is no reason why it should be at our expense. We must therefore hit upon some arrangement which will enable us to reassure our Mussulman subjects in Algiers and Tunis as to the ultimate independence of the Commander of the Faithful, and which will also secure for us—besides the preservation of our holdings in the Near East and the safeguarding of our economic interests in Asia Minor—the recognition of our rights in Syria, Alexandretta and the vilayet of Adana. But the possession of Constantinople would not only give Russia privileges as to the line of succession in the Ottoman Empire but would bring her within the concert of Western nations and might enable her to become a great naval power. This would entirely upset the equilibrium of Europe. So large an increase of strength could only be acceptable to us if we derive equivalent advantages from the war. The subject cannot be dealt with now piecemeal. We can only back up Russia's wishes in proportion to what we shall gather ourselves. The struggle with

Turkey and the hopes which Russia builds on it must not blind our eyes to the origin of the European war. It was the Servian question which set Europe aflame. Germany's spirit of aggression was brought to bear on a subject which had far more interest for Russia than for France, and France was dragged into the fray, in spite of herself. We have been loyal to our alliance, but we should take it amiss if the vision of Constantinople were to deflect public opinion in Russia from the real causes and the essential object of the war. For the Allies there can only be one right and reasonable course ; to continue the struggle with united effort, to banish all idea of a separate peace, and to hold over all questions of sharing out until the hour comes for a final settlement. We are all entitled to formulate our wishes, and even to voice our claims. But it is impossible to say what will be our portions until we know what there will be to distribute. As Delcassé telegraphed to you, we must first win the war, and win it as quickly as possible. I feel sure that if you are firm you will bring the Emperor and his Minister round to a more just estimate of the permanent interests of our alliance. You enjoy their confidence ; make use of this to put things in a clear light to them and to warn them against notions which are based on ideals rather than on common sense." This private letter, in which I was able to express myself quite freely, proves of itself sufficiently that, whatever may have been said or written, neither the Government nor I had entered into any contract with Russia, and that, on the contrary, we were entirely taken aback by her new demands. And just when the Emperor was unfolding to Paléologue his disquieting intelligence, Sazonoff was committing a curious blunder. On the pretext that Italy—according to the Marquis Carlotti's confidential communications—was trying to obtain from us some very substantial advantages in return for her co-operation, the Russian Minister submitted to the Emperor a note which ran clean contrary to opinion here. " M. Sazonoff is not altogether happy about Italy coming in now that her naval and military support have lost much of their value. Any new partners will increase the difficulties of the peace negotiations. The

close confidence which exists between the Allies lies at the very root of their strength. If a fourth Power were to join up with us, is there not some fear that the newcomer might try to sow discord to his personal profit? M. Sazonoff thinks that if the Italian Government offers their active support, we ought to try, in the friendliest manner possible, to excuse ourselves." Needless to say, the Cabinet here lets Russia know at once that we dissociate ourselves from any such policy of aloofness. But there is no need to go so far as some politicians who, in order to secure Italy's immediate adhesion, are likely to run into imprudence.

The Senatorial Committee for Finance has gone out of its way to ask that the Garibaldian soldiers in our ranks should be set at liberty and given a large pecuniary indemnity to enable them to form themselves into an independent corps and attack Austria. Jules Guesde, with an air of profound mystery, has invited me to consider this proposal which fits in with his revolutionary romanticism. "The Garibaldians," he whispers to me, "want to be licensed, to receive some money and rifles; they will then make their way, somehow, to Trentino where they will embark on a guerrilla war of liberation. They are sure Italy will follow their example." General Ricciotti Garibaldi had apparently said to him that if Italy then remained aloof, it would mean the end of the monarchy. Guesde asked me if I thought the scheme impracticable or dangerous and loyally said he would not suggest it to the Ministers without my consent. I did not quite see how the Garibaldians were going to get to Trentino, unless the Italian Government shut their eyes to the freak, but their adventure might not be unlike one of those in which Cavour scored so successfully. The Government, after making some pertinent enquiries, has agreed to release the Garibaldians, and give them some money and arms though their plan of action seems a little sketchy. Italy meanwhile, like Greece and Bulgaria, has her eyes fixed on the Dardanelles and is awaiting the result of operations where up to now our efforts have been as fruitless as in Champagne: we have bombarded Fort Dardanos and the Yldiz redoubt, but the fleet has not gone forward in the Narrows. Nor does any

hope linger as to Japanese intervention in Europe: the Belgian plenipotentiary at Tokio has been flatly told by the Foreign Minister that no Government would dare to propose to the Emperor that he should send abroad an army conscripted purely for internal defence. Will this serve to discourage Clémenceau? Nothing is less likely. With the general uneasiness due to our military impotence we are the target for conflicting recriminations. Some blame Joffre for his bloody and useless offensives; some complain of his inertness and say the same about Admiral Lapeyrère in the Adriatic. The First Lord of the Admiralty has suggested to Augagneur how useful it would be to make a demonstration there concurrently with the battle in the Dardanelles. Admiral Lapeyrère has written to Augagneur pointing out very clearly and graphically the chances and the risks of putting up a fight and directing two cruisers on Trieste; against these, however, he weighs the intense satisfaction which it would give to the officers and men of the ships if they could come to grips with the enemy, but he throws on the Government the responsibility of a decision. After a good deal of discussion an answer in the negative is sent to the Admiral, as it is thought, besides the danger incurred, a raid on Trieste might make a bad impression on Italy.

And now Greece is being made to feel the heavy hand of the Kaiser. On the 6th the whole population at Salonika kept high holiday for the anniversary of the capture of Janina. English, French, Greek, Russian and Servian flags waved aloft and the streets resounded with cries of "Long live the Allies!" "Down with the Boches!" "To Berlin, to Constantinople!" The next day at Nisch, the Greek Minister told M. Pashitch* that Greece had decided to cast off her neutrality and to place her fleet and a division of infantry at the disposal of the Triple Entente. M. Pashitch was warm in thanks, but at eleven o'clock that evening he received news of the resignation of Venizelos. King Constantine had frowned on the policy of intervention and the statesman, disowned by his Sovereign, was obliged to retire. Queen Sophie has prevailed, and Queen Sophie is the Kaiser's sister.

• Servian Foreign Minister.

10th.—I have read to-day a report drawn up by the Committee composed of hard-headed and thoroughly conscientious men which the Government has set up to enquire into acts committed by the enemy in violation of the rights of peoples. Nothing could be more distressing than the accounts of the shocking treatment received by the poor fellows who were made prisoners in the invaded territories and have recently been repatriated by the Swiss, and nothing could be more odious than the abuses committed in the villages of the Meuse.

A Gounaris Cabinet has been formed and King Constantine has told the British Minister that the policy of the country is unchanged and that a benevolent neutrality, as regards the Entente, will be the order of the day. The King says this is the best way of keeping Bulgaria out of the field.

Joffre is insistent that he should be allowed to nominate the General in whom would vest the reversion to command, in case of his being momentarily disabled. Personally, I do not like the idea of withdrawing from Galliéni the letter which he holds as to his own succession, but as Joffre would never, in any circumstances, allow Galliéni to replace him, it is necessary to designate some other General and Joffre has agreed to accept General Dubail's name.

11th.—Lord Kitchener says he would be very pleased indeed to meet Millerand and Joffre; he proposes to come to G.Q.G., but rules out of discussion the Dardanelles and the formations in which the New Armies are to be employed. It is in the back of one's mind that the English are a little out of temper. They coveted Dunkirk as a naval base and Joffre has declined this idea as he declares he requires the port for his own troops. But every day it is more and more burnt into one how essential it is that there should be a really close and friendly collaboration between the two armies. Yesterday, for instance, the British troops, thanks to our heavy guns, achieved a brilliant success between the Lys and the La Bassée Canal. The Government has decided that Joffre is to be told he must give way about Dunkirk, and in return Kitchener is to be asked to enlighten us as to operations in the Dardanelles and the part which

French troops are to play there. A very secret telegram just received from Paul Cambon runs: "Yesterday my Italian colleague told Sir Edward Grey that even if Italy should decide to come in, she could not be ready to take any action before the 15th April." He added that Italy might throw in her lot with the Allies under certain conditions enumerated in a memorandum which had been handed to Sir Edward Grey but which he had been asked to treat as confidential. Sir Edward replied that he could not commit himself as to this memorandum without consulting France and Russia. The Marquis Imperiali insisted that the conversation should be kept quite secret and that the memorandum should not be forwarded to us.

Sir Edward has therefore only quoted to my Russian colleague and myself: "The frontier claimed by Italy would include part of the Tyrol; starting from Mont Ortler, it would stretch to the Col de Brenner and rejoin the actual frontier passing east of Brunecker, then leaving this frontier up to a point west of Klagenfurt would drop down directly to the west of Fiume, leaving to Italy the Trentino and Istria, together with the Islands, Cherso, Lussin, Pago and Premuda. The Croatian coast, including Fiume would be neutralised and Dalmatia would fall to Italy. From the northern limit of Dalmatia to the Drin, above St. Jean de Medua, the neutralised coast would belong to Servia and Montenegro; Greece and Servia would get some pickings in Albania, but Durazzo would become the capital of an autonomous and Mussulman Albania whose coasts, as far as Cape Stylos, would also be neutralised. Italy would absorb Valona with some of the neighbouring territory, and would retain the Dodecanese, as also she would enjoy, in Asia Minor, a zone of influence round Adalia. If the Allies should occupy Turkish territories, Italy would occupy this zone, and if the Allies take over certain German colonies in Africa, Italy would further extend herself in Erythrea. Sir Edward told Imperiali frankly that he thought the Italian claims were somewhat exaggerated." Somewhat exaggerated they certainly are; but perhaps our good neighbours have received some conditional promises from Austria which they want to

compare with what we can offer them. Anyhow, they make it clear that before coming to our support they want, besides access to Ethiopia through Djibouti, the control of the Adriatic and the Eastern Mediterranean. This is a good slice in itself. Imperiali received the memorandum on the 16th February, but only handed it to Grey on the 4th March.

12th—Imperiali has now allowed us to see the memorandum in which there is no mention of Erythrea; perhaps Sir Edward ran his pen through this at sight. But in addition to her geographical claims, Italy postulates that no peace shall be signed without her concurrence, that the Anglo-French fleets shall support hers against Austria, and that Russia shall keep a fixed number of troops to deal with that enemy. Delcassé, however, anxious to attract Italy, insists that three points require most serious consideration: the neutralisation of the Slav territories handed over to Servia and Montenegro, the occupation by Italy of Dalmatia, and the reconstruction of a Mussulman Albania. It is quite right to encourage Italy, but quite wrong to discourage Servia, who is struggling for her very existence.

G.Q.G. publishes a communiqué with the title, "Our action in Champagne; its object and the results." We are told of "an uninterrupted series of local successes," that "our losses have been relatively small and few men taken prisoner"; "enormous losses have been inflicted on the enemy." We have "helped to secure the brilliant British and Russian victories," the latter by pinning large German forces down to our own front; we have caused "the German General Staff to offer explanations which are tantamount to an avowal of defeat." This glowing optimism notwithstanding, the rock fact remains that we have not pierced the German lines nor even pushed him back appreciably. Our soldiers have behaved splendidly, as they always do, but it is no moment for a hymn of victory.

A sad bit of news. General Maunoury, commanding the 6th Army, has been severely wounded; he was with one of his Corps Commanders in the front-line trenches and was looking over the parapet when he was spotted by a sniper fifty yards off. Maunoury has lost one eye and may lose the

sight of the other besides having his jaw-bone broken; General de Villaret was struck at the same time and badly hurt in the head. If no complications supervene it is hoped both Generals will recover, but I started off at once for Villers Cotteret where Maunoury has been brought down. I found him in a sound sleep from which I would not wake him, so I just laid on his sheet the Military Medal which Joffre asked me to take to him. On leaving Maunoury's bedside I paid a visit to a hospital close by where I found comparatively few wounded but numbers suffering from typhoid fever, scarlet fever, diphtheria, measles and meningitis. Yet I am assured the sanitary conditions of the 6th Army are excellent. Poor fellows! They are pouring out their blood for us and exposed at the same time to all these other ills. How shall we ever be able to prove to them our gratitude?

13th.—On enquiry from Delcassé, Paul Cambon states that the Italian memorandum does lay down that if the Allies absorb German territory in Africa, Italy is to have proportionate gains on the frontiers of Erythrea, Somaliland and Libya. Grey did not mention this in the résumé which he sent to Bertie as he thought it of minor importance, and that it might be difficult to make concessions in respect of Somaliland. It is all very well to talk about "minor importance," but when it comes to Erythrea and Libya, it is France who will be put under contribution, and there is no particular reason why this should be so.

According to telegrams from Vienna and Berlin which the Greek Foreign Minister showed to our representative in Athens, the Emperor in Council has agreed that in order to immobilise Italy, she should be offered certain territorial and economic concessions. Italy is obviously enquiring at each door in turn, but she is too shrewd to jump in before she looks well round. Sir Edward has given a list of Italy's claims to Sazonoff, who protests against the total annexation of Istria, and asks that the shores from Cape Planka to the mouths of the Cattaro—and from thence to the Drin—shall appertain to the Slav States. He hopes that Albania may be shared by Greece and Servia, but he has no objection to Italy enjoying the Dodecanese or to her interests being recognised in the

region of Adalia. Shall we ever be able to reconcile all these divergent views and conflicting opinions?

The death of Count de Witte almost amounts to a victory for the Triple Entente. The Tsar did not like him and even made some very sharp remarks about him to myself. But one always had to fear an influence which was generally exercised in favour of Germany. As the price of a rather ready compliance with the designs of Nicholas regarding Constantinople, the British Government, which does not waste time, has just asked that the neutral zone in Persia shall for the future be incorporated in the British zone; to this the Emperor has consented.

Colonel Pénélon, just arrived from G.Q.G., tells me frankly that the operations in Champagne have definitely failed, and Joffre must resign himself to break off. We have, quite uselessly, lost 25,000 men killed, prisoners or wounded, and have expended an enormous amount of ammunition. Everything has been done quite methodically but so slowly that, beyond the trenches taken by us, the Germans had always had time to dig new ones. We have barely gained a few kilometres and Joffre recognises that even if he were to go on with the offensive we should score very little. His idea now is to take advantage of the British successes and allow Foch to try a convergent attack from the two wings of the British Army. The new movement will start to-morrow but these subordinate attacks seem a little haphazard.

Millerand, in full agreement with Joffre, has asked Galliéni to take over Maunoury's command of the Sixth Army which, after a few hours of reflection, he has refused; Galliéni does not say whether he entertains other ambitions or whether he does not see eye to eye with Joffre as to the conduct of the war. Joffre has now proposed General Dubois, whom Millerand has nominated; Dubois is a first-rate Cavalry officer; he has been Commandant of the School at Saumur and Director of his branch of the Service at the War Office, and has distinguished himself greatly with the 9th Corps on the Somme, on the Meuse and on the Yser, indeed wherever he has been engaged.

14th.—Freycinet, who is laid up with a bad cold,

asks me to go and see him ; I found him in his bedroom in a dressing-gown with a damp nose but a perfectly cool head. He tells me that the Army Committee of the Senate is again very irritated against Millerand ; the delegates appointed to visit the various manufactories of arms say they have found everywhere a great lack of organisation. Only 26,000 rifles have been converted and they are not turning out any ; while the order for 500 of the 75's, which Millerand announced, has not yet been put in hand. Freycinet complains that the War Minister does not know how to stir up his underlings, and the Committee have, in spite of their President, inserted some words of blame in their report. I am writing fully to Millerand begging him to be pitiless in the matter of dismissing incompetent or otherwise unsatisfactory officials and reminding him that these vexatious delays do much to prejudice the formation of our new units.

Paul Cambon, who is here, wonders why Paléologue cannot set a term to Sazonoff's ramblings. The Russian Minister seems to spend his time in arranging—on paper—the future of Constantinople. One seems to hear the Duc de Menuail, Comte Spadassin, unfolding to Picrochole his plan of conquest, " Je, dist il, feray doncques bastir le temple de Salomon."

At the same time the Pope is asking if the Catholic rites cannot be restored to St. Sophia. When conveying the message to Jules Cambon, the Archbishop of Paris reminded him that in 1453 when the Turks took the town St. Sophia was a Greek Orthodox Church, and of his own accord he suggested that the wishes of the Vatican might give considerable offence in Russia. Cambon will tell the Archbishop that if the occasion arises another edifice must be devoted to the Catholic religion, but it seems rather puerile to try and make arrangements for a town which is not in our hands.

15th.—Viviani again complains that Millerand is far too secretive and Léon Bourgeois endorses Freycinet's adverse comments. Except Clémenceau, and perhaps Doumer, no one wants a change of Government or military command, but Millerand must make up his mind to keep a tighter hand on things. Pénélon reports another little cloud between Joffre and Sir John ; no one knows precisely why

the latter has broken off the battle of Neuve Chapelle, but Foch, as a result, has also had to call a halt. For me our brilliant success at Vauquois is a cause of real thankfulness and joy, though I think the newspapers exaggerate its importance.

16th.—Viviani has been talking to Millerand and seems happier; the delegates of the Committee only made enquiries at Chatellerault and apparently it is only there that the orders had not been put in hand.

M. Romanos, just back from Athens, reports that Greek policy is unchanged and that the new Government may quite possibly in the near future decide on military intervention; the King—who is under the influence of the Kaiser as much as ever—had said to him: “I don’t believe in any decisive German victory, nor that there will be any real victors or vanquished, so we have to be prudent here.” General d’Amade has left for the Near East with the Expeditionary force; he will disembark under instructions from Sir Ian Hamilton. Kitchener hopes to come to Paris very soon to talk things over with Millerand and Joffre.

17th.—The Swedish Foreign Minister has just told Thiébaud that he believes Austria is about to come to some agreement with Italy, with an offer of Trentino and a rectification of the frontier towards Trieste. One wonders if this really means business or is Italy spreading the story so as to induce us to increase our terms.

18th.—Joffre writes to Millerand that since the eve of the battle of the Marne, the initiative has appertained to the French armies. “The manœuvre which followed our victory there was calculated to bring our left flank to the sea, to give a hand to the Belgians then shut up in Antwerp, and to overrun the enemy’s right. The two first objectives were secured, but thanks to their newly constituted reinforcements the Germans could parry our outflanking movement though they could not drive our left wing back. Since the end of the battle of Flanders, we have set afoot, at selected points, a series of operations with the ultimate object of breaking through the enemy’s lines wherever we could most advantageously exploit any success. This task requires

very large means, but I am still convinced that it is both necessary and capable of accomplishment. Our offensive in Champagne, like the British attack between the La Bassée Canal and the Lys is only a phase of the action with which I shall persevere to the end. The British activities are for the moment suspended ; apart from the question of ammunition I believe that Field-Marshal French is upset by the large number of his casualties. I did my best, however, to back him up and to further any success he had achieved, and owing to our keeping the German reserves busy in Champagne, the British had only inferior troops to deal with ; moreover, owing to their previous inactivity, they were able to spring a considerable surprise. The operations in Champagne had for their second motive the desire to help the Russians ; in this we wholly succeeded as well as in keeping up the morale of our own troops." The letter went on to explain why it was necessary to go easy for a time except for minor efforts largely for the purpose of preventing the enemy from taking the initiative. " The arrival of the new British armies, the creation of our own new units, the full output of war material, will afford the possibility of undertaking concerted actions of the Allied armies. . . . These operations will, I am quite sure, result in the decisive victory which we must seek and secure in the principal theatre of war, apart from what is being sought through diplomatic paths and the economic struggle which is being maintained." To this cheerful allocution was appended a detailed report of the fighting in Champagne—which quoted 326 officers killed or missing, 382 wounded, 14,659 men killed or missing, and 21,923 wounded—but the Ministers were nevertheless inclined to think that Joffre's new projects were somewhat illusory and it is arranged I shall ask him to come to breakfast on Sunday and give us more particulars.

Paléologue has been invited by the Tsar to go to the front where, on the borders of Lithuania and Poland, he has had much talk with His Majesty, the Grand Duke Nicholas and Sazonoff. He has been told that, if the occasion arises, we shall have full liberty of action in Syria and Cilicia, but that Russia will never yield to a Catholic Power the protec-

torate of Jerusalem, Galilee, the Jordan and the Sea of Tiberias. General Janouschkevitch painted the Russian Army in very sombre colours, and the Grand Duke, whom Paléologue found pale, emaciated and greatly aged, and with his features perpetually twitching, said, "Of what incalculable, nay absolutely imperative, value would be the co-operation of Italy and Roumania." It is not easy to reconcile such exacting diplomatic demands with such abject military penury or to fit in the Grand Duke's opinion with Sazonoff's objections.

19th.—A German wireless announces that the *Bouvet* has struck a mine in the Dardanelles, and the news unhappily proves to be true.

The Chambre has sat again to-day, and Viviani tells me that a feverish anxiety seems to prevail, strange rumours are being circulated, and a group of alarmists have faces as long as fiddlestrings and are predicting all sorts of catastrophes.

20th.—Lord Kitchener has put off his visit here for a few days, though his presence is becoming more and more necessary, as Millerand and Augagneur are most anxious to confer with him; the British Expeditionary Force has not yet left England and the Cabinet want d'Amade, whose Division is by now at Lemnos, to go back to Alexandretta. Augagneur has rather gathered from his conversation with Winston Churchill that the Admiralty would like to take action nearer Egypt. There is information to hand as to the move of the British fleet on Chanak; the *Souffren*, *Gaulois*, *Charlemagne* and *Bouvet* steamed forward to fire at closer range on the forts; the *Bouvet* struck a mine and sank within three minutes, only four officers and sixty of the crew being saved; the *Gaulois* is badly damaged and our attempt to force the Narrows—gallantly led by Admiral Guépratte—has definitely failed.

M. Sonnino, the Italian Foreign Minister, tells our Ambassador that there are no actual negotiations with Austria; offers have been made which had to be considered, but are not likely to be a basis of agreement. Sir Edward Grey meanwhile, after consulting France and Russia, has conferred

with Imperiali. Sazonoff is now disposed to allow Italy to sit down in the region of Zara Sebenico, but Grey thinks that her claims, with respect to Dalmatia and the Guarnero Islands, will unduly restrict Serbia's access to the sea. Nothing therefore is settled either in London or Vienna.

21st.—Two Zeppelins paid us an early visit this morning and dropped bombs on the Rue des Dames, the Batignolles and at Neuilly; very few people were hurt but among them two little girls whose father is serving at the front. After breakfast Joffre explains again to us that his operations in Champagne were governed by the necessity of preventing the Germans from demolishing our Russian allies in Poland. He is by no means dissatisfied with the results, but must hold his hand for the time in order to husband his munitions; in the last month he has fired away more stuff than has been manufactured, and his reserve has fallen from 600 to 450 rounds per gun. He means to be busy again about the middle of April, when he will attack at two points and feels sure of getting through. He is perfectly explicit and precise. It is on the Western front that a decision will be arrived at, and this will probably be before the summer, certainly before the autumn. We have in front of us the finest of the German troops and, when these have been accounted for, Germany will be at our mercy; already they are sliding down towards defeat; we are taking many more prisoners than before, and German officers are beginning to give themselves up. As soon as he has ammunition and reinforcements in hand, the Generalissimo will take the steps which will lead to victory. He does not want Kitchener to send us all his new armies, as he thinks that when Sir John has received the troops now arranged for, he will have enough British support, and does not seem to want any more. But he considers it necessary that Sir John should come under his orders and this is a point we must discuss with Kitchener as soon as he comes to Paris. Joffre is a little bitter when speaking of the English; he refuses to give them Dunkirk though Kitchener says he will not, without it, be able to supply his troops. Our General is imbued in this matter with a rather dangerous spirit of controversy against which I try to warn

him, but nothing will move him. I remind him that if we do not come to amicable terms with the English they may send their new armies elsewhere than to France. Joffre says this would not particularly disturb him. "But," I suggested, "suppose Italy should come in and England were to send her troops to Italy; from a political point of view it might be impossible to let England go by herself to support Italy, for we know Italy is casting her eyes more and more towards England and is contemplating a future naval alliance with her in the Mediterranean." "Never, never," said Joffre vehemently, "would I allow any of our troops to be taken from our own front, for it is there the great decision will be registered." Joffre presented this ultimatum with such bluntness and with such fine contempt for the civil power that I felt bound to reply, "General, so far the Government has not made up its mind on this matter, but if it were to decide on sending men to Italy, you would have to bow to their decision." "Then, M. le Président, there would be nothing for me to do except to get myself killed in front of my men," retorted the soldier. "No, my dear General, indeed you would not do so, for it would be an act of disobedience to authority. As guardian of the Constitution, I must maintain the rights of Government, but we are none the less grateful to you for speaking your mind so plainly." Joffre looked straight at me from those wonderful blue eyes, and resumed quite quietly: "I reckon on obtaining some decisive success before the month of May, and when our front is less strung out I will not raise any objection to some of our men being sent elsewhere, if they can be of real use in another theatre of war." The good-humour, the frankness, the gentle obstinacy of the man combine to leave the best impression on the Ministers who feel their confidence in him to be renewed.

22nd.—Briand brings Prince George of Greece to see me. As son-in-law of Prince Roland Buonaparte he is a firm friend of France and he is starting for Athens where he hopes to induce his brother to take up arms. But he wants to be able to assure the King that we will defend his country if she is later attacked by Bulgaria, an assurance which Briand

will give him ; nor does the Prince hide the fact that the prospect of entering Constantinople with the Allies is the chief motive which may determine Greece. Would Russia ever agree to such a partnership ? It is pleasant to telegraph to the Tsar and the Grand Duke my congratulations on the capture of Przemysl, a success which may open for our Allies the chief path to Hungary through Galicia.

The Cabinet has declined a rather wild proposal of General d'Amade that we should send him the Marine Fusiliers, some of them to disembark in the Gulf of Adramit and the others to attack Smyrna, and M. Tittoni who, a day or two ago, joyously announced the almost immediate intervention of Italy, has cooled down suddenly since the loss of the *Bouvet*. The Triple Entente has agreed to give Italy almost all she asks for, but the Italian Cabinet, who want to have as much Greek and Slav as Italian land, forgets their Dante :

*“ Si com'a Pola presso del Quarnaro
Che Italia chiude e suoi termini bagna.”*

The country which has borne none of the early burdens of the war wants to gather the richest fruits of victory, but no promises in the Adriatic or Asia Minor must be made to her which would embarrass the eventual conditions of peace. Roumania, now that Russia is badly held up, begins to assert herself ; Russia with her hand on Constantinople and the Narrows is more silent about Roumania, but agrees with Sir Edward Grey that Bulgaria should be asked to show her game.

Lord Kitchener has told our Military Attaché that the difficulties encountered by the Navy will prevent any landing in the Peninsula till a very careful reconnaissance has been made. At Hamilton's suggestion, Kitchener is directing the British troops to Alexandria and Port Said, and he asks that only a small portion of our contingent shall be kept at Lemnos and the others sent to Egypt. A curious destination for an expedition raised to attack the Narrows.

24th.—The Chambre, I hear, is very irritable with Joffre and Colonel Pénélon tells us that most officers think that he

should either have placed the reserves at the disposal of Langle de Cary in Champagne or should have commanded the operations in person. General Pellé, who has been attaché at Berlin and takes a broad view of things, is going to replace General Belin on the Headquarters Staff, but Joffre is not prone to take any advice or allow any alteration in his plans. No one at Chantilly agrees with the Commander-in-Chief that the war will be over in the summer, and to use up the 1916 class and incorporate the 1917 class in July seems like picking the cherries before they are ripe.

25th.—The operations in the Dardanelles will not be resumed till the 15th April, till then the troops will mark time. The whole scheme is faulty, having been insufficiently thought out in London. It was a conception of the Admiralty too rapidly put into effect without due regard for military difficulties or diplomatic repercussions.

Sir Edward Grey has sent us a note as to Italy's final demands which he thinks we ought to accept at once, and to this we agree although some of us point out what we think amiss as to Servia's portion; Sazonoff has still to sign.

26th.—Pierre Loti has been very anxious to be more actively employed and asks if he could be given some sort of a mission which would enable him to go to Ypres, and to the King of the Belgians. I entrusted to him a letter for the King of the Belgians, who received him most kindly and has written me a charming note as to the pleasure which the visit afforded him. Anyhow, Loti has been able to write for the *Illustration* a little account of his trip and he is duly grateful.

29th.—The last two days have been spent in most interesting visits to Langle de Cary and the 4th Army and afterwards to Sarrail and his 3rd Army. The former is more hopeful than when I last saw him and thinks we have shown that we are more than a match for the enemy. He gives me to understand that had the reserves been within his hand he might have succeeded in piercing the German lines, but he is too discreet and too well disciplined to utter a word of reproach against Joffre. It is clear, however, that by keeping the reserves under the control of G.Q.G. delays occurred

which might have been prevented, and the Germans were quite able to dig and defend a second line of trenches.

Sarrail's outlook is less cheerful than that of the 4th Army Commander ; he sees little chance of penetrating the German lines and would prefer to make an attempt elsewhere, preferably in Belgium. He is very outspoken against Joffre and complains of receiving perpetual orders and counter orders. He also says that the Commander-in-Chief has asked him to report the points of his conversation with me. Whether he is mistrusted, or whether it is I, I don't know, but anyhow for every uniform I meet I get a fresh set of opinions.

30th.—Millerand calls before the Council meeting to tell me of his talk here yesterday with Kitchener, who promises to send us two new Divisions before the end of April, so that Joffre can then relieve two corps in the line and have eight corps for his army of manœuvre. The forts in the Dardanelles have been a good deal damaged by our bombardment, but only one big gun has been put out of action, and the net results are meagre. Winston Churchill wanted to go on with the naval operations without waiting for the soldiers, but the British Admiral advised to the contrary and has had his way. As to the command in France and Flanders, Kitchener quite agrees with Joffre that there should be unity. He gave instructions to Sir John to this effect at the beginning of the war and is ready to repeat them to Paul Cambon for Joffre's benefit if necessary : " Only," he says, " why don't you promote Joffre to be a Marshal ? French is a Field-Marshal and is constantly reminding us that Joffre is only a General." Kitchener still covets Dunkirk, but he has been struck by some of Joffre's remarks and would like the matter to be examined anew by a joint conference on the spot. Kitchener has heard that Germany will declare war on Holland so as to get new naval bases and to have more elbow room in Belgium. " What could we do then," he asked, " to help Holland ? " Joffre's only reply was to lift his hands towards heaven. On the whole, Millerand is largely satisfied by what his British colleague has said to him but thinks that he and Sir John are rather at loggerheads.

Delcassé says it is now ten to one on Italy coming in, but

Sazonoff, who was at one time ready to disregard unduly Serbia's interests, now goes to the other extreme and is inclined to belittle the advantages of Italian intervention. Russia, however, has through Count Benckendorff told Sir Edward that she relies on him to obtain the best possible terms for Serbia, but she is not otherwise going to be obstructionist. All seems ready when Sazonoff, under pretext of not doing violence to Servian feelings, once more faces about and telegraphs to Delcassé that Italy is no longer free not to attack Austria, that she must shed her neutrality, and there is therefore no need to be ultra-generous to her.

31st.—The Triple Entente continues to study the future régime for Constantinople and telegrams daily pass between Paris, London and Petrograd. One would think that our flags were already floating over the Golden Horn and that three religions were disputing for possession of St. Sophia.

CHAPTER IV

The 1917 Class—A telegram from the Crown Princess—Italy—A German Easter Egg—The King and Queen of the Belgians—Morocco and Spain—Sofia—Telegram to the Tsar—What Italy secures—Asphyxiating gas—The London Agreement signed—Irishmen at the Elysée.

APRIL

1st.—Of the five new Divisions, four are to be sent to Joffre who is to use them as he thinks best, but Millerand has warned him that at any moment the Government may require an equivalent number of men for duty in some other theatre of war. Joffre has also been reminded that he is not Generalissimo of the whole French Army but only of the forces on the West Front and that it is for the Government to decide as to the distribution of troops on other fronts; I insisted on this point being made clear for the future, as the idea of an expedition to the Balkans which, at Joffre's urgent entreaty, we discarded in January, may yet be carried into effect. Meanwhile he is incorporating his new Divisions, not by regiments as once he intended but by brigades at the front, and he can then relieve two army corps now in the line and post them to the army of manœuvre.

Lord Kitchener has shown Paul Cambon the instructions, approved by the Cabinet, which he handed to Sir John French on the 9th August in London. They are far from being precise as Millerand understood them to be. It is of course laid down that Sir John is to do his utmost to conform sympathetically with the plans and wishes of the French Commander-in-Chief; but he is to be careful not to expose his troops against superior enemy forces without being assured of the support of the French Army. If operations proposed by Joffre should be of a nature to endanger the

British Army, Sir John is to refer to Lord Kitchener, but the entire responsibility remains with the Field Marshal who is to understand that his command is independent, and that he is not to shelter himself under some order from General Joffre. These instructions have evidently no relation with unity of command and are likely to promote, rather than to prevent disagreement.

Millerand had a great success in the Chambre to-day when making his statement about the census for the 1917 class, and incidentally he was able to say that since the outbreak of the war the number of our heavy batteries had been increased sevenfold. His speech was so admirable and so moving that it may do much to assuage the ill will, inspired by Clémenceau, of the Army Committee. The Chambre, wise enough to recognise the uselessness of frequent sittings, has adjourned till the end of the month.

2nd.—M. Gaston Ador, President of the Red Cross, and some time President of the Helvetic Confederation, has come from Germany, and reports that the moral of the people is quite obviously depressed, and that Switzerland is altogether in our favour. M. Ador is very Francophile and his wishes may colour his thoughts, but his news is no less welcome. The American Relief Commission has begun to do excellent work in Belgium and this is to be extended to our own invaded regions; Germany is however putting every difficulty in the way. The Reichstag has to-day celebrated enthusiastically the centenary of Prince Bismarck. The shadow of the old Chancellor has hovered for the last eight months over the battlefields, and it is quite right, from their point of view, that Germans should remember the man of blood and iron and all he inspired. Negotiations between Russia and Italy drag slowly on under British auspices.

3rd.—German officers are organising more and more solidly the defence of the Dardanelles; any number of waggons loaded with war material have, in these last weeks, arrived at Constantinople, through Roumania and Bulgaria.

4th.—A melancholy Easter Day. General Pütz has been relieved of his command as Joffre was not too pleased with the conduct of operations in Alsace, especially in the Munster

Valley. There will very soon only be in the region of the north, d'Oissel's Division and some rather weak units, who are to support the Belgians. Pütz will command this little army and General Maud'huy, now in charge of the 10th Army, will take charge in the Vosges. General d'Urbal, who has been commanding the IXth and XXth Corps will now command the 10th Army. I hear of many officers who complain about these perpetual changes.

The Grand Duchess Anastasie—our former neighbour at Eze—forwards to me a telegram she has received from her eldest daughter the Crown Princess of Germany, which runs: "Can you make direct appeal to President Poincaré and beg him to stop the harsh treatment which is being inflicted on Lieutenant Schierstaedt of the Cuirassiers of the Guard, and Count Strachwitz, of the Life Guards. They are both prisoners of war and I hear they are in chains and are soon to be sent to do hard labour in Cayenne. I shall be so grateful if you can help in this matter." In her covering letter, the Grand Duchess declines to believe the accusation formulated, but she begs for information which I gave by writing to say that the two officers in question were condemned by a court-martial for looting under arms; they have not gone to Cayenne and they have never been put in chains. They are in France, they are not ill treated in any way and are only performing their sentences in a military prison, quite apart from ordinary criminals. The rumours which have reached Germany are therefore wholly ill-founded.

5th.—Our old acquaintances the *Goeben* and *Breslau* came out yesterday on the Black Sea and made for the Crimean coast. A Turkish cruiser has struck a Russian mine and sunk in the neighbourhood of Odessa.

6th.—Millerand sends me a long confidential note, which has just been put out at G.Q.G. as to the battle of the Marne, but I note there is no mention of the action of the Government in forming Maunoury's Army, nor of their giving orders for the defence of Paris, nor of the way in which Galliéni came to the rescue.

7th.—The communiqués are as dreary as ever. Rain and fog. We take or lose a few trenches, but all the while King

Death is stalking about. Delcassé has made a suggestion as to the Adriatic shores which the Emperor has accepted. The islands of Curzola, Meleda and Lesina will go to Italy; the Sabioncello peninsula will be neutralised. But who knows whether these arrangements will hold good, when Peace comes.

8th.—Another disappointment. Joffre had sent three Army Corps to the north and south of St. Mihiel to try and drive the Germans out; we were told that he was fairly sure of dealing a good stroke, but the thing has missed fire. G.Q.G. blames the weather which was certainly very bad.

9th.—Italy is negotiating and getting herself ready to fight at the same time. Mobilisation is in full swing. A large number of reserve officers have been called up.

10th.—A long discussion in Council as to how the agreement with Italy should be drawn up. Delcassé and several Ministers would have a protocol signed by the four Powers, but Paul Cambon raises the same objection which has occurred to me. There is so far no sort of understanding between England, France and Russia as to what they will respectively enjoy when Peace comes; if we now tell Italy that she can have such and such territories, we thereby put ourselves under the obligation of seeing that she secures them, and if Italy were unable to acquire them by conquest, she might oppose any peace negotiations until we had rendered her *beata possidens*. In other words, we run the risk of being bound to besiege Pola or, if the Serbs were occupying all Dalmatia, to take action against Servia. The Triple Entente would therefore be giving Italy considerable advantages without any reciprocity, as we certainly should not ask for any such sort of guarantee from her. Cambon thinks it would be both just and prudent for us to accept an Italian memorandum with the simple declaration that we shall be very glad to see Italy enter into possession of the properties she wishes for. The Ministers accept Cambon's view, but personally I am sorry there should be left in the text such a phrase as, "In the treaty of peace, Italy will obtain." Again the wording in the Italian memorandum was, "Italy will engage with all her forces against Austria, Turkey and any other Power who may come to their help." Nothing about fighting Germany. Grey and Del-

cassé have altered the Italian sentence into, "Italy will engage with all her forces against all the enemies of the Allies." This phrase has rather alarmed Imperiali who says he must refer it to Rome. In spite of my remonstrance the Council has decided that even if Italy sticks to her own verbiage they will not further insist. "You will see," I could not help saying, "that in a few months you will regret not having followed Paul Cambon's advice."

In the evening with Millerand I took train for St. Pol to pay a visit to that part of the front.

13th.—General d'Urbal, whose headquarters are at St. Pol, was full of admiration for the troops he has just been sent to command, and full of hope as to a new move which Joffre is contemplating in that region; and also very satisfied in that the British reinforcements have enabled him to withdraw his IXth, and part of his Xth Corps from the line. From St. Pol we motored to the Moulin de Bouvigny, which dominates the Black Country, from where we witnessed one of those artillery duels which succeed one another continuously; this portion of the front is now in charge of General Pétain, a tall, strapping, beautifully-groomed soldier who explained with luminous clarity his arrangements and dispositions, but had no illusions as to any blazing success. At Cassel, however, we found Foch as full of zest as ever, and still confident that with the early days of May we may score something like a real decision; he thinks that a way may be found through Arras, and on his big map laid his finger on Fleurus and Waterloo with the words, "There is where we ought to win." General Henry Wilson came in to pay his respects to me; he is a fine-looking fellow, speaking French extremely well, very frank and open in his ideas, very well informed as to our ways, and readier than anyone else to brush away misunderstandings between the two General Staffs.

A long afternoon was spent in Ypres, now almost entirely occupied by British soldiers; we slept at the Sous-Préfecture in Woersten, and yesterday after visiting the billets of the 45th Division and XXth Corps, we breakfasted with General Pütz, who is established in a lawyer's house in Roosbrugge. We then went northwards to Houthem where King Albert

has transferred his headquarters. I found the King very calm with his gentle, though now rather sad, smile, and bearing up with real heroism against the fearful trial which, from sheer patriotism and loyalty, he has incurred. In the afternoon General Hély d'Oissel, whose quarters are in the dune between Ostdunkirke and Nieuport, pointed out our own and the German positions and also showed us a 77 shell, which the Germans had fired into Nieuport forty-eight hours before my arrival, and on which was inscribed in their language: "An Easter egg for M. Poincaré." We paid a brief visit at La Panne to Queen Elisabeth, who, simple, charming and gracious as always, spoke chiefly of the ruins of Ypres, the bombardment of Furnes, and the bravery of the Belgian soldiers, and then from Dunkirk, where I met with the same enthusiastic greeting as last July, we took train for Paris.

On my return, I find that the British Government, attaching special importance to the collaboration of the Greek fleet in attacking the Dardanelles, has suggested that the representatives of the Triple Entente at Athens should inform the Greek Government that in return for their intervention they should be guaranteed the lands already promised to them in the vilayet of Aïdin. Delcassé and Sazonoff have agreed, as also to further gentle pressure on Sofia, but neither Constantine nor Ferdinand seem disposed to be persuaded. Late in the afternoon Delcassé tells me he has seen Tittoni, just returned from Rome, and says the agreement is practically settled; Salandra and Sonnino have accepted Mr. Asquith's final proposals in which Sazonoff, at our request, has concurred. All seems therefore in order.

General Pau comes to tell me of his visit to Russia where he found the Grand Duke Nicholas still full of confidence though woefully short of ammunition; the General also cheerfully assures me that the moral of the Russian Army is excellent, their commissariat, and sanitary arrangements well organised. The dark spot seems the lack of war material. The Grand Duke declared he never told Paléologue that the intervention of Italy and Roumania was indispensable, only that it was very desirable.

14th.—Jules Cambon tells me of a letter from Princess Radziwill which represents the Kaiser as becoming daily more and more “mystic” and superstitious. He went, apparently attended by only one officer, to the Polish frontier where he entered a monastery—whether Protestant or Catholic is not said—asked for a service, at which he assisted, and gave 15,000 marks to the place. In Germany anyone—like Princess Radolin, or Countess Munster—suspected of French sympathies is closely watched and if necessary interned.

At the Trocadero fête for the wounded soldiers this afternoon Sir Francis Bertie told me that in 1909 when the Racconigi agreement was signed, he said to Tittoni who was then at the Italian Foreign Office, “Now that we are friends, why don’t you get away from the Triple Alliance?” “What would be the use of it?” was Tittoni’s reply. “We shall only leave the Triple Alliance when we have to make war against Austria.” I could congratulate the British Ambassador on his last mot, at which he laughed but did not admit as his own. He heard that the Zeppelins would try to bomb the Elysée, and remarking its nearness to his Embassy he hoped “they would make a good shot.”

The King of Spain has written me a long letter as to some minor incidents in Morocco on the frontier of the two spheres of influence; these for the most part have been exaggerated or imperfectly reported, and in my reply I can do much to explain them away, and anyhow can assure the King that our interests in Morocco are closely knit and that the fact of our being neighbours there should do much to draw tighter the bonds between France and Spain. Marshal Lyautey wholly favours close collaboration between the countries, but our agents are not always too happy in carrying this policy into effect.

15th.—Attacks and counter-attacks near Berry au Bac, in Argonne, the Bois d’Ailly, the Bois de Mortmaze with the usual dull, dreary, windy communiqués.

Prince George of Greece has asked our Minister in Athens to inform Delcassé that he is coming back to Paris charged with a message as to Greek intervention; he begs that all

pourparlers should be kept very secret, and it would seem that the internationalisation of Constantinople is for Greece a *sine qua non*. And it looks very much as if the Greek Government wants to play a trick on Venizelos and, so as to keep the pot simmering, to resume the conversations which they themselves broke off. Meanwhile they claim that during, and for a period after, the war the Allies shall guarantee the integrity of these inland and Island properties, including northern Epirus. Italy is giving up her claim to Sabioncello and only asks that the coast line, credited to Servia, from Cape Planca shall not be neutralised ; but she wants to have all diplomatic responsibility for the future autonomous State of Albania, and to this Grey raises no objection. Italy has further to say that she cannot take the field until a month after the agreements have been signed.

16th.—Count Ehrensward, former Foreign Minister in Sweden, has told our Minister in confidence of the impressions he gathered during his recent stay in Germany. Young soldiers are seen about everywhere ; 1,000,000 well trained men will very soon be sent to both fronts ; one must not count on the shortage of food to shorten the war ; the bread is horrible but the German manages very well on meat and fish which have not gone up in price ; they still hope to win, but are no longer sure of doing so ; they would agree to the sort of peace which would mean *statu ante quo*.

17th.—G.Q.G., convinced that the battle in Champagne (concluded on 20th March after a series of miniature and costly successes) could have been won if only certain things had been done, is now preparing for next month a new attack in Artois. But meanwhile, in spite of the bad weather, there has been set afoot an offensive in Woevre, in the Etain-Saulx sector. Gales and mud have hampered our movements and little has been gained except that we have taken the spur of the Eparges, which dominates the plain, but from which we have not been able to descend on to the other slope of the banks of the Meuse ; the wireless from Nauen publishes that the attack has failed.

Sazonoff tries to resume the policy of intimidating and threatening Bulgaria, although for 35 years this has always

meant Russia having to swallow a nasty pill. Grey wants to try gentle measures and say at Sofia that the Allies will use their influence for the benefit of Bulgaria; Panafieu thinks this too vague and that we must promise that Bulgaria, at the end of the war, shall have the western frontiers as proposed in the 1912 treaty. Failing this there is no hope from that quarter. It is thought this one last effort should be made and Delcassé is to consult Grey and Sazonoff as to this. Briand, who has seen Princess Marie of Greece, hopes we shall not further delay in making some reply to the *démarche* of the Greek Government. Cavalla is a difficulty, and we have to walk warily on that point, nor can we admit that the King should impose on us the break up of the Ottoman Empire.

Joffre has been to see me, and I told him, as a secret, about Italy; he maintains that Italy's help, to be really effectual, should be active in the first days of May. If not, the Russian offensive in the Carpathians may be held up by an Austro-German thrust. It is essential that Austria should be immobilised in Trentino and round Trieste, and she ought to be forced to send fresh troops to that quarter. Otherwise if Russia should unhappily be beaten or paralysed, Germany might withdraw several Army Corps from the eastern front and bring them back to France. Joffre said there was no question of their piercing our front but we might be badly handicapped in our next offensive which he wants to take place early in May; the English will be ready by then and Sir John's mind is made up. One quite understands why Sazonoff is so keen to have the Italians in arms with us as quickly as possible. Joffre tells me that in Woevre fifty of our 75's exploded, either as a consequence of faulty shells, or wear and tear of the guns, or too rapid firing bursts. Everything is being done to make good and prevent a recurrence of such happenings but the matter of our guns requires the closest watching.

Paléologue telegraphs to say there was a month's delay in the delivery of my last letter and to explain how the growing claims of Russia came about. On the 25th September Sazonoff started this hare; he then thought that the freedom of the Narrows should be safeguarded by some international organ-

isation, and by a Russian fort at the entrance to the Bosphorus. On the 2nd November, Turkey declared war, and on the 12th, the King of England in conversation with the Russian Ambassador, used a very decisive phrase: "Constantinople ought to be yours." Two days later, Buchanan said very distinctly to the Russian Government, "The question of Constantinople and of the Narrows ought to be settled according to Russia's wishes." On the 21st November, the Tsar summoned Paléologue to Tsarskoe Selo and confided to him his ideas as to the general base on which a future Peace should rest. In the course of the interview, Nicholas declared that he was resolved to turn the Turks out of Europe and expressed his desire to annex southern Thrace up to the Enos-Medea line to Russia. He had no fixed ideas as to the future régime for Constantinople but he thought the town should be neutralised with an international status. Finally on the 4th March, influenced as he was by the consistent British promises, the Emperor of Russia finally decided to claim for his country Constantinople, southern Thrace and the Adriatic shore of the Bosphorus. Paléologue is clear that until he received my letter he had received no instructions which ran contrary to the projects of the Emperor, and it is unfortunately quite true that on this point Delcassé had left the path free for Russian ambitions, without daring to obstruct it.

18th.—The Tsar and Sazonoff stipulate that Italy must enter the field by the 1st May. Operations in the Carpathians and round Cracow are in full swing and the Grand Duke must know at once whether, or no, he must meet the whole of the Austro-German forces on his way to the Oder. Paul Cambon thinks that this demand is unjustifiable, and Sir Edward and Delcassé are to say so to Sazonoff who is now as keen as he was formerly languid about Italian intervention. Both Joffre and Paléologue remind us that it is a strategic rather than a diplomatic question; the Grand Duke has given way so far as to say he will be content if Italy publishes on the 1st May her adhesion to the Triple Entente, but now Grey considers she cannot do this until she is actually ready to fight. A vicious circle from which it is difficult to emerge.

19th.—To try and secure finality I am telegraphing

directly to the Tsar. "Dear and great friend, Your Majesty will permit me to say how dangerous I consider to be the delay in our endorsement of the Italian memorandum. General Joffre, like H.I.H. the Grand Duke Nicholas, is anxious that Italy's entry into the field should be at as early a date as possible, but the only way to hasten this is to sign at once the agreement. So long as this remains unsigned, there is always the fear that negotiations might be compromised by unforeseen circumstances. On the other hand once bound by the signatures of the Entente, Italy must assume her activities as soon as she is fully equipped to do so, and we can ourselves help to bring this about. The delay for which she asks can be shortened as soon as she is effectively our ally, but we have here certain proof that she is not asking for the respite in order to fail us, that she has to take certain preliminary steps, and that in refusing her a short breathing space we run the risk of her maintaining her neutrality. Better that she should take up arms for us a little late than never. Your Majesty, whose consciousness of the interests of the allies is so lofty and so enlightened, will certainly not hesitate to ward off a rupture which might have the direst consequences. It is evident that Italy cannot publish her adhesion to the agreement of the 5th September 1914 until the day she enters the field. The longer we put off signing, the longer we prevent her from making public what she then did. I beg you to allow the urgency of the case to be my plea for thus telegraphing direct to Your Majesty, and I beg you to believe in my unswerving and devoted friendship."

But Italy's help, however precious, is going to cost us dear. She is claiming at once the lion's share; Trentino, the Cisalpine Tyrol with the frontier of Brenner, Trieste, the counties of Gorizia and Gradisca, the whole of Istria up to the Quarnero, including Volosca, and the Istrian islands, Cherso, Lussin, the little islands Plaverik, Unie, Canidole, Palazzuoli, San Pietro di Nembi, Asinello, Gruica and the neighbouring islets. She is also to acquire the Province of Dalmatia within the existing administrative boundaries, the islands north and west of this province, Valona, the island of Sasseno; she is now in possession of the Dodecanese; she has obtained the

neutralisation of a large part of the Adriatic coast, and is to have diplomatic charge of Albania ; if Turkey in Asia is in any way divided up, she wants a slice of the region near Adalia ; she is to have " equitable compensation " if France and England take over any German colonies in Africa, (her eye is now resting on the frontiers of Erythrea, Somaliland and Libya) with the reservation that she cannot touch our colony Obock Djibouti. She stipulates, further, that her allies will agree with her in forbidding any representative of the Holy See from taking part in any future peace negotiations, and finally she asks that a military convention shall forthwith determine the minimum force which Russia shall employ against Austro-Hungary to prevent that Power from concentrating her efforts against the Italian army.

In return Italy undertakes to fight with all her forces alongside the Triple Entente. This diplomatic bargain seems to have whetted the appetite of Count Romanones, the leader of the Liberal Party in Spain and a firm Francophile. In a speech just lately he has claimed Tangier for his country's sphere of influence and protested against the internationalisation of that port.

20th.—The Grand Duchess Anastasie writes to me from Eze that she has telegraphed to her daughter, who has just given birth to a little girl, " Neither chains nor Cayenne." The Grand Duchess asks if she may send my letter as it stands to her daughter, and a copy of it to her " charming son-in-law the King of Denmark," to which I agree ; she gives vent to her sympathies and sorrow for her Russia, and adds : " I am of course outside politics, but one must have one's own thoughts ; when you made your tour of the North beginning with my beautiful country, knowing what a partisan of peace you were, I said to myself that advantage would be taken of your being at sea to make the pourparlers more difficult."

Prince George comes to my room to tell me of his visit to Athens. But the British Government have asked us to be very chilly with regard to any proposals he makes ; they are sure that the one idea of his brother and himself is to do a bad turn to Venizelos. Of course I listen politely to what the Prince has to say. King Constantine and the Government

are, he assures me, inclined to side with the Entente, and their conditions are not difficult, the text setting them out was badly worded and could be revised. Greece could not consent to give up Cavalla ; other matters might be arranged. I could only say that I would much like the entente proposed, but that it was a question for the Government. Prince George frankly says in his opinion an entente with Greece would be much easier to arrange if we were at once to break with Bulgaria, and help Greece to fight. In other words, the co-operation which King Constantine wants is one in which he would get a good deal more than give.

Delcassé says King George has telegraphed, like myself, to the Tsar begging him to speed up the agreement with Italy.

21st.—The acts of savagery are unceasing ; twenty incendiary bombs have been dropped over Rheims.

Paléologue telegraphs that at long last the Russian Government consents to sign the agreement with Italy, although the Russian Ambassador in London has been instructed to make a certain number of reservations in favour of Montenegro, Servia and Greece, and the Tsar has telegraphed to me : " Very Dear and Great Friend, Fully conscious of the utility we shall derive from Italy's help which might do much to shorten the war—(words left out)—concession to Italian demands, although these are very considerable and, at many points, in conflict with the aspirations of the Slavs whose sacrifices cause me to fear danger in the future. The entrance into the lists of Italy only seems valuable if it takes place at once, and I cannot conceal from you that I received a very bad impression when, having obtained all they asked for, the Cabinet at Rome wished to postpone their active co-operation which they themselves had announced for the end of April new style. However, since you make appeal to me by invoking the interests of the allied countries I will not raise any opposition to the signing of the agreement with Italy, and I have entrusted my Government with the full powers necessary to do so. Declining therefore the formula suggested in London as to the date of execution of the Franco-Russian agreement, I prefer to think that the Allies will mutually

continue to urge Italy to hasten her intervention. I rely, moreover, on the belief that all the other engagements agreed on between the allies before the coming in of Italy will remain unchanged. Please believe in my feelings of sincere and constant friendship."

22nd.—In acknowledging the Tsar's telegram, I underline that the entente of the 5th September, which forbids any separate peace, remains intact. Italy has moreover agreed to this herself.

The Spanish Ambassador in London has let Sir Edward Grey know of his Government's wish to acquire Tangier, on account of the various changes in the basin of the Mediterranean; the British Foreign Minister has prudently reserved his answer until the end of the war, and after England has studied the question with France.

23rd.—Yesterday, north of Ypres, between the Canal and the Staden railway line, a thick cloud of gas was vomited on to our lines; the French and Canadian troops, who had no masks or any other protection against this poison gas and who were of course wholly taken unawares by this new method of attack fell back at first south of Pilken and Poelcappelle. The Belgian Grenadier Guards, the corps d'elite, gallantly seized and hung on to the position where the British and French troops had been asphyxiated. To-day we have sent up fresh troops who, in close touch with the Belgian and British, will try to recover the ground which was lost. Science is indeed becoming the accomplice of crime. Since January the Germans have used a poisoned gas shell, which they call Shell T; but since then they seem to have formed a department to deal with the ingredients of asphyxiating vapours. This is nothing more or less than to organise assassination and, unhappily, if we are to defend ourselves we must in future employ the same weapons.

Italy and Russia are still bandying certain points, such as the neutrality of the Montenegrin coast, and what is to go to the Slav States of the Adriatic, but a definite agreement seems now to be imminent.

24th.—M. Blondel* continues to complain of Russian

* French Minister to Athens.

diplomatic blunders ; he is really afraid that Sazonoff may end by alienating Roumania from us. The *Journal Officiel* publishes rules for the award of the Croix de Guerre, Parliament having decided to create a special decoration for conspicuous acts of individual gallantry. It is a bronze cross, with two crossed swords on one side ; on the obverse is a head of the Republic with Phrygian cap adorned with a laurel crown ; the ribbon is green with a red edging.

As I am leaving this evening for the front, and as I do not like to telegraph direct to the King of Italy for fear of indiscretion, I have asked Tittoni to come here and have begged him to express to his Sovereign my keen satisfaction. The Ambassador says the agreement is as good as signed ; he has been summoned himself to Rome but is sure that no further difficulty has arisen.

25th.—Millerand and I dined and slept last night at the Sous-Préfecture of Compiègne where we were met by General Dubois, now in command of the 6th Army, poor General Maunoury being, alas, quite blind. This morning we made our way through a narrow and winding communication trench as far as the observation post at Ollancourt where the view extends over the German lines and over the communes of Bailly and Tracy le Val which are in German hands. The enemy's trenches are well within sight, but that sector is just now quite quiet. General Ebener, commanding the XXXV Corps, took us to see the batteries and defended positions and near Rethondes, Joffre joined us for an inspection of two newly formed regiments, part of Ebener's corps, to whom I presented their colours.

26th.—After a long day full of interest which included an inspection, just south of Grand Rozoy, of the 89th Territorial Division and a brigade of the 55th Division newly arrived from the north, I returned to Paris to find among a heap of telegrams a bitter complaint from the King of Bulgaria that his appointment of M. Guénadieff to succeed M. Stancioff as his Minister here, has not yet received our approval. Panafieu is rather nervous ; if Ferdinand is wounded in his *amour propre* he may seize the opportunity to take some sinister step.

A general attack was launched yesterday in the Dardanelles. The Army, covered by the Fleet, began to land at dawn at different points on the peninsula, and before nightfall a very considerable force had dug themselves in ; the War Office is highly pleased with the way in which the landing was effected.

The agreements with Italy have at last been signed to-day in London.

The Kaiser has just sent through Bucharest to the Queen of Greece a telegram *en clair*, of which Blondel has given us the text. " The Russian offensive in the Carpathians is definitely broken off, the Russians have lost there 100,000 men ; their losses since the beginning of the war are upwards of 700,000 men and 60,000 officers. Victory for us is assured ; this I can guarantee you. Woe to those who lift their hand against me. Love to Tino." Wilhelm is the same Wilhelm as ever. *Moi, moi, moi : ich, ich, ich.*

27th.—For the healthy breezes which one enjoyed those two days at the front, the heavy and troubled political atmosphere in Paris is a bad exchange. Before the meeting of the Council, Viviani confides to me his worries. G.Q.G. he complains still keep themselves isolated in their ivory palace and conceal the real truth about the recent fighting, especially in Woevre. Ribot reproaches Millerand for the bargains with America which he is piling up ; our exchange is deteriorating ; it will soon mean having to export gold and the bank note will suffer ; we really must put the brake on with respect to the bills we are running up in America. Also, owing to lack of some arrangement, we are competing with England in our purchases, and the prices are being put up accordingly. Ribot begs me to speak to Millerand, so I bring the two together in my own room and the War Minister promises to do what his colleague urges on him.

Late in the evening the Roumanian Minister, M. Lahovary, comes to see me ; he has heard of our arrangement with Italy and he says again that Roumania will take the field, but he speaks of the Banat, and of Czernowitz, of the line from the Pruth in Bukovina, and he even throws out a hint about Bessarabia. Meanwhile Bratiano has written personally to Delcassé also mentioning the Banat and the Ruthenian

portion of Bukovina. Having neither right nor reason to encourage such high hopes, I abstain from any sort of promise and merely tell Lahovary once more that if Roumania becomes our ally, we shall be very glad to do our very best to help her.

28th.—The King of England telegraphs to me :

“ Although the fact cannot be disclosed yet, I wish to take the earliest opportunity to express to you most confidentially my deep sense of the assistance which you have rendered in the delicate negotiations with Italy which have to-day been brought to a successful issue—and my earnest hope that the co-operation of our new Ally will tend to hasten our complete victory. I follow with much interest the gallant deeds of the valiant French troops and congratulate you warmly on their successes.

“ GEORGE R. & I.”

My reply to His Majesty conveys in its turn my greetings and best wishes.

We hear that the armoured cruiser *Léon Gambetta* was torpedoed at the entrance of the Otrante Canal on the night of the 26th. The Italians have sent help to save the crew, and a telegram has gone to King Victor Emmanuel to express our gratitude. All the officers died at their posts, but 136 men have been rescued.

This morning shells of huge calibre fell on Dunkirk from some position north of Nieuport, that is to say at a range of about 30 kilometres ; another surprise which German science had in store for us.

29th.—Millerand has decided to send another Division under General Baillou to the Dardanelles ; General Gouraud will be in supreme charge of our contingent.

M. de Léon brings me another autograph letter from King Alphonso. After thanking me for my letter to him, the King goes on to say : “ There must be some original mistake in the Moroccan régime which stultifies our efforts. I think our two Governments should study the question in that brotherly spirit worthy of the peoples we direct, so that Morocco may be,

as you and I agree it should be, the constant expression of our friendship and of our joint interests. I will not tire you with a long letter but Quinones de Léon, who brings it to you, will give you further details of my ideas and feelings." No one knows better than I how genuine are the King's feelings of friendship for France. But what is it exactly he wants? Quinones de Léon with some hesitation tells me that Spain would like some change to be made in the control of Tangier. He does not say more and I can only reply that, after the war, we will do all we can to tighten the bonds between Spain and France and that I will let the Government know what is in the King's mind. There is however a French colony in Tangier who are protesting, in advance, against any sort of cession to Spain of the town and the port.

30th.—Some deputies, among them Franklin Bouillon and Leygues, bring to the Elysée a delegation of Irish M.P.'s. Mr. T. P. O'Connor who heads the deputation in place of Mr. Redmond who is ill, is a very keen partisan of ours, and Sir Edward Grey has cordially commended him to me. Mr. O'Connor, in the name of the Irish Party, gives a very fervent address reminding me of the links of relationship and friendship which have bound the French and Irish together. "As one of the branches of the Celtic race, how could we forget that France is the greatest of all Celtic countries? The century-old quarrel between England and Ireland is happily almost at an end, so with no less keenness than the other peoples of the British Empire the Irish, faithful to this past, have set themselves to defend the sacred cause of liberty and justice. . . . We have been as proud as you yourselves to see this last invasion stemmed by the indomitable energy and heroism of the French people. . . . It will be the pride of the Irish for generations to come to think that our soldiers have borne their part in this heroic struggle. . . . To-day from every Irish lip the cry goes up, 'Long live a one and undivided France.' This cry the Irish race will cause to echo through the world." In reply I can add to my words of deep appreciation and gratitude: "The war will be a definite and solemn consecration of our brotherhood; that blood which our common ancestors have given us is being poured out by us

together with the same courage, in the same bitter fights, against the same enemies and for the same sacred cause. Soon the reward will be found in the same victories."

King Victor Emmanuel has thanked me very amiably for my telegram of thanks but says no word of Italy's entry into the war. The watchword of the Cabinet in Rome is silence, and our censorship takes care night and day that no mention shall be made in the Press of the signature of the agreement.

CHAPTER V

A Report of the Army Committee of the Senate—Naval Negotiations with Italy—The *Lusitania* torpedoed—The Battle of Arras—Prince George of Greece—Resignation and return to office of the Salandra Cabinet—Russia and Roumania—Greece and Bulgaria—What Austria offered to Italy—Pierre Loti as diplomatist.

MAY

1st.—Another gala at the Trocadero for the wounded. The place is packed with wounded and convalescent soldiers. Deschanel delivers a really fine speech in which he makes kindly allusion to myself; less amiable is Clémenceau in this morning's *Homme Enchaîné*. He spares none of us and accuses the Ministers and myself of nothing less than conspiring against Parliament. In the last weeks few have escaped Clémenceau's criticisms; Salandra and Sonnino, Bratiano*, President Wilson, Gounaris, and the Pope himself have all been told what they ought, and ought not, to do.

I have just seen General Bailloud who is off to the Dardanelles with the 2nd Division; he looks rather tired and seems a little anxious. Millerand is sending d'Amade on a special mission so Gouraud will be in command of the two Divisions.

2nd.—We have arranged as to our payments to America for which Morgan's Bank will draw on the Bank of England.

We now know that the systematic bombardment of Dunkirk is from a long range gun somewhere between Dixmude and Mercken; the inhabitants go about their business without fuss or fear.

A long talk with Viviani and Millerand as to a report which Paul Doumer has handed to the Army Committee and

* Roumanian Prime Minister.

which is a positive indictment against Millerand and the War Office. The Committee has come to the conclusion that when we started the war we had less than 3,000,000 rifles of the 1886 type which would be only the amount necessary for a very short campaign ; that since the beginning of August over 700,000 rifles have disappeared and that now in the eighth month of the war not a single rifle has been manufactured ; that only a few rifles of the 1874 type has been converted, and that neither method nor energy have been shown as regards the manufacture of what is so vitally necessary, and that the administrative arrangements for the future are quite inadequate. Even greater and more immediate would seem the danger as regards field guns. At the beginning of the war there were 4,700 of the 75's, in other words, just enough to give 30 batteries to each of the Army Corps in the field apart from the Artillery allotted to independent Divisions. A report from M. Charles Humbert on the 17th March showed that 447 guns had disappeared in the course of fighting—since when a great number have suffered the same fate—and 122 had exploded ; altogether, it was stated, no less than 500 explosions had occurred. A very large output of new guns was of course imperatively necessary, but what has been done falls very far short of what ought to have been done. The workshop at Bourges, the only Government establishment for the manufacture of bombs, has with great difficulty managed to turn out 24 per week during March, whereas the minimum should have been 36 ; nor up to now has the War Office utilised the resources of private industry open to them. The position as regards heavy artillery is equally unhappy ; the 105's, which were put in hand in 1913, have been delivered very slowly both before and since the declaration of war, and of the 48 guns received and put into use, 18 have exploded. The report tells the same sorry story as to siege artillery, aircraft, munitions, explosives, and other material for the army in the field. I have questioned Viviani and Millerand very closely as to the different points brought up by the Committee, and I begged them once more to let me have a precise statement as to what is being turned out and as to what steps are being taken for future supplies. Millerand assures me

that nothing has been overlooked either by himself or by his colleagues, and that the depressing report is very prejudiced.

3rd.—In the Dardanelles our troops have repulsed a very violent attack and moved forward, but at the price of about 1,000 men per regiment; the English troops have suffered casualties amounting to nearly half their strength. General Gouraud has been to see me before leaving for the Near East; he seems very pleased at the thought of fighting on foreign soil where he hopes for something like real activity. and thinks we shall require Mitylene as a naval base for our operations in the Dardanelles.

M. Tittoni, just back from Rome, brings me the thanks of the King of Italy for the wishes which I conveyed to him; Victor Emmanuel agrees with me that France and Italy are laying solid foundations of friendship in the future. I have now in my hands the precise text of the Agreement signed in London on the 26th April between Paul Cambon, Sir Edward Grey, Imperiali and Benckendorff, and of the Military Convention attached to it, and Tittoni is quite clear and explicit that the arrangements will be put into effect without delay. Italy undertakes to employ all her resources in prosecuting the war alongside of France, Great Britain and Russia against all our enemies; she therefore cannot long delay breaking off with Germany as with Austria. Tittoni, however, after giving me these assurances, has a word to say about Roumania. The King of Italy, he tells me, is very anxious that Roumania should co-operate with us in the very near future and he says we must try our best to induce Russia to make certain concessions. To this I replied that Roumania was still maintaining her original claims. "True," said the Ambassador, "and as regards the Banat the King thinks that we ought not to disoblige Servia too far, but that Russia might be well inspired to give way a little about Bukovina." I quite agreed that it was much better in this matter to obtain concessions from a great Power rather than impose them on a small one, but that Russia had agreed with Roumania as to an ethnical distribution, and that the Pruth was scarcely an ethnical frontier. Tittoni persisted that it was in Russia's own interests to be generous and that she might anyhow

consent to give a little bit of Bessarabia. I had no opinion to offer on this point and could only say that we would do our best to bring about mutual concessions, but that the first thing was to unite in winning the war.

A long visit from Léon Bourgeois who shares the anxiety of the Committee. I was able to put him right on one or two points of the report, and I tried to show him that Millerand does not deserve anything like the blame that has been laid on him, and that by sheer determination he has achieved some very considerable results, such as, for instance, persuading Joffre to spare sufficient Army Corps to make up a very considerable Army of Manœuvre. Bourgeois was agreeably surprised by this bit of news and said that for the most part criticisms were due to uneasiness. I suggested he was going the best way to create an atmosphere of general uneasiness. "Do all you can," I urged, "to stimulate the Government—nothing could be better—but don't go about belittling their efforts. If you think them incompetent, turn them out, but don't tie their hands and don't undermine their authority by demands which are nothing less than indictments." Bourgeois then alluded very bitterly to the explosions; he was much irritated by Millerand telling the Committee that they had had to sacrifice quality to quantity. My friend is very unhappy about this disagreement between the War Minister and the Committee and in his excitement begins to support me which I beg him to continue to do, and on his leaving I asked him to come and see me often and to be quite sure that I would personally do my utmost to speed up the manufactures.

4th.—Augagneur's difficulties with the Naval Committee of the Chambre are scarcely less than those of Millerand with the Army body. Admiral Bienaimé, a deputy, has just handed me a report which contains a very sharp criticism of the slackness of Admiral Boué de Lapeyrère and of the suspected ill-will of the Minister towards the Committee.

On the other hand Millerand fears that Augagneur has kept rather too stiff a lip in pourparlers about the Naval Convention with Italy; nothing has yet been settled and the Italian delegates do not seem quite satisfied. Augagneur explains to us that Italy wanted to entrust the command of

the Allied fleets in the Mediterranean to the Duc d'Abruzzi, and he added that he would rather resign than allow our squadrons to come under the orders of a foreign Admiral even if it were only to be in the Adriatic.

The Cabinet has rather light-heartedly entrusted M. Raynaud, a former Colonial Minister, with a Mission to look after certain purchases of corn in Russia. M. Raynaud, who has never quite forgiven me for allowing the Viviani Cabinet to be reconstructed without him last August, has nevertheless had the courtesy to come and see me before his departure. He has been under the altogether erroneous impression that I was responsible for his being left out of the Government whereas I had only advised Viviani to enlarge the Cabinet ; he is one of those who has given rein to feelings of animosity in the couloirs of the Palais Bourbon ; one dares to hope that his Mission, with which I have nothing to do, may calm down his feelings of resentment.

A long visit this afternoon to the Cochin Hospital where there are a large number of Moroccan, Algerian and Tunisian patients ; the loyalty of these native soldiers is really admirable, and foul fall the day that we forget our debt of gratitude to the Mussulman peoples of our African colonies.

5th.—Viviani and Millerand attended the meeting of the Army Committee yesterday where everything seems to have gone off well ; the question of rifles was treated yesterday, and this afternoon the guns and explosions are to be dealt with.

Commandant Herbillon tells me that the Italian officers who have come here find Augagneur very difficult to deal with ; I asked Augagneur to come and see me with Viviani and Delcassé with the idea of begging him, if necessary, to sugar his words a little. Apparently it is not a question of the command which is the stumbling-block ; the Italians no longer want to put our Admiral under the Duc d'Abruzzi, but they have unfolded a plan of action which the British Admiralty and our own Staff alike think to be very risky. The Italians want to send at once some big ships to the north of the Adriatic in spite of the mines and submarines, while Lapeyrère, no less than the English, thinks that we can only adventure

lighter vessels in those quarters. It has therefore been suggested to the Italians that the Duc d'Abruzzi shall be in command of the Italian fleet which he will constitute as seems best to him and to which England and France will contribute a certain number of smaller craft, submarines, torpedo-boats, etc. The large French ships will remain under the orders of Lapeyrère, but if the Austrians come out of Pola, the Duc d'Abruzzi can call on our Admiral who will bring up his fleet in support but will retain command; the Italian delegates have accepted this idea but before signing they want to refer it to Rome.

Gabriele d'Annunzio, who has been living in France these last months, was at Genoa yesterday where he stirred a large audience to wild enthusiasm with the wonderful appeal: "What do you want, Genoese? What do you want, Italians? To diminish or aggrandise the country? Surely you desire an Italy greater than ever, not by acquisition but by conquest, Non a misura di vergogna, ma a prezzo di sangue et di gloria. Fiat! Fiat! Si faccia! Si compia! Viva San Giorgio armato! Viva la giusta guerra! Viva la piu grande Italia!" This evening and during the next days d'Annunzio is to continue his patriotic campaign among his fellow countrymen.

I have received with the accustomed ceremonial the new Portuguese Minister M. de Bettencourt Rodriguez; we exchanged some cordial words as to the deep-rooted friendship that exists between our two countries, but no allusion was made to the war which looks as if it will go on for ever.

Millerand has sent me detailed replies to the criticisms of the Army Committee as well as to the questions which I put myself. There have certainly been mistakes and miscalculations, but the Committee has painted things with rather too dark a brush. Viviani and Millerand attended the Committee again to-day and finally agreed to accept the permanent co-operation which the Senators offered.

Mr. Winston Churchill has come to Paris to sign the Naval Convention with Italy; Joffre is starting this evening for the North as d'Urbal's Army, in close touch with the English, is about to take the offensive.

7th.—The Italian delegates have not yet received a reply

from their Government as to the Naval Convention. The mills grind very slowly.

The offensive has not yet begun as neither to-day nor yesterday was the weather suitable for aircraft ; Joffre is not yet off to Doullens where he is going to transfer his headquarters.

M. Ribot has been very successful in the Chambre to-day in expounding the Bill to raise the limit of the issue of Treasury Bonds, Ordinary Bonds and National Defence Bonds to six milliards. He paid a fine tribute to the financial effort which the country has made to sustain the efforts of the soldiers ; he was loudly applauded and secured a unanimous vote.

The steamship *Lusitania*, that " magnificent greyhound of the seas," on her way from New York has been torpedoed by a German submarine eight miles to the south-east of Old Kinsale point on the Irish coast. There were nearly two thousand souls aboard, of whom many were Americans, and less than 800 have been rescued. Such, in the twentieth century, is European civilisation.

8th.—The Naval Convention is not yet signed as the delegates are waiting for instructions which do not arrive.

Maurice Barrès begged me to attend this afternoon, at the Théâtre Français, the répétition générale of the play M. Frondaie has taken from " Colette Baudoche ; " he says that of course it is not the moment to go to the theatre, but that " Colette Baudoche " is something a little out of the ordinary. My admiration for the novel and my friendship for the author, great as they are, would scarcely have induced me to pay a visit to the theatre at this time had not the performance been for the benefit of Alsace and Lorraine, and had not the ladies interested brought great pressure to bear on Madame Poincaré to induce me to be present. M. Frondaie has prolonged the subject of the book until after the Battle of the Marne, and in the last act Asmus reveals himself as odiously brutal ; the play must have been extremely difficult to adapt but it scored a very remarkable success, and Marie Lecomte, who acted the heroine, Madame Pierson and M. Féraudy of course played their parts to perfection.

Viviani and Millerand are hauled up every day for three or four hours before the Parliamentary Committees, and Millerand says he is really becoming quite exhausted. The Army Committee of the *Chambre*, not to be outdone by that of the Senate, have framed a resolution to the effect that the War Minister renders their task impossible of accomplishment and that they reserve to themselves the right of sending delegates when they please either into the Army zone or into the interior. Millerand was up before this Committee yesterday when the President, General Pédoya, read out this Resolution and asked him what he had to say in reply. The Minister quietly said he had no reply to offer, that he was quite ready to work in with the Committee but could not allow them to stand in his shoes. He then left the room. Pédoya rushed off after him to the War Office, and asked in suppliant tones if that was his last word. "Yes," replied Millerand, "and if necessary the *Chambre* will judge between us." The Minister is perfectly right to insist on governing himself; the Committee, elected by the *Chambre*, is quite right in its wish to exercise control. Is it quite impossible to reconcile the respective rights and to distinguish what is advisory from what is operative?

9th.—Accompanied by General Duparge I have been to-day by car to Cagny, a few kilometres from Amiens where are the headquarters of the 2nd Army under General de Castelnau. There I heard the first news of the offensive started this morning at Arras; the thing went well at the beginning and we took several lines of trenches, but Castelnau does not think any very important result will be derived, and contrary to the opinion of Joffre he thinks we may have to look for a decision in some other theatre of war, Italy or the Danube. In the afternoon we went close up to the lines which pass about halfway between Compiègne and Noyon and visited several gun-positions and observation posts, making our way across the woods through long communication trenches. In front of us, in the valley of the Oise, was the village of Pimprez occupied by the Germans; not a man to be seen among the half-destroyed houses. In the orchards, among the ruins, the apple trees are in blossom but everything seems deserted and

everything would be calm just now if on our right there were not in progress an artillery battle north of the forest of Laigle. General Castelnau left us at Machemont and we came back to Paris by Compiègne. A beautiful day; Nature in smiles; humanity in tears.

P 751

10th.—Roumania is negotiating at Petrograd, Rome, Paris, and London: but there is nothing further. The Naval Convention with Italy was signed at last this afternoon. Difficulties arose from the amount of light craft which Italy asked for the Adriatic, and from the insistence of her claims on England of four armoured ships for the same fleet. In pursuit of Article 3 of the Italian Memorandum signed in London on the 26th April, it is now agreed that the French and British fleets shall give their active and permanent support to Italy until the Austro-Hungarian fleet has been destroyed, or until Peace has been concluded. An Allied fleet is to be constituted, under the command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Italian Naval force which will include, independently of Italian vessels, twelve French torpedo-destroyers, as many torpedo boats, submarines and mine-sweepers as the Commander-in-Chief of the French Naval force can detach; a squadron of French aeroplanes and an aircraft-carrier, four British light cruisers, who will join the Allied fleet as soon as they are numerically replaced by four British cruisers in the Dardanelles, together with four British cruisers to be at the disposal of the Italian Commander-in-Chief. In view of possible operations in the Adriatic there will be a second Allied fleet which will be under the command of the Commander-in-Chief of the French Naval force, and will be ready to answer any appeal from the Commander-in-Chief of the Italian fleet. In a word, Italy has obtained all that she asked for.

Several Senators have been here to complain of Joffre's slowness and of Millerand's slackness as regards his departments; one must recognise that all these criticisms betray the uneasiness for the country, which is abroad. The letters I receive show clearly how everywhere, and even at the front, there are signs alike of languor and restlessness. General conditions are still excellent, but here and there are to be

seen some ugly little spots on an otherwise healthy organism.

I have just returned a visit which President Loubet paid me the other day ; the veteran is confident and resolute as ever. He deplores the articles in the *Homme Enchaîné* and roundly alludes to Clémenceau as "a public malefactor." But in bare justice to Clémenceau one must remember that he is inspired by a sort of defiant love of his country which induces him to think that he and he alone can save it ; the other day, during a sitting of the Committee, he burst into tears, and those tears are his excuse for a great deal.

Yesterday we made an appreciable advance north of Arras towards Loos, Lens and Vimy ; the fight was on either side of the two flanks of Notre Dame de Lorette which the German lines were astride of. The Germans had a large number of machine guns so disposed as to accentuate their flanking fire ; the Crown Prince of Bavaria was in command. Our attack made by the IXth, XXIst, XXXIIIrd, XXth, XVIIth and Xth Corps was really brilliant ; we seized the village of Latargette and half Neuville St. Vaast, and took 2,000 prisoners and 6 guns. The achievement of the XXXIIIrd Corps, for which Pétain's meticulous care was chiefly responsible, stood out as something really remarkable ; we made an advance of four kilometres but unhappily once again our reserves were not sufficiently close up. Nobody had foreseen quite so rapid a move, and as the front to be attacked was eight kilometres long, the Army reserves had been left twelve kilometres in rear so as to direct them when required to the right point. Unfortunately therefore we have not been able to use to the highest advantage what has been a genuine success.

11th.—M. Panafieu lets us hope that Bulgaria will mobilise, march on Constantinople and join up with us ; M. Radoslavoff, however, is imposing certain conditions, and King Ferdinand says no word.

We have taken another 1,000 prisoners and four guns north of Arras but the Germans have strongly counter-attacked.

I have seen Prince George of Greece again. Yesterday he telegraphed to King Constantine to beg him not to let slip the opportunity of realising the aspirations of his country ; he

read me out the telegram which is couched in very strong terms. The King in reply told his brother to come and tell me : " What is holding Greece's hand is the refusal which her demand for some territorial guarantee is met with ; if this guarantee were given, up to and including the treaty of peace, Greece would make a move." I suggested to the Prince that it might be difficult for the French Government to enter into an engagement, the fulfilment of which would not depend on us. Prince George then said to me that Delcassé had raised the same objection as myself but would agree to some such a formula as " In joining the Triple Entente, Greece will form an alliance which implies the maintenance of her integrity." Thus, so the Prince suggested, " The Allies would undertake nothing as regards Greece, and it is only Greece who would read into the alliance the desired standing." I could only say that so far Delcassé had not spoken to me of this formula which seems to me rather equivocal.

The bombardment of Dunkirk by the long-range gun has started again and there are a good many killed and wounded. Yet G.Q.G. put out a communiqué that this gun had been located and silenced. After this, how can one expect the civil population to believe in the accuracy of military reports, and yet in a war of peoples public opinion counts for a good deal. Millerand is to be asked to call the attention of the Commander-in-Chief to the danger of such mistakes.

The Battle of Arras after all has produced no decisive result. Large reserves had been mustered behind the 10th Army, there was an ample supply of ammunition, the heavy artillery had been massed in the chosen sector, and Joffre had gone himself to Doullens to take personal charge of the operations. The first day, Sunday, was good, but despite our artillery preparation the whole thing was more difficult than had been expected especially in the parts immediately round Arras ; the second day was less satisfactory. This evening Colonel Pénélon is loud in praise of the tactical success which we have gained, but Joffre has warned him not to indulge me with any notion of a strategic decision. The cavalry is there behind our lines ready to go forward if we get through, but so

far Joffre seems to have lost his hope of opening the way to them.

In referring to the *Lusitania* the *Homme Enchaîné* has a smart word for President Wilson whose impartiality "begins with a personal tribute to the Kaiser."

12th.—We have lost some of the ground we gained at Loos and our cavalry alas will not have to saddle up. We are now going to try and seize the crest of Vimy Ridge but our "dash" is a little broken.

Delcassé assures me that he never approved the ambiguous wording of which Prince George of Greece spoke to me.

Viviani has given me his impressions as to yesterday's meeting of the Army Committee of the Senate; he is very much annoyed with Millerand who very pluckily persists in standing up for his departments, and with General Baquet, his "directeur," who does not believe in having a larger amount of artillery. Clémenceau has again been in tears and sobbed out his complaints of the slackness of the Ministry; Charles Humbert has lodged a violent indictment with regard to the lack of heavy artillery, and Viviani seems to think that either he or Millerand must resign. I said that anyhow there could be no possible question of his resigning and that the country would take it very ill if Millerand were to do so. For the moment the best thing would be for the War Minister to deal drastically with those of his subordinates who were lacking in initiative or energy.

Our reports from Berlin represent the public and the military people as very proud of the destruction of the *Lusitania* and as hoping that the dose may be repeated. Count Bernsdorff, the German Ambassador at Washington, called on the Secretary of State to express regret at the death of American citizens, but of course laid on England the responsibility for the catastrophe.

In Rome the neutralist press, under Austro-German influence, make a violent attack to-day on Salandra; the papers which defend the Government, and especially the *Giornale d'Italia* take off the velvet glove and go for M. Giolitti who they say is playing the foreigner's hand for him.

Bourgeois tells me that at the meeting of the Committee of

the Senate to-day Viviani was tactful and clever while Millerand was dry and rather hesitating; Bourgeois thinks General Baquet ought to make room at the Ministry for some one else.

13th.—Viviani and I may argue as we will, but Millerand persists in retaining General Baquet and declares he would not know how to replace him.

Doumergue, Ribot and Malvy agree with me that Russia ought not categorically to refuse Roumania what she hankers after in Bukovina, but Delcassé turned on us rather sharply and said that a great country like Russia must not give way to anything in the nature of blackmail.

M. Roosevelt, sometime President of the United States, has started a campaign, à propos of the *Lusitania* against Germany who, he says, ought to be cold-shouldered by every other nation. The American Government has sent a very strong Note to Berlin setting out that the recent act is wholly inexcusable and asking for immediate compensation and that such practices shall for the future be abandoned.

14th.—The Salandra Cabinet has resigned and the Giolittians with the Germans are straining every nerve to put the Government in a minority. Our Ambassador thinks that Salandra ought to inform Parliament and the country at once as to the facts, and if he does not act vigorously, the conspiracy directed against him is fraught with grave Parliamentary danger. One does not know whether that Cabinet has broken up under the threat of the Germanophiles or whether they wanted to invite the renewed confidence of the Crown, or whether they thought it impossible to repulse the last offers of Germany and Austria which they themselves could not accept after having treated with us; they may therefore have preferred to "pass the hand." So far we have no definite information.

15th.—Salandra has sent in his resignation to the King declaring that, in the present circumstances, he must have the unanimous assent of the constitutional and political parties, and this he has not secured. Victor Emmanuel has reserved his decision, and yesterday received the Presidents of the Chambre and the Senate as well as M. Giolitti.

The American Ambassador, Mr. Sharpe, has given Delcassé a copy of the American Note ; it is courteously worded but distinctly summons Germany to put an immediate stop to illegal, inhuman practices and to disavow those who have indulged in them.

Yesterday evening, in the course of a performance at the Théâtre Costanzi, d'Annunzio made another speech in which he declared that the treaty of the Triple Alliance had been denounced at Vienna on the 4th May and that the Salandra Cabinet had entered into formal engagements with another group of Powers, engagements which had been rounded off by military arrangements ; the poet was frantically applauded.

Millerand is now thinking of replacing General Baquet but he has the idea of placing M. Albert Thomas in charge of the artillery. M. Thomas, a Socialist Deputy, who has been mobilised and is now on duty at G.Q.G., is very energetic, very painstaking, and has been very busy over the questions of guns and munitions ; but I cannot help fearing that he may not have the necessary technical knowledge for the task, and I have told Millerand plainly that it would be more appropriate to select an expert soldier.

Italy continues in ferment and in Rome the people are furious with Giolitti, while at Milan the situation looks rather serious. The demand for war is growing by leaps and bounds and Salandra has again been sent for by the King.

16th.—Since the beginning of the month the Russians seem to have experienced a whole series of reverses ; the invasion of Courland, the capture of Libau, a set-back at Jaslow and at Krasno, the retreat into Galicia and Southern Poland. The large number of prisoners, the huge casualty list, the shortage of munitions, the high price of victuals, the depreciation of the rouble, have all conspired to take the heart out of the people. Paléologue has asked the Russian statesman M. Kokovtsoff, on whose opinion he relies : “ If the Russian Army continues to fall back, or to give way without ever again taking the offensive, and if, on the other hand, the Allied fleets should succeed in capturing Constantinople, are you not rather afraid lest the Russian people should have no further appetite for fighting against Germany and consider themselves

quite satisfied with the results obtained against Turkey ? ”
 “ No,” was the answer, “ Russia to-day considers the struggle against Germany to be a vital necessity.”

Paléologue telegraphs the text of a Note which Sazonoff proposes to send to Roumania with regard to the territorial claims of the latter. The Minister intends that the western Banat should go to Servia, and Northern Bukovina to Russia ; I am asking Delcassé to impress once more on Sazonoff how highly inconvenient are these independent diplomatic moves. The Russian Note also alludes to an agreement which seems to have been made last September with Roumania and of which I know nothing.

From a London telegram we learn that Paul Cambon has made precisely the same observations as myself to Sazonoff, and asks that Russia shall be invited to say nothing to Roumania until after consultation with England and ourselves.

King Nicholas of Montenegro has begun to develop some personal whims which require watching. He wants to take advantage of the general upheaval to occupy certain points in Albania, especially Scutari ; we have arranged with London and as far as possible with Petrograd, to calm this monarch’s impatience and cool his ambitions. It is becoming more and more difficult for three great Powers to run abreast without accidents.

For some weeks Delcassé has been without any news of his son who is wounded and a prisoner ; he says nothing of his anxiety to anybody but locks up his troubles in his own breast ; having accidentally heard how unhappy he is about his beloved boy, I have written to beg him to believe in my heartfelt sympathy.

The King of Italy has to-day refused to accept the resignation of the Salandra Cabinet which therefore remains in power.

17th.—The flood of insulting letters, some signed, some anonymous, swells in volume day by day ; some of my correspondents reproach me with having “ wanted the war,” others with not having made any preparation for it ; many of them urge me to make peace, and not a few threaten me with a

revolution. Happily, however, there is nothing of this sort at the front. The soldiers constantly send, both to Madame Poincaré and myself, delightful proofs alike of their dogged courage and their constant good-humour; my wife has established regular workrooms in the Elysée from whence there is a punctual flow of parcels for the Army; she has already several thousands of war godsons whose letters are a delight to us.

Viviani has seen Tittoni who declared that Italy would come in even if Roumania did not. But Roumania's aloofness, the Ambassador thought, would be at once a deception and a cause of weakness. "We must do our very utmost," he pleaded, "to bring Roumania to a decision; please help us to convince Sazonoff. He is a man liable to influence and who defers to the Russian General Staff. He ought to give way in some measure about the Pruth, and if he wants to stir up Roumania to make a national move, he has only got to give up Bessarabia." Tittoni has also seen Delcassé to-day but said nothing to him about Bessarabia, and Delcassé thinks we can scarcely advise Russia to dismember herself. No doubt, ever since the Treaty of Berlin, Bessarabia has been a deep-seated cause of misunderstanding between Russia and Roumania, but it would be rather a difficult matter for France to interfere on a point which an Allied Power considers as enhancing her own sovereignty.

18th.—After conferring with Viviani and Joffre, Millerand has decided to entrust Albert Thomas with the charge of the artillery; whatever the worth of the young Deputy, this arrangement seems to me to be very hazardous, and I renewed the objections I had already raised. Millerand and Viviani however bring forward their proposal in Council when Briand, Augagneur, Ribot and Malvy declare that Parliament would not quite understand how a Deputy should become, even as a temporary measure, the head of a department in a Government office. I again insisted on the advantage of appointing a man with technical knowledge, and reserving for M. Albert Thomas a sort of general inspectorship. Finally there was a majority vote that Thomas should be appointed not a "Directeur" but an Under-Secretary of State, and that

as such he should be responsible for the administrative services of the artillery.

The news from Russia is not reassuring. "Since the beginning of the war," Paléologue telegraphs, "we have seen the same thing happen five or six times. The Russian General Staff prepares a big offensive; the German General Staff upsets this by the rapidity of their movements and the violence of their attack. The Russian Army can neither meet them squarely nor manœuvre, and always ends by giving way because the artillery is short of munitions. But even if obliged to assume the defensive the Russian forces are of great value to us. The French Army has just now been faced with forty-eight German Army Corps and two Divisions of cavalry; the Russian Army is up against twenty-five Austro-Hungarian and twenty-seven German Army Corps, altogether fifty-two Corps and twenty Divisions of cavalry. Nor can one pay sufficient tribute to the dogged energy with which the Russians fight on, as every fight means for them an appalling hecatomb of slain. The Russian people accept without murmur the terrible sacrifices imposed on them; the defeats of our Allies no doubt postpone the end of the war but will not affect its result."

Paléologue also sends us the text of letters which passed on the 1st of September last between Sazonoff and the Roumanian Minister, M. Diamandy. Russia undertook to recognise Roumania's right to annex the regions of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy inhabited by the Roumanians; as to Bukovina the principle of the majority of the population was to serve as a base for distributing territory between Russia and Roumania. Russia agreed to get the Cabinets of London and Paris to agree to these promises. In exchange for this declaration Diamandy, on behalf of Roumania, undertook to preserve, as regards Russia, a benevolent neutrality until the day when she should occupy the Austro-Hungarian regions inhabited by Roumanians. The agreement had therefore nothing in it of a military alliance. The fact remained, however, that except for some vague information given to Delcassé by Isvolsky in October, and of which I was completely ignorant, Russia said no word of dealings which had

considerable interest for ourselves. M. Delcassé has expressed to M. Sazonoff the hope that in the negotiations now on foot, Russia will not speak to Bucharest except in agreement with England and France.

M. Doeschner, our Minister to Portugal, pays me a visit. The day after he left Lisbon a revolution broke out there, and M. José Chagas, who was Minister here at one time, was put at the head of a new Government. But he had no sooner arrived at Lisbon from Oporto than an attempt was made to assassinate him, and his life is now in danger. The former Cabinet Ministers are in prison, but the President is still in office. This morning the trouble seems to have blown over and the town has resumed its ordinary aspect.

19th.—Regardless of my objections Millerand has submitted to me a decree appointing Albert Thomas, Under Secretary of State with the administration of the Artillery. The Socialist group, however, do not want a third member of their party in the Government, so Sembat and Thomas must arrange this with their colleagues. The matter has therefore to stand over.

Another communication from the Army Committee of the Senate, as another visit to Bourges has put their sub-committee in a state of fever against Millerand and his subordinates. Some of the members of this committee are saying that the operations north of Arras will have to be stopped for lack of munitions. Some, I hear, are very melancholy about this, others, who are irreconcilable opponents of the Cabinet, scarcely conceal their satisfaction.

Paléologue telegraphs that Sazonoff has given way so far as to consent to the Sereth being considered as the future frontier in Bukovina, and he recognises Roumania's right to annex the district of Torontal. But in return Roumania—so Paléologue says—must declare herself ready to negotiate on the lines of the Note which the Imperial Government handed to her on the 14th May. Delcassé is telegraphing to Bucharest urging that Roumania shall reply with good grace to their concessions.

The Socialist group has reconsidered the matter and has authorised Albert Thomas to accept office; as was quite to be expected, the appointment is the worse received by the

“Moderate” newspapers because the Cabinet does not include any representatives of the party of the Right, and the balance of the “union sacrée” is therefore upset. I have suggested this difficulty to Viviani and Millerand but they have paid little heed to it.

A Radical Deputy, M. Fabre, has lodged an interpellation as to a Collectivist-Socialist being appointed an Under-Secretary of State; I have seized the opportunity to point out that in England the Liberal Cabinet seems to have decided to co-opt Conservative colleagues, and that we might do well to invite men like Denys Cochin and Léon Bourgeois to join the Government. Briand is all for this, Viviani approves the idea if rather nervously, but Augagneur, Malvy and Sarraut are dead against any such thing. Sembat would not object to Cochin being made an Under-Secretary of State with the charge of explosives, but suggests that if he were made a Minister, the Cabinet might be accused of coquetting with Rome. Millerand says nothing will induce him to agree to another Under-Secretary of State, and there the matter stands.

Sir Edward Grey has sent through Bertie a verbal message to Delcassé about Bulgaria. He would like Sofia to be told that in return for Bulgarian co-operation against Turkey, the Allies would guarantee them the Enos-Medeia line in Thrace, and in Macedonia the frontiers of the 1912 treaty; this latter subject to the condition that Servia shall be compensated elsewhere. The Allies would also try, after the war, so to influence the Greek Government as to let Bulgaria own Cavalla and make it up to Greece in Asia Minor. Grey's proposal is scarcely one which is likely to be accepted; Bulgaria will not think it goes far enough, Greece will shake her head. We run the risk of eventually being refused help from everywhere. Here the Ministers are divided in their opinion. Some would sacrifice Greece to Bulgaria whose support they think indispensable for our undertaking in the Dardanelles; others hold much more to Greece than to Bulgaria. Personally, I think we should ask Greece point blank if she will come in unconditionally, as she at first led us to hope she would do, and to tell her that if she does not say yes, we

shall resume our former liberty of action. In such case, we could open out a little more to Bulgaria, but if we try to please everybody and don't make up our minds, we had better give up any idea of obtaining co-operation in the Peninsula. The majority of Ministers are of my way of thinking, but no agreement is reached and the discussion is adjourned ; so the precious time slips away and is wasted.

M. Blondel has had a long conference with M. Bratiano who said explicitly that ever since the beginning of the war he has wanted Roumania to join the Triple Entente. "If," he continued, "I have delayed any pronouncement it is because I wished to complete our military preparations without being exposed to the sharp tongues of our enemies. . . . I have now, at what I consider a propitious moment, formulated, after mature thought, the demands of which you are aware. These fit in not only with our national aspirations but also with the necessity of preventing by the establishment of natural frontiers, such conflicts as have for so many years been the scourge of Macedonia. When I insisted on having the Danube as the frontier between Servia and ourselves it was not in order to secure a few kilometres more than Russia wanted us to have, but in order to take advantage of a definite line of demarcation. The same argument applies to the Pruth, and, on these two points, I must be inflexible." Bratiano has also quoted the agreement of the 1st October to justify himself. "Russia," he says, "has given us, in return for our neutrality, the right to occupy the Austro-Hungarian lands now inhabited by Roumanians, except Bukovina, where a commission is to determine the frontiers on the principle of an ethnical majority ; we are justified therefore in exercising this right, nor is it a *sine qua non* that we should fight. I do not think Russia will imitate Germany and treat our arrangement as a 'scrap of paper.' "

Albert Thomas tells me he is going to split the Artillery Department into three sections—portable guns, light artillery, and heavy artillery.

21st.—Yesterday the Italian Parliament, amid scenes of great enthusiasm, voted by a majority of 407 against 74, a Bill conferring plenary powers on the Government in the

event of a national war ; M. Salandra solemnly said : “ The Austrian Emperor’s ultimatum to Servia in July 1914 annulled by a single stroke our efforts. It violated the formula of our pact, for the Emperor omitted to come to some preliminary agreement with us or even to give us bare notice of what he was going to do, and it violated the essence of the pact, as it tended to disturb the system of properties and spheres of influence which had been set up in the Balkan Peninsula. But what was far more important than this or that point, the whole spirit which animated our treaty was injured and even quenched ; for in bringing about a fearful world war, in direct conflict with our own interests and feelings, the equilibrium which the alliance was intended to maintain was destroyed, and the whole problem of the integrity of Italy was inevitably revived. Nevertheless all these long months the Government has patiently sought for some compromise which would restore to our treaty the *raison d’être* which it had lost.”

These negotiations are set out in a green book which the Government circulated in Parliament. It would appear that on the 9th September, 1914, the Duc d’Avarna, Italian Ambassador at Vienna, was instructed to tell Count Berchtold that the Austrian threat to Servia was an action which ought to be considered by both Governments of the Allies in virtue of Article VII of the alliance, this Article obliging Austria to come to some preliminary arrangement with Italy and to give compensation, even in the case of a merely temporary occupation of territory. Count Berchtold at first replied that the campaign against Servia was not one of aggression but of defence, and therefore there was no question of an exchange of views with Italy. But, agreeably with a hint given by M. de Jagow, the German Ambassador at Vienna, Berchtold became more conciliatory and Prince Bülow came to Rome and offered to discuss the matter with M. Sonnino. Austria began by suggesting Albania as compensation, to which Italy replied by claiming the Trentino and Trieste ; Prince Bülow said that Austria would rather fight Italy than give up Trieste to her, but he thought she might get the Trentino ; nothing further. The *pourparlers* were rather painfully protracted

through February and March, and Austria then said that, in return for liberty of action in the Balkans, Italy might have the districts of Trente, Roveredo, Riva, Tione and Borgo. M. Sonnino stood out for the whole of the Trentino, with the 1811 boundaries, Gradisca and Goritzia, Trieste and its territory and the Curzolari Islands. Austria on the 16th April refused these demands except for a large portion of the Trentino. The breach then became irreparable, and Italy addressed herself to the Triple Entente and denounced her alliance with Austro-Hungary.

The news sheets issued at the front are constantly increasing and are always brimming with good humour. One has just been sent to me from a Territorial Division entitled, "L'Echo des Gourbis," "The Journal of the Troglodytes at the Front," which wants to organise a journée de "Rosalie" in honour of the bayonets. In contrast, the Chambre is the reverse of good tempered, and to-day a very sharp discussion has taken place as to the purchases of corn for the civil population.

22nd.—I have told the Ministers to-day that if M. Bratiano is not satisfied with Sazonoff's concessions we really must try and induce the latter to increase his offer. The military situation in Russia is little less than critical, Roumanian help is imperatively necessary, and it seems inconceivable that it should be Russia, to risk the negotiations falling through. Briand and Viviani agree, but Delcassé says Bertie has put in his hands a note in which Grey lays the blame on Roumania, and that he himself would find it difficult to bring further pressure to bear on Sazonoff just when Sir George Buchanan is describing him as very "déprimé" and thinking of resigning his portfolio. Also, if Russia were, out of spite, to treat with Germany we should have fifty-two Army Corps sent against our lines. Delcassé is quite determined, and directly after the Council meeting came a telegram from Bucharest that Bratiano would rather resign than abate his demands, our Minister adding that Bratiano would have his hand forced, or would be obliged to give way to a Ministry ready to take sides with us, if only Russia would yield as to the Pruth and Czernowitz.

General Brugère tells me that on the 9th May after Pétain's

conspicuous achievement with the XXXIIIrd Corps, our advance might have had really substantial results if only the reserves had been ready, but they were not in the hands of the Army Commander who was himself, as usual, too far back. The officers of the XXXIIIrd Corps are very much annoyed at being let down after their success.

As I am going to the front to-night, I have left a letter for the Foreign Minister to forward to King Victor Emmanuel as soon as Italy's entry into the war is announced.

23rd.—General Dubail, commanding the group of Armies of the Est, and General Humbert, commanding the Lorraine Army, met me at Frouard this morning and we proceeded by car to the Bois de Chapitre and the Ste. Geneviève hill, on the right side of the Morelle valley, whence we could see the Bois Le Prêtre which the war has so brought into notice. After visiting some of the batteries and defensive positions we breakfasted at General Humbert's headquarters and during the meal came a telegram announcing the Italian decree of mobilisation which was hailed with delight, everyone hoping it might do much to shorten the war. The afternoon has been spent in seeing some of the exercises of the Challa brigade and in paying a visit to the 7th Division under General Bigot, which are in the forest of Parroy where they have thrown up some seemingly impregnable defence works.

24th.—I slept last night at Lunéville, and on waking I heard that Italy has declared herself in a state of war against Austria, but despite the London Agreement no word as to her relations with Germany. This morning we saw the 2nd Cavalry Division, a fine body of well mounted men who looked so fresh it was difficult to believe they had been in the trenches last night; then a tour of the ground recently won by the Army of the Lorraine, and I could offer my heartiest congratulations to General Humbert who describes himself as "enfant de la balle." The son of an old soldier who fought in the Crimea and then became a mounted gendarme, Humbert started life under very modest conditions. However, he passed first out of St. Cyr, distinguished himself greatly with the Tonkin rifles, then under General Duchesne at Madagascar, and finally in Morocco. In this

war, after commanding the Moroccan Division and the XXXIInd Corps, he was, last March, put in charge of the detachment of the Lorraine Army whose duty it was to keep as many Germans as possible busy in front of them, so as to facilitate the operations in Artois, a duty which was carried out to Joffre's entire satisfaction. After bidding Humbert good-bye and good-luck we went to the 7th Army, which is under General Maud'huy, whom I found in his usual good spirits and very pleased in having the Vosges troops in his command. Through Baccarat and Raon l'Étape—both dreadfully damaged—we came to St. Michel-sur-Meurthe, where were some of the 41st Division, and thence through St. Dié, which the Germans are perpetually bombarding, to Plainfaing, at the foot of the Vosges, where I found Messimy serving as Lieut.-Colonel in the Chasseurs, and just mentioned, for the second time, in despatches. The Chasseurs had decorated the place in honour of Italian intervention, the houses had flags hung out. We breakfasted to the music of fanfares, some scraps of Italian hymns, soldiers' songs and a chorale of hospital orderlies. After a very simple meal we mounted mules to climb to the crest by a very steep and rocky path. Our animals had mouths of iron and were rather restive and by no means easy to guide; and when at the top of the Col du Bonhomme we had to pass in review some companies of the Chasseurs, I was not particularly proud of my personal appearance. Going still further up we could see the German trenches in front of Orbey and further away, in the plains of Alsace, the white houses. Always the promised land, always the enemy in possession of it. The descent on mule back was scarcely more comfortable, and then from Messimy's quarters we went to Fraize, Anould, the Col du Plafond and Bruyères, passing in succession the 253rd Brigade, a newly formed brigade of Chasseurs, and a group of artillery. It was a privilege to hand out decorations, military medals, Croix de Guerre to selected officers, N.C.O.'s and men, and they seemed so pleased to receive them from the President of the Republic that one dares to think there may be occasions when one's rôle of symbol has some national value.

25th.—I was back in Paris by 8 a.m. and could speak to

Millerand before the Council meeting giving him my impression of what I had just seen. The morale of the troops seemed excellent, but I gathered from what I heard that the Army Commanders are kept much too tight in hand by the Commander-in-Chief, or rather by the departments of G.Q.G. Neither they, nor even the commanders of groups of armies, have any freedom of action, and the whole organisation is therefore lacking in elasticity. Also, there is evident congestion at G.Q.G., and Joffre himself scarcely knows the workings of an unwieldy machine. General Pellé himself, who is at Joffre's right hand, said the other day how sorry he was to see such a gulf between Headquarters and the firing line.

The Foreign Minister has sent my telegram to the King of Italy, but so far no answer. The Council has at last decided that, in approaching Sofia, Grey's, and not Sazonoff's formula shall be accepted for fear of irritating Roumania. Delcassé is to tell M. Romanos that as Greece will not rally to us unconditionally we must have our hands free, but that we shall not lose sight of Greek interests, such as they are understood by the most eminent men of that country; King Constantine will scarcely fail to note that we are alluding to Venizelos.

Pierre Loti, who has a very tender heart towards Turkey, comes to inform me that the Turkish opponents of Enver Pasha are disposed to enter into relations with France; I can only reply that we cannot listen to any proposals, except in the presence of our Allies; this hint he will give his correspondents.

26th.—M. Margaine, deputy for the Marne, has resigned his commission as Commandant in the Artillery in order to expound the military situation to his colleagues in both Chambres. "Some," he says to me, "are against Millerand, others against Augagneur, whereas there is only one cause of trouble. The military stagnation is due to persistence in the same mistakes: disjointed attacks, no concerted scheme, blows dealt haphazard. The Commander-in-Chief must adopt other methods, and to do so he must consult his subordinates and allow them access to him, and not shut himself up as he does more and more. If he will not do this, then he

ought to go ; and just now no one would regret him." Harsh and unjust words perhaps, and only destructive criticism offered ; but M. Margaine is not alone in his opinions. Fabius Cunctator would not be popular in France for very long.

General d'Amade back from the Dardanelles cheerfully says that we may within a month be masters of the Peninsula and he even hopes that the Turks will sue for peace sooner ; Pierre Loti writes from his point of view that his Turkish friends have consented in advance to Russian and English delegates being admitted to any conference, and that there should be no further difficulty in getting together. Their only objection is a reasonable one ; as Italy has not yet declared war on them, they do not see why an Italian delegate should be brought in, though they will probably yield on this point. The suggestion is that a Turkish diplomat, chosen by the Allies, whether Djavid or Talaat, should be summoned by telegram to some selected town in Switzerland where the Allied delegates could join him in secret conference ; no preliminary condition is imposed. Djavid could come quicker than Talaat because he is already at Berlin on some other business, but Loti writes : " I have more trust in Talaat ; if it were possible to know before eight o'clock this evening, through the Embassies, whether Russia and England would consent to send their delegates to Switzerland, I would send an emissary to-night to Geneva, who would telegraph thence in code to Djavid or Talaat. Thus we should lose no time. It is of course understood that there will be no cessation of hostilities during the conference, and please remember that Talaat and Djavid are just now the two leading spirits of Turkey. Whatever reply you send me I shall forward to the Turks not in writing but by a trusted messenger." Viviani and Delcassé think that we might let Talaat come to France if he is really ready to take the journey, and I have told Pierre Loti that we have said as much to London and Petrograd.

M. Boudenoot, Vice-President of the Army Committee of the Senate, reports that three of his colleagues who were deputed to look after the sanitary conditions, had been prevented by military authority from carrying out their task ;

they were forbidden to come to Noeux-les-Mines and Aubigny. The Committee are highly incensed and are going to lodge a protest.

Viviani personally would very much like to enlarge his Cabinet and bring in such men as Barthou and Cochin, but he is rather afraid of whetting other appetites and of creating jealousy and discontent. The British Cabinet has been reconstituted and will consist of eight Ministers; Mr. Bonar Law, Leader of the Opposition, is to be Colonial Minister, and Mr. Balfour succeeds Mr. Winston Churchill as First Lord of the Admiralty. Is it not possible for us to show the same sound common sense in this respect?

A delegation from the Italian Colony has brought me an address couched in very warm terms, but my visitors seem to think of Austria, whereas I more especially think of Germany, as the enemy. So far I have received no answer from the King of Italy, and this silence rather surprises the Ministers.

Briand came to dinner here this evening and said how earnestly he hoped that we should follow the example of England and that Viviani will widen his Cabinet.

27th.—Another letter from Loti who has sent a messenger to Geneva. “Two points remain over as to which I beg for your answer by telegram in some sort of code. 1. Talaat (who in our communications is called Paul) will of course prefer that the interview shall not take place in Paris but in some other French town where he will be less easily detected by the Germans; I hope you will grant this favour. 2. Although Djavid (whom we allude to as Jean) is not in our inner confidence, would he be allowed to come over here if Talaat wishes to bring him?” I replied at once that Paul could bring Jean and that there was no need for them to come to Paris as some other town could be chosen.

King Victor Emmanuel, as a matter of fact, telegraphed to me last Tuesday through the Italian Embassy, but as Tittoni thought it rather a chilly reply to my message, he did not hand it to me but asked that some words should be added to it. Tittoni has given us this information simply because I asked whether the King's reply had gone astray, and he has sent me the text of the telegram in his hand which

is rather stiff. "While Italy is taking up arms to free Italian territory from our common enemy I am glad to send Your Excellency my cordial greetings and my earnest desire for victory.—Victor Emmanuel R."

28th.—In the Arras sector fighting is going on with moves backwards and forwards. Diplomatic relations are broken off between Germany and Italy but neither Power has declared war.

At Briand's request I have just received "le petit-père Combes" who is very bitter against Millerand; he is very anxious for an immediate reconstruction of the Cabinet and hints that he would himself rather like to have the portfolio of Public Instruction, chiefly, as far as I could gather, as he wants Greek to be pronounced in the modern way.

29th.—Millerand is going to see Joffre and will try and induce him to give a freer hand to the Commanders of the three Army groups which he proposes to form, that is to say to Foch, Dubail and Castelnau.

A very gloomy Council meeting. The operations in Arras drag on and all the Ministers ask how soon we shall see the end of this siege warfare. They remember that when Joffre breakfasted here a few weeks ago, he led us to hope that the war might be ended in June; to-day that longed-for end seems further off than ever, and Parliament is becoming very restless. M. Bokanowski, who is serving at the front as an officer, has written Millerand that he intends to question him as to the administrative services since the beginning of the war, and that he will ask for a secret session; we have told Viviani that he ought to meet this with a vote of confidence.

Charles Humbert has apparently said in the Senate that two battalions have gone over to the enemy singing the "International"; everyone is talking of the slackness of the troops, and if they talk about it much more they will succeed in bringing it about. Meanwhile in the Reichstag Bethmann-Hollweg announces that Germany, if necessary, will undertake a winter campaign. Firmness and entire confidence there; must one admit that here there are symptoms of fatigue and exhaustion?

The revised and corrected telegram from the King of Italy

is to hand. "On entering the field I sent Your Excellency my greetings and my best wishes. My telegram crossed a message in which Your Excellency, taking the opportunity of our new brotherhood in arms, recalled the traditions and the bonds which had united France and Italy in the past and which to-day bind them together in a new ideal of liberating oppressed peoples, and of standing for the defence of general civilisation. Profoundly touched as I am by Your Excellency's eloquent words, I am anxious to renew, both towards yourself and towards France, the assurances of my most cordial thoughts, and of my fervent desire that the victory of our arms shall issue in establishing a lasting peace based on the accomplishment of national claims as to justice and liberty. I beg Your Excellency to believe in my sincere personal friendship for yourself."

Dr. Théophile Braga has been elected President of the Portuguese Republic.

30th.—The Algerian Society has given to-day a couscous to more than 400 wounded African soldiers. This fête took place in a restaurant in the Avenue de la Grande Armée, and having sent some cigars and cigarettes to all the guests, I put in a short appearance after the breakfast and was rapturously greeted.

31st.—M. Blondel continues to telegraph to us from Bucharest that Sazonoff is piling up his very untimely proposals and that Russia's claims exclude any possibility of agreement.

CHAPTER VI

New Secretaries of State—Visit to the 2nd and 10th Armies—General Gouraud is awarded the Military Medal—14th July—General Lyautey in Paris—General Sarrail is replaced in the command of the 3rd Army—Parliamentary difficulties.

JUNE

1ST.—The British Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, who is just now staying with Sir John French, has fixed his visit to Joffre for to-morrow; Joffre is now at Doullens, and it has been agreed that Millerand shall go there himself to meet Mr. Asquith. Joffre has written to Millerand to ask that the Government shall urge on the Cabinet in London to send as soon as possible twenty Divisions of the Kitchener Armies; from what the British War Minister said both to Joffre and Millerand, he is not altogether willing to send us the whole, or even part, of his Armies unless he is fairly sure that the German front can be pierced, and as Joffre says that to pierce the German front we must have British support, we seem up to now, to be turning in a vicious circle. Also, as the Kitchener Armies are short of rifles and munitions, England's reply to our request is problematical. Meanwhile the operations in Artois limp painfully along and are costing us very dear. Fifty thousand men are already *hors de combat*, and the Government knows nothing of what is going to be done to-morrow nor of any future plan.

The Allies have offered Bulgaria the immediate occupation of Thrace as far as the Enos-Medea line, and the subsequent possession of the towns of Egri Palanka, Ochrida and Monastir; M. Radoslavoff seemed agreeably surprised, but he is very much embarrassed as to how best to approach the King.

In the Reichstag the German Chancellor has spoken of Italy in very insulting terms, but has in no wise suggested that a state of war exists between Germany and her former Ally. Our Ambassador has asked M. Sonnino what the Cabinet at Rome is going to do about this, but the Minister only replied that M. Salandra would take an opportunity to reply to the German Chancellor, and that anyhow Germany would be sure to strike a heavy blow against Italy; M. Sonnino, however, did not betray any intention of declaring war on our principal enemy.

Last night there was a Zeppelin raid over London; we have not so far had any casualty list, but we know that there were some killed and wounded.

2nd.—I have seen Charles Humbert and Boudenoot to-day; the former spoke very bitterly about Generals Baquet and Ste. Claire Deville, but assures me that he has no grudge against the Cabinet, that his efforts are purely disinterested, that he is carrying out a patriotic duty, and that under no conditions would he accept office. He points out blunders in the Artillery Department very clearly and says that however important in his eyes may be the mobilisation of industry, he is specially concerned with the discontent which he sees to be growing among the Army Commanders; Generals who have lost their job, and the officers generally. Everyone is complaining about Joffre and especially about his entourage, and Humbert is compiling a dossier of all these complaints. Boudenoot who, in Freycinet's absence, is presiding over the Army Committee, tells me that the hostility towards Joffre is increasing every day, that he is blamed for not bowing to the will of the Government, and that the Government are blamed for not imposing their authority on him. "Clémenceau," he says, "is now as much against the conqueror of the Marne as is Doumer. Last Saturday when the Committee learnt through Humbert's report that Joffre wanted to keep the factory hands in the firing line, contrary to the orders of the Government, there was a regular commotion; Clémenceau and Humbert declared they would resign as a mark of protest."

In Russia as in France defeats and losses in the field have

resulted in conflicts between the Army and the civil authorities. M. Rodziensko, the President of the Douma, went to the Emperor's headquarters to advise His Majesty of the gravity of the circumstances and to beg that something should be done at once in view of the shortage of munitions. The Emperor listened sympathetically and appointed a Committee to deal with the matter consisting of the War Minister, the President and three members of the Douma, four Generals and four representatives of mechanical industries.

The same causes produce the same results, and here several Deputies tell me that they are trying to counteract the spirit of the evil, but the conspiracy against Millerand and Joffre seems to have taken very disquieting proportions in Parliament.

Another letter from the poet whose missives now arrive in series. Talaat, he writes, "cannot come because there are known to be plots against his life, and as he could not give the real reason for his absence it will look as if he were afraid; he says that Djavid is willing to come immediately and that he will have full powers to negotiate." Another allocution runs: "Djavid is only at Berlin to try and get some money as the Turks have no more; I have heard, moreover, in strict confidence, of a very serious reason which keeps Talaat back, and which, if you really wish, I could tell you." And in yet another emotional communication I am told of the alleged reason why Talaat is detained and which I am implored to lock in my breast. "Just lately it has been discovered, or it has been thought to have been discovered, that in the last conspiracy against Talaat's life, the Sabah-Eddine conspiracy, the Ministers of France and Athens were involved." This time Loti's naïveté outsteps the bounds of reason, and it is evident that his friendship for the Turks has served to blind his eyes. I have written him a personal note to say that the story of the plot is a piece of pure invention, and that the Young Turks are reigning by terror in Constantinople, and there is no earthly reason why Talaat should not absent himself if he is sincere in his pacific intentions. "I need hardly say," I added, "that the allegations against the French and Greek Ministers (and for the matter

of that against the British Minister also) is a silly calumny. As Djavid is at Berlin and is without any official status, the French Government might fall into a trap if they were to send someone to confer with him, and this might well be interpreted as a sign of weakness. If the Turkish Government really want to make proposals to us, they have only to communicate them first of all—anyhow on broad lines—by the trusted intermediary whom you know, and we could then see whether it would be right to enter into relations with Djavid or anybody else expressly detailed for that purpose.” Another rhapsody from Loti only draws from me the assurance that if Talaat decides to come himself he will not be asked, as a preliminary, to put anything in writing, but that if Djavid is to come from Berlin, we shall require guarantees.

3rd.—Millerand saw Joffre and Asquith yesterday at Doullens ; Joffre is arranging for two attacks to be made in the next few days, one by the 2nd and the other by the 6th Army. Asquith seems to have come to France to arbitrate as to the perpetual struggle between French and Kitchener. Sir John, in agreement with our G.Q.G., wants the twenty new Divisions, in other words the bulk of the Kitchener Armies, to be sent here ; Kitchener would prefer to keep these back for service elsewhere ; it has been arranged between Asquith, Millerand, Joffre and French that five or six of the new British Divisions shall come to France, and for the moment there can be no question of twenty Divisions being sent across seas, as they are still short of rifles and munitions. The English will relieve one of our Divisions south of La Bassée, and one of the two who are north of Ypres ; it is not very much, but it is anyhow a beginning.

Ribot of course finds it impossible to frame a regular Budget ; the difficulty of increasing taxation while so many taxable individuals are with the Armies will compel us to multiply at the same time the issue of National Defence Bonds and the demands in advance on the Bank of France. However glorious victory will be, it will not be easy on the morrow of the war to readjust finances which have been so rudely shaken.

4th.—A group of Senators have come to advise me to

enlarge the Cabinet and to bring in representatives of all parties; they quote especially Charles Dupuy, Jean Dupuy and Léon Bourgeois, but I can only reply that I will inform the Prime Minister of their advice as constitutionally I can do no more.

I went to Fresnes to-day to see a military ambulance established in part of a prison; the wounded are of course not in contact with the prisoners, but that they should be in such close quarters seemed rather distressing and not a little shocking.

Sir Francis Bertie has been raised to the peerage and becomes Lord Bertie of Thame; my congratulations are heartfelt, and he replies with the utmost cordiality and is evidently very pleased indeed.

5th.—Another Zeppelin raid over London, but we are without knowledge as to the number of victims. Before leaving for the Armies of the Lorraine I had to attend a long Council meeting, at which Albert Thomas was present, and which was entirely devoted to the question of war material.

6th.—With General Duparge and Colonel Pénélon I arrived at Ligny in the early morning and we went straight on by car to Verdun; since my last visit the town has been cruelly knocked about, but the gun that did the most mischief has been located and silenced. The Governor has, however, thought it well to evacuate the hospitals and more than 2,000 inhabitants have been sufficiently alarmed to leave their homes and move away. At the Côte des Hures, General Gérard commanding the IInd Corps was waiting for us and took us to an observation post whence we got a wonderful view of the French and German trenches. To the north our troops hold the Woivre up to the outskirts of Etain, whereas to the south the enemy has climbed the Hauts de Meuse and as far as the south of St. Mihiel we only hold a scrap of the Woivre. Behind us a large area is not invaded, and in front of us is the bare and reddened ground of the Eparges where such deadly fighting has occurred. Further the whole line of the Heights is occupied by the enemy as well as the pretty communes which lie at their feet or are perched on their slopes. Combres, Hattonville, Hattonchâtel

and others. At the dear little town of Ancemont I was recognised and greeted by several of my compatriots, and at Dieue we found General Herr, commanding the VIth Corps whose frugal meal we shared. In the afternoon a long walk from Marcaulieu brought us to an artillery observation post, whence we could clearly see Chauvencourt and St. Mihiel; the former in ruins, the latter, whose familiar features one sadly recognised, only damaged at certain points. Poor captured St. Mihiel seemed fairly quiet, and one could see the slate roofs shining in the sun; I easily made out St. Etienne, which contains Richier's "Laying in the Tomb," St. Michel with the same artist's "Pietà," the old Benedictine Abbaye, where the other day justice was administered, and beyond the town the seven picturesque rocks which go by the name of the Dames de Meuse. The heat was intense; a battery of 75's was firing on the enemy trenches on the right bank opposite, and one could see beyond the communication trenches the smoke of the bursting shells. Oh what memories are awakened! I never thought to see this dear place so soiled and defaced by an iniquitous war.

7th.—From Ligny this morning we went to Toul and thence to the Bois le Prêtre, which has figured so largely in our communiqués. Later we crossed Pont à Mousson and Dieulouard which are under the enemy's fire, the traces of which are very apparent, and thence to Commercy, where I found that twenty-three soldiers of the 56th Regiment had been condemned to death for leaving a trench in the Bois d'Ailly; General Cordonnier, commanding the VIIIth Corps, asked me if I would pardon them, and I at once acceded to his request in the sure knowledge that these young men, if they remain at the front, will very soon wipe out the memory of a momentary act of weakness. But is it life which I am restoring to them or only fresh opportunities for mutilation and death?

8th.—I was back in the Elysée by 8 a.m. to preside over a Council meeting. Ribot is ill and all the other Ministers are greatly depressed by the news which in my absence has arrived from Russia and the Dardanelles. General Gouraud has telegraphed that after most careful preparations our

Expeditionary Force attacked the Turkish positions without obtaining any result proportionate to the losses we have suffered and the great effort we have put forward ; he agrees with Sir Ian Hamilton that the situation is not unlike that on the Western front, and that progress in the Peninsula will be slow and costly if Turkey retains her forces there. Gouraud thinks that it will be of the greatest advantage if help were to come from elsewhere in order to reach finality without too heavy a casualty list. In Russia the next session of the Douma has been postponed till November, but in view of the defeats of the Russian armies which have involved the loss of all Eastern Prussia and of Galicia, a section of public opinion is beginning to demand that the Assembly shall meet sooner so as to give a session to the slackness and defects of the military administration. The movement is growing in volume and Paléologue has been told that the Emperor would gladly entertain national representation ; meanwhile Przemysl has been evacuated by the Russians, and the effect of this is deplorable in the country which feels itself humiliated and beaten.

The 2nd and 3rd Italian Armies have begun operations to force the passage of the Isonzo between Caporetto and the sea.

Nothing further so far either in Bucharest, Sofia or Athens, but Paléologue, who is much worked up by the misfortunes of the Russian Army, has been insistent that Sazonoff shall be more conciliatory with regard to Roumania ; no news either of Loti or of his Turks. M. Margaine, who is in reality a most amiable person, has been outspoken with me as to Joffre being replaced, and he would like to see Sarrail as Commander-in-Chief. I told him it was very injudicious to allow gossip about a change of command to be circulated among our enemies and neutrals ; Sarrail did very well at Verdun during the battle of the Marne, but there is nothing to show that he would at the present moment do better than Joffre in any attempt to break through.

9th.—Loti's messenger went as far as Munich so as to get into touch with Djavid, but the Turks, who are more and more German-fed, and are moreover heartened by their own resistance in the Dardanelles, now decline any conversations,

and Djavid will not put anything on paper ; as to Talaat, he thinks less and less of taking a journey.

Millerand has very painfully made up his mind to replace General Baquet by General Bourgeois, and General Ste. Claire Deville by General Dumézil ; the Parliamentary Committees will not be too grateful to him for so belated a decision. No doubt the two officers have been rather harshly criticised. Baquet is a pupil of General Deport, who invented the 75's, and he himself brought into being the 120 millimetre gun and had to do with the 155 millimetre. Whatever M. Humbert may say, it was not Baquet who in November cancelled the order for 100 batteries ; he simply carried out an arrangement already made, but he did say more than once that we had too many big guns in proportion anyhow to the supply of shells, and as a matter of fact he was not successful in increasing the output of shells or in pushing forward the manufacture of guns. Ste. Claire Deville fell between two stools, for in his desire to have guns at whatever price, he yielded to the representations of the manufacturers who wanted to lessen the normal pressure when testing the guns, and the General was therefore not altogether unreasonably held responsible for the explosions. For minor faults several Generals have been limogés—*i.e.* sent to the rear (to Limoges) and have accepted their penalties with great dignity ; war is a pitiless mistress, and to stimulate the efforts of the Artillery, examples have to be made. Millerand, however, wants to give some small compensation to the Generals who have been relieved of their commands, and Ste. Claire Deville is to have a third star ; the War Minister has said no word to me about Baquet, but since August military appointments for the Legion of Honour have been outside the knowledge of the President of the Republic, and Baquet has been raised to the grade of Commander without my knowing of it.

10th.—Mr. Bryan, Secretary of State at Washington, has just resigned ; he has not been able to make up his mind to sign the reply to Germany which President Wilson drafted himself, as he considers the wording too aggressive and liable to provoke war.

Thanks to the intervention of Paléologue, the Emperor

and Sazonoff have announced that Russia is ready to give way on the question of Czernowitz if Roumania will undertake to come in at once.

11th.—Servia will not trust the Allies to arrange without her the conditions to be offered to Bulgaria, and she is equally nervous as to what may have been promised to Italy; Italy for her part is not overpleased to see Servian troops moving forward in Albania, and the more the Coalition widens, the less easy it will be to carry on.

Rather to the surprise of his colleagues Millerand had an excellent hearing yesterday in the *Chambre*; it was a question as to men who had been mobilised or were liable to mobilisation, and the Minister expounded, with admirable clearness, the measures taken since the beginning of the war to recall to the ranks the largest possible number of men exempted, or reservists or auxiliaries, and he went on to show precisely what remained to be done in the matter. He succeeded for the moment in quelling all opposition in the *Chambre*, but the Committee still pursue their campaign against him and Joffre. Boudenoot, who is still doing Freycinet's work, has read me parts of the speeches made in a semi-secret session of the Committee by Humbert, Doumer and Chéron which amount to nothing less than violent indictments against the General Staff. Boudenoot told me in so many words that in despair of being able to calm these turbulent spirits he weeps by himself every evening when he goes home. Clémenceau has apparently said that if things go on as they are, there will be a revolt of the Generals against the High Command, and Humbert has threatened to stand up in the *Place de la Concorde* and proclaim the truth to the people and allow himself to be arrested.

12th.—Colonel Buat, who has just come back from London, has been very unfavourably impressed by what he has seen and heard; up to now no rifle has been turned out; a million men are being trained with wooden rifles; the new Divisions are entirely without munitions, and yet England has industrial resources which we have not. The first Kitchener Army, consisting of six Divisions, has just been sent to France; the three Divisions which remain on the other side

of the Channel will be here before the end of the month, but the Second Army cannot arrive till the 15th of August.

Marcel Sembat tells us that the Socialists claim, for all the groups in the *Chambre*, the right of sending delegates to the Armies, and he insists that Viviani shall agree to this; Viviani replies that he would rather resign his office than authorise visits, the harm of which he knows by bitter experience and which give rise to dangerous abuses. Ribot says the same thing, as of course I do also, and Sembat is not going to insist. But how difficult it is to reconcile Parliamentary customs with the exigencies of war, and yet how dangerous it will be for France if we do not manage somehow to prevent open conflict between the two.

I have insisted, in Council, that Servia shall be officially informed as to what she is to be granted in Dalmatia and that she shall be urged to resume activities and penetrate into Bosnia-Herzegovina. No wonder the temper of this little country is upset; she is neglected, disregarded, and naturally wounded in her feelings by being treated as a negligible quantity. Ribot backs me up in this respect. It is true that, according to the *Verts*, Italy intends to keep the secret, but we can ask Barrère* to try and persuade the Foreign Minister that it is to everybody's interest to speak the truth. Delcassé has, however, only sent to our Minister at Nisch a short, condensed, and insufficiently explicit telegram; it would of course have been better not to have indicated distributions, before winning the war, but since Italy has put forward her claims, and as we have tried to work them in with the just rights of Servia, why let the latter country think that she is being sacrificed? Just now, for lack of being better informed, she is trying to help herself; she has moved forward in Albania and has occupied El-Bassan and the heights of Cafa-Saj, Orosi, and Ura-Vezirit. Italy and Montenegro are alike indignant about this forward move, and the Montenegrin Cabinet has advised King Nicholas to occupy Scutari.

President Wilson's reply to Germany is published in to-day's American newspapers; Jusserand telegraphs that it is very

* French Ambassador to Rome.

moderate in tone and renders Mr. Bryan's indignation inexplicable.

13th.—Joffre has reorganised his command so as to have real experts at his side, and so as to establish also a better liaison between the Armies and himself. The forces operating in the northern theatre will for the future be divided into three Groups of armies, the Northern under Foch, the Central group under Castelnau, and the Eastern group under Dubail. Foch will have the XXXVIth Corps, the 10th Army and the 2nd Army minus the XIIIth Corps, and moreover, in his relations with the Commander-in-Chief, will have to co-ordinate our operations with those of the British and Belgian Armies. The Central group will include the 6th Army, increased by the XIIIth Corps, the 5th Army and the 4th Army, while Dubail will have under him the 3rd and the 1st and the 7th Armies and the detachment of the Army of the Lorraine. The Commanders of the groups of armies will have full control over their zones of action, as regards the distribution of units in the front line, and the creation of their own reserves; they will also have a free hand as regards disposing of their mobile heavy artillery, as well as conducting the operations which they set afoot themselves or which they will undertake under orders from the Commander-in-Chief. As regards organisation and personnel, the Generals will no doubt refer to the Commander-in-Chief, but they are to make every representation at Headquarters which they think useful. Foch and Dubail will get to work at once on these lines, but there will be a little delay in fixing up Castelnau's command.

Joffre is still very disgruntled with the English; neither he nor Millerand nor Delcassé knows for certain if the Divisions promised to us for the end of the month will come. Moreover, Kitchener and Joffre view the military situation quite differently. The British War Minister, who allows the Government to retain control of the war and gives Sir John French a perfectly free hand as regards the command in the field, is, as was the Duke of Wellington, opposed to the offensive. He says, "Joffre and Sir John told me in November that they were going to push the Germans back

over the frontier ; they gave me the same assurances in December, March and May. What have they done ? The attacks are very costly and end in nothing. It would be better to husband our men, especially if some day we have to meet a really formidable German attack."

Paschitch declares that no Servian troops have been taken away from the Austro-Hungarian front, and that the recent operations in Albania, undertaken to help Essad Pasha there, will not affect in any way the principal battlefield, where their attacks will very shortly be resumed.

Humbert has published over his signature, in this morning's *Journal*, an effusive eulogy of the Bethlehem Steel Company which offered, while he was in America, to manufacture munitions for us ; he has not forgiven Millerand for having brushed this offer aside, and he wants him to reconsider his decision. I had scarcely read his article when I received a letter from him in which he reproaches me, in rather singular terms, for having allowed any compensation to have been given to Baquet and Deville. Humbert seems to be composing a dossier which, in the event of any national disaster, will enable him to say he foresaw what was going to happen and in vain warned the President of the Republic and the Ministers ; so far I had never credited "le gros Charles" with the rôle of Cassandra, and my reply to him is tinged with irony.

I am leaving Paris this evening with Millerand and General Bourgeois to visit our munitions works at Tarbes, Toulouse, Carcassonne, St. Chamond, Fourchambeault and other places in the Midi.

17th.—During my absence our troops have tried to capture the Vimy Ridge ; on our left and to the north of Notre Dame de Lorette we seized Buval as also the height to the north of the Souchez sugar works, and we took three lines of trenches south-east of Hébuterne ; but on this portion of our front it is always just a matter of going forwards and backwards.

The Greek elections seem to be all in favour of Venizelos, but the Government has not yet published the figures.

King Nicholas still wants to occupy Scutari ; he says that he will only remain there if the great Powers are agreeable,

but he evidently intends to confront them with a *fait accompli*.

Bulgaria has handed to the four Allied Ministers a Note in reply to their statement of the 16th—29th May; she expresses herself as much touched by our address to her and our evident confidence, but she wants several points explained. Will the retrocession of a part of Macedonia include all the non-contested zone cited in the Servo-Bulgarian Treaty of 1912? What will be the department allotted to Cavalla? What compensation will be offered to Greece in Asia Minor? How will the entente between Roumania and Bulgaria with regard to the Dobrudja be settled? Our Ministers think that Bulgaria is trying to gain time, and they advise us to let her know that the substance of our proposals will depend on the rapidity with which a decision is registered at Sofia; they also point out the precise answers we can furnish to the Bulgarian questions. But already the Servian Press is casting blame on the Allies for taking the side of Bulgaria against Serbia in the Macedonian problem.

Gaston Thomson, who asks me to sign the prolongation of the moratorium of rents, speaks with patriotic indignation of the wave of pessimism which has broken over Parliament and has drenched a good many of the middle classes in Paris. Albert Sarraut also tells me that at the Council meeting yesterday several of the Ministers made some very disparaging remarks; while M. Margaine now writes to me that the happier impressions which I have brought back from my last visit to the Armies were mistaken. He says that if from Rheims to St. Mihiel conditions in the front line are only on the verge of being disquieting, at Commercy they are alarming, that a French General was deliberately shot at in his car with French bullets, and that General Dubail is alluded to generally in the ranks as "the Assassin." He ended, "I am not discussing whether the facts are well or ill founded; they are what they are. I regret that the warnings and subsequently the appeals which I made to the Government have been without effect. I am therefore going to address myself to Parliament, and urge Members to go and see for themselves what is happening in our Army

where there is burning indignation and where the incapacity of the Generals may very possibly induce something like a revolt." I must admit that what makes me especially anxious is not the temper of the Army but M. Margaine's state of mind. If the Deputies whom he is going to incite to go to the front bring back, as he has done, all the complaints, just or unjust, which they hear, and if they are going to palliate a cowardly attempt at assassination, we shall be indeed heading for anarchy.

18th.—In response to an urgent invitation M. Margaine has called upon me, and I am surprised to find him in so quiet a mood. He admits that it would be dangerous actually to replace Joffre who enjoys great prestige within and without France, nor would it be possible to guarantee in any degree Sarraill's strategic worth; my friend also thinks that final victory is certain, but that the war will be long drawn out, and one must accustom the people to the idea. The very obvious reply was that one must begin by not discouraging them.

A clever journalist, M. Téry, who has generally befriended me, addresses me an open and not unfriendly letter this morning and suggests that when I go to the front I shall don my old uniform of Captain of Alpine Chasseurs; I have neither right nor reason to dress up as a soldier, but the matter of what one should wear on these occasions presents a difficult, if rather ridiculous, side especially in bad weather. I can't tramp about in the mud without leggings nor open an umbrella in the trenches, so latterly I have taken to wear a cap and put on a pea jacket and gaiters. As the photographers have the right to circulate everywhere, even in the zone of the Army, this very convenient and inoffensive costume has quickly become known and has cost me a good deal of chaff. Gustave Téry's suggestion would save me from these quibbles; but just now when things are looking rather black, it is all to the good that people should be amused, and what really matters is that I should be able to walk about at my ease, whatever my habiliments, among the soldiers who are defending the country.

Commandant Revol, whom Joffre has sent to Italy, tells

me that General Cadorna has failed in his attempt to back up north of the Isonzo, the offensive which he made in the lower valley ; he has only left two Army Corps in front of Trentino, and two north of Venice, and both of these are poorly entrenched. A Bavarian Army Corps is, we are fairly sure, in the Trentino.

M. Stancioff, the Bulgarian Minister who has been appointed to Rome, has just brought me his letters of recall ; he does not know the answer which his Government has given to the Allied Note, and he gives me to understand that he is being kept in the dark because for some time past he has told his country that Italy would be sure to come in and has always been in favour of Bulgaria doing the same. He has married a Frenchwoman and his brothers-in-law are fighting in our Army ; he offered to resign from public service altogether, but his Government refused to allow this and said, " You will take our full confidence with you to Rome."

Paul Cambon has telegraphed very wise words to Delcassé begging him to be very careful as to what he says to Bulgaria. " I am never tired of saying that Bulgaria will only show her hand when we have secured the Dardanelles. It is to deceive oneself to think that we shall attract her with promises, the realisation of which she will have to await, and our perpetual nibbles, which are quite ineffective at Sofia, have a bad effect at Athens." Delcassé has nevertheless submitted to London, Petrograd and Rome, the reply which he proposes to send in which he points out that the Macedonian frontier contemplated in our communication, is the line of the 1912 Treaty ; that Bulgaria will be assured of this zone while Servia will acquire Bosnia-Herzegovina on the Adriatic ; that the Cavalla territory will include the old Cazas of Uavalla, Drama and Serrès, and that in the Dobrudja, Roumania will be asked to hand back to Bulgaria the regions of Dobritch and Baltchich. We are piling up the offerings to lay at the feet of His Majesty Ferdinand, while this morning the *Homme Enchaîné* takes the Roumanians to task.

M. Ribot has serious difficulty not only with M. Bark the Russian Finance Minister, who is asking for a renewal of the advance of 625 millions, but also with the Bank of England

and the English banks who are not very willing to offer trade credits to our own bankers, and who therefore are not facilitating our purchases of raw material and manufactured goods in Great Britain; M. Ribot has appealed to the Chancellor of the Exchequer. We seem to be a good way off from that perfect financial entente which was so cheerfully announced.

The story which Colonel Pénélon tells me to-day, in strict confidence, leaves me no illusion whatever as to the Arras operations, which have utterly failed. The thing is over, the casualty list is very heavy, and we are not going to get through; this is the third time that Joffre has made his attempt on too narrow a front; Champagne, Woevre, and Artois all point the same moral. We have been exposed to flanking fire across our positions which were rendered untenable. On a wider front and with concomitant attacks supporting the main offensive we might not have met with the same difficulties. Both Pénélon and Herbillon are quite unable to explain what they call the wilful stubbornness of the Commander-in-Chief, and they say that the Generals of Groups of armies, the Army Commanders and the Army Corps Commanders, almost all complain of being led by theorists and professors. Both these liaison officers think that it would be very useful for the Government and myself to have an interview with Joffre and his three principal Generals as soon as possible.

19th.—The Russian Prime Minister, M. Goremykine, who is in failing health, has sent in his resignation which has been accepted by the Emperor; reactionary influences will be at work to dissuade the Sovereign from constructing a Cabinet with Liberal tendencies, and to induce him to set up a sort of military dictatorship.

Baron de Brocqueville, the very good-looking Belgian Prime Minister, has called here to say how much it is hoped that, if we take away our troops in the North to make room for the English, we shall anyhow leave a few in Belgium. He thinks it would be very unfortunate if we were to clear out bag and baggage as it is an excellent thing for the morale both of the people and the Army to exhibit in con-

crete form our community of action.

20th.—It is the Pope who is this morning in Clémenceau's black books; he now has the whole world under his daily instruction.

M. Maurice Reynaud has returned from his Mission to Russia, where he says public opinion is inflamed against France; we are blamed for laying on the Russian Armies the heat and burden of the war. Recent troubles in Moscow are partly explained by this frame of mind.

Ribot again confides to me his financial anxieties; if the war goes on it will be very difficult to maintain the exchange at a favourable rate. He does not like the idea of a forced loan, and he thinks that it will be difficult to apply a tax on revenue, which we may have to face, while fighting is going on. He feels sure that new taxes, voted in mid war, would produce feelings which would be very injurious to public credit, and that the expense of collecting them would be so heavy that they would produce comparatively very little. Ribot also tells me that according to Paul Cambon, it is not true that England, of her own accord, agreed to Russia's annexation of Constantinople; when Sazonoff said that he had secured the British consent, it was not so. Delcassé, however, had considered Sazonoff's statement to be accurate. It would seem that he did not put the question to London; he rather rashly involved himself; and England might only have consented because she thought we had done so. Shall we never know the exact truth on this point?

Tittoni has now written to Delcassé that Austria has sent to the Italian front almost all the men who were engaged against the Servian Army and has also withdrawn her troops from Galicia. He also believes that, in spite of our offensive, some German units have been sent to the Tyrol and to Trentino. "Thus," he says, "is shown up the want of harmonious co-operation, the error into which coalitions always fall, an error which always favours the enemy manœuvring on inner lines. Cadorna thinks it imperatively necessary that the Allies should come to an explicit agreement as to the date on which their armies will simultaneously attack on different

fronts, and that they should make a formal promise to stick to it. This date should be fixed to begin as early as possible, and anyhow should come in the middle of harvest, which in Hungary takes place between the last week in June and the beginning of July. Austria would thus be obliged either to spare a good number of her fighting men or to sacrifice a large part of her harvest." It seems to me that Italy, who has only just come into the war, is consulting primarily her own interests, and she is careful also, in spite of the London Agreements, not to throw down the glove to Germany. But as she has anyhow the right to ask for a general military understanding, Millerand is going to submit her case at once to Joffre.

In Russia the appointment of Prime Minister remains open; the Minister of the Interior, M. Maklakoff, an aggressive reactionary, is replaced by Prince Stcherbatow, a very judicious and moderate man.

21st.—Tittoni has been to see me about his letter to Delcassé; I assured him that there is nothing we should like better than a close understanding between the General Staffs, and we mean to do what is necessary to bring this about. As to an immediate offensive I told him that the English did not seem to be greatly in favour of this. "Yes," was his reply, "because it is only we who are wearing ourselves out." "Wearing ourselves out" indeed! The man talks as if Italy had been fighting for the last ten months.

M. Lahovary brings me a telegram which he has received from M. Bratiano and which, according to him, proves the perfect sincerity of the Roumanian Prime Minister. Bratiano is ready to promise that the Roumanian Army shall take the field anyhow within five weeks if we can come to an agreement as to the political conditions; but here, and especially as regards the Banat, he will not give way an inch. I tried to show Lahovary that it is all to Roumania's interest to please Servia as much as possible as the one would find the co-operation of the other in the field extremely useful.

22nd.—Another gloomy Council meeting. The Ministers are aghast at the thought of the operations in Arras being all over; and Ribot and Malvy say that on Friday the Senate

is going to finish off Millerand altogether, although they do not quite know how it is going to be done. Bourgeois himself has said that he could no longer accept the responsibility of leaving the War Minister where he is, but Millerand, who is quite aware of what is going on, does not disturb himself at all; he shrugs his shoulders and smiles; nothing seems to affect his nerves, and trouble seems to slip off him like water off a duck's back.

Ribot and Albert Thomas declare that Charles Humbert's campaign in the *Journal* as to the necessity of sending skilled workmen into the manufactories, is doing great disservice to the Army; a good many of the soldiers now think that if they are skilled workers they have an absolute right to be sent back. My own idea is that the men sent down to the workshops should remain mobilised and entirely subject to military authority, and that they can be ordered back to the front if they are idle or give any sort of trouble; the Council, broadly speaking, is of my opinion, but unfortunately the question "is reserved for future consideration."

Colonel Gondrecourt, the Chief of our Military Mission in Italy, has telegraphed that the Italians have already met Germans against them on the Trentino side, and they have even taken some German prisoners; if this is a fact, why on earth does not Italy declare war on Germany?

I have been furnished with a correct casualty list of the fighting in Artois. From the 6th May to the 15th June we lost 451 officers killed, 1081 wounded, 139 missing, 12,095 soldiers killed, 49,097 wounded, 13,517 missing; from the 16th to the 18th June there were 53 officers killed, 151 wounded and 19 missing, and 1377 soldiers killed, 5675 wounded, and 2527 missing; the German losses are said to be much greater, but this is very little better than guesswork; and besides the German Army is much larger than ours.

23rd.—This morning M. Boudenoot, in a great state of mind, came here to read to me the statement which Doumer has prepared for the Army Committee; it is a new indictment which will be read to-morrow and which winds up with a formal censure of the War Office; Millerand when questioned by the Committee yesterday remained—so Boudenoot tells

me—like a block of ice. Boudenoot had only just left me when Viviani and Millerand arrived to go with me to Chantilly, where we are to see Joffre and the three new Commanders, Castelnau's command having just been constituted like the two others. On our way I made a few quite friendly but very firm remarks as to Millerand's attitude both as regards the seeming slackness of his departments and also as to his persistent refusal to give anything like precise information either to the Committees, the Government or myself; I could not help saying a sharp word to him for not having woken up his underlings, and I mildly hinted that he might have told me he was going to promote Baquet, and not have left me to find it out from the papers. The War Minister remained quite placid and unmoved, and I have no idea whether he thought I was right or wrong.

As to Viviani, he approved of everything I said and told me that it had become impossible for the Government to stand where it does; the growing opposition of the Parliamentary Committees, especially the Army Committee of the Senate and the Finance Committee, are making the lives of the Cabinet a burden. "Even physically," he said, "I cannot go on much longer; every day I spend three or four hours with these Committees listening to interminable speeches and replying to questions dealing with infinitesimal details; I go back to my room quite exhausted, where I am again tackled by Senators and Deputies; I have scarcely a minute to work at my ease, and I am tired out, discouraged and disgusted." Millerand, quite unmoved, merely says that the Prime Minister has only to give a few words of explanation from the tribune in order to disperse the clouds and put an end to the intrigues.

At Chantilly Joffre received us in the villa where he is living and where the three Generals have already arrived; the seven of us sat down round a table and General Pellé, the Chief of the Staff, joined us. There was first the matter of the organisation and functions of the three groups, as to which the Commanders expressed themselves entirely satisfied, and thought that the Commander-in-Chief's heavy task would be considerably lightened; with this Joffre cordially agreed.

Viviani then spoke of the strong feeling which is beginning to show itself among the people scarcely less than in Parliament ; although the war had now lasted for ten months, no real success had been secured since the battle of the Marne, and the operations in Champagne, Woevre and Artois had resulted in something like failure ; hence the disfavour in which the Commander-in-Chief was beginning to be held, while it was becoming more and more current talk that he was inaccessible even to his immediate subordinates. I intervened to say, and to say very distinctly, that at all cost these feelings must be combated, and popular confidence must be maintained ; I asked Joffre whether, in order to reply to the criticisms which are being circulated, he would see any harm in convening from time to time the three Commanders, in allowing them to exchange their own views in his presence, to discuss what they had each been able to do, and to confer together as to future action, it being of course quite understood that decision would then rest with the Commander-in-Chief. Viviani and Millerand wholly approved this idea which Castelnau warmly supported ; Foch, however, thought that these meetings would be quite useless, and Dubail was very lukewarm on the subject. " With the Generals who are here," Joffre said, " I shall always get on with very well, and I always take care to see them and consult them ; but just now it is not a question of discussion but of action." It was a very obvious reply to say that action seemed to have been generally paralysed and the general disappointment was the greater because very often too much had been said ; the enemy's lines were going to be pierced ; the war was going to be finished by June, whereas the end is a very long way off ; extravagant accounts had been given of battles which had been declared as triumphs ; and even yesterday an official communication had painted the occupation of the Labyrinth as a victory. All this had given rise to hopes which were unlikely to be realised, and the country, if greatly disillusioned, may very likely lose some of the patience and energy so absolutely necessary.

Joffre replied that the conferences I suggested might present a good many inconveniences ; that they would be

very much like councils of war, and that they would very often draw away the Commanders from their posts at a moment when their presence with their troops was essentially required. Millerand then chimed in and insisted that the interviews would not in any way have the character of a war council, but that they would permit of a very healthy exchange of ideas, that each General would learn exactly what was going on in the other two groups, and he repeated that the Commander-in-Chief would of course remain master of all decision. Finally Joffre, rather half-heartedly, agreed to these meetings in principle, provided they were not at stated intervals nor on any fixed dates.

Immediately after breakfast, at which we were joined by several Staff officers, we resumed our talk, and Joffre explained that the operations in Arras would gradually die down, as he did not wish to set an abrupt end to them, but he had no longer any belief that he would break through. Nor had Foch any certainty as to securing the Vimy Ridge, and as soon as possible the Corps which were semi-exhausted would be relieved. Castelnau thought that they would take nearly two months before they would be ready again for the field, but Foch would not hear of this and said excitedly that two or three weeks would be sufficient.

The explosions are going on in really disturbing proportions and our batteries are reduced to three guns and often to two. The heavy artillery is still very short of munitions in spite of recent efforts to speed up manufacture.

There followed a long talk about what the British had done and were going to do, and Joffre thought that Viviani and Millerand should go again to London and tell the Cabinet how absolutely essential it was that we should get further help from across the Channel. England is finding great difficulty in securing arms and ammunition, as she has not yet mobilised her national industries, and she is receiving most of her stuff from America or Canada. The recent visit of Albert Thomas to England did little to improve the situation, especially in the matter of putting a stop to our competition in the American markets for the purchase of raw material; much has been done, but very much remains to

be done. Also Kitchener's liking for standing on the defensive renders our position rather difficult both with regard to Italy, who is clamouring for an immediate offensive, and to Russia, who is blaming us for our immobility. Joffre and the three Generals consider Kitchener's theory as heresy, and Joffre declares that if we adopt purely defensive measures we shall render ourselves liable to weighty and incessant enemy attacks. "Kitchener," they all agreed, "can pronounce at his ease as he has no invaded provinces to liberate." Incidentally a few words were said as to the expedition to the Dardanelles, and Mr. Winston Churchill's methods were rather roughly handled by the Generals. It was further, and not unreasonably complained, that the general co-ordination of operations on the different fronts was badly organised; the Germans are perfectly aware of this and consider in the disjointedness of our efforts lies their best chance of victory; there was a consensus of opinion that there must be one directing brain, and that that brain could only be in France, but unfortunately the Allies do not seem to see this in the same light. Until we can think of something better I asked if it were possible to convene the Generals delegated by the Allied Powers, England, Belgium, Italy, Servia and if possible Russia, who would receive general directions from the French Commander-in-Chief. But there might be some difficulty in conveying these directives to the different Governments; it might not do for G.Q.G. to communicate directly with foreign Governments, and the French Government might possibly have to intervene. It is a matter which has to be considered especially as in no belligerent country, whatever its constitutional conditions, are the relations sufficiently defined between the civil power and the military command. In Great Britain it is a Cabinet consisting of twenty-two members which, almost entirely, independently of the King, has the political control of the war; Lord Kitchener, albeit a very distinguished soldier, only considers himself as the Minister for raising the troops and supplying and equipping them for the field; he gives no orders to Sir John French, who, as he is not on British soil, receives scarcely any from the British Government, and considers

himself more and more independent. In Belgium the King commands the armies, but day by day he needs all his tact and all his personal authority to bring what his Government does into line with what his military staff want to do. In Russia the Tsar passes for being all powerful, but he is at times the plaything of his Ministers, who themselves are constantly and sulkily opposing the Grand Duke. In Italy General Cadorna is Commander-in-Chief ; the Ministers are responsible for sending him men, arms and ammunition, but they seem to leave him entire freedom as to strategy, a freedom on which Victor Emmanuel never trespasses. No less discreet and modest, than he is intelligent and active, the King seems to wish to be considered, even when he is at the front, as a witness who observes and encourages, much more than as an adviser or director. In France ever since the outbreak of the war the Commander-in-Chief has apparently assumed that everything centres in him ; if the fortunes of war had for the last ten months smiled on him, it is possible that we should somehow or another have put up with this régime, but little by little the nation has quite obviously asked the Government to resume all responsibility, and moreover in a coalition campaign strategy and politics do not function in two separate worlds. Let us hope that our meeting at Chantilly may do something to facilitate concerted action.

24th.—Boudenoot sends me the text of the resolution which was voted yesterday. “ The Army Committee of the Senate, recognising that, since the vote taken on the 17th May, the situation as regards our war material has grown worse, now declares that the inactivity and the serious blunders of the War Departments, are a source of danger to the country.” The Ministers think there must be as early a debate as possible in Parliament, but the task of the Cabinet is rendered more difficult by the undeniable way in which the War Office has let things drag on as well as by the awards to Generals Baquet and Ste. Claire Deville. On this latter point Millerand has a word to say, and with quite unusual heat he stands up for the two Generals who, he says, may have made errors of judgment, but have done excellent

service, and whom he is not going to be so cowardly as to throw to the wolves.

This afternoon at the Trocadero there has been a great Franco-Italian demonstration organised for the anniversary of Solferino, and in the course of a speech Tittoni has declared that to Austria's lustful ambitions in the Balkans is due the origin of the war. He reminded us of the negotiations of November 1912 and April 1913 when Serbia and Montenegro were discussed between Vienna and Rome, and he treated us to some very characteristic details as to the Austro-Hungarian Government's lack of good faith. All the speakers were loudly applauded, but unhappily in another corner of Europe the Russians are abandoning Lemberg.

25th.—Sir John French went to Chantilly yesterday and told Joffre that he was afraid of the British Government adopting the ideas of certain members of the Cabinet and of ordering him to remain on the defensive, in which case the new Divisions would be kept in England or sent to the Dardanelles. French is personally much opposed to the idea and thinks that our plain duty to Russia lies in making a great enveloping attack on the French front at an early date. He has written to London to this effect, and Joffre now begs that we shall also make representations to the British Government. My own opinion is that an early meeting between Kitchener, the Italians and ourselves is indispensable; we have asked for this, but Cambon telegraphs that Kitchener and a representative of the British Admiralty cannot come before the 5th July. It is impossible to wait so long, and I dash off a note to Delcassé to insist that one or other plan must be agreed upon and definitely adopted.

Despite the advice of Russia and the protests of Italy, the Montenegrins have marched on Scutari, but, up till now, they have halted at the gates of the town.

26th.—Pierre Loti is again busy about the Turks; Djavid has let him know that Talaat has not so far authorised him to enter into any conversations, and it is quite likely that Russian reverses and our own impotence in the Dardanelles largely disfavour the designs of the indefatigable poet.

27th.—With General Duparge, I went by car this morning

to Château Thierry, where Castelnau has his headquarters. In our few minutes' talk he was more outspoken than he was the other day at Chantilly, and he is now emphatic that we must make up our minds either to stand wholly on the defensive until the Allies can lend us their full strength or we must make an offensive, planned with meticulous care, on two parts of the front, so that the Germans, when attacked, shall not swoop down on us in full force at one point. "It is for the Governments," he said, "to decide which of these plans we shall adopt; at present we have no plan, and we are rather like a cockchafer in a glass case; we keep on putting our head out right and left haphazard." We then went on to Jonchery-sur-Vesle, where Franchet d'Espérey is established and where we breakfasted with him and General Lardemelle, his former Chief of the Staff, who is now commanding the 122nd Infantry Division. Both these soldiers are strongly of opinion that we should stand steady; they think the war will be long and we must not squander our strength on a spasmodic attack; better to form a strong reserve Army and try some other field of operations. In the afternoon from an artillery observation post which dominates Villers-Franqueux, we could see at our feet the German lines, the Aisne Canal and Fort Brimont, which is occupied by the enemy; alongside of us one of our heavy guns was firing effectively and was answered from batteries out of sight; we could only hear the shriek of the shells as they passed over our heads to explode behind us. At various places, there was the usual distribution of decorations, and through the outskirts of Rheims, still far from deserted, we made our way to Epernay where Castelnau and Franchet d'Espérey dined with me, and where I spent the night.

28th.—At Rheims, which is of course even far more hurt than when I was here last, I met Franchet d'Espérey, who showed us all the elaborate defence work at Betheny, the spot where, as it seems only the other day, Nicholas II and M. Loubet saw our troops file past them. About a dozen women have clung to their houses in this tiny place, of which so very little is left standing, and they gathered me a few roses from the deserted gardens as a souvenir of my visit to

their devastated homes. At Rilly, north of the forest of Rheims, we found General Mazel, commanding the XXXVIIIth Corps, who believes that a concentrated attack, on the Nogent l'Abbesse side, if carried out by the 4th and 5th Armies and well supported by artillery, might relieve Rheims. Later from an observation post looking over Cormicy, we had a fine view of the front and could see the huge funnel which we have made in the German trenches south of Berry-au-Bac and which our guns are continuing to enlarge. As it would have been dangerous for a string of cars to go along the river side under the German guns which are on the right bank beyond the Chemin des Dames, I made the little tour alone with Franchet d'Espérey, joining the others at Villers à Merval, whence we returned to Paris through Fismes after a long inspection of the field hospitals there.

29th.—Before the Council meeting this morning Viviani tells me that Millerand's stubborn blindness is destroying the Cabinet and that Baquet's decoration is very unpopular; the Prime Minister thinks that if we are to get a vote of confidence to-morrow, he alone ought to speak, but Millerand has declared that he will not be such a coward as to keep silent. Our meeting took place in Millerand's absence, as he was detained on a financial discussion. Everyone agreed that the sop to Baquet was very unfortunate; and Marcel Sembat said he could see nothing for it but that Millerand should go. Briand, however, very shrewdly insisted on how inconvenient this would be, that Millerand was personally much liked in the Army and even in the country, that the soldiers would be very sorry to lose him, that it would be far better to induce him to keep silence this afternoon and secure a vote of confidence which would be the reply to the resolution of the Army Committee, and then take care that Millerand should exercise his functions better and execute the decisions of the Government. When Millerand arrived Viviani told him what had been decided; the War Minister at first said his dignity obliged him to speak for himself, but when we all pointed out that the Prime Minister, speaking in the name of the whole Government, would carry much more weight, he agreed only reserving the condition that he might say a

few words if he were personally attacked.

Hard fighting goes on in Gallipoli ; we take a few trenches and then lose them again. The story of Artois repeats itself.

Joffre has written to the War Minister : " After the visit of the President of the Republic to G.Q.G., I think I ought to set out the point of view which seems to me to dominate the supreme control of the war. The campaign of 1914 began with a definite war scheme, with a plan of operations decided on by France, Russia and England in agreement, but the present phase of the war, which is unfolding itself under quite different conditions, does not present the same features.

" The relations of the Allies between themselves and Italy, who has just come in, are cordial, but the different Armies are acting on their own account without effective co-ordination. There is a growing impression that the war is not being well managed by the Allies ; such, anyhow, is the opinion of such personages as the Grand Duke Nicholas and M. de Brocqueville, and it is conveyed in a letter addressed by the Italian Government to our Foreign Minister. The remedy for this state of things might be something like this. The French Government might propose to the Allied Powers to centralise the supreme control of the war in the French G.Q.G., where concerted plans and instructions for operations could be worked out. The French Commander-in-Chief would have with him a General Officer duly credited by each Power, whose duty it would be to give us exact information as to the Army which he represents (strength, munitions, natural theatre of operations, etc.) ; he would speak in the name of the Commander-in-Chief whom he represents, and he would convey to him the plans and instructions drawn up by the French Command. As to what particularly concerns the French theatre of operations where French, English and Belgian Armies are in the field, the necessity of close and constant co-operation is imperative ; if they do not go so far as to say that the French Commander-in-Chief is to issue orders, it is at least indispensable if we are to win the war that the English and Belgian Commanders-in-Chief should follow his instructions. It is only thus that we shall be able

to co-ordinate all our efforts and to close in on our adversaries to whose advantage it is that the conduct of the war is certainly not in the hands of one of the belligerent Powers." Joffre is quite right, but it remains to convince the Allied Governments and their Commanders-in-Chief; whether it is a matter of orders or instructions, they do not seem inclined to receive any other than their own.

Millerand in his reply reminded Joffre that at our meeting he had pointed out how important he felt it that there should be an organised defensive and offensive of such character as to assure us that our troops would be able at any moment and at any point either to resist an enemy attack or if occasion should arise to attack themselves. Joffre's answer ran: "I have the honour to inform you that the organised defence of our lines has received my constant attention. Since November I have frequently given orders to the Army Commanders on this point and have taken care that these orders were executed. . . . It is of course impossible to say that any front is by itself inviolable, but I am confident that our troops can at any time and at any point resist any attack of the enemy."

Our Military Attaché in Russia has telegraphed that the Grand Duke Nicholas has explained to him with great detail the difficulties which confront him more especially with regard to the vast distances and because the various functionaries feel that they are thereby unlikely to be found out and held responsible for their delinquencies. Their indifference to duty is such, he said, that it is a constant strain to overcome both the fatalism and the faint-heartedness which is generally felt as a result of the poverty and the tardiness of any results which have been secured, and although a Russian, the Grand Duke added, he had never realised how fearful would be this dead weight. This is indeed a terrible avowal, but happily General Laguiche could say that the Grand Duke himself remained perfectly calm and self-controlled, and was still quite hopeful as to the future. Happily also General Soukhomlinoff has just left the War Office, where he did so much harm. Paléologue telegraphs: "Soukhomlinoff, on whom rests the heaviest responsibility for

the disorder and corruption in military administration, has been relieved of his duties and has been replaced by General Polivanow, formerly attached to the War Minister." That is all to the good, but I cannot help remembering the Emperor's words when he introduced me to Soukhomlinoff: "His looks are not in his favour, but he is an excellent Minister, and I trust him entirely." The poor Emperor has made many mistakes and is only now beginning to have his eyes opened; he seems even to have decided to get rid of others of his Ministers so as to "direct the interior policy of the Empire resolutely towards Liberalism." Sazonoff, who has been with his Sovereign at Headquarters, told Paléologue that he thinks something of this sort is absolutely necessary for Russia's salvation.

Montenegro, as one always expected, has finished by occupying Scutari, and both Italy and Servia are much upset by it. Negotiations with Roumania, Bulgaria and Greece are punctuated by a whole series of cock and bull stories.

30th.—Charles Humbert has been here to assure me that he has never written anything except in the interest of the country. He is still very hot against Millerand and says that Viviani must send him about his business and take over the portfolio for War himself. He flatters himself that it is owing to his journalistic campaign that he had all the country behind himself and the Army Committee with regard both to the conduct and material of war. I told Delcassé, Viviani, and Briand of this interview, and they all three agreed that if Millerand were to go it would create a deplorable effect both here and elsewhere, and would provoke a conflict between the Army and Parliament as Millerand is generally popular with the soldiers; Pénélon, who has heard of all these goings on in the Chambre, goes so far as to say that Millerand's resignation might give rise to something like mutiny.

There have been further manifestations in Bucharest in favour of Roumania taking up arms. Také Jonescu has made a very stirring speech in which he urged the Government to take the field against Austria and thus ensure the constitution of a really great Roumania. But Bratiano seems in no hurry to take sides.

CHAPTER VII

Visit to the 1st Army—Verdun—Constitution of the Groups of Armies—Conference at Chantilly—The Army Committee of the Senate—Rheims and Betheny.

JULY

1st.—The year drags on and victory does not come our way. Joffre has decided to have conferences with the Generals of the Groups of Armies, and has also agreed to give eight days' leave, exclusive of the actual travelling days, to all ranks; this is a favour which for some time we have asked of him, and with an indefinite prolongation of the war it would have been inhuman to refuse any longer what is justly due not only to the soldiers but to their families at home.

The question is now before us of appointing several Under Secretaries of State with the evident idea of splitting up Millerand's powers. Viviani is sure that this would be enthusiastically accepted in Parliament even if the Government were to oppose it, but thinks it would be better for the War Minister to take the step himself and nominate his own collaborators. Millerand began by riding the high horse and saying that his dignity would not allow him to agree to such a dissipation of his authority, but as we all insisted he wound up by saying that he would think over the men whom he would choose.

Ribot, more and more anxious about the exchange, has asked me to sign a decree forbidding all export of gold; he still complains of the light-hearted and lavish way in which the War Minister places foreign orders especially in America. M. Combes, at Briand's request, has paid me a visit to-day;

like so many others, he is anxious that Millerand should vacate his office and thinks that Viviani should do likewise, and would like to see a Ministry formed under Briand. "All my Radical friends," he says, "would back up Briand, and I shall be very happy myself to take over the portfolio for Public Education." My friend was rather disappointed when I told him that Briand had constantly expressed himself as disfavoured any Ministerial crisis. I have just been asked to sign a decree appointing as Under Secretaries of State M. Joseph Thierry and M. Gaston Godart, the former a Moderate and the latter a Radical-Socialist; Millerand has arranged matters with his two new collaborators without asking my opinion and does not even think it necessary to bring me the document himself. Late this evening Dubost came to tell me that the Army Committee have rejected by fourteen votes to seven the proposed resolution asking for a secret session of the Senate; the President, who is against any change of Ministry, is highly pleased. A telegram from Mudros gives the sad news that General Gouraud when visiting the field hospital of Sed-Ui-Bar had been seriously wounded by the explosion of a shell fired from the Asiatic side; his right arm and left leg are fractured, but his condition, though serious, is not dangerous. He is leaving to-day for France, having handed over the command to General Bailloud.

2nd.—Boudenoot has told me what happened at the meeting of the Army Committee yesterday when the opponents of the Government were completely routed. Clémenceau and Humbert made violent speeches against Joffre, G.Q.G. and the whole Government, and asked for a secret session of the Senate, which was refused and for it substituted a letter to the Government in reply to Millerand's last speech which was thought very inopportune. Humbert then read out a letter which he said was from a Corps Commander and which was nothing else than a violent onslaught on all the ideas of G.Q.G. "Nothing but faults have been committed since October," so ran the letter, "men were being uselessly slaughtered, and the troops had lost their dash and had lapsed into a sort of gloomy resignation." As the Committee

did not ask for the name of the writer, it would seem that they accepted information forwarded, in violation of all disciplinary rules, by an individual unknown to them! If Clémenceau had been Minister he would have had something to say on this point. Millerand has consulted me as to who shall succeed Gouraud at Gallipoli; from what Dubost has said to me I believe Galliéni would accept the post, but the War Minister hesitates between him and General Villaret.

3rd.—Humbert, in this morning's *Journal*, quotes the letter which he alleges to have received "from one of our great soldiers," in which occur the phrases: "We will speak the truth. Time is on our side. Let us hold on; let us make the war material we need; let us husband the men; let us have a real armed force when other armed forces are worn out instead of wearing ours out for nothing; don't let us be contented with talking, but let us make ready for a winter campaign." The sentiments may be all right, but is it quite wise to shout out every morning to our unhappy soldiers that they are being worn out for no good? Clémenceau again has some nasty things to say about Bratiano and Roumania, "Nothing but maize and petrol." It seems an odd way in which to recruit our friends. Millerand says that after full consideration he thinks it better to leave Galliéni as Military Governor of Paris, the defences of which he has so admirably organised, and to send someone else to the Dardanelles, either Villaret, if he is quite recovered from his wound, or Grossetti, who did so well on the Marne and in Belgium.

Malvy tells us in Council that the writer of the letter to Humbert is General Anthoine, who is serving under Castelnau. M. Caillaux has begged Viviani to censor a campaign which the *Action Française* has started against him and to which M. Almeyreda has replied in his *Bonnet Rouge* by a violent attack on Léon Daudet.

Another Note from Sazonoff, who despairs of ever obtaining the co-operation of all the Balkan States, and thinks we ought to choose between them. He has gone back to his old idea of favouring Bulgaria and would now make her fresh offers. All this is very wounding to the Servians, who are, anyhow,

in arms against our own enemies and who keep on asking anxiously what has been done about Italy. Sazonoff does not want any official answer to be sent on this point, as he fears that Servia may not think herself sufficiently well treated, while Italy is inconsolable because she has not been promised either Fiume or Spalato.

4th.—Delcassé has announced that he is going to-morrow with Viviani, Millerand and Joffre to meet Asquith, Kitchener and Balfour at Calais ; he will try and make them appreciate the necessity of adopting a definite line of conduct in the Balkans, as if we try to please everybody we shall end by merely creating a general atmosphere of uneasiness and discontent.

Under a recent decree of the Emperor, the Douma will be convoked for the last days of this month but, despite the silence imposed on the Press, public opinion is against this delay of several weeks and asks not only that the Douma shall meet at once, but that a really responsible Ministry shall be formed. There is a good deal of unrest in the working classes, and one wonders whether the Monarchy will accommodate itself more easily to a state of war than to our constitutional liberty.

5th.—The war weariness which permeates many quarters has produced a fresh crop of insulting and threatening letters addressed to me. "We want peace. If not beware of the 14th of July ; it will be quite easy to get rid of you." On the other hand, I receive a large number of letters expressing confidence and full of sympathy, and the combination of the two types of missives affords clear evidence of how war brings out the very best and the very worst in people affected by it.

Commandant Girard, who is now our liaison officer with the Italian Army, gives a very cheery account of the Army there ; he says the men are in excellent spirits and that the offensive, so far from being given up, is to be continued on the Isonzo and under very satisfactory conditions.

The reply of the Army Committee to Millerand's speech is full of exaggerations, and among other things sets out that if Parliament had not met when it did, the Army would be

without guns, rifles or munitions. It was decided that the reply was to be addressed to the President of the Republic, "The Chief of the Armies, and the supreme guardian of the interests of the country." I told Boudenoot at once that the term "Chief of the Armies" was singularly unfortunate, and might lead people to suppose that I could give orders either to the armies in the field or to the War Office, whereas, as Head of the Constitutional State, I can only act through the responsible Ministers. Boudenoot said that Léon Bourgeois did raise this objection, but that Henri Chéron quoted from Article 3 of the Constitution: "The President disposes of the armed forces," and the Committee agreed. At this rate they might as well have upheld that the President is the Chief of diplomacy and even of all the Ministers, as the text says that he negotiates treaties and makes civil and military appointments. The Committee simply forgot the last paragraph of the same Article: "Every act of the President of the Republic must be countersigned by a Minister; as also Article 6, which says: "The Ministers are jointly and severally responsible for the general policy of the Government as for their own personal action. The President of the Republic is only responsible in the case of high treason." Authority must surely go hand in hand with responsibility. The King of England reigns and does not govern. The President presides and does not govern. It is the A.B.C. of the Parliamentary régime. I hand the letter which Boudenoot has brought to me back to him and beg him to point out to the Committee that the expression of which they have made use seems to me quite unconstitutional.

Chéron has lost no time in coming to try and justify the words "Chief of the Army," but he eventually recognised that I am only nominal chief without any direct or personal authority. He then vigorously protested that both he and his colleagues were determined to prosecute the war to the end and to refuse any unsatisfactory peace. I can entirely agree with him on this point and could slip in a word of warning as to exaggerated and inopportune Parliamentary manifestations which might quite possibly give rise to a panic and which already had done no little to create alarm. Chéron

is a sound patriot as well as a fine fellow, and he will do what he can to put things right.

6th.—I came by car this morning to Cagny, where are now the headquarters of the 2nd Army under Pétain, whom I last saw at the head of the XXXIIIrd Corps, mentioned in General Army Orders for its splendid behaviour north of Arras. Brilliantly led by Pétain, the XXXIIIrd Corps in less than two hours broke through the German line and seized the crest of Vimy Ridge. It was said that if the reserves had been within the General's hand, a really decisive victory might have been scored. Pétain does not share this view ; he says that he was a spear head as the other Corps had not come up, and if he had pushed on he would have been exposed to heavy counter attacks. But also he says that the artillery preparation for the neighbouring Corps was not sufficient, and that the fault was repeated of starting an action without sufficiently consulting those who have to carry it out. He thanked me warmly for having secured the Chantilly meeting and for obtaining Joffre's consent to future consultations between the Commander-in-Chief and the Generals holding the chief commands. Pétain must be counted as one of those who is indisposed to further attacks just now, and thinks that with a long war we must husband our forces and get together more heavy guns and ammunition. The General speaks forcibly but very coolly and clearly, and only a slight movement of the eyelids from time to time allows one to see that under an apparently very cold exterior the General conceals a very warm and indeed rather passionate nature.

After breakfast at Headquarters General Baumgarten, commanding the XIth Corps, took us by car to Sailly-au-Bois and thence on foot to Hébuterne, where all the houses are destroyed and where a bombardment is a daily happening. At Doullens in the evening I was allotted quarters in the modest little house that Joffre occupied during the battle of Arras ; Foch dined with us, and he was vivacious, outspoken and spicy in his talk as ever, but he seemed to me rather to have changed his outlook. He no longer talks about offensives but now says that the war will be long, indeed very long, and that we must exercise patience and dig ourselves solidly in.

7th.—At St. Pol, the H.Q. of the 10th Army, early this morning we found General d'Urbal waiting to take us to see the IXth Corps, who are in billets in the villages round about and are enjoying a very well-earned rest. General Curé, commanding the Corps, snatched a moment of *tête-à-tête* to say, "Pray, M. le Président, do what you can to put a stop to these local offensives; the instrument of victory is being broken in our hands." In the afternoon I went to the headquarters of the XXIst, XXXIIIrd, IIIrd, Xth and XVIIth Corps, and with a little variation, all the Commanders voice the same opinion. Their Corps have had a very bad time, and the enemy artillery, with its unquestionable superiority over our own, has done terrible damage. D'Urbal listened but rather impatiently to all the remarks of his subordinates and by no means agreed with them; his rather lofty idea was that if the troops are having so sorry a time where they are, they should be pushed on up to the crest. D'Urbal is personally a very brave fellow, but I am by no means sure if his judgment is right or wrong; anyhow, one again gets the impression of profound disagreement between the man who sets the task and the subordinates who have to execute it.

8th.—I returned to Paris late last night, and this morning Millerand and Viviani have told me about the interview which they had on Tuesday at Calais with Asquith, Kitchener, Lord Crewe, Balfour, and Sir John French, at which also Delcassé, Augagneur and Joffre were present. A subsequent interview took place yesterday at Chantilly between Kitchener, Sir John and Joffre to which Ignatieff, the Russian Military Attaché, was summoned. An agreement was reached under which Kitchener will send us this month six new Divisions, six more next month, and six others some time after October; the English are to relieve part of our front north of Arras; at Joffre's earnest entreaty Kitchener will give way about standing on the defensive only, but for the next weeks there will be nothing but minor attacks in order to hold and wear out the enemy. My own fear is that these are more likely to wear out our own troops as well with little results, and everything which the junior Generals said to me yesterday seems

very sound. Three English Divisions are to land in the near future in the Dardanelles, but for the moment Kitchener does not intend to send any other reinforcements there.

Our Ambassador has asked Sonnino why Italy does not declare a state of war with Germany. He was told that the situation had altered since the conclusion of the London Agreement as on account of the Russian retreat Germany has forces in hand which she can set against the Italians or ourselves. "Public opinion here," Sonnino said, "is rather excited. It is important that we should not be thought to have chosen this moment to lay ourselves open to the blows of a very formidable adversary." While the Italian Government is making up its mind to keep its promises, the Germans have renewed their attacks on the Hauts de Meuse and near Souchez as well as near the Bois d'Ailly and the Bois le Prêtre. They have been repulsed everywhere, but not without inflicting heavy losses on us.

Viviani came late this evening to tell me of the stormy meeting in the Chambre where M. Albert Favre, the Radical-Socialist member for the Charente Inférieure was heartily applauded for every word he said against Millerand. "Life is no longer worth living," says poor Viviani. "Almost all the Deputies advise me to break off with Millerand, but while some propose Barthou, others, and especially the Socialists, won't have anything to do with him. Some want me to take over the portfolio for War myself, but it is quite outside my line; some recommend Briand, but he would be sure to say no. I can't see any politician suitable for the task, and I thought of putting in some soldier, only that he would probably soon be in difficulties with the Commander-in-Chief." I suggested that if, at the worst, Millerand really had to go, Barthou might be the best man. "Yes," was Viviani's reply, "but then Caillaux would be on the war-path again, and it is rather important to keep him quiet." The poor "union sacrée" seems in rather a bad way!

9th.—I opened a hospital this morning at Neuilly which has been started under the auspices of the Association des Amitiés Mussulmanes, and I seized the opportunity to pay a tribute to our African troops who have done so well at the

front. I then went on to the Maison de Santé in the Rue Bizet to see General Gouraud, who has had his right arm amputated. His thigh and the tibia of his left leg are also broken, but he is bearing up stoically. He thinks the British plan for the Dardanelles is by no means bad, but that the two Admirals do not keep sufficiently in touch, and he would like Bailloud to succeed him.

General Porro, the Italian Chief of the Staff, who is going to Chantilly to-morrow, tells me that the Italians have killed several Germans and taken four prisoners. He cannot understand why war is not declared between the two countries, and he also thinks that all offensives should be suspended until Russia is able genuinely to take the field again, that is to say, until the autumn.

10th.—In Council this morning it was decided to give Gouraud the Military Medal, and it was proposed to hold a ceremony on the 14th July at the Pantheon where the ashes of Rouget de l'Isle are to be transferred. In the afternoon I pinned the Military Medal on Gouraud's breast, who was moved to tears. The doctors say that it is not the thigh which is actually broken but its socket; they are not sure how far the General's injuries will incapacitate him. He himself is quite unmoved and has borne his sufferings un-murmuringly, only saying, "So long as I can get on a horse again."

Delcassé, Sir Edward Grey, Sazonoff and Sonnino continue to converse at cross purposes as to Roumania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Greece and Albania, but no forward step is taken; we are negotiating to secure success in the field, and the lack of success in the field paralyses our negotiations.

11th.—The German and Austrian Ministers have held out threats to Bratiano in order to try and wring from him a formal declaration of Roumanian neutrality; they have asked as a pledge of this that war material for Turkey may be allowed to go through Roumania.

12th.—King Victor Emmanuel has, on the occasion of our national holiday, given me the Collar of the Annonciade, and Tittoni, in a very friendly address, reminds me that the Order is one of the oldest in Europe. "This earnest of friendship

and esteem which my August Sovereign has been pleased to give to the distinguished man who is so brilliant a representative of his country, has a special significance just now when a bloody war has brought together the two countries who are struggling for the principles of nationality and for the liberties of the people."

13th.—The transfer of the ashes of Rouget de l'Isle to the Pantheon has met with unexpected difficulties, as to confer this posthumous honour some legislation is required. It being impossible to convene the two Houses of Parliament, we have been obliged to give up the ceremony at the Pantheon, and the ashes will be conveyed to the Arc de Triomphe and thence to the Invalides.

Viviani and Ribot again complain that it is impossible for them to get on while the Parliamentary Committees are grasping at plenary powers; the Prime Minister declares that he will very soon be absolutely exhausted, and this is probably just what so many of the politicians want.

14th.—A dull, chilly, cloudy day; our aeroplanes are flying overhead to prevent any interruption from Taubes. On our way to the Arc de Triomphe, Viviani, who seems rather nervous, tells me that at the Committee meeting yesterday Humbert produced some letters from Joffre and showed that since October G.Q.G. had pleaded in vain for heavy marine artillery. Millerand had great difficulty in explaining and was once more accused, like his underlings, of apathy. "How is it all going to finish?" said Viviani. We agreed that Millerand should lay before the Council to-morrow Joffre's demands and his replies to them. But why have I been told nothing of all this?

At the Arc de Triomphe, Rouget de l'Isle's ashes, placed on a bier which belonged to the First Republic and decorated with flags, were escorted by a detachment of Engineers. Before the cortège moved off, Madame Delna sang some verses of the Marseillaise, and on arrival at the Cour des Invalides I read out my speech in which I said that having drawn the sword we could not sheathe it till we had avenged our dead nor until "the victory of the Allies will enable us to repair our ruins, to render France whole again,

and provide effectively against a periodical recurrence of these troubles. . . . Let our enemies make no mistake. It is not to sign a precarious peace, which would mean an uneasy and unlasting truce between one war which had been merely cut short and another war far more terrible in its consequences. It is not to remain exposed to fresh attacks and deadly dangers that France has risen as one man to voice the virile words of the Marseillaise . . .”

Millerand has thought it right to let me know that the Army Committee has decided to send delegates to the fortified places at the front with the mandate to ascertain accurately the conditions of our artillery and munitions. The War Minister thinks this sort of thing impossible. The guns and munitions are handed over directly to the Army as there is no longer any defence behind walls, and also there are no longer any fortresses but places organised for defence. What the Committee wants therefore would be to arrange the distribution of guns and munitions among the troops and no Commander-in-Chief would ever accept such unwarrantable, and dangerous, interference. Pénélon thinks that the Governors of towns, and especially General Coutanceau at Verdun, have told the Committee about what has been taken from the towns to help the men at the front ; it would really be better if the Army Commanders were made responsible for the towns as well ; thus, for instance, Sarrail would be in charge, not only of the 3rd Army but of the defences of Verdun itself ; the idea is being mooted at G.Q.G., and there does not seem to be any insuperable difficulty in carrying it out.

Yesterday and to-day there has been murderous fighting in the Argonne.

15th.—Millerand brings us the letter from Joffre of the 3rd October and a whole dossier to show that the War Minister has done all in his power to satisfy the demands of the Commander-in-Chief. There have been difficulties and delays, but, quite contrary to what the Committee was so easily led to believe, no request has ever been left unanswered for a single day. Millerand is to point out to the Committee the gross inconvenience of a Parliamentary inspection of our artillery in fortified places.

The fête day has brought a flood of loyal messages from French colonies in all parts of the globe.

Sazonoff, more and more flighty, has gone back on his acceptance of the Allied Note regarding Roumania, and now wants to make a separate representation to Bucharest. This would simply mean giving Bratiano a plausible excuse for further delays, and everything emanating from Russia is suspect in Roumania.

The Mayor of Dunkirk writes that the wreaths which had been prepared for my reception at Dunkirk on the 29th July, 1914, and were not, of course, required, have now been used to decorate the soldiers' graves. I have told M. Terquem how much I like the idea and how heartily I admire the courage of the inhabitants under the shell fire to which they are so constantly exposed.

The National Council of the unified French Socialist party has voted a resolution in which occur some very trenchant phrases, such as "The party remembers that this time last year the Austrian Socialist section then fixed responsibility on the Austro-Hungarian Government. We cannot accept responsibility for this war, which we lay with all its consequences on those who desired, supported and carried out the fatal step, the Servian ultimatum, which brought us face to face with war.

16th.—From Ferdinand of Bulgaria, the King of Montenegro and President Wilson come telegrams couched in very friendly terms, but neither the first nor the last expresses any wish for our victory. King Ferdinand, who kept the Duc de Guise waiting for four days before seeing him and then only talked banalities, is not the man to change his attitude because it is the 14th July.

Marcel Sembat brings M. Branting, the Swedish Socialist Member of Parliament, to see me. He speaks French very well and assures me his country will never shed her neutrality; M. Branting also says that it is a great pity the Queen betrays her German origin at every turn and is most imprudent in what she says. He thinks that to prevent future misunderstanding between Sweden and Russia, Finland must be given larger constitutional freedom.

17th.—No Council meeting this morning, as Viviani, Millerand and Ribot have gone to Chantilly to discuss with Joffre what financial measures must be adopted for the prosecution of the war. Better management and rather more regard for economy need not conflict with military action.

To congratulate me on my Annonciade there comes an impassioned letter from Count Joseph Primoli. "That volte face," he reminds me, "will be one of the most curious enigmas in our national history. One day, 300 Deputies were leaving their cards to express their adhesion to Giolitti, and in the Senate less than 60 out of 400 members were in favour of our intervention; the very next day Salandra had to give Giolitti police protection on his departure from the town for fear he should be lynched by the crowd. It was just then I arrived in Rome; I had left London apparently quite stolid; I found Paris serious, full of vitality but fully conscious of the tragic hour; I found Rome beflagged in the morning and illuminated at night. I have found in my library an old book on the statutes of the Annonciade; pray accept it as a souvenir from a friend of twenty years and an ally of two months." Yes, twenty years! and there rises to my memory the smiling face of Princess Mathilde with her gracious welcome, under the auspices of Count Primoli and Maurice d'Ocague for artists and writers and even for a rather shy young Minister for Public Education.

I am more than delighted to hear that my old battalion of Chasseurs has just been mentioned in General Orders for the capture of Metzeral, and I have sent them my heartiest congratulations.

18th.—A long talk with General Lyautey, who has come to France for a week and gives very satisfactory news about Morocco. It is really wonderful that a country where, two years ago, there was rebellion and fighting, should now be so pacified that we can take away two-thirds of the regular soldiers and replace them with Territorials. During that time our units were sent to the Eastern front and very soon natives enlisted as loyal and faithful soldiers. To bring about this phenomenon Lyautey has had to do everything to stimulate productive labour and to intensify economic life;

the result has been a deficit of 47,000,000 francs, but the General asks the Government to say if the result is not worth the price. The General would also put us on our guard as to what he calls the material and moral wear and tear of his defensive weapon. Every officer and non-commissioned officer detained in Morocco while France is at war regards himself as in some degree discredited, if not dishonoured, and this feeling will increase as the war goes on. Yet, if everything is peaceful internally in Morocco, there is constant and often pretty hard fighting on the frontiers. The General asks that he shall be given full responsibility for his troops, as also rather more independence and authority as regards promotion. As usual Lyautey talks to one, or rather at one, so vigorously as to give his hearer a poor chance of considering what to reply and he breaks like straw any objection one can offer.

In the afternoon I left for Bourges where Millerand and Thomas had preceded me and where we are to-morrow to witness some artillery practice.

19th.—We went first to the butts to be shown some experiments ; the firing of a new trench mortar ; the burst of a 370 mm. explosive shell ; some incendiary shells for the 75's, and the bombardment of a work by the 75 mm. shells with asphyxiating smoke, the objective being 300 or 400 metres of trenches, a small fortress, some casemates. After the firing we went up to the lines ; there was a strong smell of phosphorus but neither the asphyxiating gas nor the incendiary bombs had produced any great effect. Some wretched sheep and rabbits which had been tied up behind the entrenchments were in a state of terror, a few had been killed and wounded by the bursts but none asphyxiated. They looked at us with their terrified and plaintive eyes as much as to ask what it was all about and whether humanity had gone crazy. It is evident that so far our attempts to reply to the enemy's foul gas have been fruitless, and that we must get our very best chemistry experts to work at once.

Afterwards Paul Clémenceau, a brother of Georges, who is an engineer by profession and now a Lieutenant in the Army, very kindly showed us over the works. Bourges, helped by

Tarbes, is turning out twelve gun barrels per day, and hopes to raise this figure to twenty in October, but even this will fall short of requirements. Our guide did not think the explosions which have so unfortunately occurred were due to the wear and tear of the guns, but rather to faulty shells.

A long round of manufactories took up the afternoon, and on our return to Paris we could only hope that our visit had done something, however little, to stimulate the efforts of the workers.

20th.—Viviani has been treated to a long letter from M. Margaine, the Deputy for the Marne, who complains that Sarraill is interfered with from G.Q.G. because, forsooth, he is a Republican General; he is not given the troops he requires, he is not allowed to push his way into Germany through Spincourt, and so on, and Joffre is to blame for all this bullying. Yet so far as I know Joffre can scarcely be considered a Royalist General and, thank heaven, so far politics have not affected the war.

Ribot is more and more anxious about his money difficulties as for the fourth quarter of the year he will have to find three milliards. Payment in gold will of course be out of the question and he will either have to get credit in America or help from England. Morgan thinks the former will be difficult and Ribot proposes to send a financial mission to the United States.

Delcassé has recalled our Minister at Athens who has been so unwise as to take sides with Venizelos against his adversaries.

21st.—This morning I went to the La Chapelle station to see a train full of our wounded prisoners of war arrive. The Dames de France had provided a very attractive canteen and in the hall of the station tables had been laid covered with plants from the conservatories in Paris; on alighting from the train the men ranged themselves round the tables and I toasted them in champagne. A Zouave, who had his right leg amputated, came up to me and said: "They hate you as much in Germany as they love you in France." I asked all the wounded how they had been treated in the enemy country and they all replied that they were quite well looked after but

very badly fed. The Germans also had tried to disseminate false news and gave them copies of the *Gazette des Ardennes*, a newspaper got up for the occupied regions and written in French in the hope of deceiving and demoralising the inhabitants.

L'Information announced yesterday that one of the leading morning papers had been bought by a syndicate, and the *New York Herald* says to-day that it is the *Journal* which is in question. M. Letellier, however, has published a letter to say that he remains the owner of the paper and there is no idea of change, but there are rumours of a combination with M. Lenoir, the publicity agent. M. Grosclaude is very uneasy about some of Charles Humbert's articles which, with their headlines "Guns! Munitions!" may give some useful hints to the enemy.

Things are going badly in Argonne where every day we lose a great many men and a little ground; Joffre has instructed Dubail to set up an enquiry, and Pénélon tells me that no single General, not excepting Foch, has any more faith in an offensive proving successful, and the Commander-in-Chief is very unhappy about this.

Paléologue telegraphs that as a result of the Russian reverses the rouble has had a very heavy fall, and Russia's foreign credit will be upset altogether; trade and industry will suffer for many a year to come, prices will go up and the working classes will be the first to suffer. Everyone is surprised that M. Bark does not bestir himself more, and Paléologue wonders if the Finance Minister is going to avail himself of this extraordinary movement in the money market in order to get fresh credits in Paris or London without touching the Russian reserve of gold. There is an idea of having a financial conference at Boulogne next month between Ribot, Bark, and McKenna.

To-day being the Belgian National Fête I have sent a telegram of good wishes to King Albert and have tried to make it as little banal as possible.

22nd.—Our meeting to-day was largely concerned with the Dardanelles and it was unanimously agreed that any success there would be of first rate importance—far more so than any

of the little offensives on our own ground—and that our diplomatic as well as our military interests largely depend on it. Millerand reads us two letters written by Joffre to Dubail, with instructions as to the enquiry about the operations in Argonne; there are also to hand two reports drafted by Dubail who thinks that Sarrail was wrong not to have supported the XXXIInd Corps which was in the front line, that he was wrong not to have used his support troops as his reserves, that he was unduly afraid of intermingling his units, and that by not starting an immediate counter-attack he turned what might have been a signal success into a positive reverse. Joffre, in his second letter, asked Dubail about certain matters of another sort which are laid to Sarrail's charge; that he had for personal reasons favoured certain men and refused to do anything for others who were really more deserving, that he was on bad terms with some of his subordinates, and that there was a spirit of unrest throughout the 3rd Army. In his reply Dubail, whom one certainly cannot accuse of being a "Republican General," was pretty severe about Sarrail whom he denounced for "taking sides"; he suggested that Humbert should take over the 3rd Army, and Sarrail should be sent to take charge of the Lorraine force; Joffre, however, does not approve of this *chassé-croisé* and writes that he has decided to relieve Sarrail of the command of the 3rd Army and to give him an Army Corps unless the Government think otherwise. Several of the Ministers feel very strongly about this, and even those who are personal friends of Joffre declare that he is going too far; Ribot said that it is rather hard to punish Sarrail for the failure in Argonne, whereas no one was called over the coals for the happenings at Arras, but that of course one must not say or do anything which would risk Joffre's resignation. It was finally agreed that we could not insist on Sarrail being retained at the head of the 3rd Army as Joffre had always been given a free hand about his Lieutenants, but that the Commander-in-Chief should be asked if he cannot fall in with Dubail's suggestion and give Sarrail the command of the Lorraine forces. Briand recorded his vote against this idea as he said that a disgruntled Sarrail would become a centre of unrest if

he remained at the front ; from what Colonel Buat tells us Joffre would like Sarrail to go to the Dardanelles where his energy and strength would be fully employed, and on Ribot's proposal we are to get Joffre's opinion on paper as to this.

M. Benazet has just informed me that yesterday one of the wives of the deposed Khedive, who is now settled in Switzerland, declared to him that her spouse, acting on Germany's behalf, had got into touch with several French politicians, and that a financier of the name of Bolo was being employed as intermediary.

23rd.—From the Quai d'Orsay's "sure and secret source," the Spanish Ambassador here telegraphed a day or two ago to his Government that, on the occasion of my last visit to the troops, the soldiers shouted out, "Vive la paix!" and that I was obliged to return hurriedly to Paris. The *Correo Espanol* echoed the silly story which the *Neue Freie Presse* at once took up. It occurred to me to ask M. Quinones de Léon, whom I know to be a friend of the King's, to come with me to-day, and see something of the 5th Army. Franchet d'Esperey met us at Fismes which the Germans have tried hard to bombard but so far without effect, and took us to the sector held by the XVIIIth Corps north of the valley of the Aisne. At Moulins, a little village half in ruins, the soldiers, who are natives of the Basses Pyrenees, are billeted in the cellars of the houses, and their greeting gives the lie to the vapourings of the *Correo Espanol*. At Paissy, a little further north and still more devastated, the men are living, when not in the trenches, like troglodytes in caves. M. de Léon was struck with their wonderful good spirits, but I had to admit to myself that they seemed rather tired and as if the perpetual set-backs had left their mark. We then pushed on through clayey communication trenches soaked with rain, to the Bois Foulon trenches north of Oulches where we were close up to the enemy lines, south of the Hurtebise farm and Craonne. Franchet d'Esperey, with whom we breakfasted at Jonchéry, is fully alive to the importance of the Dardanelles and says we ought to have three Army Corps there. In the afternoon we went to see General Guillaumat's artillery park in the sector held by the Ist Corps, and then to an observation post above

Cauroy whence we could see some evidently very accurate firing on the enemy's position near the Godat farm.

I was at the Elysée by eight o'clock and an hour later Viviani, who had already called here, came back to tell me there was considerable trouble about Sarrail who had refused the command of the Expeditionary Force to the Near East which he (Viviani) and Millerand had offered him. I asked Viviani if he had tamely accepted the refusal. "What on earth was I to do?" said poor Viviani. "The Chambre is dreadfully excited and both Violette and the Socialists have been trying to get at me all day to protest against what is being done about Sarrail. I managed to keep out of their way, but the situation is becoming impossible, as of course we have to reckon with Parliament. To-morrow morning Doumergue, Sarraut and Malvy are going to Chantilly to try and wring from Joffre his consent to give Sarrail the Lorraine Army. Failing this Sarrail has made up his mind to go home; he told us that his career was finished, that he knew he was going to be put on the retired list, but that he refused to go to the Dardanelles; he thinks he has been humiliated by being relieved of his command, and so forth, and under these conditions he will accept nothing." I could not help telling Viviani that I thought it a mistake to offer Sarrail a new command when he had refused what had been proposed to him, but Viviani could only murmur that one was obliged to keep in with Parliament and that we must fix the matter up in Council to-morrow. In the course of conversation the Prime Minister told me Maurice Sarraut, who is with the French Mission to the Italian Army, has written to his brother that we must not part with Millerand as it would be taken very much amiss in Italy.

24th.—Briand came to see me before the Council meeting with a full story of Benazet and the wife of Abbas. The lady is French by origin and says she wants to render France a service; she declares that Caillaux has had several meetings with the former Khedive whom he knew through the Egyptian Crédit Français and who had been sent by the German Government. Caillaux then appears to have allowed himself to be represented in conversations with Abbas by Bolo Pasha,

and Briand says that if Benazet's story discloses any concrete facts he will, if necessary, set up an enquiry.

Sarrail was the subject of a long discussion ; only Doumergue went with Millerand to Chantilly where Joffre said that he had already given General Gérard the Lorraine Army, and added that he would certainly not refuse to post Sarrail to an Army Corps, and that he saw no military objection to his being given charge of the Dardanelles Expeditionary Force ; nothing, however, would induce him to take the responsibility of keeping Sarrail in command of the 3rd Army. The majority of the Ministers think that Joffre was wrong to tell Sarrail that he had been replaced before we could offer him the command of the Expeditionary Force ; and they think that Millerand should have asked the Commander-in-Chief to hold his hand until Sarrail had been interviewed at the War Office. It is recognised that feeling is running very high in Parliament and that the different groups have come together ; that the Left is as one man against Millerand first, and after Millerand, the Commander-in-Chief and the Government ; that excitement is by no means spontaneous, and that Sarrail himself does not appear to be altogether a stranger to it, as Malvy and Sembat, among others, say that some of the Deputies have come to them as the emissaries of the General. It seems beyond all things necessary to quieten Parliament down, and it is decided that Sarrail—the plural of Sarrail, as Marcel Sembat jokingly says—shall see the General, point out to him how very unbecoming his conduct is, and persuade him to reconsider his refusal. Sarrail is to be reminded how vitally important the operations in the Dardanelles are, and of the necessity of taking Constantinople as soon as possible ; it is also to be hinted to him that the Expeditionary Force may very likely be increased. If the General persists in his refusal he is to be asked to go to Montauban and to keep quiet there ; no interpellation as to this unhappy incident is to be allowed either in the Chambre or the Senate.

Colonel D'Harcourt who has just been returned by Germany as severely wounded, has given me some details about his time in prison. He and his colleagues were pretty roughly treated and not allowed to keep either gold or silver in their pockets,

the senior officers only being allowed one hundred marks a month ; the German people are not starving but are kept very short, and meat is at an impossible price ; the men now being called to the colours are more than forty years old ; they seem to dislike very much having to go, but they are soon amenable to discipline which is very strict.

25th.—Viviani tells me that Sarraill seems inclined to go back on his "refusal" ; he has gone to Montauban but saying very bluntly that he is not made of the same stuff as Boulanger. The Prime Minister seems to be very down on his luck to-day ; he says the Chambre is thirsting for Millerand's blood and something catastrophic will happen before the end of the week. General Lyautey, who is just off to Rabat, has asked that Moroccan questions shall not be taken into account in making decisions for the expedition of troops to the Dardanelles. These decisions, he says, should be inspired by military considerations or by general policy as to which he has no particular information ; as to Morocco his own military means will suffice.

Pénélon has some very unhappy information as to our losses in Argonne. On the 20th and 30th of June, the XVth and XXXIInd Corps lost about 3,200 and 5,500 men ; on the 13th July, the Vth Corps lost about 9,200 men, and the next day the XVth (Colonial) Division, 128th Infantry Division and the 42nd lost about 4,300 men. The large proportion of officers killed and wounded disposes of any idea of anything like a general collapse, but it is true that the asphyxiating gas which the Germans are using produces a sort of semi-stupor, and even something like syncope, which defeats the best will in the world.

After long pourparlers Bratiano says he is ready to sign with the Allies a political convention into which military co-operation can be read, but he does not think himself able to fix any date for Roumania's entry into the field, and he thinks this point had better be left over for the authorities who will be asked to draw up and conclude the military convention.

The culminating point of the great struggle for the possession of Warsaw seems to have been reached, and anyhow the

Russians continue to put the fear of God into the enemy armies who are trying to converge on the Polish capital.

26th.—Combes, who says he has been sent again by Briand, tells me the Cabinet is exhausted and discredited and must be changed. “ Nobody wants Millerand, and you should have a big National Defence Ministry with Briand as War Minister to preside over it. Keep Viviani where he is, if he agrees ; put me into any corner you like ; let Freycinet be a Minister without portfolio ; send Clémenceau to the Marine, and give some post to Denys Cochin. I think that politics ought to be kept out of the war. Don’t keep Sarraut or Malvy who just now do not lend any weight to the Cabinet. I am a sentimentalist in spite of appearances, and if I have just accepted the leadership of the Radical-Socialist party, it is from a sense of duty and, if you will allow me to say so, out of loyalty and devotion to yourself.”

M. Clementel tells me that it is over Parliamentary control for the Army that the Government will be challenged in the *Chambre*, and that an effort is being made to whip up all the Left.

27th.—Things seem to be growing worse between Parliament and the Government, a burning question being Parliamentary control over the sanitary services of the Army, and this is coupled with the thirst of the Deputies to go and inspect for themselves the organisation of the trenches. I do all I can to emphasize the undesirability of this sort of interference and I beg the Government to stand by their own prerogatives. Viviani of course, rides out on the old story that the war blunders are weakening the authority of the Cabinet, to which my reply is that if once a crisis occurs it may be impossible to predict the end, that a riot, a revolution or a military dictatorship might be the outcome and all this in face of the enemy. Gouraud has said that three or four more Divisions ought to be sent to the Dardanelles, and as we are all agreed upon this, Viviani and Millerand are to try and arrange matters with Joffre. Delcassé has telegraphed to London to ask Kitchener and the British Cabinet whether the attack on the forts and batteries of Koum-Kalé can be made as soon as possible ; this is agreeably with the wishes of Gouraud and

Bailloud, who are anxious as to the position of our troops on the point of the Peninsula. The answer comes that Kitchener cannot ask Sir Ian Hamilton to be responsible for an operation which seems to him to be fraught with danger and which would anyhow be very costly in life and which might, according to the G.O.C. Expeditionary Force, prejudice plans already drawn up ; meanwhile our soldiers are being killed by the shells from Koum-Kalé.

Continuous fighting in Alsace on the crest of Lingekopf ; on the Isonzo front, Cadorna has managed to occupy Mont Seibusi and Mont Michele.

28th.—Viviani saw Joffre at Chantilly yesterday ; the Commander-in-Chief said very distinctly that he would rather resign than allow envoys from the Army Committee to make a tour of inspection of the fortified places in the zone of the armies. M. Boissonas, Diplomatic Attaché to our Expeditionary Force in the Near East, tells me the situation there is very serious ; our camp is violently bombarded, munitions, however well sheltered by the fortress walls, are set on fire by shells from the Asiatic coast, and the position of our troops is becoming untenable ; he thinks we ought to try and come to terms with the Turks.

29th.—As we are not going to run any risks of Joffre resigning, Viviani is to give Boudenoot a reply in the negative. With the Chambre agreement is easier. An Order of the Day affirms the right and duty of Parliament to exercise its control as being essential to the national defence, and the Government is asked to assure the permanent exercise of this control ; the Order adds that the Committees can delegate to some of their members certain definite and temporary missions, and Viviani is to ask that there may be added the words " without any interference with the military operations."

Joffre does not like the idea of Sarrail having charge of an Expeditionary Force if it is to be considerably increased and would prefer Franchet d'Esperey for the job ; also he thinks that until September, he must keep on his own front all the forces that he has actually in hand. During our meeting, Millerand received a letter from the Commander-in-Chief, drafted by the 3rd Operations Bureau, which, full as it is of

diplomatic considerations, tends to place all preparations for the further expedition to the Dardanelles under G.Q.G. ; it is also rather surprising that the letter is apparently to be signed, not by the General-in-Chief of the Armies of the North but by a member of the Government. We have asked Joffre to come and see us here.

Delcassé reports further difficulties which have arisen in Petrograd as to the negotiations with Roumania and in London as to negotiations with Bulgaria. As to the first, if Sazonoff does not rally to our opinion, I shall telegraph direct to the Emperor, and with regard to Bulgaria it would seem wise to settle the Roumanian question before making any further address to Sofia. Late in the evening, however, we heard that Sir Edward Grey does not wish to postpone any longer another attempt to come to terms with Bulgaria ; we feel we must do everything possible to please England, but it must be clearly shown at Nisch that we are not going to sacrifice Servian interests, and that any promise given to Sofia remains subject to Servia's annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and of a territory giving access to the Adriatic.

30th.—Messimy has been wounded in Alsace, and I have just received from him a letter, dated the 25th, in which he protests against the "falsehoods of the communiqué" which stated that we had seized the Bauenkopf. As a matter of fact it was his battalion who tried unsuccessfully to set foot on the crest of the Linge, and as to the capture of the Bauenkopf the cost was 1,000 killed, 2,000 wounded, and 1,500 prisoners, while the 5th Brigade of Chasseurs, who did manage to get to the top could not maintain their position more than four hours. Messimy is very bitter about G.Q.G. and liaison officers who sacrifice realities to the desire to say something good.

The *Gazette de l'Allemagne du Nord* publishes extracts from the Belgian Archives with the report drafted on the 16th January, 1914, by poor Baron Guillaume, then Belgian Minister in Paris. Delcassé, Millerand and I are accused of having followed a chauvinist and jingoist policy ; the Belgian Government knows now only too sadly on which sides nationalism and imperialism were to be found.

Sazonoff has confided to Paléologue the distress of the Russian Government. "For the love of heaven," he exclaimed, "give us some rifles."

31st.—Joffre came here during our meeting to talk about the Dardanelles. He began by saying it would be difficult for him to spare four Divisions, especially on account of artillery and ammunition, but gradually he came round to our way of thinking. It was decided that the question of a supplementary expedition should be studied, but that this would only materialise if the English failed in carrying out Sir Ian Hamilton's plan. It was arranged, in Joffre's absence this afternoon, that Sarraill should be given charge of the expedition and told to get on at once with his plans; he will leave in a fortnight and take over anyhow the two Divisions which are there. The interview with Joffre was very frank and very cordial; we told him what the Army Committee want as to an inspection of fortified areas, and he agreed to a visit of the delegates to be conducted by Dubail, but he explained that on account of the heavy artillery, it will be impossible for the future to defend fortresses after investment and that such defence must be organised forward. The Commander-in-Chief, who seemed a little depressed when he came, cheered up at breakfast and talked quite gaily to us all; he still contemplates an offensive to take place in five or six weeks, and I had to tell him that just now he must consult the Government about this as the prolongation of the war obliges us to husband our defence and keep an army for the time when English, Russians and Italians can make a joint attack.

Poor Baron Guillaume, very crestfallen, has given Félix Decori a very pitiful explanation of his report of which he does not deny the authenticity, but he said that being Belgian and not French he could see nothing wrong if France had secured the maintenance of peace by yielding to German Force. He sees now that events have put him altogether in the wrong.

Another letter from Messimy dated the 29th, which runs: "The heroism of our Chasseurs has been beyond anything I could imagine and again I entreat you to rid us of theorists

who see the war from afar. I am in a good deal of pain but consider myself lucky because neither my life nor my leg are in danger." He also said that he should have spoken of 1,500 missing instead of 1,500 prisoners, but from what we can make out the majority of the missing are dead.

The Journal this morning announces that it has just been taken over by a syndicate at the head of which is M. Charles Humbert. In this number there appears a new article with the headline "Guns and Munitions," in which the Senator for the Meuse, while congratulating the Government on the steps taken to hurry up manufacture, complains that no heed was paid to him on the morrow of his speech of the 13th July, 1914, and he adds one or two phrases scarcely calculated to establish public confidence.

CHAPTER VIII

On the Franco-Belgian front—Visit to King Albert and Queen Elizabeth—Sarraill and the Dardanelles—In Alsace with Pierre Loti—The Government and the Parliamentary Committees—The Ministers and General Joffre—The King of the Belgians on the French Front—The Tsar thinks of assuming supreme command.

AUGUST

1st.—Early this morning Foch met Millerand, Duparge, Doumayrou,* and myself at Bergues and took us to the aerodrome where was General Hély d'Oissel—who has succeeded General Pütz in command of the French troops in Belgium—and where was drawn up a newly formed composite regiment of sharpshooters and Zouaves. I gave them their colours and proceeded to do the same to another new regiment, the 3rd (bis) Zouaves, at Crombecke, as also at West-Vleteren to another composite regiment of sharpshooters and Zouaves—the 3rd, who fought so gallantly at Arras and Soissons, and to yet another, the 2nd (bis) Zouaves who among other fine feats took Etrepilly; lastly I fastened the Croix de Guerre on the standard of the 3rd Zouaves. All the new units, stiffened by seasoned men, seem well set up, well turned out and in good spirits.

In the sector held by the 45th Division we were taken to the elaborately organised defences of the Zuydschoote Wood north-west of Ypres; Millerand and I climbed up a ladder to an observation post above a tree, and just as we reached the little platform a couple of shells whistled over our heads. Our string of motors had evidently been spotted and Foch wanted us to go back, but I was quite determined to see the gunners who were expecting me. Two more shells dropping

* Liaison officer to Lord Kitchener.

near us caused Foch to give us an "order to retreat," which I laughingly told him I must disobey, and with Hély d'Oissel I pushed through the brushwood to the battery where the gunners were the more pleased to see me as owing to some delay, they had begun to think I was not coming. We breakfasted at Hély d'Oissel's headquarters at Roosbrugge, and then left for a tour of the northern sector on the left wing of the Belgian Army.

2nd.—To-day being the anniversary of the German ultimatum to Belgium I had arranged to pay my respects to the King and Queen. I found King Albert at Loos, and from the belfry tower of the beautiful church which has been so badly damaged, we saw the emplacement of the battery which deals almost daily destruction to Dunkirk. In the course of our *tête-à-tête* drive to Furnes, the King spoke of his anxiety about Russia and that he is now certain the British War Minister was right in his original estimate of a long war; the King also alluded to a speech the Kaiser made yesterday in which he said that he had never wanted war and that his conscience was quite clear on that point. I could not help saying a word about the curious reports which Baron Guillaume used to send to Brussels, and the King simply replied that no one knew better than he did how averse France had always been from a chauvinist policy. I then asked whether the King would pay a visit to the French Army in the near future, and was told that it was only out of discretion that he had not already asked me if he might do so, and that he would be more than pleased to come and see our troops for whom no praise could be too high. The Queen with her children was waiting for us in the little villa close to the sea and had asked M. de Brocqueville to meet us at breakfast, after which she insisted first on taking photographs of her guests and then of taking us to see the big La Panne hospital admirably installed partly in the Grand Hotel and partly in little houses built of wood and just brought from England. The hospital—in which, among the wounded Belgian and French soldiers, were two child victims of German shells—is called after Queen Elisabeth who works in it with all the energy as well as all the skill of a professional nurse. Rain was falling heavily at Calais where we spent

some time inspecting the various British and French arrangements for storing and forwarding supplies, and at night we took train to Paris.

3rd.—During my short absence the Douma has opened a new session and desultory negotiations have continued with the countries we are trying to attract ; so long as victory evades us, diplomacy remains impotent. The Deputy Chief of the Staff of the Bulgarian Army, formerly Military Attaché in Germany and a close friend of King Ferdinand, went three days ago on a mysterious mission to Berlin where the new Bulgarian Minister M. Rizoff, whose sympathies are well known, is busy paving the way for an entente with Germany.

Pierre Loti, whom I have asked to come with me on Sunday to Alsace, is rather anxious as to how he will manage his toilette in a motor car expedition and asks if he may bring a soldier servant ; he is more powdered and painted than ever, and it is difficult to reconcile the man's undoubted genius with these curious trumperies.

4th.—The Presidents of the Senate and the Chambre are both anxious we should celebrate this anniversary ; the King of England has sent me a telegram full of resolution and confidence, and it is surely well that in France the public should show itself equally determined and imperturbable.

5th.—M. Pashitch does not at all approve of the communication that the Allies submitted to him yesterday and thinks that what we have promised to Bulgaria will threaten the very existence of Servia. He has reserved his reply, and to try and allay his discontent I telegraph to the Prince Regent of Servia reminding him that for twelve months past we have been fighting with his country against the enemies of the independence of Servia, and that we must still make great efforts to ensure a decisive success. "I beg Your Royal Highness to believe," I added, "that in all the diplomatic negotiations which are necessitated by events, France and her Allies continue to keep the interests of Servia steadily in view, and if we ask her to consent to certain sacrifices, it is because on those sacrifices may depend decisive victory. Servia will also be largely compensated by the weighty advantages which the Allies intend she shall enjoy, and will anyhow include the

annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina with a wide outlet to the Adriatic."

The Council entirely approved of the message I propose to send to Parliament which ran : " When, twelve months ago, I appealed to the country for that " union sacrée " which was, and is, one of the conditions of victory, I had no doubt that my appeal would at once fall on willing ears ; only our enemies, who have always misunderstood France, could believe that any dissensions on our part might serve to assist their brutal invasion ; at the very hour when they declared that Paris was a prey to internal troubles, our great capital had assumed that serious and serene outlook which testified to our cool and determined resolve." After paying the tribute so justly due to our armies in the field, I ended with, " The only peace that the Republic can accept is one which will guarantee the safety of Europe, which will enable us to breathe freely, to live and to labour, which will reconstruct a dismembered country, repair our ruins and effectively protect us against any recurrence of aggressive Germanic ambitions. France has the will to conquer and she will conquer."

Millerand has received a letter from Joffre who strongly objects to the plan which Gouraud and Bailloud have unfolded, while Sarrail seems very disinclined to accept command of the Dardanelles expedition unless it is strengthened by new units. Some of the Ministers are nervous as to appearing to " humiliate a Republican General," and Marcel Sembat declares that if this happens the Government will fall. I begged them all to regard the question of the Dardanelles without personal considerations, and this was admitted to be the correct line. Unfortunately fresh trouble arose with another letter from Joffre which Millerand had to read to us. " Despite a considerable numerical superiority the Russians, owing to shortage of arms and ammunition, are retiring before the Austrian and German forces. As regards the future we must on no account allow ourselves to be deluded by false hopes. The reconstruction of powerful modern armies cannot be improvised nor can cadres be created or shells and rifles turned out in large numbers from one day to another ; several months may therefore ensue

before the Russians can again assume the offensive. . . . Do not forget that we have touched the maximum of our military strength ; if the English in the course of next winter bring new forces to help us, we still cannot ourselves do otherwise than decrease from the point of view of effective strength. Now everyone knows that the French Army alone can stand up to the German Army and defeat it. Not only is the occasion favourable to take action but our strict duty towards the Russians is to do so, a duty in which, under analogous conditions, they for their part have not failed. And we are formally bound by the protocol of the conference of the 7th July last, which was approved by the military representatives of all the Allied Powers, and I consider that your signature and mine pledge France. In a word, conditions are too uncertain at the moment for us to be able to take away troops from the Armies of the North-East in order to send them to the Dardanelles." Thus the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief may be summed up in one or two sentences, of which the first does not do justice to our Allies ; the French Army alone is able to defeat the German Army ; the French Army from now onwards will continue to decrease ; we must be active while we are strong and this the more because of our promise to be so. As to this solemn promise the information which was vouchsafed to me about the conference of the 7th July did not altogether enlighten me ; Colonel Buat only sent me the minutes of the meeting which was held at Chantilly and at which Sir John French and representatives of the Italian, Servian, Russian and Belgian armies were present. It was there decided that, so long as the Russian retreat lasted, the French troops should go on with their local attacks and as soon as possible resume concerted offensives ; that the British Army, soon to be swollen by new Divisions, should help these offensives in every way, and that the Belgian Army should do so to the best of its means ; that the Italian Army should develop its operations towards Laybach-Villach, and that the Servian Army should try and co-ordinate its activities with those of the Italians. Neither I nor the Government knew anything of these ideas which seemed to me to run clean contrary to the opinions I gathered from most of

the Generals. Two days ago Joffre telegraphed in cipher to Millerand that between the 15th August and the 15th September, just when Kitchener's Third Army will be landing, we shall be "in full swing of operations," and that therefore these Divisions could not be pushed in between our own Armies. I took pen at once to ask Millerand what these contemplated operations are. "Is it to be a repetition of Champagne, Woevre, Eparges or Souchez? Joffre told us himself that the wear and tear of his fighting strength was far beyond what he calculated. I must formally ask you that no new offensive shall be set afoot without my being fully informed as to its conditions and objective, or without my being able to consider whether, in a war which anyhow will go on till next year, anything like premature action may not constitute a dangerous squandering of strength. When I know all about it we will consider, you and I together, the situation, and if there is good reason, lay the matter before the Government. Till then no definite or irreparable step must be taken; the question is not one for purely military consideration but affects our diplomatic and national concerns."

Sembat has called to tell me that he thinks the Cabinet is "morally upset" owing to Millerand and, in the event of a crisis, he and Guesde would like to be free to fight in the ranks of the Socialists against influences which disfavour the continuation of the war; Albert Thomas will be authorised by the Party to remain in a reconstructed Cabinet. Etienne, the former War Minister, whispers in my ear that he has found Joffre very depressed and under the belief that he has lost the confidence of the Government. At the Palais Bourbon, Deschanel has made, with due emphasis, the apology of the Chambre and has thereby scored a great success. Viviani, looking, as someone said, like a ghost who is dragging himself along, mounted the tribune and read in a dull, monotonous voice my message, which of course only received polite and perfunctory applause, but in the Senate it was much more warmly greeted.

6th.—Commandant Revol and Maurice Sarraut, now a Lieutenant in the Army, have just returned from the Italian Headquarters and says that the Army itself is excellent but

will, in its turn, have considerable difficulty about munitions.

7th.—Viviani, who is either tired or really unwell, did not come to our meeting and Delcassé read a new telegram which he has sent to Bucharest ; he has begged Bratiano to do what he can to remove Bulgaria's apprehensions and to broach as soon as possible, the rectifications of the Dobrudja frontier. The news that the Quadruple Entente is going to ask the Greek Government to give up Cavalla to Bulgaria has caused a good deal of feeling, and even a good deal of excitement, in Athens, Salonika and Seres.

The Russians have retired from Warsaw and the Germans have entered the town.

The *Homme Enchaîné* attacks Millerand as the leader of a band of opportunists, Viviani as his accomplice, and myself for not having resigned after Charleroi.

Albert Favre and Franklin Bouillon have again approached me to say bluntly that they are determined to get rid of Millerand unless I can induce him to resign ; I can only say that the Parliament is always free to turn a Government out, that I am not going to do the work of Parliament, nor am I going to take upon myself the responsibility of a crisis.

8th.—Pierre Loti and I started yesterday for Alsace where I hope he will find a rich field for his pen to traverse, and that he will bring back material for one of those volumes which he alone can write ; but for the moment he is rather unhappy about the early morning starts which do not leave him time to touch up his face. At 8 a.m. Maud'huy, now in command of the 7th Army, met us at that pretty little town Gérardmer, and we left at once by motor-car, Loti having with him a cunning little valise which holds—so he tells us—his “*fétiches*” and, if I mistake not, his still more precious accessories of toilette. At Valtin we found Messimy still in bed but rapidly recovering from his wound and very voluble about the Linge fighting which he again said was ruined by G.Q.G. refusing to pay attention to what was told them by the soldiers who had to do the job. Colonel Brissaud-Desmaillet, who commands the 3rd Brigade of Chasseurs, was at Messimy's bedside and was equally emphatic about the terrible mishap, and bursting into tears, sobbed out : “ I can't help thinking of our splendid

Chasseurs being slaughtered, poor fellows, quite uselessly." I could only promise I would again draw Joffre's attention to the methods of which the men in the firing line so reasonably complain. The Commander of the 47th Division, General Pouydraguin, took us through the charming valley of the Moselotte, and then up the Col de Bramont into Alsace, and thence along the high valley of the Thur to the little village of Krüt. Here we went into some billets where the men seemed genuinely pleased to see us, and where children ran in to offer us flowers, Loti, who had never before come to Alsace, being greatly taken aback by the children speaking in a sort of Germanic dialect.

Leaving Krüt we went in light motor-cars by a new road through fir and beech trees which the Engineers have just made up to Mittlach. When we were obliged to give up Munster the Germans got as far as this place where they stayed until the 26th April when they were "surprised" by our troops and hurriedly bolted. A girls' school has been set up in the church, and of the sixty little girls only two know a few words of French; two of the children asked me, one in very broken French and the other in German, to allow their fathers to come back, the poor men having been deported and interned under a procedure which Barrès has justly denounced but which has scarcely yet altogether ceased. The Mayor, who spoke French, drew my attention to what was written on the wall of the Town Hall: "The commune of Mittlach became French once more on the 26th April 1915." General Pouydraguin then took us to breakfast with Colonel Boussat who is in charge of the contingent of Chasseurs of the 66th Division, and from what the former told me it is evident that, even if Joffre has told the liaison officers to inform themselves more thoroughly as to what is required in the firing line, there is still not nearly close enough touch between G.Q.G. and the front. General Serret, in whose sector we actually are, was coming to see us for a moment at Krüt but had to attend a function at St. Amarin and left General Pouydraguin to look after us. Colonel Boussat has his quarters in the Presbytery, which the Curé of Mittlach, an immigrant German, left in some haste on our approach; the Colonel has for his cook a

former chef to the King of England who was mobilised at the outbreak of the war, and our meal therefore, if simple, was unexpectedly delicious. After breakfast came a tour to see the hospitals, the military cemetery, a detachment of machine guns, and the municipal council which the Mayor convened and of whom only two knew any French ; we then climbed to the Chasseurs' Camp south of Mittlach, and to an observation post at Breitfirst whence we could see the Linge trenches and in the far distance the Alps. It all seemed peaceful enough as a strong German counter attack had been repulsed yesterday evening, and both parties were taking a little rest. Loti was not disposed to climb up to the observation post and preferred to lie on his back in the cool of a little wood and dream away half an hour. From Krüt, where bouquets galore were thrust into our motor-cars, there was a lovely drive by the Col du Ventron, Le Thillot to Létraye, where my friend Bernard had invited Loti and myself to spend a quiet evening in his charming country house.

9th.—A beautiful morning in indescribably beautiful surroundings seemed to make the misery of the war only more acute ; along the fine avenue which is the approach to the Château, crowds of kindly folk had gathered behind the lines of soldiers and greeted me as an old acquaintance, while the same experience awaited me at St. Amarin and Moosch whence we went down as far as Thann which looked like a dead town, so empty and so fearfully mutilated. St. Théobald, on the contrary, was full of animation ; flags were hung out and people moving about in the streets seemed as delighted to see us as we were delighted to find what little hurt had been done to the glorious old fifteenth-century church from which, however, for safety's sake, the windows had been removed. At Weiler, were the light cars to take us up, by a new military road, to a splendid artillery observation post facing the Hartmannsweilerkopf, the blood-stained height which the soldiers familiarly call " Old Armand " ; Pierre Loti preferred to remain below in a small camp in a wood where a friendly fountain enabled him to perform his ablutions. A drive through forests with beeches and ash trees alternating with abies and silver firs brought us to Thomannsplatz, a lovely

spot where breakfast had been prepared for us. Some of the chasseurs had devised special menus on little wooden frames bordered with leaves, and during our repast they treated us musically to the Sidi Brahim and other selections as well as to the sound of their horns from the depths of the wood. In this wonderful Alsace, which seems to be ours once more, with the echoes of the chasseurs' music dying away in the soft breeze, I can for a few moments forget both the horrors of the war and the trouble which to-morrow will surely bring. Pierre Loti listened attentively in silence, and one hoped that he might trace some imperishable lines about these splendid chasseurs who, between two deadly struggles, have been at pains to give us such pleasure. From Weiler, by another new road which may hereafter become very popular with tourists, we made our way down to Masevaux where, as soon as our arrival was known, an impromptu fête was started, the Colonel of the regiment of dragoons turning out his men and horses to give us a little display; then through Sentheim and La Chapelle to Belfort where the Governor, General Thévenet, was waiting to put us into our train for Paris.

10th.—Fresh troubles and worries await our return; the Socialist Party has passed a resolution to ask the Government to substitute for Millerand "a Minister who will be more active and more disposed to impress the wishes of Parliament on the High Command." It is the last phrase which betrays the real mind of the Party, and is one which might well bring about Joffre's resignation. Viviani thinks that he ought to part with Millerand, but my own view is that if the Chambre wishes to bring about a Ministerial crisis it can do so without giving information to the enemy about our shortage of munitions, as it would be only necessary to refuse a vote of confidence to the War Minister on account of the way things have dragged on; the hands of the Deputies are therefore in no way tied and it is not for the Prime Minister, still less for the President of the Republic to take a responsibility which belongs to Parliament. If Viviani gives way an inch to-day, they will ask him for an ell to-morrow; he has only got to show a strong hand and things will right themselves.

Paléologue has asked the new War Minister, General

Polivanow, when he thinks the Russian Armies can make another move. The General replied, "Towards the end of December," which is of course tantamount to next year. The English, as they announced, landed three new Divisions in the Bay of Suvla, and have started a big enveloping movement towards Bogali and Maïdos.

M. Barrère has had a talk with M. Sonnino as to the details which Paschitch requires respecting the Note of the Allies. The Italian Minister thinks that we might let Servia know that besides Bosnia-Herzegovina she will acquire Spalato and Ragusa, but he does not want to tie himself up as to the question of Croatia, and Paschitch now says that he cannot reply to the Allies until he has consulted some important Parliamentarians, and he has therefore convoked the Skouptchina for the 3/17th of the month.

Bad news from Tunisia; the Resident General telegraphs that Dchibat will be attacked next Friday, the day after Ramadan, by native troops under Turkish officers.

11th.—Relations between Millerand and the Army Committee are a trifle better, although M. Doumer and M. Jeanney have been particularly troublesome about the fortified areas; as a matter of fact it is now Joffre who has decided that fortified areas will be constituted round Verdun, Belfort and Dunkirk; the fortified region of Verdun will comprise the IInd Army Corps, the 67th, 72nd and 132nd Divisions, and the garrison of Verdun itself. The General in command of the fortified area of Verdun will be Governor of the place, and will have the rank of an Army Corps Commander.

12th.—"I am really at the end of my tether," says poor Viviani, as he tells me how a group of Radical-Socialists not only want the head of Millerand on a charger but would like to include those of Augagneur and Delcassé; these worthies complain that we have not enough submarines, and that the Balkan States are still standing aloof. I can only remind Viviani that he has only got to stand firm and to allow those who want to upset the Ministry to do so from their place in Parliament.

Our Military Attaché for Servia and Montenegro, Colonel Fournier, and Colonel Maucorps, sometime our Military

Attaché at Constantinople, have drawn up an exhaustive report as to an expedition to the Balkans, without minimising either the difficulties inherent in it or the possible advantages to be derived from it. They think anyhow that communications between Russia and Salonika, across Servian and Roumanian territory, must be improved; Joffre has himself proposed to send three officers who know something about railways in the Near East, to make an enquiry on the spot, and the Ministers are quite agreeable to this provided the officers do not set afoot any work on Greek territory without the approval of the Government at Athens.

13th.—Delegates from the Army, Marine, and Foreign Affairs Committees have waited on me to-day to recommend there should be an immediate expedition in increased strength to the Dardanelles, as also to say that we have been too weak in our dealings with Bulgaria; as regards the former I can only say that it is not for me to offer any opinion independently of the Ministers, and with regard to the latter I can only point out discreetly that difficulties have abounded not only with Bulgaria, but with Greece and Servia as well.

Italy now seems willing to declare war against Turkey but, with fine contempt for the London Convention, takes no step against Germany.

Paléologue telegraphs that Russian opinion is more and more depressed by the continuous retreat of the Russian troops, and is feverishly impatient for us to resume activities. Sazonoff still draws on his imagination to try and please Roumania, Servia, Greece, and Bulgaria all at the same time, but with his penchant for Bulgaria he has let it be known at Sofia that Servia and Greece will get no increase of territory for themselves unless they let Bulgaria have Macedonia and Cavalla.

14th.—Parliamentary troubles occupy our whole attention in Council this morning; the discussion is no less complicated than prolonged and is all around the importance of the solidarity of the Cabinet, Ribot being one of those to insist that if we were to lose a vote of confidence, Ministers should individually pledge themselves not to be members of a new Government. Millerand, with unusual warmth, supported

this but said it was no use pronouncing for it if the next day members began to criticise him either to their Party or in the Houses of Parliament. It was impossible not to observe that the solidarity had been infringed by Millerand himself with his persistent isolation and his refusal to take his colleagues into his confidence. My own knowledge of military happenings was derived from replies to written requests for information ; no item of intelligence was ever offered to me spontaneously. On the other hand Ministers ought either to have refused to be kept perpetually in the dark and, if still dissatisfied, have resigned their portfolios, or if they remained they should not have bandied about their criticisms of a colleague. I quoted what M. Brizon, a Socialist, and consistently defeatist, had been able to say two days ago about our meeting here with Joffre. Sembat manfully owned up and said that it was he who had complained of Millerand to the Socialist Party. On the whole the vent given to Ministerial feelings did good ; the wounds were lanced and healed, and there was a *nem. con.* decision that the Cabinet should present itself to Parliament as a united whole.

Viviani, Millerand and I were due to go to Chantilly this afternoon, and before starting I had an opportunity of again begging the War Minister—whose splendid energy and dogged perseverance no one appreciates more than myself—to treat, and trust, his colleagues a little better. I made my appeal to him as an old and constant friend of thirty-five years' standing, but to no avail ; he merely lowered his eyes behind his glasses and only unclosed his lips to mutter, "What's the good ? Time enough for me to tell things at the end of the war."

At Chantilly we found Joffre rather tired and not a little worried by two conversations he had had, one with Maurice Sarraut and the other on the telephone with Maud'huy. Sarraut, in the rôle of the candid friend, has told him of the campaign against him which is largely encouraged by serving officers. I did all I could to reassure Joffre ; I pointed out to him how popular, according to Sarraut, he was in Italy, and that although far too many officers were sending complaints and criticisms to politicians, he must remember that he

retained the full confidence of the Government. Then Maud'huy in alluding to my visit, had given Joffre to understand that I had agreed with what the officers had told me about the needless sacrifice of human life at Linge. The Commander-in-Chief, who is now rather smarting under Parliamentary attacks, had asked himself if I was also against him, and I could only once more beg him not to rely always on his liaison officers but to act on the lines of his own recent instructions, and derive his information from the fighting Generals themselves.

As to his future projects, Joffre is definitely preparing an important operation in Champagne for a month hence ; this is to be launched along a front of thirty kilometres in the direction of Souain and Massiges, and will not last more than five days, and will indeed be broken off if the contemplated "surprise" is not immediately effective. To my reminder of the objections which so many Army Commanders raised to these local offensives Joffre quoted the necessity for helping the Russians, and said it was a debt due to our alliance. "No," I firmly replied, "the questions of alliance are for the Government, and not for the soldier, to consider ; you must only look at the thing from the strategic point of view, the rest is our concern." The Commander-in-Chief was equally sure that from purely military considerations it was necessary to keep his troops employed, as otherwise they would deteriorate physically and morally. He would have nine hundred heavy guns to serve his thirty-kilometre front as well as ample munitions not only for an intensive bombardment but to constitute a reserve which would deal with the Germans if they were to bring up fresh forces and try to pierce our line. "Not," said Joffre, "that they have any chance of piercing our line ; there is not the slightest cause for anxiety on that score."

As regards the Dardanelles, Joffre does not want to spare four Divisions until the end of his offensive ; he still hugs the hope of winning a really important battle to avenge the Arras failure, and he wants to keep all his men in his hands till then. He even went so far as to ask what we were going to do at the Dardanelles, and whether we were collecting an

expedition for a factitious General. He spoke very bitterly about Sarrail, but I told him that it was not Sarrail but Gouraud and Bailloud who thought that our Expeditionary Force should be increased, that this had been advocated by the Army Committee, and that the Government was favourable for diplomatic as well as military reasons. All we wanted to know from him was whether he could spare two Army Corps, to which he answered that he could promise them in September but not an hour sooner. It is evident that if we try to force his hand Joffre will resign, and the gentle persuasions which Viviani and I employed were met with no less gentle, but perfectly determined, resolution, the same resolution which he showed last year in the tragic hours of Charleroi, and the same resolution which after all enabled him to make the magnificent recovery on the Marne.

15th.—Sarrail has drawn up a memorandum as to the military situation in the Near East in which he puts out different suggestions; a landing at Adramytte, a move on Chanak, Cherdak or Broussa, a raid on Smyrna or Alexandretta, or, which he seems to prefer, something to be done in Servia after occupying Salonika.

Colonel Buat has also just favoured me with a report which G.Q.G. has just drawn up as a reply to certain allegations made in Parliament with respect to the doings of the 3rd Army in September. The story ran that at the moment of the battle of the Marne, Sarrail would not have saved Verdun had he not disobeyed an order to evacuate it. The Commander-in-Chief declares that no such order was given, and the report seems to give all the instructions which ranged from 25th August to 25th September. Twice, on the 8th and 10th September, Sarrail, having sent word that he was being seriously threatened on the Meuse, was authorised to draw back his right so as not to let himself be cut off from the 4th Army, but he was left an entirely free hand; anyhow it is to his credit that he availed himself of this freedom of action and held good.

According to Pénélon Joffre was very pleased with our meeting yesterday and now wants councils of defence, under my chairmanship, to take place periodically and to consist of

the Prime Minister and the Ministers for War, the Marine, and Foreign Affairs.

16th.—The move in the Dardanelles on which the English have reckoned so confidently, has failed; the First Division, which disembarked on the morning of the 7th August and was reinforced that afternoon by a second, has been held up in the northern zone.

M. Paschitch is much flustered by a fresh communication under ten headings which the French, British and Russian Ministers have handed to him. He says that nothing will induce him to accept it, that the Allies want to cut up Serbia as if it were a question of negro States, that Italy is at the bottom of it, that Italy may be a more useful ally than Serbia, and, if so, that it was quite natural she should be listened to, but that Serbia was not asking for anything and if necessary would fight on to the end.

17th.—M. de Brocqueville has been for some days at Havre and told our Minister how more than regrettable were the remarks publicly directed against Joffre. "The victor of the Marne," he said, "is not only the Chief beloved of the French Army because he looks for fresh victories, but because his coolness and firmness, mated with his keen judgment and courtesy, have acquired for him, among the Allies, an authority which no other General enjoys. It would indeed be to incur a terrible responsibility if one were to try and disturb a trust which will play a large part in future successes; it would also be to serve, however unconsciously, the interests of the enemy who for a long time has counted on the weakening of the will of the French people." From our Consulate in Amsterdam comes the same story. The criticisms levelled in the Paris press against the High Command, and the reports of Parliamentary doings published in the Dutch papers to-day and yesterday, have had a deplorable effect. Hitherto everybody has been much struck with the solid confidence in the Government and the present doings have depressed us greatly. We are politically discredited in this town if we do not show ourselves as a united family with one mind and with one heart.

It was decided in Council that Viviani should ask Sarraill to

study more closely how the Dardanelles could be forced, leaving aside all the other expeditions—Smyrna, Alexandretta, and so forth—which have more vaguely occurred to him.

18th.—M. Renaudel, the Socialist Deputy for the Var, has just given me his reasons—and they seem rather foolish ones—for opposing Millerand; this armchair critic charges the Minister with the Eparges and Arras operations, with which he had certainly nothing to do. M. Renaudel frankly admits he has just been to Switzerland, and there met the German Socialist Bernstein with whom he discussed the conditions of a future peace. But he assures me that this meeting in no wise implies any intention of not pushing the war until Germanic militarism has been crushed to powder, and that on the contrary Bernstein himself declared that a German victory would defeat his own conceptions. I suggested to M. Renaudel that this sort of thing was not very becoming at this moment, and that it is either too late or too soon to make a parting of the ways among the Germans.

M. René Besnard, my colleague of 1912, has been on a mission to Switzerland on behalf of the War Minister, and tells me in confidence that the big workshops in Zurich have secured the German prescription for asphyxiating gas and have communicated it to him; he is pretty sure of the value of his information which he will hand on to-morrow to Millerand.

Sembat brings two of his English political friends Mr. Smith and Mr. Hodges, who want to inform France as to England's effort and as to what is in the minds of the British working classes. They are to hold a meeting next week at the Ministry of Public Works. M. Marcel Cachin, who came with Sembat, stayed behind after the Englishmen had gone and told me, with evident glee, that the Socialists were becoming more conciliatory and were less and less thinking of upsetting the Cabinet.

The news from South Tunisia is better and the much feared attack seems to have been put off.

King Constantine, whose hand has been forced by the elections, has sent for M. Venizelos, but up to now the former Prime Minister has neither accepted, nor has he indeed been offered, anything definite.

The *Homme Enchaîné* has been suspended for four days because Clémenceau refused to comply with the requirements of the Censor to suppress a further attack on Joffre.

19th.—Viviani, who really seems exhausted, says that he is ill, that the exigencies of Parliament are becoming unbearable, and it is becoming impossible for him to lead. Yet everybody thinks that things are easier in Parliament, and everything will come right if only the Government shows itself strong and united. Millerand is dead against any idea of a secret session and says that once the Chambre starts this sort of thing, the precedent will serve as a pretext for repeating the occasions and as a consequence Parliament will function in the night without balance and without any control of opinion and will end in a sort of blind tyranny.

Our War Minister also gives us an account of his journey to our Armies with Lord Kitchener. The British Minister has agreed with him as to a formula for military co-operation; while the English troops are serving to free French territory from invasion, in Joffre will vest the initiative as to operations in the field, whether in respect of the strength to be employed, the objectives, and the dates.

Grodno has just been taken by the Germans and in the Douma, the gloomiest predictions abound as to the consequences of this defeat. Meanwhile the German newspapers chuckle over our internal squabbles and say that Millerand is sure to resign.

20th.—A charming telegram from King George reminds me that I am fifty-five years old to-day; Millerand has rather unfortunately alluded to the trouble about Sarrail in the Chambre and, as Viviani rather ruefully tells me, has dragged in Joffre's name. He thereby spoilt the effect of an earlier part of his speech about the medical services of the Army which had done much to bring round a good many of his audience who began, as usual, by being hostile to him.

21st.—In Council Viviani expounds, in very moderate language, that Millerand has broken the agreement not only between the Cabinet and the two groups of the extreme Left, but also between the Ministers themselves. The allusion to

Sarrail, the comments on the relations between the Government and the High Command, the allusions to Parliamentary control, tacked on as they were to the debate on the sanitary services, whetted the appetite of the *Chambre* for a general discussion. Viviani blames Millerand for having delivered a speech without telling his colleagues what he was going to say, and for himself infringing the solidarity which he is always imposing on us. Millerand replied very temperately and offered his excuses for any blunders he had made in his speech ; he only wanted to reply to certain criticisms which had been published ; he had no thought of sheltering himself behind Joffre's shoulders, and his only idea was that, if the War Minister were forced to resign, it was above all things needful to prevent any crisis affecting the High Command, and he rather congratulated himself that, with the greeting accorded to the name of the *Generalissimo* in the *Chambre*, this point had been assured.

Delcassé read out a telegram from Paul Cambon : " Sir Edward Grey tells me that Lord Kitchener has returned from France very well satisfied ; he came to an agreement on all points with M. Millerand and General Joffre, and he has brought about really harmonious relations between the French Commander-in-Chief and Sir John French. Lord Kitchener is on the happiest and most confidential terms with General Joffre and Millerand, and he says frankly that if, as rumour runs, any alteration in the Cabinet should bring about the resignation of either of these two, it would seriously compromise the intimate relations which at last, and not without considerable painstaking, have been established between the two General Staffs. In the course of the interviews between the British Secretary of State and the French military authorities, a fresh offensive has been decided upon ; the date for this has been fixed, but Sir Edward Grey thinks that we ought to give secret information about it to the Russian Government. Petrograd just now is plunged in anxiety, and instead of laying blame on their own lack of foresight and the corrupt Russian administration, public opinion prefers to attribute the advance of the Germans to the inertia of the French and English armies. Sir Edward Grey thinks this a

very dangerous frame of mind and has instructed Lord Bertie to propose to you that we should notify the Government at Petrograd of the intentions of the General Staff." Briand put up a mild protest against the notion of an Allied Government interfering at all in a matter, such as the composition of a Cabinet, or the choice of a Commander-in-Chief, which appertains exclusively to our national sovereignty. In principle of course he is right, but the rock fact exists that a crisis, such as is adumbrated, would be misunderstood in England as in Italy. Also we are going to be dragged into a new offensive, less in the hope of really helping the Russians than because we think we must justify ourselves in their eyes, and one cannot help fearing that this next attack may be as fruitless and as costly as the others.

Agreeably with his own wish Joffre has been here to-day to discuss things with Viviani, Millerand, Delcassé, Augagneur and myself. He has promised that if he does not "get through" in September, he will spare four Divisions for the Dardanelles. It is of course eminently desirable to open the Narrows, not only to influence the Balkan States, but to enable us to communicate with Russia and send her munitions when with winter the port of Archangel is closed. Joffre was asked to let d'Amade go as soon as possible to Russia to inform himself at first hand about the military situation there. Both the British and French Ministers for Foreign Affairs have received information—the latter from American friends of France who have been to Berlin—that Germany is on the eve of using up her last resources of man-power; Joffre thinks that this is quite likely to be true but however acceptable the news, it must be accepted only with great caution.

Baron Ishii, the Japanese Ambassador, who has just been appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs, has called to assure me that he will do everything to foster close relations between his country and ours, but that he depends on us to deflect Russian ambitions in the Far East.

22nd.—The question is being mooted in Petrograd whether the Tsar and the Government had better not betake themselves to Moscow; the military happenings of these last days have rendered this point very acute. Paléologue does not think

that the Russian Army can do anything to counter the German thrust for the next two or three months; Georgievsk and Kovno have just been captured by the enemy.

Sazonoff does not conceal his irritation with Italy. "What is all this," he writes, "about the Marquis Garroni only being told to break off relations with the Porte if any difficulties are put in the way of Italian residents leaving; so, if the Porte does not raise any difficulties, diplomatic relations will remain! And yet for the last four months Italy has pledged herself to attack our enemies. It is a scandal which must be stopped." Meantime M. Barrère tells us that Italy has at last handed the Turkish Ambassador his passport, but there is still no question of declaring war on Germany.

Preparations for war are being actively carried on in Bulgaria, both in the provinces and the capital, and in a very short time the country will be standing to arms. Panafieu still however thinks that if Paschitch can persuade the Skouptchina to make the necessary concessions without any delay, we may still cling to a hope of securing Bulgarian help against Turkey, but that unless the Servian Government does what the Bulgarians think the right thing, the latter will not hesitate to seek satisfaction by force of arms. Delcassé, as also are Grey and Sazonoff, is insisting, or trying to insist, that Servia shall not only give up Macedonia at the end of the war, but that she shall allow the Allies to occupy it at once as far as the Vardar. Paschitch has not been without hope that the Deputies might be favourably impressed by this proposal which would anyhow serve as a guarantee against the Bulgarians taking over Macedonia before Servia had actually entered into possession of the territories promised to her, but he has met with more opposition in the Skouptchina than he anticipated.

Venizelos told our Chargé d'Affaires yesterday that he had decided to accept the mandate to form a Government and hoped to have it ready by to-morrow.

23rd.—Millerand and I were early at Chantilly this morning where I had to meet the King of the Belgians on his arrival by special train, from Dunkirk. The King inspected the Guard of Honour and bestowed decorations on some of the Staff

officers from G.Q.G., while I tendered the Cravat of the Legion of Honour to General d'Orjo, who is at the head of the Belgian Military Mission here ; two Chiefs of State cannot, I suppose, take any trip together without this preliminary exchange of compliments. King Albert did not wish any mention to the troops to be made beforehand of his visit, and so we passed without being noticed through Senlis and Compiègne on our way to Rhétondes. The King seems in no way depressed by the military situation except in so far as the Russian retreat may affect the Balkan States ; in alluding to the relations maintained between public offices in war time, he hazarded the same remark which, with the same smile, King George made to me one day : " What complicates matters in these strenuous times is that when things go well, the Ministers get the credit, and when they go badly, all the blame is laid on the Sovereign or the President." On the open ground near Rhétondes were mustered three regiments of infantry, a composite regiment of Zouaves and Chasseurs, and another of Morocco riflemen, all new units to whom, after the King had passed round their ranks, I gave their colours. In the few words which I was expected to say I would not pretend that victory was within sight, but could only urge the men to fight on as valiantly as ever to the end. Most soldiers have by now begun to realise that a long and difficult war is still ahead of us, and many of them are remembering Napoleon's *mot*, " A man must want to live but know how to die." After this little review we went on to Boulogne-la-Grosse where a château has recently been built by a Belgian Baron whose attempts to fake antiquity are in very doubtful taste, but the false Gothic tower of this very expensive edifice provides an excellent observation post, and in the glorious sunshine one could see our own, and the enemy's, position near the Roye. Breakfast was served in M. Bargemont's château at Davenescourt whence we proceeded to Villers-Bretonneux to see one of the Divisions of the IXth Corps, and then up to the woods facing Thiescourt which has been put in a thorough state of defence. Some " Minnies " were fairly busy on our right as we made our way through the woods to the front line trenches where the King wanted to linger, and on our way back he was

greatly fascinated by some picturesque grottoes where advance parties are installed in what looked like a comic opera scene ; on one of the rocks which form the huge embrasures of the caverns, a soldier, with a nice taste for sculpture, has carved in high relief an equestrian figure of Joffre. After dinner, to which Joffre entertained us at Chantilly, we left by special train for Pont St. Vincent.

24th.—General Dubail, who has assumed command of the group of armies of the Est, and General Gérard, now in charge of the Lorraine Army, awaited us at the station and went with us to Azelot where the XXth Corps, which has fought so superbly since the beginning of the war, and the 3rd Morocco Brigade were drawn up for the King's inspection. It was an excellent turn-out, and when giving new colours to the Moroccans it was pleasant to be able to say that King Albert had come to thank them in person, for what they had done towards freeing his country from an enemy's insult. We then made a tour of the heights north and west of the forest of Parroy, visited some billets at Einville, and returned by Crévic and St. Nicholas to the beautiful Renaissance Château de Fléville where kind Madame de Lambel—who has lost one son killed, and has another serving—had allowed me to entertain the King to breakfast. Then through Jarville and the Faubourg de Bon Secours to the big aerodrome at Malzéville. We only skirted Nancy, the King having begged us to excuse him from going into the town for the simple reason that he does not want to be fêted by any populace so long as his own people are under the yoke of the enemy. At Malzéville, sixty aeroplanes ploughed the air over our heads, but the Commandant was rather unhappy because his craft were not fleet enough for his liking, and because he could not raid further than Mannheim or Carlsruhe. We then climbed Mont St. Jean where a wonderful amount of work had been done since my last visit, but whence, despite the visibility, we strained our eyes in vain to make out Metz. After dinner in the Royal "special" we took our leave, the King heartily assuring me again that he had derived the utmost pleasure from his visit.

25th.—From Dunkirk, the King sent me a charming tele-

gram to thank me once more, and once more to congratulate the French armies.

In my absence, and after a shower of telegrams from Sazonoff, the Roumanian Government has told France, Russia and England that they will be happy to draw up a definite agreement with Russia and the Allies as to the future frontier of their country in view of a military co-operation, and that in consequence, until definite terms have been drawn up, Roumania will continue to forbid the transport of munitions addressed to Turkey through the country. It is a little step forward but still not a very decisive one.

The Germans have followed up the *Lusitania* outrage by sinking another British ship, the *Arabic*, and drowning a number of American passengers. Feeling is running high in the United States, but the White House preserves silence and seems to want to gain time for the more fiery spirits to calm down. Mr. Roosevelt has published a Note in which he says it no longer suffices to break off relations with Germany but that the time has come to take active steps.

The Venizelos Cabinet was formed on Monday and the Prime Minister is keeping the portfolio for Foreign Affairs in his own hand ; he has told our newly arrived representative, M. Guillemin, that Greece ought to range herself alongside the Allies, but that opinion is very stubborn with regard to giving up Cavalla, and that he is more than doubtful about Bulgaria doing anything to help us.

The Servian Skouptchina, by a large majority, has passed a vote of confidence in the Government and pronounced itself determined to prosecute, jointly with the Allies, and with what ever sacrifice of the vital interests of the country, the struggle for the deliverance and union of the Slav Servo-Croatian people. This resolution was doubtless inspired, or at least favoured by the fear of an attack in the near future by the Austro-German troops who seem to be concentrating on the Servian frontier ; we have informed the Government at Nisch that we are willing to send to the Balkans a Mission with a view to ameliorate as soon as possible the railway communications between Salonika and Servia as well also as between Servia and Roumania.

Russia has scored a naval victory in the Gulf of Riga from which the German fleet has had to retire.

26th.—Gravely disquieting news ; the capture of Kovno and Novo-Georgievsk has decided the Tsar to relieve the Grand Duke Nicholas of his command, and to appoint him His Majesty's Lieutenant in the Caucasus. The Tsar will himself assume chief command with Generals Ewert and Alexieff to assist him in the conduct of operations, and General Headquarters will be moved back a little nearer Petrograd ; the Tsar has notified his decision to his Ministers without allowing them to discuss the matter.

The *Chambre* continued to-day the discussion with regard to the salaries for the two Under-Secretaries of State for War, which of course means the general debate on the medical services, munitions, the command of the army, and operations. Viviani has very loyally admitted certain negligences and mistakes, there have been instances of irresolution and of ideas adopted one day and abandoned the next ; he congratulated himself on the collaboration which has been established between the Government and the Parliamentary Committees, and he defined the rights of Parliament as unlimited liberty in the zone of the interior but liberty which must be curtailed in proportion to its nearness to those military activities with which no Senator and no Deputy has ever wished to interfere. He did not contest the right of the *Chambre* in the matter of a secret session but said he could give such session no further information than he had already given to the Committees ; he drew down rounds of applause with the mention of Joffre's name and made a capital reply to the remarks which have appeared in the German Press about divergences of opinion here. " There may be divergences of thought and discordant words for these are the essence of Parliamentary régime, but there is not a Frenchman who is not ready to renew the oath which he took last year not to lay down his arms until the independence of heroic Belgium had been restored nor until France had recovered ' our Alsace and our Lorraine.' " The vote for the salaries of the Under-Secretaries was passed with a minority of one, M. Accambray, who is by no means a Pacifist, thinking that, after his long indictment

of Millerand, he could not go back on his word.

I have just received M. Octave Homberg, whom Delcassé and Ribot are sending to America with Lord Reading and the British representatives with a view to floating a loan ; he seems a very able and very intelligent person, but he is not very cheerful as to what he will be able to accomplish in the United States. Another caller was M. Gustave Hervé, one of my former adversaries, but who is now nothing else than an ardent patriot ; I reminded him of, and we had a laugh over, the vehemence with which, in 1912, he refused the favour which Briand and I offered him.

I gave a dinner this evening to Baron Ishii, who is about to leave for Tokio, and in the course of the evening Lord Bertie told me that his Government had only given way to Russia's claim to Constantinople because they thought that France was favourable also ; he admitted that this was a mistake, and that it was this unfortunate promise which had paralysed everything in Roumania and Bulgaria. I asked Isvolsky if he knew anything about the change of command, and he said that he had been told nothing, and he certainly seemed very surprised and very anxious about it. He fears that the Emperor as Commander-in-Chief will be confronted with great difficulties ; with any defeat there will be cries of ' Treason,' and this the more so as considerable attacks are being made against the Court where there is a good deal of backstairs influence at work. I begged Baron Ishii to expedite, as much as possible, delivery of the arms which Japan has promised to Russia, and on the other hand I reminded Isvolsky that the Japanese Minister said to me the other day how anxious his Government was to secure from the Russian Government certain concessions in the Far East. " As a matter of fact I have just been told to say that they can have what they want," was Isvolsky's remark as he settled himself down for a talk with Ishii. For the first time M. Vesnitch, who up till now has kept his foot down with regard to Servian claims, recognises that his country must give way on certain points while Baron Guillaume, who is considerably embarrassed by recent German publications, keeps out of the conversation altogether.

27th.—M. René Besnard tells me that a prescription for asphyxiating gas which he has brought back from Switzerland has been tried and found right, and he is very justifiably pleased with the discovery.

The Parliamentary Committees, to whom the proposal for a secret session has been referred, have, by a large majority, declined the idea. In reply to my enquiry as to how he is getting on with the matter of protecting our troops against asphyxiating gas, Albert Thomas assures me that he is working night and day at the problem, and sends me a detailed account of the manufacture of acetate for masks and the new types of spectacles with gauze edging.

It would seem that certain French politicians, whose names are not mentioned to us, are taking sides with the Italian Pacifists, and that Salandra knows all about it and is determined to put a stop to it.

In a telegram of the 23rd, Sir Ian Hamilton has told Lord Kitchener that his plan to take the Turkish positions by a turning movement has failed. The tone of the telegram denotes that the Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force to the Mediterranean, is greatly depressed, and anyhow he says that unless they send him not only men to make good his casualties but substantial reinforcements, it will be impossible for him to resume the offensive, and that he will have to stand entirely on the defensive and may probably have to evacuate either Suvla or Anzac. Lord Kitchener is himself very anxious about this; he will not, however, either give up the game or evacuate Suvla Bay, which is a very good roadstead; anyhow Joffre is not to go short of any of the British troops promised him.

28th.—The telegram from London, reinforced by others from Panafieu, Cambon and General Bailloud, is the main subject of discussion in Council, and the Ministers are clear that the British set-back renders a despatch of fresh French troops nothing else but indispensable. Sarrail has sent in another report but it is not particularly clear or sufficiently detailed, but Millerand reads out to us a memorandum drawn up by the General Staff which lays down, quite definitely, that some intervention on the Asiatic coast is absolutely necessary.

The three Parliamentary Committees have sent us copies of the resolution which they set out in an allocutional address to Viviani. The reasons which they give are very far from being on the same level of value and are sometimes a little fantastic; these Committees cannot be fully informed, and their judgments are based rather on impressions they have gathered than on any real knowledge of the facts. The Note winds up with an invitation to the Government to organise immediately in agreement with the Allies an expedition of sufficient strength to force the Dardanelles and capture Constantinople. The Committees seem to think that neither the military authorities nor the Government officials have as yet paid any heed to this question. They ignore all the difficulties with which we are being confronted and seem to think that an injunction, drawn up in the terms of a sovereign judgment, is sufficient to force the Dardanelles and cause Constantinople to fall into our hand. The amusing thing is that in their covering letter to Viviani they say that six months have elapsed since the expedition to the Dardanelles was undertaken, and so far they have been unable to obtain any clear information on the situation. The Committees again urge the formation of a reserve army independent of the troops at the front—a matter on which Joffre has been more than busy for some time past—and they ask for much greater diplomatic activity to secure the co-operation of the Balkan peoples “with whom negotiations ought to have been set afoot before the retreat of the Russians”; they say that our front line must be reinforced, and all the villages in the fighting area turned into block-houses, and that we must prepare second and third line defences and establish rapid means of communication; further recommendations are made in respect of armaments, supplies, and reinforcements for our fortified places in the East, the North, and Paris itself, as well as suggestions with regard to the employment of naval guns and guns on the coast at our front. I had a visit in the afternoon from the authors of these demands, who confided to me their agonies, and very courteously expounded their criticisms. I tried to show them that one could not always give them information as to negotiations between

Allies as the other Governments would certainly take umbrage at any indiscretion of this sort, and that the delays of which they complain are not chargeable to the supposed dilatoriness of the Quai d'Orsay but to the difficulty of bringing the views of Russia and Great Britain into line with our own.

On the heels of these Deputies came Viviani, Millerand and Joffre, the last of whom was told that the Government deemed it absolutely necessary to send reinforcements to the Dardanelles, and that very soon. The Generalissimo seemed very perturbed and a little bewildered and said that he needed the four Divisions asked for both for an offensive of his own and possibly to withstand a German attack; and when we reminded him of the promise he made at Chantilly he only clasped his head with his hands and pleaded his responsibility. I could only again say to him: "If the offensives which you are preparing in France are inspired by purely military considerations, all is well; that is your business, and we shall bow to your authority as Commander-in-Chief; but if your plans are in any way based on our relations with the Allies, please let me say that the opening of the Narrows is of far greater importance, affecting as it does Russian opinion and the supplies to the Russian Army, than the gain of a few kilometres on our front." Joffre then only pleaded that he would like to keep the four Divisions until the 22nd September, when he would know the result of his operations in Champagne. "This battle," he kept on saying, "will be the great battle of the year; in time of war inaction is a disgrace; and besides we shall kill many more men of the enemy than they will kill of ours." The phrase, "We shall gnaw at the Germans," has been attributed to Joffre, but personally I never heard him use it, although his idea evidently now is that the front gnawed at will be eaten into. The upshot of the discussion was that the four Divisions will be placed by the 22nd September at the disposal of the Government, who will make all previous arrangements for their embarkation. It is certain that some sort of offensive is imposed upon us by events in Russia, and perhaps this might have more effect if it was made in the Near East; our inaction is very sharply criticised both by the Russian

people and the Russian Army, and we are accused of abandoning and almost of betraying a friend while the defenders of Kovno and Novo-Georgievsk, as a matter of fact, fought very badly and their retreat was little more than a rout. But the more blame we can lay on others, the more blame is sure to be laid on us.

An agreement has come about between Bulgaria and Turkey under which the latter is to give to the former the right bank of the Maritza and the left bank of the river up to the inundation; the railway, as also Karagatch, will become Bulgarian. Bulgaria gives up her claims to the region of Kirk-Kilissé, and in exchange the Turks only ask for Bulgaria's benevolent neutrality, but the entente, whatever its limitations, has been brought about under pressure from Germany.

General Laguiche telegraphs that the Emperor's decision to relieve the Grand Duke of his command is deplorable, as the Grand Duke is the idol of the Army and his departure may have a very bad effect on the soldiers. Everyone is saying that the Emperor has no knowledge whatever of strategy, that he will be made directly responsible for defeats which are only too likely, and that above all the Grand Duke Nicholas has the full confidence of the people and the Army; Sazonoff has told Paléologue in confidence that the Emperor may agree to postpone the step for two or three weeks. The Emperor is also busy rearranging his Cabinet and has asked M. Krivochénine, now Agricultural Minister and a capable man, to be Prime Minister. Krivochénine has agreed to accept on condition that the Prime Minister shall for the future be not only a Chairman of Sessions as he is to-day, but the real leader of general policy with authority over the other Ministers; he also makes it a *sine qua non* that the new Cabinet shall ask for a vote of confidence from the Douma. These two innovations mean nothing less than the end of an autocratic régime and the beginning of a representative one, and it is doubtful if the Emperor will agree without a lively protest.

29th.—Delcassé has gone to Havre to ask if King Albert could possibly write to King Ferdinand of Bulgaria and

guarantee him against any confiscation of his Austrian property if he will come to terms with the Allies ; it is not very likely that even King Albert will succeed where the Duc de Guise so badly failed.

The dreadful affair of Novo-Georgievsk has decided the Grand Duke to order Brest Litovsk to be evacuated, and all possible material to be brought away.

30th.—Our liaison officer with Italian headquarters says that Italy is not making the full industrial effort of which she is capable, and that General Cadorna himself may underrate his future requirements. Because, on one part of the front, the artillery is not firing and because the winter will prevent mountain warfare, the General thinks that an immediate output of 48,000 shells for all types and an output of 50,000 in the spring will suffice. But, besides the fact that it will be to Italy's advantage to fire off a larger amount of stuff, she really ought to help us to provide our other Allies with what they require and to enable her to profit from our own experience I am suggesting to Albert Thomas to send some technical experts to Italy.

Delcassé has come back from Havre and King Albert is to ask his brother-in-law the Duc de Vendôme, who is now at Calais, to go to Sofia and tell King Ferdinand that we will indemnify him against any loss of his property.

Colonel Pénélon tells me that G.Q.G. is sure that four more Divisions will not suffice for the Dardanelles and that double that number are required if the operations are not to be hampered. But will Joffre consent to this further subtraction from his own troops, and will he not have used up a good many of them in his own offensive ? Will things be ready on the 20th of September ? One wonders if it would be easier for us to deal with these questions if we were a Parliamentary Committee.

General Cadorna, taking his cue from Joffre, refuses to send troops to the Dardanelles and the Italian Minister at Athens has reported to the Consulta that King Constantine said to him, " It is no use for you and your Allies to try and win over Bulgaria ; I have it direct from the German Emperor that Bulgaria is going to place herself alongside your adversaries."

31st.—Letters were read in Council from Léon Bourgeois and Painlevé, the latter in the name of the Inter-Commission of the Chambre, both asking that the Government shall state what is happening about the Dardanelles ; Viviani, Augagneur and Millerand say that they will be obliged to refuse all details as to the preparations for the expedition.

Delcassé is to come to some agreement with England about asking Greece, if occasion should arise, to give a free passage to the troops occupying the region of Vardar, and eventually, if necessary, to a contingent which may be detailed to help the Servians against German aggression.

It has been decided that anyhow four Divisions shall be ready to start on the 20th September for the Dardanelles and that if necessary four more shall go as soon as possible.

The Prefect of the Marne reports that the enemy artillery are very busy on the Champagne front and that at Courmicy, and Valmy and other places houses are being destroyed and a considerable number of soldiers and civilians killed.

Joffre, in a report on the operations in Artois, states that since a term was put to these he has been busy arranging for a concerted offensive which should consist of several powerful and simultaneous attacks.

CHAPTER IX

Preparations for a new offensive in Artois and Champagne—General Sarrail and the Dardanelles—The Military, and Political, Situation in Russia—In Alsace—King Ferdinand of Bulgaria shows his hand—Venizelos and King Constantine—Tactical success, but no strategic decision, in Champagne—Bulgaria mobilises—Servia appeals to the Allies for help—M. Delcassé ill and speaks of resigning.

SEPTEMBER, 1915

1st.—M. Bonvalet, Deputy for the Charente Inférieure, suggests that I shall sign and give diplomas of honour to every family of which a member has fallen in the war and, with the ready consent of the Government, I am going to do so.

Millerand saw Joffre to-day; the Commander-in-Chief at first fixed the 7th September for his offensive and then told us he must put it off till the 19th, but he now says that there must be a further postponement till the 26th. How is he going to keep his promise to hand over the Divisions for the Dardanelles in due time?

Rudyard Kipling has just returned from a tour of the French front and is enthusiastic about all he has seen and heard. The newspapers publish his letters to a friend in which he says he would like to bow down before every Frenchman whom he meets. And he adds these significant words, "I am sure that a year ago France did not know her real worth." Let us rather say that the real worth of France was unknown to foreigners, even to the most intelligent of them, and to those who looked most favourably towards us. We were judged by appearances, which were misleading. The France of to-day, the France of the "union sacrée," France full of energy and determination, sure of the righteousness of her cause and confident as to her future, is the same France

as of old, ripened with the flux of centuries and rejuvenated by the trials of which she has made proof.

Millerand forwards me a letter from Joffre of to-day's date in which he very rightly urges that we shall do nothing in the Dardanelles until a precise plan has been drawn up and has been decided upon in agreement with our Allies. "At our meeting last Saturday," he says, "I was told that such a plan existed and it was because of this that I agreed to detach four Divisions, any day after the 22nd of September, to help in carrying it out. But General Sarrail's memorandum which I have since received, does no more than consider, without coming to any conclusion, the possibilities of landing on certain points, on the European and Asiatic coasts. . . . There is nothing said about how many men will be required nor as to what are the chances of success, nor indeed anything about the hundred and one questions inherent in the organisation and conduct of the expedition . . ." All this is perfectly correct, but I do not remember that anyone suggested Sarrail's memorandum was cut and dried; far from it, for I was careful myself to say that nothing would be done until a close and exhaustive study had been made of the whole matter. Joffre now tells Millerand that he has instructed his Intelligence Branch to go carefully into Sarrail's proposals, as well as those of his predecessor. As a matter of fact this branch, which has just been formed, with General Graziani as its head, does not come under G.Q.G., but is a department of the War Office, and they have already set themselves to study the pros and cons of the undertaking and, like Joffre, foresee a good many difficulties. The Commander-in-Chief now asks that Sarrail shall go out to make a detailed reconnaissance on the spot, and that the despatch of the Divisions shall be postponed till the first days of October.

Yesterday, however, it was arranged that Delcassé should telegraph to London and propose that (1) a French Army Corps should set afoot an operation in the Near East, quite distinct from the theatre of war on the Gallipoli Peninsula, but in close touch with the British forces fighting there; (2) British ships should help to transport the fresh French troops; (3) the Allied fleets in the Dardanelles should jointly

arrange for the landing of the French troops ; (4) an exclusively French military and naval base should be established at Mitylene, or if not, at Mudros as it would be highly inconvenient for the ships and the establishments of the French and English Corps to be mixed up together ; Joffre's letter does little to help this programme. Kitchener has, however, welcomed the idea of a landing on the Asiatic coast so as to take in rear the Turkish defences of the Narrows, and he thinks that if the operation is to succeed, at least four Divisions will be required.

The King of Servia telegraphs to me that his Government is considering the proposals of the Allied Governments in the spirit of self-denial of which they have already given us proof, but there is no reply yet from M. Paschitch.

Paléologue has been told in confidence by the Chief of the General Staff that the Russian losses are enormous ; there were 350,000 casualties in May, June and July respectively, and 450,000 in August ; yet they think that about the middle of December it will be possible, not only to make a regular stand against the German advance, but to resume the offensive.

2nd.—Joffre has been here to-day and has told us that he thinks it better to put off his attack till the 25th as several of his subordinates, such as Pétain, Foch and Curé, have said they cannot be ready on the 15th. The Commander-in-Chief assures us that, if he adjourns, he has no sort of idea of cancelling the offensive which he believes to be necessary and likely to be successful. He recognises, however, that if he does not succeed there must be a change of plan and that we must assume the defensive, with the absolute certainty of our line not being broken ; we must try elsewhere, either in the Near East or, as Joffre himself suggests, in Alsace, where he thinks that in the valley of the Ill we might manage to advance from Mulhouse to somewhere near Strasbourg. He does not think that the lesson of Champagne, Arras and Eparges is that we are wholly unable to force the enemy's lines, and he wants to try once more ; as to the Dardanelles, he cannot accept the responsibility of detaching any Division till October, and he would rather resign than

do so. In October four Divisions will be available, but Joffre thinks these will be quite insufficient to force the passage of the Narrows, and he expounds to us the memorandum drawn up by the new Department, as also a report of one of his Staff officers, Colonel Alexandre. It is eventually decided to adopt Joffre's suggestion, and Sarrail is to start at once for the scene of future action and come back with a really well-considered report of what he had better try to do in the Near East.

The reply of M. Paschitch is to hand, and Serbia agrees to make further sacrifices, "the greatest of them all"; she will accept in principle the line laid down in the former Servo-Bulgarian treaty of 1912 with certain rectifications, a buffer frontier for Uskub and Ortchepolye, the town of Prilep still to belong to Serbia, contact of Bulgarian territory with Albania to be avoided. Certain other conditions are imposed; the immediate co-operation of Bulgaria, the Allies to guarantee the régime for Croatia and Slavonia as also the protection of Belgrade, immediate financial help and a positive alliance. Paschitch solemnly declares that the territories which he agrees to give up are Servian by historical right, by irrefutable tradition, and by well-known ethnical distinctions; he says also that the Servo-Bulgarian treaty of 1912 no longer exists, having been torn up on the 16th June, 1913, by Bulgaria when she suddenly flung herself on Serbia, and that the Treaty of Bucharest of 1913 is the only international document to determine the distribution of territories between Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria and Roumania. The Servian Government therefore claims, as a set-off to these sacrifices, the cession of Fiume, the liberation of the Slav regions, the western portion of the Banat, and commercial communication with the Ægean Sea. How are we to reconcile these claims, not only with those of Bulgaria, but with what Italy is asking for?

General Laguiche telegraphs that he still hopes the Emperor will give up his idea of assuming command, as if the Empress should be made Regent, a revolution would immediately occur. The Grand Duke has enormous influence over the soldiers while the Emperor has none, and Laguiche begs us

to draw the Emperor's attention to what may prove to be the sinister consequences of his decision. It is decided that I shall telegraph directly to the Emperor, but this is not an easy thing to do as, under a timid exterior, the Tsar conceals a rather obstinate and suspicious nature. My message runs : " Having just made a long visit to the French armies, I am able to tell Your Majesty how proud our officers and soldiers are to think that they are co-operating actively with the gallant Russian troops ; all France is one in admiring not only the courage and determination which Your Majesty's Army constantly displays, but also the great military skill which has enabled the forces under the command of His Imperial Highness the Grand Duke Nicholas to escape from the grasp of the enemy. Entire confidence between the Allied Armies has never failed to exhibit itself since the beginning of the war and I have a firm belief that such mutual trust will go far to bring about our common victory ; it is with this ardent conviction that I send Your Majesty my congratulations and my fervent good wishes."

But there are other changes in Russia ; General Yanouchkevitch has been relieved of his duties as Chief of the General Staff and appointed Adjutant-General and Viceroy of the Caucasus ; his former duties have been taken over by General Alexieff. According to Paléologue these appointments go to show that the Emperor will almost immediately assume command of the Army, although urgent representations have been made these last days to induce him to reconsider his ukase ; the advice of General Soukhomlinoff, whose hatred of the Grand Duke does not abate and who, although in retirement, remains as powerful as ever, has prevailed.

M. Charles Maurras, whom so far I have never seen, writes to me he has accepted an offer to furnish some Paris notes for the A.B.C. at Madrid so as to re-establish the truth about France. He will write as a political opponent, of course, but as one who puts country above all politics, and as he is precluded from fighting, he wants to put his pen at our service ; he asks if we can suggest anything he can usefully mention. He has addressed himself to me as he scarcely knows either Delcassé or any of his colleagues ; I asked the Royalist

author to come and see me, but the dear man is so terribly deaf, that although I shouted in his ear I doubt if he heard exactly what I said. If not, and if he misquotes me, I must console myself by re-reading "Anthines" or else "The Venetian Lovers."

3rd.—General d'Amade, who is starting on his mission to Russia, called to ask me on what points his enquiries should be specially directed, the moral and material conditions and the command of the army, man-power, arms and munitions.

The British Government is well pleased with what we propose to do at the Dardanelles.

I am leaving Paris, with Millerand, for a day to inspect some of the military services, in rear of the Army.

4th.—On arriving at Dijon we first saw the place where the army cycles and motor-cycles are repaired, the various stores, the Army bakery and the provision trains, and then went to the Is-sur-Tille station and watched the goings and comings of the men on leave, the arrangements for distribution of parcels, and the system of postal services; at Andilly were the engineers' stores, and at Neufchâteau the stores of sanitary material. Everything seemed to be functioning smoothly, and having spent the day in the couloirs of the theatre where the terrible drama is being enacted, we passed the night in my train just outside Dijon.

5th.—We left early by car for Clermont, in Argonne, passing Beauzée, which is a mere ruin, and Nubécourt, with the little cemetery where German soldiers now lie beside my parents. I felt I had no right to stop there and that one must try to forget all that is purely personal. At Clermont in the station we saw how the supplies are sent up and the frozen meat dealt out, and at Valmy how the shells for the heavy guns are distributed, and then, riding on trucks, we inaugurated the railway from Aube to Somme-Suippes. At Châlons I had arranged to meet Léon Bourgeois, who breakfasted in my train with Langle de Cary and Pétain. Pétain's new army, on the right of the 4th, is holding the line from St. Menehould to Somme-Suippes, and I am more and more impressed by his clear-headedness and the accuracy of everything he says. Both Generals believe in Joffre's

next attack, but agree that it must be called off if there is no material result after two days' fighting, while if the enemy's first and second lines should be pierced, we might well push on anyhow to the Aisne; the officers and men, they assure us, are as fit and as keen as possible.

All that we looked at in the afternoon at Chalons, Compertrix, Faguières, went to show that anyhow there was no fault to be found with the system under which day by day the army in the field is fed and equipped. The train was stopped near Epernay for Castelnau to join us at dinner, and of course his opinion was asked about the forthcoming move; his reply was that, with the very thorough preparations which had been made, something like real success might be looked for; 300 heavy guns had been allotted to Pétain and 360 to Langle de Cary, and although the German defences had been considerably strengthened, we had also constructed hundreds of kilometres of communication trenches and Decauville rails. Castelnau thinks that the attack north of Arras should be made four or five days before that in Champagne. We must live in hope.

The usual pile of telegrams awaits me on my return to Paris. In the Holy City, Moscow, the Shrine of Russian Nationalism, there have been several demonstrative meetings at which the speakers have insisted that Russia should fight on till she wins, but that the Emperor should rid himself of his present advisers and at once form a responsible Cabinet. Paléologue thinks it would be risky for me to follow Laguiche's advice and address the Tsar directly as, however unhappy his last idea may be, the Emperor of all the Russias might resent anything like outside criticism, and would very likely be only stiffened in his determination. He is evidently very unhappy, although he remains quite calm and keeps a stiff upper lip, but his calmness and firmness are due to his religious faith; rational arguments affect him but little, and any argument which seemed to do violence to his conscience might have the effect of pushing him into some extreme measure; on the whole, therefore, Paléologue thinks it better to keep my telegram in his own pocket. As for the Grand Duke, he is living in a sort of chivalrous and semi-

mystic dream ; he reads into each successive defeat a proof of Divine protection, and this is at once his strength and his weakness. But the military situation is more than disquieting ; the difficulty about ammunition is on the way to be overcome, but rifles and guns are sadly lacking, as are also the men to fire them. Russia's resources in manhood are, of course, well nigh unlimited, but with 1,500,000 casualties these last months, the supply of officers, non-commissioned officers and trained men is running dry, and no one can safely predict what will be the consequences of the Emperor taking control in the field. The internal conditions of the country are also so unsatisfactory that Paléologue hints at a revolution before the " Cease Fire " has sounded. The Emperor left last night for General Headquarters, where he will be at four o'clock this afternoon, presumably to take over command ; he has not even kept the Grand Duke as Chief of the Staff.

Delcassé has telegraphed to London, Rome and Petrograd that if we are to fix up things with Servia, it might be well worth while to get Paschitch to come to Paris and discuss verbally the various points of his paper, but he must be asked meanwhile to allow the Allies to occupy Macedonia up to the left bank of the Vardar, so as to protect the Servians from any possible Bulgarian attack.

Berlin has enjoyed beautiful weather for the Hindenburg Tag in honour of the Russian defeats : an immense crowd has surged round the wooden statue of the Marshal, which, with the millions of nails—sold for the benefit of charity—which are being driven into it, looks like becoming an iron statue. Hindenburg has been proclaimed a national hero by the Chancellor, and by the Mayor of Berlin.

7th.—General Gouraud has been to see me ; his leg is better ; he can walk a few yards without much pain and hopes to be all right in a month ; and though his right arm has gone, he looks forward to taking up his command again. I know no finer military figure. As the upshot of a long talk with him, I have written to Millerand that Gouraud will not offer any opinion as to what strength we should require to open the Dardanelles or to seize Constantinople, that he never contemplated either of these steps when he was on the

spot and has no recollection of mentioning the ten Divisions which, according to General Alexandre, he is said to have thought necessary. Without committing himself, he is inclined to think that four new Divisions would be enough to land on the Asiatic bank and prepare for the Fleet to open the Narrows. But anyhow he considers it very dangerous to leave our two Divisions where they are without trying to silence the Asiatic guns. For this limited job he would suggest one new infantry, and one cavalry Division, but the important thing is to send this lot at the earliest possible moment, and anyhow not later than the first days of October.

8th.—Boudenoot, who took the chair at yesterday's meeting of the Army Committee, says that Clémenceau and Doumer are as bitter as ever about Joffre, the Tiger declaring, half in jest and half in earnest, that it takes more than a képi with gold lace on it to convert an imbecile into an intelligent being. Doumer has protested against the substitution of fortified regions for fortresses and thinks there is danger of our having to evacuate Toul and Verdun, while on the other hand, to follow a very just remark of Joffre, it is a matter of "mobilising" the fortresses and preventing their being invested.

The Commander-in-Chief, who has been here to-day, is very pleased with what he has seen during his tour of the Italian front. The condition of the troops there is excellent, but munitions will soon run short unless the manufacture is speeded up. The Tsar has telegraphed himself to Joffre to say he has taken over command. I told the Commander-in-Chief what Castelnau had said to me about the attack in Artois preceding that in Champagne, and he quite saw the point that the Germans, seeing an attack on two fronts, would think the real attack was to be on the larger front, and would send their reserves to Champagne. Joffre, however, after long deliberation, has decided on a simultaneous offensive; the English are to attack at the same time as ourselves, and as our move in Artois is to be on as wide a front as the other, the enemy will have no indication as to where to send his reserves.

9th.—Millerand went to Bourges yesterday to see some

new experiments with noxious and asphyxiating gas and was disappointed with the results ; the shells dropped on quite a small space neither choked nor poisoned sheep or rabbits. Clearly, the genius for evil-doing is less developed here than in Germany.

The Grand Duke Nicholas has said to Laguiche in confidence : “ I give you my word of honour as a soldier that my departure will alter nothing. You can trust Alexieff as myself ; we are old friends, we take the same views ; he is a soldier to the core and in a word, we understand one another.” Paléologue hears that the change of command is the result of a Court intrigue in which the Montenegrin Grand Duchesses are mixed up, and which might easily take shape as a conspiracy. The Emperor has anyhow begun well with a considerable success achieved by his Southern Armies near Tarnopol, and this turn of fortune, coinciding as it does with the arrival of the Tsar at the head of his troops, cannot fail to act favourably on the superstitious imagination of the Russians.

Discussion goes on as to what is to be done about Servia and Bulgaria and how Paschitch is to be persuaded to let us occupy the ground east of the Vardar, and meanwhile we have had another reverse in Argonne, losing ground to the depth of 200 to 400 metres on a 1000-metre front ; our counter-attacks have won back part of what we had to yield.

10th.—A hundred questions seem to crop up together, and financial difficulties seem almost as hard a nut to crack as the military. Ribot has in mind a five per cent perpetual loan with a sinking fund, under which the bonds will be redeemed in series after fifteen years, the interest to be tax free. The Finance Minister does not see how all the money is to be raised and voted which will be required before the end of hostilities.

11th.—I arrived at Lyons early this morning with Albert Thomas, and went to the Oullins workshops where the explosive shells and long-winged bombs are being made ; to the Hotchkiss establishment where they are turning out 200 machine guns per month and will produce 2000 more

before April, and to all the various other hives of industry where weapons of war are being forged and where now work is at high pressure and up to time ; at Le Chambon, Firminy and Unieux we watched the various parts of the guns being turned out and at St. Etienne we waited to see the night shift take over their work on machine-guns, rifles and revolvers.

12th.—We slept in the train on a siding outside the station and rose early to resume our tour of inspection, which in the afternoon included a visit to the Hotel de Ville, where, under the direction of Madame Herriot, parcels are made up for our prisoners of war ; enquiries for these are lodged and every effort made to trace and obtain information about them. Arrangements for the refugees are also systematically worked out. I remembered the happy time at Lyons only last year, the town illuminated, the wonderful party in this same Hotel de Ville, and the Hotel Dieu where I dined with the good nuns and where now the hideous results of war are to be seen ; men frightfully hurt, men disabled perhaps for life, and one with his face disfigured by an incendiary shell ; his eyelids torn, his nose smashed, his cheeks all ploughed up. He half raised himself in his bed, and trying to wave his poor hand, cried out : “ What beats me is that I shall not be able to use this hand again to kill some of those fellows. Vive la France ! ”

13th.—From Belfort, where we arrived at dawn and where Millerand was awaiting us, we went to the plain near Giromagny where the Moroccan Division under General Codet was being trained and whence it is to start almost at once for the fight in Champagne : “ Morituri te salutant ! ” murmured the General to me as these fine troops—so soon alas ! to be decimated—filed past us after I had given colours to their four new regiments. Then, with Generals Maud’huy and Demange—the latter having replaced General Thévenet in command of the fortified area at Belfort—we went up to the Ballon d’Alsace and made a tour of the works which have just been carefully organised as a point d’appui for the second line of defence. Demange, a very quiet and thoughtful but evidently a very determined officer, pointed out all his carefully considered arrangements for both defence lines, but reminded

me that on his right, facing Alt Kirch, he had only one rather tired Territorial Division with, for artillery, some of the 90's and a few heavy guns; Pénélon will draw the attention of G.Q.G. to this. In the afternoon we went to Dammerkirch, which has just recovered its French name Dannemarie, and as far as that pretty village Ballersdorf, decorated for the occasion, where the children are just beginning to speak French again; thence we motored to Altenach, Merzen, St. Ulrich, and other little communes where the inhabitants are pursuing their own business amidst the Territorials of the 105th Division, and so from Füllern to Hindlingen, where I found an old friend in Colonel Hennocque, who told me sadly that the people near the Swiss frontier had lost their sense of French nationality and that Germany had succeeded in stamping out the old Alsatian spirit. Our last lap to the railway lay through Rechezy, where I saw the much talked about Lucie Morel, who hails from Sampigny and has proved herself such a little heroine.

14th.—Millerand gives us an account of his interview with Kitchener, whom he met at Calais. It has been agreed that four French Divisions shall be ready to sail on the 10th October, but the British War Minister does not want Hamilton to be put under Sarrail, nor does he think that if our new troops start on the 10th October they will be ready to take the field before the 15th November. Sarrail is to be asked to take the responsibility of saying whether he would prefer to draw up the really thorough report which we require here, or whether he would prefer to confer first of all on the spot with Hamilton and Bailloud.

In recognition of the great services which he has rendered in Morocco, General Lyautey, at Delcassé's suggestion, is to receive the Military Medal.

St. Menehould has been violently bombarded by long-range guns; fifteen people have been killed, several houses have been set on fire, and one of the hospitals has been destroyed.

The situation in Bulgaria grows steadily worse, and a Turco-Bulgarian agreement, with regard to railway transport, awaits the Sultan's signature; political compensations will probably give Germany an open road to Constantinople.

Public opinion at Sofia is weakening, and the Duc de Vendôme, who should by now be on his way to see King Ferdinand, has had an attack of jaundice and cannot travel; M. Radoslavoff's Government makes no secret of an impending Austro-German attack on the Servo-Bulgarian frontier, and they will fold their arms and let the invaders by.

The Germans seem already to have discovered something of Joffre's plan, and M. Beau telegraphs from Berne as to a report that the British and French will make an attack together about the 15th September, and that several trains with heavy guns have passed through Cologne on their way from Russia, and that apparently most of them are going towards Arras. The *Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten* announced on the 7th of September that, according to the *Novoie Vremia* Joffre was about to make a big attack.

15th.—We hear from New York that there is a strong German campaign against any American loan to the Allies, and no stone is left unturned in the attempt to close the American market against us.

The Allied Ministers at Sofia have told the Bulgarian Government that the four Powers guarantee that, at the end of the war, Servia will give up to Bulgaria the belt of Macedonia included in the Servo-Bulgarian Treaty of 1912; this guarantee is subject to Bulgaria's declaration that she is ready to come to a military arrangement with the Allied Powers as regards her taking action against Turkey in the immediate future; if no declaration of this kind is received within a brief period, the present offer would be considered as cancelled. In default of any definite agreement with Servia, the proposal to occupy the left bank of the Vardar cannot now be the subject of an official engagement, and M. Radoslavoff has prudently said that he will submit the question to the King.

16th.—A long talk with Augagneur, who is more and more afraid of a failure in the Dardanelles.

17th.—I went this morning with Millerand and Galliéni to the ground outside the Invalides to give colours to the 230th and 237th Territorial regiments and to present Military Medals and Legions of Honour to mutilated and blinded

soldiers ; the crowd broke down the barriers to fling themselves on the men and embrace them, and the few words which I tried to say were wholly drowned in the general enthusiasm.

The Government of the Tsar has made a fresh blunder, as Paléologue telegraphs that the Douma is to be prorogued till the 15th November, and with the present restless state of public opinion, the postponement may have very disagreeable consequences.

Paul Cambon is trying to dissipate the illusions to which Delcassé still clings about Bulgaria. "There is not the slightest hope," he telegraphs, "of any co-operation with Bulgaria. . . . What we must therefore do is to get all the help we can from Bucharest, Nisch and Athens, and to back up Venizelos against Bulgaria ; this would of itself provide a certain guarantee against an Austro-German move towards Constantinople." But while the astute Venizelos has not yet taken sides against Sofia, M. Barrère telegraphs from Rome : "In expressing the opinion that the Allied Powers will spare no effort to bring Bulgaria to their side—even if the chances of this are very poor and even if other sacrifices may be necessary to bring it about—M. Venizelos gives further proof of political wisdom and sound judgment ; I think his suggestion to bring about a defensive treaty between Roumania, Greece and Servia against a Bulgarian attack is an admirable one, and there should be no delay in making sure of M. Bratiano's frame of mind."

18th.—M. Jean Cruppi, a Deputy, has just rounded off a trip to Russia with a call in the Dardanelles, and has returned to Paris in no happy mood. At Mudros he saw General Baumann and several officers, and he thinks that if we do not send reinforcements at once, our people are very likely to be thrown into the sea. "In Russia," he tells me, "all eyes are turned towards Constantinople, and they are waiting impatiently for us to take the town ; there is a good deal of grumbling about our inaction. Joffre had told the Grand Duke Nicholas of the meeting between himself and French on the 7th July, and had announced he was going shortly to make an attack ; this attack was then postponed till August and nothing yet

has happened. The Emperor has become very unpopular and Rasputin has come back to the Court and resumed all his former influence ; in the Douma the leaders of the political parties talk glibly about revolution, and the tradespeople in Moscow say the same thing." Cruppi's story is confirmed by telegram from Paléologue to the effect that several thousand workmen have gone on strike as a protest against the prorogation of the Douma and are clamouring for a popular Government.

For the first time since the beginning of the war Joffre has been out for a ride, and all his Staff are delighted to think that he may be on horseback if his next attack succeeds. He as usual is full of hope, but one still wonders what will be the net result of an offensive which has been far too much talked about and which, Barrère telegraphs, is the theme of gossip in Italy. G.Q.G. do not think that the Germans have sent any considerable forces to our front ; they have brought up a quantity of heavy guns for the campaign in Argonne.

Lord Bertie brought his new Naval Attaché to see me, but first said a word in my ear to try and convince me that we must withdraw the promise to Russia about Constantinople. I told him I was very sorry, but that it was his Government who had, very lightheartedly, given the promise, and that the Russian retreat accentuated every day the Slav Nationalist movement. I told the Ambassador that Russia had fixed her eyes on Constantinople and was scolding us for our inaction, and it was therefore scarcely the moment to go back on our word.

19th.—M. Cruppi called again to tell the other Ministers as well as myself something of what he had seen and heard in Petrograd ; he is a very intelligent person, has kept his eyes well open, and is wholly without prejudice. He had an audience and begged the Tsar to try and influence King Ferdinand, but Nicholas only answered rather wearily. "What can I possibly do ? I have already paid his debts twice." Cruppi also tells us that a foolish, and quite obviously false, story has been circulated about the young Tsarevitch, who is supposed to have said, "I am really very unhappy ; whenever there is a German defeat mamma cries,

and whenever there is a Russian defeat, papa is miserable." These ugly jokes are due to a very violent, if probably quite unjust, campaign which is being carried on in Slav milieus against the Empress, but the influence which Rasputin has resumed is more justifiably looked at askance. The Douma as a whole is very Nationalist and therefore somewhat reactionary on certain important subjects, and there is considerable disorder in all the Administrative departments. The Prime Minister, Goremykine, an old and a tired man, counts for nothing; Sazonoff is very depressed, and anarchy is abroad; there has been something like a panic at Petrograd, which many folk have begun to leave if they can get away. Nevertheless the people are full of courage, Moscow remains thoroughly loyal, and it is quite true that the soldiers, having no rifles, fought with stones in their hands. The Dardanelles is a matter of greatest importance to Russia. Cruppi also begged us to believe that our position in the Dardanelles was impossible, as in addition to many other difficulties and dangers, there was typhoid fever at Mudros and shortage of water at Gallipoli. The game, he thought, was all up at Sofia as Radoslavoff, who is bound hand and foot to the King, is playing a double game. Ferdinand is furious with all Europe; his dream was to be Emperor of the Near East. He has been baulked of this and he will never get over it.

As soon as Cruppi had left us I begged Viviani and Millerand to ask Sarraill to hurry out and see things for himself on the spot, but unfortunately, according to Millerand, Sarraill seems as unconcerned about the Dardanelles as he was about the Army of the Argonne.

Commandant Langlois, on his return from his fourth mission to Russia, has handed in a report which puts rather a different complexion on things. This officer does not consider that the Russian armies are either disorganised or demoralised, and neither the abandonment of Warsaw and the fall of Kovno, nor the powerful German thrust against Vilna, has induced anything like panic. All retirements have been effected in orderly fashion, and in none of the ranks is there any sign of discouragement or discomfiture; the Emperor and the Grand Duke are still full of confidence. The losses

in officers and non-commissioned officers have been very great, but one must remember that Russia has a population of 175,000,000 and that everything possible is being done to fill the gaps. It is very difficult to obtain exact and accurate figures as to armaments and their manufacture; if it is a question of enlisting the sympathy of an ally and obtaining help the figures as to shortage fall below the truth, but if on the contrary they want to show what a fine part Russia has played, then things are deliberately exaggerated. One thing is certain: that, at the present moment, the Russian infantry, from want of rifles, cannot be utilised at their normal strength. As regards social matters, the report ran, there are a large number of people in Petrograd who are closely related by ties of blood and friendship or by common interests with Germans, there is also a very considerable section whose one idea is to have a good time without any thought of public duty. Many of the working classes also have been for a long time subject to anarchist agents, who are often either Germans or Austrians, and it is in a word an evil spirit which since the beginning of the war has inspired Petrograd. Outside the Capital, things are better and people are reminded that Napoleon came as far as Moscow and gained nothing by it. The Emperor is receiving a large number of addresses couched in most patriotic terms; General Soukhomlinoff, who is suspected of treason, is specially attacked, and one hears on all sides that he and his wife ought to have been hanged long ago. The administrative régime, which had so much to do with the military reverses, is very sharply criticised; the Emperor, who personally is one of the most Liberal men of the Government, seems convinced of the necessity of certain, if rather limited, reforms, and has made General Polivanow Minister for War although he has been on bad terms with him for many years, and has agreed to a special Committee being set up to fix responsibility for faults which have been committed; he is, however, before all things, a mystic and believes implicitly that his power comes to him from God, and that before God he is responsible for the actions of his Government. Will he ever admit that he can share that responsibility with any other? It is difficult exactly to

know what led to the dismissal of the Grand Duke. He was blamed, it is true, for having undertaken the offensive in the Carpathians without sufficient means, as well as for having left a garrison at Novo-Georgievsk. But other reasons can be adduced; like General Janouchkevitch, he was greatly disliked by the officials in Petrograd, who had been often asked to do things which conflicted with their own ideas. Did the Grand Duke want to shield his Chief of the Staff; did his enemies tickle the susceptibilities of the Emperor by alluding to the immense popularity of his uncle; or did the Emperor, wishing to gather up and concentrate everything for the defence of the country, merely resume the project which he had in his mind at the time of mobilisation of placing himself at the head of the Army? Anyhow, the consequences may be very serious, as the Grand Duke, Langlois assures us, was a peerless Commander-in-Chief, while the Tsar, who knows little or nothing of military matters, will find it very difficult to exercise anything like the same authority over the soldiers. Langlois' story fits in exactly with Cruppi's, and both are equally disquieting; is poor Russia going to be another Colossus with feet of clay, and what can we do to help her?

M. Guillemin telegraphs that the King was very pleasant when Venizelos spoke to him of a defensive Servo-Greek agreement to which Roumania would be a party and which would serve to ward off a Bulgarian attack; but our Minister rather mistrusts the apparent willingness with which the Monarch lent his ear. From Sofia we hear that King Ferdinand has received the leaders of the Opposition, and that the representative of the Agrarian Party showed himself very hostile to the King personally and thinks that if the peasants, who constitute the larger part of the population, had forgiven him for what he did on the 16th June, 1912, they would never forgive him should he do the same thing again.

20th.—“So long as the Russian Army retires and so long as the French Army does not move forward, Italy will not dare to declare war on Germany. The neutrals will not believe in our ultimate victory and will evade our advances.” So Paléologue telegraphs, and from all evidence he is quite correct.

M. Weiss, Director of Mines at the Ministry of Public Works, tells me that the Committee on asphyxiating gas, of which he is Chairman, has arrived at results which will enable us to reply, as reply we must, to the methods adopted by the enemy. With regard to the waves of toxic gas, such as the Germans created near Ypres, the precise ingredients have been discovered and could be used at once if the War Minister wishes and if the raw material can be secured ; two sorts of gas have also been discovered for shells, the one asphyxiating and poisonous, and the other simply suffocating. M. Weiss says that the ground at Bourges was less favourable for the use of gas than the woods of Argonne where the Germans employed it ; I am asking Albert Thomas for further details.

21st.—A melancholy Council meeting. Viviani began by telling us that the Army Committee want more information about military operations than the daily communiqué affords ; probably there are some members of the Committee who think that they could do Joffre's work better than he can himself. Viviani will simply reply that the communiqué we give contains the only information we have ourselves.

Millerand gave us a fair account of the experiments he saw yesterday at Mailly of the 19's and 24's, mounted on trucks, with some other details which are distinctly depressing. On the 1st September we had only 64,000 German prisoners here as against our 272,000 prisoners in Germany ; on the 17th September we had 12,777 officers and 458,573 men killed, 5,898 officers and 349,632 men missing, with 22,283 officers and 756,312 men wounded. To these must be added our casualties in the Near East : 253 officers, 71,471 men killed, 33 officers and 4,648 men missing, 368 officers and 112,515 men wounded or invalided out. What will these figures amount to if victory keeps us long waiting and if this bloody war must go on and on ?

Millerand tells us that Joffre has now written to say that he cannot definitely promise that the four Divisions detailed for the Dardanelles shall be at Marseilles on the 10th October, and he considers that the expedition, organised as it is, runs great risk of failure and may issue in our having to send reinforcement after reinforcement, and thus seriously

endanger the safety of our own soil. Our resources in manpower are very limited ; we may be able to keep our army on the same footing as now until the beginning of 1916, but we must then either reduce our fighting strength or call up the young men of the 1917 class. " You see," Viviani exclaimed, " it's just what I told you. The Dardanelles expedition will not materialise ; G.Q.G. will not look at it because Sarraill is to command." Joffre's letter cuts across the promises which he has twice made, and before giving any opinion as to the proposed expedition the Council must hear Delcassé as to the grave news we have just received from the Near East. Far from deflecting King Ferdinand from his projects, the leaders of the opposition in Bulgaria seem by their attitude to have decided him to unmask and bring about a sort of minor *coup d'état*. On Friday he caused an order to be issued to mobilise the railways, and it is stated that the ukase proclaiming anyhow a partial mobilisation of the army has been signed and will be published the day after to-morrow. It is thought at Sofia that a Turco-Bulgarian agreement will at once be put into full effect, and it is quite clear that since a recent visit of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg, a military convention exists between Bulgaria and Germany. The King and his Government are alike convinced that the Germans will win the war, and they evidently contemplate early and definite rupture with us ; M. Panafieu thinks the situation critical and that Allied troops should occupy Dedeagatch and that a Russian Army Corps should land at Varna or Burgos. Ribot rightly suggested that Joffre should be at once informed of these happenings ; the veteran Minister thinks that we are now obliged to send an adequate force to the Near East and his own hope is that Joffre will give up his next attack.

M. Bark, the Russian Finance Minister, has told Ribot that he is prepared to deposit a milliard of gold in England if Paris and London will advance him ten milliards ; and that he absolutely requires this money to go on with the war. I have asked Pénélon to let Joffre know at once what is happening in the Balkans, and the Colonel remarked that we should not have had this particular trouble if, two months ago, Castelnau's

advice had been followed and we had sent troops to Servia.

Our troops are having a good deal of success in the Cameroons, and I have telegraphed my congratulations.

22nd.—Venizelos has told Guillemin and his Russian and English colleagues that the Bulgarian Government have decreed mobilisation, and to cover this mobilisation, four Divisions, about 150,000 men, and some cavalry, have been sent to the Servian frontier; Venizelos thinks the situation critical, and at once asked to see the King and the Chief of Staff who consider that, as Servia must now make a stand against this German attack, and as she cannot therefore furnish the contingent of 150,000 men contemplated in the Servo-Greek treaty for operations against Bulgaria, Greece is also released from her engagements in this respect; King Constantine, General Dousmania and Venizelos also agree that as Greece has only 150,000 men available to take up arms, she cannot take the field without being supported by an equivalent force from outside. The Prime Minister is therefore anxious to know at the earliest possible moment if the Allies can supply these men but he makes it a *sine qua non* that they should be European and not Colonial troops. If Roumania should decide to join up with Greece, these troops would no longer be necessary but Venizelos has very faint hopes of being able to negotiate with Bucharest, and, while he is waiting to hear what Roumania really intends to do, he must ask the Triple Entente to give an immediate reply as to what support they can possibly give. Our M. Guillemin thinks that if we let slip the opportunity of setting Greece against Bulgaria, now an ally of Germany, we must abandon all hope of any Greek co-operation during the war; Venizelos has told the Allied Ministers in confidence that if the troops for which he asks are forthcoming, and if King Constantine then refuses to mobilise, he will resign his office. Knowing that Delcassé has little appetite for any operations in the Near East, I asked him to come and see me at once to talk the thing over, although as a matter of fact, M. de Panafieu has telegraphed that, for some unknown reason, Bulgarian mobilisation is postponed for a few days and the danger is less acute than it was yesterday.

Delcassé has seen a letter from King Ferdinand to one of his friends, full of recriminations against France; the writer reproaches us with having given Cavalla to Greece in 1913, and says that, in January last year, we showed very ill will as to floating a Bulgarian loan here. M. Doumergue remembers that he was unable, as President of the Council, to agree at once to a Bulgarian loan on account of the Lefèvre amendment which suspended all authorisation for foreign loans, and because a prior formal promise had been made by his predecessor, Stephen Pichon, as to a Greek and Turkish loan; three months later, however, he begged the banks to favour Bulgaria's application but met with a refusal. Ferdinand is evidently seeking some pretext to justify his ill temper.

An inhabitant of Lille, one M. Guérin, whom the Germans have authorised to come to Paris to see about provisions for his fellow citizens, tells me that the invaded countries are going to have a very bad time of it this winter, but they will be in no degree discouraged. As M. Guérin is to go to Berlin before returning to Lille, I begged him to be very careful as to what he says in any interviews and above all not to indulge in any talk about peace. When Germany wants to treat, she will do so officially, and meanwhile she must not be allowed to do anything to demoralise or split up the Allies by semi-official proposals.

At seven o'clock this evening Delcassé has not yet replied to Athens, and indeed since his son has been wounded and a prisoner, he seems to be altogether out of sorts; with some difficulty I managed to get him to telegraph that if Bulgaria arms we will consider very favourably the demands of M. Venizelos.

23rd.—The Cabinet not only approves the telegram which Delcassé sent yesterday but is going to back it up with a still stronger Note so that Venizelos may have no excuse for climbing down; the general opinion is that even if Venizelos were to resign, we should still send help to Servia, and Millerand was asked to consider a landing either at Salonika or at Dedeagatch.

The Russian Government very much dislikes having to treat Bulgaria as an enemy and would much prefer to support

the people against the King, but once more Sazonoff's suggestions are a little belated.

Sarraill has handed in a report to Millerand as to what he thinks should be done to enable the Allied fleets to enter the Dardanelles ; he would have two bases, one at Lemnos and the other at Mitylene, and later perhaps another at Koum-Kalé. The general landing of the French forces would take place in the bay of Yukyesi as the country in which they would actually fight offers difficulties to landing. He prefers, instead of four Divisions, two Army Corps, of which one should be made up from the Colonial Army ; he thinks that the operations should be set afoot as soon as possible and that to force the Dardanelles we must occupy Chanak and Cherdak. He has drawn up his report in Paris and sees no particular advantage in going to the scene of action until he can start with his troops.

Bailloud has called Millerand's attention to the "incalculable consequences" which Bulgarian mobilisation may have on the expeditionary force, and our Military Attaché at Bucharest telegraphs that the situation in Russia is making the civil population in Roumania very uneasy, and that only the despatch of an expeditionary force to the Balkans, even if this be not immediate, will give the Greek and Roumanian Governments the assurance they require. The Bulgarian Government has told the Deputies that there is to be a big German offensive in the immediate future against Servia who will be crushed out of being, and that the Bulgarian territories which have belonged to her since the Treaty of Bucharest will be taken from her, and that the Bulgarian troops expect to occupy the places almost without striking a blow. M. Radoslavoff added that Bulgaria had nothing to fear either from Greece or Roumania as "we have the most formal assurances on this point and we are sure of these two neighbours." I am writing to Delcassé to beg him to let King Ferdinand and the Government know through Panafieu that even if Greece holds off, an armed intervention of the Allies in the Balkan Peninsula is inevitable.

Colonel Pénélon tells me that all along our line the adjustment firing of the guns has been very successful and that the

artillery preparation for the forthcoming offensive has begun ; I know nothing more. I have written to Millerand to remind him that the Council have decided we should ask G.Q.G. for an exact statement of the heavy guns, and other requirements, for the offensive which Joffre has ordered, and that Pénélon had told me there would be no difficulty about letting us have this. " I now hear," I went on to say, " that Joffre, fearing leakages, would not allow us to have this information before the order was given for the offensive, and that even now he will not send it except on the condition that it shall not be communicated to the Council. It is really extraordinary that a number of officers should have knowledge which is refused to the Government. . . . We have the right—and it is our duty—to know in advance if when undertaking an offensive, the initiative for which the Commander-in-Chief himself is responsible, there are available resources to ensure, and exploit, success ; otherwise your political, and my moral, responsibility would be seriously involved. . . . The entire confidence which Joffre reposes in the success of his attack and his hopes of freeing our country with a single stroke may, to a certain point, explain and excuse the independence of his attitude ; but too many, and too heavy, faults have been committed in Woevre, Champagne and Artois for us to be able to give up our right of being informed betimes."

But if my letter to Millerand shows how little a mere civilian is relying on anything like a signal military success, the Commander-in-Chief has just issued a General Order : " Soldiers of the Republic, after months of waiting which have enabled us to increase both our strength and our resources while the enemy has been using up his, the hour has come for us to attack so as to win. . . . Your dash will be irresistible, and your first effort will carry you up to the guns of the adversary, beyond the fortified lines which he has set up against us. You will give him neither truce nor breathing space until victory is yours ; go forward with your hearts bent on the deliverance of your country's soil, for the triumph of Right and of Freedom." And it is at this moment our Minister warns us that M. Paschitch is beckoning urgently to us to come and help Servia, that Joffre sends Colonel Barrès,

Director of Aviation at G.Q.G. to tell me that our pursuing and bombarding aeroplanes are of very inferior quality, and that two Deputies, who have been on one of these "Parliamentary missions" to the Dardanelles, report that considerable reinforcements in infantry, aircraft, and sanitary services are absolutely required there.

24th.—Colonel de la Panouse telegraphed yesterday evening that the British Government, before replying to the cry for help which came from Nisch, have asked Lord Kitchener to report as to what England and France could jointly do if Servia were really attacked by Austro-Germans and Bulgarians. The British General Staff has in mind an attack on Servia by 450,000 Austro-German troops, the whole Bulgarian army and eventually 100,000 Turks. Servia would have at her side 100,000 Roumanians—the remainder of the Roumanian Army being left to guard the Transylvanian frontier—the whole Greek Army and Anglo-French Corps which would consist, at the most, of 300,000 men; Lord Kitchener wants to know if the calculations of our General Staff work out like his.

Viviani, Millerand and Delcassé came with General Graziani to confer with me as to this telegram, and we decided to let Venizelos know at once we are sending a Division to look after the Greek railway, and that the Cabinet in London knows of this. Delcassé has telegraphed to Athens, "The French Government, wishing to enable Greece to fulfil, in the circumstances foreseen by the President of the Council, her treaty obligations with Servia, are ready to do their part in furnishing the troops which have been asked for." The Foreign Minister has also made an appeal to Russia but, unstable as water, Sazonoff has the very odd idea of forcing Servia to make new concessions in favour of Bulgaria; in other words, he is playing the Germans' game for them.

General mobilisation in Bulgaria is official since yesterday morning; the people are uneasy but undemonstrative, and yesterday the Crown Prince of Servia said to our M. Boppe: "When shall we know what the Allies are going to do?" It is no longer the time for talking and writing but for doing something. Bratiano has flatly contradicted Radoslavoff's

statement that Roumania has promised to remain neutral.

In the last fortnight the weather has been superb, and now to-day, on the eve of our offensive, it is raining in torrents. "Gott mit uns!" the Germans will say. Colonel Pénélon tells me that, despite the deluge, the bombarding and destroying fire have given excellent results; the offensive will no doubt begin to-morrow. In reply to the request for information which the War Minister has sent on his own, and my, behalf the Colonel brings us a verbal and not very explicit message from the Operations Bureau; it would seem that the instructions given to commanders of groups of armies set out that the enemy's front is first to be broken, and when that is done success is to be strategically exploited as rapidly as possible in such way as is best facilitated by our front in its enveloping form between the sea and the Argonne. The group of the Armies of the North whose operations will be interlinked with the British offensive, will seek to break the enemy's front near Arras on the line roughly from La Bassée to Ficheux. General Foch has available for this attack seventeen infantry Divisions, two Divisions of cavalry, and about seven hundred 75's, with three hundred and eighty heavy guns; the five British Cavalry Divisions will act in co-operation with the French Cavalry. The British First Army will attack towards Loos and Hulloch with two minor movements north of the Canal, while the British Second Army will make a demonstration with two Divisions east of Ypres. The group of French Armies of the Centre will attack between the massif of Moronvillers and Argonne on the front held by the 4th, 2nd and 3rd Armies with thirty Divisions of infantry, seven cavalry Divisions, 1200 75's and about 850 heavy guns. The further progress of these Armies will be helped by an attack by the 5th Army, between the massif of Graone and the valley of the Aisne, which the General Officer commanding the group of Armies of the Centre will deliver at such moment as he thinks best after the entry into action of the 4th and 2nd Armies. The troops which the 5th Army will furnish for this duty comprise six Divisions of infantry, with 250 75's and the same number of heavy guns. The Air Force have been told to let their bombing squadrons destroy the points on the railways

which the enemy will chiefly use for bringing up reinforcements. The group of the Armies of the East will hold themselves ready, when the word is given, to take part in the general offensive by launching the concerted action which has been prepared in Woevre. If, as General Joffre and his Staff firmly believe, the Armies of the North and the Centre break through the enemy's front, their duty will be to push the enemy directly backwards, and without a moment's delay, towards the east and the north, aiming at his communications; any flanking movement would play into the hands of the enemy who would thus gain time to occupy with his reserves the successive lines of defence which will have been prepared. The part assigned to the British Army has been settled, and there is every appearance of a considerable success; but so bright an appearance may dissolve into a mirage.

25th.—I could scarcely sleep and rose before dawn, tortured by anxiety as to what the fortunes of war would bring forth to-day and by my almost total ignorance of the conditions under which battle is to be delivered. And yet, day in, day out, for the last three years, people write to me: "You are the chief personage in the country," "you who can do anything," "you who are the master, you have only to say a word," and so on. Poor people who, if things turned out badly, would render me responsible for everything. I read also in the *Tagliche Rundschau* of the 18th September that I am a dictator who lives by force of censorship and who conceals the truth from France, which is a dirty, corrupt, drunken, tubercular country, doomed to decadence and ruin. . . .

We hear that without, I think, the knowledge of the Greek Government, German agents installed at Corfu are provisioning enemy submarines, and Delcassé has asked Guillemin to warn Venizelos about this. Venizelos has wrung from King Constantine that Greece shall mobilise as a matter of precaution, but he does not know if she will go any further, and yesterday he was still talking of his resignation. "If he were to go," says Guillemin, "it would be nothing short of a diaster as the whole edifice of his policy would crumble away, a policy which he alone was able to keep alive in the teeth of the Sovereign."

G.Q.G. has considered the reply to be sent to Lord Kitchener and it is not thought that Serbia can be attacked by 450,000 Austro-Germans, as the resources of our enemies do not seem sufficient for a force of this size to be thus utilised. The contingent to go to the aid of Serbia need scarcely therefore consist of more than 300,000 men, and it should be derived from the troops in the Dardanelles because our resources in men and munitions do not permit us to keep going three theatres of war, and also in employing elsewhere the Dardanelles expeditionary force, the bad effects of a retreat pure and simple will be avoided. Lastly, as the Dardanelles operation was intended—and has failed—to open direct communication with Russia, we must now ensure communication with Salonika and the Danube.

There was a long and rather confused discussion in Council, and the Ministers expressed surprise that no allusion was made in the Note to the Divisions promised for the 10th October. Millerand told us he had drafted a letter in which he reminded Joffre of his former promises, and with the formal conditions under which the Government had handed over to him the new units, but he had not sent it as he did not like to trouble the Commander-in-Chief on the very eve of his forward movement.

Sir Edward Grey has told the Bulgarian Minister in London that if the Bulgarian Government does not give an assurance that their mobilisation is not directed against the Allies, the British Minister at Sofia will ask for his passports; this does not seem to be altogether a happy thought, for what will happen if the Bulgarian Government mendaciously give the required assurance? After ineffable tergiversations Sazonoff on the other hand has really proposed something which seems quite reasonable; a public announcement that if Bulgaria attacks Serbia, we shall consider this aggression as directed against ourselves. France is also going to ask the Allies to join in telling Bulgaria that her mobilisation is an act of defiance against us all, since we have promised her Macedonia and Cavalla, and that she has no right herself to tear up the Treaty of Bucharest, and that if she does not demobilise within forty-eight hours, her attitude will be

considered as unfriendly. Delcassé asked, as his first contribution to the debate, what we should do if, after the ultimatum to Bulgaria, Greece and Roumania sat still. He thought we should be obliged to take away a large quantity of troops from our front for an expedition to the Near East, and he stoutly maintained his belief that in France we ought to muster the great bulk of our effective strength. To this the answer was that if Bulgaria, hand in hand with Austria and Turkey, were to attack Servia, we should have to consider ourselves as in a state of war against her, and the question would then certainly come as to what troops we could spare to go yonder; surely it would be better to try and prevent Bulgaria from being pushed over the precipice by her King.

Early in the afternoon we heard that the offensive had begun; the English had gone forward five kilometres south of La Bassée towards Lens; they had used gas, but the wind, which would have favoured them yesterday, had partly gone against them to-day, and on the La Bassée side they have not advanced. Our Arras attack only began at 11 o'clock on account of a morning fog; in Champagne we have taken the first line all along the front, and our cavalry has got through on the right; General Marchand has been wounded when leading his troops forward with splendid dash. Colonel Pénélon who brings us the news is as radiant as if announcing an actual victory.

I felt myself altogether overcome; I went up to my library, and alone with my wife I burst into tears. If it is really victory, what joy! But if this evening or to-morrow we are held up by the second lines of defence, or flung back by German counter-attacks, how many dead, how many wounded, what flow of blood for a quite illusory result. And what a terrible effect it will have in the Near East. Would it not have been better to have dug ourselves solidly in on the Western front and turned round to strike a heavy blow in the Balkans, to rouse the Greek and Roumanian Governments from their torpor, and to immobilise Bulgaria? When the Russians had their success in Galicia our arrival in Salonika might have meant something like winning the war.

Bad news from the Near East, and one wonders if the three

Sovereigns have, without the knowledge of their people, handed themselves over to the Kaiser. Of course a great victory in France would change everything, but already the German wireless is beginning to say that our offensive has broken down. Pénélon, however, has been here twice this evening with a report of "brilliant" results with the Castelnau group, "very good" with the Foch group, and "excellent" with the English. He assured me that at G.Q.G. it was thought that the first day had produced all that could be hoped, and late in the evening Millerand telephoned to me that everything was going well, and that in Champagne we have taken more than 7000 prisoners. We must wait and hope, but the anxiety is terrible.

26th.—It turns out that we have taken more than 10,000 prisoners in Champagne and have really moved forward there. So far Delcassé has not telegraphed to Sofia, nor indeed done anything, and this morning he has a letter from Isvolsky to say that Sazonoff is withdrawing his proposal to tell Bulgaria that an attack on Servia will be considered by us as an act of hostility. One cannot help thinking that this general policy of masterly inactivity will encourage Bulgaria, and after long arguments, Delcassé gives way and is going to ask the Allies to insist on Bulgaria demobilising; Viviani came back to see me in the afternoon and complained of Delcassé's limpness and hesitations, and indeed it does seem as if something had happened to paralyse the energy of the Foreign Minister. Dubost came on behalf of the Senate to urge that we should send help to Servia, and I told him in confidence of the difficulties with which we are confronted in Greece and Roumania, as well as of those at home with Joffre.

I now hear that we have taken over 15,000 prisoners and things look well for our attack on the German second line. But it is now the end of the second day and so far those second lines have not been taken, and the time which Langle de Cary and Pétain told us would indicate success or the reverse has already expired; the enemy front has not been pierced and the German wireless announces that we ourselves have lost several thousand prisoners. It seems to me that we are a long way from the hoped-for results, but my informant,

Commandant Herbillon is still full of confidence ; let us hope he is right. Panafieu telegraphs that Bulgarian mobilisation is proceeding on the same lines as in 1912 but very slowly. The Agrarians and the Socialists have distributed among the soldiers a manifesto against the King. King Constantine has allowed Greek mobilisation to go on, but whether or no Greece remains neutral is still a bone of contention between Constantine and his Ministers ; Guillemin, after a long conference with Venizelos, urges on behalf of the latter, that we shall land as quickly as possible at Salonika. We are coming round to Venizelos' point of view, and one of the two Gallipoli Divisions is to be sent to Lemnos, and we are sending at once to Salonika horses and munitions with commissariat conductors and soldiers in mufti.

27th.—A Council meeting has been specially convened but Millerand has come back from G.Q.G. with very few details about the attack. Near Arras we have been checked and Joffre no longer thinks that we shall get through at this point ; in Champagne, on a front of twelve kilometres, south of Somme-Py, we are in touch with the enemy's last line ; this is not so strong as those we took yesterday but is nevertheless behind barbed wire which, in the drenching rain, held us up altogether on Sunday. This check has for me a very sinister aspect, as Castelnau, Pétain and Langle de Cary all told me that if we did not take all the enemy's lines with a single assault, the attack as a whole would fail, and that therefore it must be a matter of what twenty-four, or at the most forty-eight, hours had brought. According to the War Minister, however, Joffre still thinks that we shall break through in Champagne, and yesterday evening one of the Under Secretaries of State, Justin Godard, who had gone to Souain to visit a dressing station, saw a lot of cavalry making their way northwards. These splendid men are burning to " get through " and push on ; what a bitter disappointment after all this bloodshed ; there is no real break through or onward movement.

Pénélon brought me a message which Castelnau telephoned this morning to say that he was in touch with the last German lines and thought that they were giving way, and that anyhow

his troops could not stay where they were. In Champagne the attack was to begin again at two o'clock, and the 105's have been brought up to play on the enemy positions if not sufficiently destroyed by our artillery preparations; five new Divisions are going to be put in, but if we do not get through to-day, will Joffre pursue, as at Arras, an objective he cannot obtain? Surely it would be better to be content with a tactical success which we have secured, and not lose another 100,000 men in attempting a strategic decision which is outside our grasp unless we can seize it immediately. At the end of the day, Pénélon comes back to say that the last attack was not to be delivered till four o'clock and therefore there would be no news till nightfall.

The Norwegian Minister has called to introduce to me the novelist, Johan Bojer who assures me of his warm sympathies with France; Baron de Vedel reminds me how, at the end of July last year, he went to the German Embassy and found Baron de Schoen superintending his things being packed; the Ambassador said to him, "I am waiting to receive my passports." Baron de Vedel replied, "Your passports will never be handed to you so long as war is not declared, and France will not be the one to declare war." On which the German Ambassador said significantly, "That is perfectly true; in this country everything possible has been done to maintain peace."

28th.—King Constantine has been kept to his room for several days with a feverish cold and a touch of pleurisy, but an incision which was made yesterday has relieved him a good deal; the public has only been told that he has influenza. In view of the last telegrams from Greece it is now arranged to send direct to Salonika, agreeably with Venizelos' demand and the tacit consent of the King, the Gallipoli Division, or anyhow one Brigade of it with the rest to follow; the two regiments of Spahis, now in Egypt, are also to be brought to Salonika without worrying about putting them into mufti, which Venizelos says is no longer necessary. We shall send an official Note to Greece to say we are proceeding to help Servia, and we shall try to send another Brigade from here if Millerand can find one ready, and if so Sarraill will accompany

it. As soon as the operations in Champagne are over, which, alas, must be either to-day or to-morrow, we shall tell Joffre he must really send the four other Divisions ; we shall try to come to terms with the English as to the command, and we shall relieve, as soon as possible, our 2nd Dardanelles Division. As Delcassé still hums and haws, Ribot has said bluntly that unless the Divisions are sent from here to Salonika, he will leave the Cabinet. Millerand informs us as to the situation in Champagne which is not very satisfactory. G.Q.G. told us first that, at two points, we had set foot in the second enemy line, whereas we only seem to have got as far as Somme-Py and were then pushed back. About half past eleven Herbillon came with a communiqué to the effect that we have been checked by cleverly masked barbed wire entanglements in front of the enemy's second lines. This melancholy news upsets Viviani altogether, and he and several other Ministers spoke very bitterly about Joffre and G.Q.G., Albert Sarraut, who has unbounded admiration for the Commander-in-Chief, defending him vigorously. I could only mildly suggest that we had anyhow scored a tactical success which had evidently had a good moral and diplomatic result abroad, but that if there were no substantial hope of breaking right through, we ought not to be so pigheaded as to try to secure a strategic decision. I then felt I must tell the Council what Pénélon had disclosed to me and what Joffre, on his last visit, had hinted at. G.Q.G. is contemplating a new offensive, this time in Alsace, and this is why the four Divisions, which may be absolutely required for the Near East, are being refused. On this point the Government have a right to their own opinion. Will they leave the Commander-in-Chief free to start another offensive this year ? Will they allow him to retain for such offensive the men and munitions required for any expedition to the Near East ? Are we going to give up the idea of helping Servia, that is to say, of ensuring, by protecting the Salonika railway, our communications with Russia ? It is for the Government, and not for the Commander-in-Chief alone, to determine these questions, the more so as according to the terms of his command, he is only General-in-Chief of the Armies here. There must be some authority to decide

as to the distribution of forces between the different fronts, and this duty rests, not with the Commander-in-Chief of the Armies here, but with the Government. On this point we were unanimous.

Late in the evening Herbillon came to tell me that Joffre had gone to confer with the three Generals at their headquarters and that before starting he said to his Staff: "We have scored our success and I am not going to compromise it; we shall not go on unless there is a real chance of getting clean through." The three Generals, however, it seems, consider that we ought not to call a halt, and that there really is reason to think we may pierce the enemy's lines altogether. Does there really remain a gleam of hope?

Sazonoff has changed his mind again and now wants the Allies to deliver a real ultimatum to Sofia; he is evidently influenced by Serbia who is afraid of a flank and rear attack and who wants to be free to get ahead of Bulgaria if the latter does not disarm. In London and Rome, however, something less drastic is preferred, and the diplomatic coalition seems but little easier to manage than the military.

Greek mobilisation, the announcement that the Allies are going to send troops to Serbia, the possible rupture with the Entente Powers, and above all public opinion in Bulgaria, seem to have given Ferdinand and his Government "to think furiously." They are marking time, and a general shuffle of the Government officials has been rendered necessary by the squabbles between M. Radoslavoff and M. Toutcheff.

The Tsar has sent me a telegram of congratulation as to "the great success which the glorious French Army has achieved"; in my telegram of thanks I beg the Tsar to accept my tribute to the courage of which the Russian troops gave a display. Why cannot one speak of their victory?

29th.—Although Grey said in the Commons yesterday that England would back up Serbia if attacked by Bulgaria he has not yet agreed to Sazonoff's ultimatum. The British Government is not too keen to send troops to Salonika, and the First Lord of the Admiralty says one ought to do something about the German submarines before sending troopships to the Greek coast. But this does not alter our own decision to

hurry up a despatch of troops to Salonika ; Joffre has agreed to let the brigade from Belfort go and, despite Ian Hamilton's objections, the two Divisions will go from the Dardanelles. A Note, even if the milder British formula be accepted, is to be addressed at once to Sofia. We are going to beg Kitchener to relieve immediately our two Divisions in the Dardanelles, but whatever his answer is, and so long as we have warned him, we shall not delay the despatch of our own troops.

I have sent Millerand a letter of congratulation to the troops which was rendered necessary by the telegram of congratulations from the Tsar ; my telegram may be a little premature, but anyhow our men have behaved so splendidly that one need not wait to let them know what one thinks about them.

Pénélon now lets us know that we have reached the crest of Vimy and, north-west of Souain, we have broken the German second lines ; several of our regiments, including some cavalry, have gone through, and the enemy looks like accepting battle on open ground. I am told to keep this secret as the Germans, while gathering up troops wherever they can find them, are liable to hold us up or even thrust us back. Joffre, rather worried about the expenditure of ammunition, was hesitating yesterday evening as to whether he should go on with the battle, and Pétain was unwilling to tackle the second line trenches in front of him without fresh artillery preparation, and it was Castelnau who gave the order to resume the attack.

I had to look in at the Office of Public Works where Marcel Sembat has organised a conference with Mr. Roberts, Under Secretary of State for the Treasury, and Mr. Hodge, a Labour Member of Parliament. The subject is what Great Britain is doing in the war, and Mr. Roberts says that, shoulder to shoulder with France, England will fight to the last drop of her blood.

On my return to the Elysée I found Pénélon more and more confident ; three Divisions have passed north of Souain, one moving on Somme-Py, the other two heading right and left to take in reverse the enemy's lines we have pierced.

Delcassé complains of feeling not only very tired but very unwell, but he has signed a telegram warning Sir Edward Grey of the danger of delaying any further our help to Servia ; at Sofia M. Toutcheff's resignation is not accepted and he has made it up with M. Radoslavoff. This is a great score for the Germans who are already behaving as if they were masters of the place ; their officers are working at the War Office, and they are supplying whatever money is necessary for immediate requirements. At night Millerand telephones that the door has been opened in Champagne and that we have gone through but he does not know in what strength, and it seems that we have since been obliged to retire to the point where we broke in. Nothing more, but it is enough to give one an agonising night as to what will be the fate of the Divisions who have got behind the German lines. They may have been driven right back again, they may have had any number of prisoners taken, they may even have been decimated.

30th.—There is little news except that some of our infantry, cavalry and guns certainly did go through the breach, that our offensive has been held up, and that the people who went behind the enemy lines have certainly not all come back ; a little later on, comes word that three Brigades, and not three Divisions, went through, and no one knows what the losses have been. It is obviously more and more necessary to send troops to Salonika to reassure our friends in the Balkans ; but the Belfort Brigade cannot start for another week and will therefore not arrive before the 12th or 13th. Delcassé has consented to go this evening to London and represent how important it is that the Bulgarians should not steal a march on the Servians ; he is to beg for the two Divisions at Gallipoli to which Hamilton still clings, and he is to say that we will do our best to send more ; that we must of course first reckon up what is absolutely necessary for our own front here, and he is to try and come to some agreement with the British Government as to what troops will be eventually necessary to defend the line from Salonika to the Servian frontier.

Albert Thomas has drawn up his programme of munitions, and Ribot is aghast at the idea of manufacturing material for next midsummer. He declared that the war cannot possibly

go on till then ; it must anyhow finish in the spring or we should none of us be there to see it out. Late in the afternoon Dubost, Deschanel and Viviani came to my room, and the last, not without some impatience, sat the other two out to tell me that Delcassé had, for reasons of health, tendered his resignation, and that he thought of asking Bourgeois or, failing him, Briand or one of the brothers Cambon to go to the Quai d'Orsay. I told Viviani at once that Delcassé's resignation would be very ill interpreted here and elsewhere, and I telephoned to beg the Foreign Minister to come here. I could see at once that he was really ill, partly from fatigue and partly from anxiety about his son, but I entreated him to hold on for purely patriotic reasons, and eventually persuaded him to postpone his decision on condition that he need not go to London to-night ; and this is less important now that Kitchener has taken the necessary steps to dispense with our Divisions in the Dardanelles.

CHAPTER X

Telegram from the Tsar—M. Delcassé on the sick list—Landing at Salonika—Operations in Champagne suspended—Interview with General Joffre—Bulgaria at war—M. Venizelos replaced by M. Zaimis—Resignation of Delcassé—Viviani ceases to be President of the Council—The Briand Cabinet.

OCTOBER

1st.—M. Chaumet, a Deputy who has been on a Parliamentary mission to Mudros and the Dardanelles, has found the troops—so he tells me—in excellent condition, but that the military situation is intolerable, as there seems to be a sort of paralysis with regard to anything like an offensive. It is high time to decide between Gallipoli, where the British Cabinet took us, and Salonika where, so far, they have not favoured our landing. The telegrams this morning, from our representatives abroad, indicate anxiety as to Great Britain's slowness of action ; Grey does not want to join Sazonoff in his rather stiff note to Sofia and would merely say that the mobilisation in Bulgaria must make Servia very uneasy and that, if the arrival of German officers at Sofia is a fact, the four Powers may find it difficult to restrain the Servians from taking steps to defend their national existence. Paléologue, who knows his Bulgaria well from having so long represented us there, thinks this hesitating procedure very dangerous, and Barrère warns us that the telegrams received in Rome confirm the information that Germany has taken charge at Sofia, as at Athens, with regard both to military and political matters, and that there is no longer any doubt as to agreement between King Ferdinand and the Germans. Our Ambassador also urged the necessity of landing troops at Salonika, whatever the King of the Hellenes may think about it, and to show thereby that we are determined to check the German and

Bulgarian designs before they are put into effect. M. Salandra also thinks that diplomacy will have no effect at Sofia unless closely backed up by some military step, and from Athens comes the report that there is great uneasiness as to the handling of Bulgaria by the Allied Powers. Delcassé is far from well, and I am telling Viviani that we are going to lose the game with this sort of hesitation and that we must anyhow accept, and act upon, Sir Edward Grey's watered down formula; only this must be handed in at once, to-day if possible or to-morrow at latest. Delcassé, having seen my letter, has telegraphed to London that he agrees to Grey's wording whatever it be, and before landing at Salonika we shall let Venizelos know that he may look to us to protect Greece and Servia against any Bulgarian invasion. Delcassé then proceeded to draft a telegram which I sent to the Tsar: "The situation created by the definitely hostile attitude of King Ferdinand and by the mobilisation of his army is giving the French Government cause for grave anxiety; we have the strongest reasons for fearing that the Bulgarians will try to cut the line from Salonika to Nisch and thus forbid our communications not only with Servia but with Russia herself, and that we shall then be unable to keep up the regular supplies of ammunition which we are manufacturing for our Allies. Our daily provision of shells for Russia is now 3000 to 4000; this figure will be steadily increased and in January we expect to furnish the 10,000 per day which Your Majesty's Government ask for. It is of vital importance for France and Russia to maintain unbroken communication with one another; we shall arrange with England to send troops at the earliest possible moment to Servia, but the presence of a Russian force would produce the strongest impression on the Bulgarian people."

King George has telegraphed to me: "I have followed with deep admiration the magnificent exploits of the French Army, and I take the opportunity of congratulating you, M. le Président, as also General Joffre and the whole French nation on the great success achieved by the gallant French troops since the outset of our joint offensive."

Jules Cambon brings me a letter which the Vatican has

addressed to Cardinal Amette. The Holy Father asks if we cannot grant a Sunday rest to the prisoners of war. He has come to an arrangement as to this with the British, Russian and Austrian Governments and he thinks that Germany will not refuse him. Personally I have not the slightest objection to offer.

2nd.—Things do not get easier. Paul Cambon complains of Sazonoff's misfire at Nisch and of the blunders which have led the Greeks to believe that the four Powers are keeping open, for Bulgaria's benefit, the offer with regard to Macedonia and Cavalla; Guillemin should tell Venizelos, who is very uneasy as to this, that the offer to Bulgaria of a few months ago was subject to her taking up arms against Turkey. Cambon is insistent that this should be done at once even if the British Minister has not received similar instructions from his Government. But while London hesitates, General Bryan Mahon goes on; he has just landed at Salonika and has announced his intention of taking immediate steps to occupy the town and control the railway, and has apparently only been stopped by the Greek military authorities from laying a barrage of wire in the roadstead. This very offhand proceeding has infuriated Venizelos who says the Allied Powers are treating Greece like a conquered country, and that if our troops come to Salonika without the situation being cleared up by diplomatic pronouncement, he could not prevent the Greeks from forcibly opposing a landing. Guillemin, very much put about by this sudden change in Venizelos, thought it right to telegraph to General Bailloud and the squadron at Mudros to hold up for the moment their transports or in any case their landing; our representative took upon himself to do this because he was, "without information from the Quai d'Orsay who had not replied to any of his telegrams since the 26th of September." This negligence of Delcassé spurred M. de Margerie,* to telegraph over his own signature to Guillemin: "It is imperatively necessary that your British colleague should go hand in hand with you as regards Venizelos so as to relieve his anxieties which there is nothing to justify and which have taken us by surprise."

* Directeur Politique.

At our meeting to-day, Delcassé was in such a low state that his colleagues could not help being sorry for him, and asked that Viviani and I should draft telegrams for his signature. We have therefore sent word to Venizelos that Bulgaria has by her own attitude cancelled the offers made to her, that we mean to help Servia who is Greece's ally, and that we are therefore asking our Minister to urge the Greek Government not to delay any further the passage of our troops ; a telegram also has gone to London as to the extreme urgency of clearing away misunderstandings at Athens due to the hesitancy and the declarations of the British Government, and that there was not a moment to lose. Millerand has warned General Bailloud that we have arranged with the Servian G.Q.G. for the French Army, operating in Servia, to be concentrated in Nisch, and the General is to make his dispositions accordingly. The Greek Minister has called on Delcassé to say that the landing, once admitted by Greece, cannot take place without a preliminary formal protest and without full powers being reserved by the Greek authorities. Delcassé has telegraphed to London to urge Sir Edward Grey to waive his objection to the first condition, and it is settled that our troops in Servia shall come under the Servian Generalissimo, that is the Crown Prince Alexander, in the same measure as Sir John French is under the authority of General Joffre.

Paléologue has forwarded my telegram to the Tsar, but Sazonoff has already told him, and told him in a very choky voice, that Russia "after the frightful losses she has suffered during the last five months," is unable to send soldiers into Servia. "There is a limit to human power ; our troops are worn out, and our fighting strength is negligible. Do not call upon us to make a further effort."

General Castelnau has lost a third gallant son killed in action. I hear that Franchet d'Espérey, who knows the Balkans well, wants to be sent to Salonika, but I can do nothing without the approval of the Government and the Government can do nothing except in agreement with G.Q.G.

3rd.—Guillemin telegraphs cheerfully that all obstacles are removed, that he has received a purely formal protest, and that orders have been given to facilitate now and onwards the

landing of troops at Salonika.

Lord Bertie has proposed to Delcassé that France should guarantee to Greece the integrity of her territorial possessions and, after the war, assign to her Smyrna with its hinterland if Greece will lend Servia and the Allies her active help against Bulgaria ; Delcassé agreed to this.

4th.—Castelnau has written me a very brave and very beautiful letter in answer to my words of sympathy.

To Chantilly with Viviani and Millerand where we found Joffre in radiant mood. He now understands the necessity of operating in the Balkans but does not think he can spare more than a Division and a half of infantry and one or two Divisions of cavalry, the cavalry Divisions amounting to about 5000 men. There would therefore be available for that theatre one of the two Dardanelles Divisions (the other not being eligible on account of its being partly formed of tirailleurs whom Venizelos does not want to land in Greece), a Division and a half or two Divisions plus a brigade from France, with the two cavalry Divisions, plus a cavalry regiment from Alexandria. Millerand, who expects to see Kitchener at Calais to-morrow, will ask the Secretary of State if England can add to these 60,000 men a force of 100,000, and Joffre thinks that for this purpose some of the British Divisions now in France could go eastwards and be replaced later by the new units now being trained in England. For the moment Joffre is busy and confident as usual about his new offensive, but if it costs us anything like as dear as the others, where shall we be ?

On returning to Paris, I find among the pile of telegrams one to say that Venizelos is well satisfied with our pronouncement and agreeably with the wishes of the King, has telegraphed to the General Commanding the 3rd Greek Army Corps at Salonika to the effect that the Greek Government thought themselves obliged to enter a formal protest against the landing of Anglo-French forces but, after the assurances we had given them, it was now certain the landing would be all in the interests of Greece and that everything should be done to facilitate it.

Sonnino does not like Lord Bertie's idea of offering Smyrna to Greece and has told M. Barrère that it might tempt Venizelos

to play "the little Bratiano," and to do very little in return for a good deal, nor, as a matter of fact, does Sir Edward Grey approve of his Ambassador's suggestion.

The British Government has now approved of the Russian ultimatum to Bulgaria and the British Minister is to leave Sofia within twenty-four hours if Bulgaria remains unmoved.

5th.—General Dubail is to receive the Military Medal and General Foch and General de Castelnau are to be given the Cross of the Grand Legion of Honour.

Ribot gives us the text of his agreement with M. Bark ; in war as in peace we are Russia's bankers, but we shall now have to borrow for ourselves and must approach either British or American banks.

Late this evening Viviani telephones that King Constantine has told Venizelos he cannot go all the way with him in his policy and that, in spite of the vote in Parliament, the Prime Minister is obliged to resign. Constantine has thus rendered possible a terrible crisis which may destroy all that we have tried to do. Why did we not send troops sooner to the Balkans ?

6th.—Millerand and Augagneur met Kitchener and Balfour at Calais yesterday, and the Field Marshal said that he was not going to move without the Greeks. "Our troops will not leave Salonika until Greece has decided to take the field ; France wants to rescue Serbia, but England also wants to bring Greece to our side." Balfour recognised that Great Britain had a moral obligation towards Serbia, and the English have asked us to raise the strength of our expeditionary force to 64,000 men and promise a contingent of 67,000. A meeting of the Ministers was hurriedly convened. Briand said that Serbia must be helped at all costs, while Delcassé, who spoke with great difficulty, would prefer that we should give up the side-show in the Near East and try and secure finality on our own front. The other Ministers insisted that the British Government should be asked to increase appreciably their Salonika contingent, and eventually it was arranged that Viviani and Augagneur should go to London to-night and tell our Ally how dangerous it seems to abandon Serbia and allow Bulgaria to cut our communications with Russia and

open the road to Constantinople for Germany ; we might well lose the war in the Near East and see the Germans, flushed with success, come back and deliver a knock-out blow in France.

As Delcassé was feeling too ill to put pen to paper I drafted a telegram which the Council approved, to instruct our Ambassador to represent the gravity of the position created by Russia. "The hypothesis," so ran the message, "that Russia claims Constantinople has been for some months a drag on the Balkans question. Russia knows all about Roumania's hesitancy and King Ferdinand's hostility, and is aware of the German influence exercised over King Constantine. When Great Britain undertook the Dardanelles expedition, France only took part in it in the hope of conquering Constantinople for her Ally and on the assurance that Russian troops would be brought to the Black Sea. Now, and on the morrow of the Russian ultimatum to Bulgaria, the Imperial Government leaves it entirely to France and England to help Servia, and our information from Sofia goes to show that a large part of the Bulgarian Army refuses to move against Russia. The presence of Russian troops in Macedonia and a naval demonstration at Bourgas and Varna would therefore be of first-rate importance, while Russian inaction would certainly be exploited as an encouragement to the Bulgarians. It is quite inadmissible that now, when it is a matter of keeping up our communications with her, Russia should default in any co-operation with France and England."

The Tsar, who has gone to his headquarters, telegraphed to Sazonoff to prepare an answer to my telegram in which His Majesty will express his regret at his inability to send any troops at the present moment to the Balkans. General Sarrail, who starts this evening, assures me that we shall never pull off any decisive coup on the French front, and that he wants at least four Army Corps for Servia ; he would like the English to take Cavalla, and the French Salonika, as a base, so as not to mix up our troops.

About ten p.m. Millerand telephoned to me the result of the new fight in Champagne ; the result is very poor. We have

taken Tahure, we have moved forward near the Navarin farm, and secured a thousand prisoners, but there has been no "getting through."

King Constantine has given an audience to the British Minister and has told him that nothing is changed, that he does not propose to dissolve Parliament unless opposition prevents it from functioning. "Mobilisation will go on, as also your landing at Salonika; I protested, but was reassured as to the intentions of the French Government to send their troops to Servia who is sorely in need of help. As for myself I have always declared that I would not take the risk of setting Greece to fight against the troops of a great Power, whether they be German, French or English. I shall maintain neutrality as long as it is possible." The King has asked Zaïmis to be Prime Minister.

7th.—The Allied representatives handed the ultimatum yesterday to M. Radoslavoff who did not deny that he had come to terms with Germany, nor that he proposed to attack Servia, but he pretended that he harboured no designs against the great Powers of the Entente, and he declined all responsibility for what the future might bring forth. In spite of this hypocritical reply, we shall not take any initiative against Bulgaria but only tell M. Panafieu to ask for his passport.

The offensive which we resumed yesterday has brought us to the railway line of Somme-Py; we have taken the hill and the village of Tahure.

8th.—Clémenceau has published this morning a very pungent article against the Government; the Censor struck out a good slice of it and every time this occurs Clémenceau has another grudge against me, although he knows perfectly well I have nothing whatever to do with the censorship; to-day he devotes two columns to abuse of Delcassé, whom he has never forgiven for turning him out a few years ago.

Viviani has been with Kitchener to see Joffre at Chantilly and it has been mutually agreed to send 150,000 men to Servia of whom 64,000 will be French and 86,000 English; both Joffre and Kitchener considered this number sufficient to protect the railway and stand on the defensive. But if there

be a question of attack, the expeditionary force would have to be doubled and Kitchener does not turn down this possibility even if all the reinforcements have to be drawn from Great Britain. Kitchener at this juncture has shown himself in his true character of an irreproachable Ally. "I do not make any distinction," he said, "between English and French; we have one and the same object in view, and I quite understand that you want to keep your troops on your own territory." But he did say to Joffre, "The more troops I give you, the more you say you want, and the more you keep your own hand tightly on them. If you are so jealous on this point, I shall be obliged to be more cautious as to sending you our people, but shall keep them to allocate where I think necessary."

The disembarkation of troops at Salonika—so Bailloud telegraphs—has taken place very smoothly and with the full concurrence of the Greek authorities.

Delcassé has broken down; he feels he is no longer fit for his work, and has sent me in his letter of resignation; I begged him for the sake of the country to reconsider this, and said we would all do everything possible to lighten his labours. But he says that if it were only a question of feeling ill, he would carry on, but the incessant giddiness from which he is suffering absolutely incapacitates him; this morning he could not read a single paper that was awaiting his signature. Viviani does not seem at all disturbed by an event which I cannot but fear will have a bad effect in England and Russia, and will be a cause for rejoicing in Germany.

9th.—I have never seen good Colonel Pénélon so gloomy and so depressed and he even says that it would be better to come to some peace terms than to go on with the war as we are now doing. "Joffre will not listen to anybody and turns down any plan which the 3rd Bureau has submitted to him, and the officers there are very sore and will go if Joffre remains without somebody like Castelnau being with him. I am saying this to you on behalf of all my colleagues." Pénélon is usually so discreet and so correct that things must be very wrong at G.Q.G. for him to speak like this. I have asked him to see Viviani and Millerand whom I am going to consult, but I remember a line of Thackeray to the effect that one of the

principal qualities of a great man is success which springs from all others ; it is a latent power which compels the favour of the gods and brings fortune herself into subjection. In the eyes of some of those around him, has Joffre lost this power ? Has Joffre, in the eyes of any of his collaborators this unseen power ? While the machinery is moving with a great deal of friction in Parliament, at G.Q.G. and in the Cabinet, things are not going much better elsewhere and, although the communiqué had no word about it, I heard that we have been pushed off the Vimy Ridge, and have had to retire between Loos and the Lens-Béthune road.

From what the Intelligence branch say the Austro-Germans must make their attack on Servia very soon indeed so as to be beforehand with the winter in supplying as quickly as possible both the Turkish and Bulgarian armies with munitions ; they will also want to have their people available again as soon as they can in case Russia resumes an offensive, and their immediate purpose is probably to cut communications between Russia and Roumania.

The Crown Prince of Servia has telegraphed to thank me for the help we are giving to his army.

Delcassé's son has been condemned to a year's imprisonment in a fortress for maligning the German Army and for insubordination, a sad bit of news which will depress his father still further.

10th.—Admiral Boué de Lapeyrère has sent in his resignation. Augagneur telegraphed to him to be careful as to protecting our troopships on their way to Salonika and incidentally said how regrettable it was that our steamships had been sunk by submarines on the surface while our torpedo-boats, instead of looking after our ships and spotting the enemy's periscopes, had been hunting elsewhere for him. Lapeyrère made no attempt to justify himself and merely said that his health did not allow him to continue in his command. He probably jumped at this pretext but his authority has been so weakened that most of the officers will be very glad to see him go and he will probably be replaced by Admiral Dartiges du Fournet who behaved so well both with the Syrian squadron and recently at the Dardanelles.

Millerand and his expert advisers are against our abandoning Gallipoli altogether as they say it would be an avowal of our definite defeat in the Dardanelles and that the consequences might be serious in Turkey, Roumania, Greece and the Mussulman countries. The three British Divisions and our Division however must immobilise about 150,000 Turks and compel the Porte to keep a reserve army in the Kéchan district and while our force remains, they must threaten the enemy with a move on Adramit, Smyrna or Alexandretta and compel him to keep troops ready for any such contingency.

The Servian Government is much disappointed at the delay in the arrival of our troops whom they expected yesterday and for whom the people of Nisch had prepared an enthusiastic greeting. Nor is the news from the Danube front at all comforting for although the first Austro-German attacks have been generally repulsed, the enemy is at Ram and at Belgrade itself, and their heavy guns have done enormous damage. We shall do what we can to reassure the poor Servians, but we must wait for the British Division before sending our troops to Nisch, where they will be insufficient to withstand the blow with which Serbia is threatened.

11th.—Clémenceau has renewed his youth and rushed to the fray again ; he is now open-mouthed in opposing the Salonika expedition, loads the Government with reproaches, and talks of the molluscs in the Elysian marsh. But if Germany and Austria were to clear the way to Constantinople, it would be no use then driving them out of France as they would remain the mistresses of Europe, and yesterday they crept on further and occupied Kostolac and captured Lipar south of Ram.

Viviani has come round to Millerand's views and has telegraphed to London that we do not want to evacuate the Gallipoli peninsula entirely.

New, and sinister, changes in Russia where reactionary influences are daily gaining on the Emperor ; the Minister of the Interior and the Procurator of the Holy Synod, who have only held their posts for three months and whose liberal tendencies have endeared them to public opinion, have been retired without any explanation. Paléologue, however, has had an audience with the Emperor at Tsarskoe Selo and

Nicholas has promised him that a Russian contingent shall very shortly be sent by Archangel to help Serbia, and that, as soon as the Bulgarians become actively hostile, a Russian squadron will be ordered to bombard the forts of Varna and Bourgas.

12th.—General Sarrail arrived in Salonika this morning and Millerand has authorised General Bailloud to cross the Servian frontier and arrange with the Servian General Staff how best to protect the lines of communication against any Bulgarian attack.

Delcassé has again renewed his wish to resign and now speaks of the Government having taken decisions with which he does not agree. "You know," he has said to Viviani, "how much I dislike the idea of our going to Serbia even if the Greeks were at our side; but as soon as the Greeks refused to move I opposed strongly any far-off expedition which tended to enfeeble our front, and my conscience does not allow me to remain at the Foreign Office." "Why on earth," Viviani exclaimed to me, "did he say nothing about this before, and why is he now sending in his resignation on account of military operations which do not directly concern him?" But the Prime Minister admits that in spite of the worry and annoyance which Delcassé is causing him and which, he says, is rapidly rendering him a neurasthenic, the resignation at this moment of the Foreign Minister would be very harmful.

13th.—Freycinet has been offered the succession to the Foreign Office but is reluctant to accept it so long as Millerand remains where he is; he does not approve of a limited liability expedition to the Balkans and thinks we ought to send 400,000 men there. The Ministers are all furious with Delcassé and accuse him of political felony but think it better to let the Cabinet remain as it is until the end of the present debate in Parliament.

Prince George of Greece and Princess Marie, née Buonaparte, have telegraphed to King Constantine that the attack on Serbia must render war with Bulgaria inevitable and that they are therefore leaving for Athens. The King has replied, "War quite unlikely, and it is quite unnecessary for you to come here on that account."

14th.—Joffre now insists that the operations in the Balkans are indispensable and that although we may not be able to prevent the Germans joining hands with the Turks through Bulgaria, we may anyhow prevent the Servian Army from being cut off, surrounded, and made prisoner ; we shall also ensure the supplies of food and munitions to Servia and maintain a front in the Near East which is necessary for the conduct of the war generally. Three Austrian Divisions seem to have been transferred from the Italian to the Servian front, and General Cadorna is going to make an attack to-morrow or the day after to take some of the weight off the Servians.

15th.—Kitchener has written to Millerand to ask him to relieve the British Divisions on our front with some of our own Divisions, and to say that the troops thus available will be sent to Egypt where Great Britain foresees considerable difficulties. This unexpected move is quite contrary to our agreement and I have told Viviani, who is very much upset by it, to remind the British Government about our Convention ; it is certainly not the moment to go into Egypt as the Servians have again had to move back near Belgrade, and the Bulgarian attacks on the frontier are increasing.

Sir John French has telegraphed to Joffre as to Kitchener's decision, and the Commander-in-Chief has replied in his very best style.

16th.—It was decided this morning that Millerand should go as soon as possible to the British headquarters and thence to London to see the Secretary of State for War.

The Allied representatives having left Sofia without obtaining even the shadow of a promise, and Bulgaria having yesterday declared war on Servia, we now consider that a state of war exists between France and Bulgaria ; Great Britain has gone ahead of us in this respect.

Millerand sent yesterday a telegram, which Joffre edited, to Sarraill to say that, with our diplomatic relations as they are, there could be no question of taking any offensive against Bulgaria or of taking part in the operations in which the Servian Army is actually engaged in the north of Servia, but that we have the firm intention of making Servia easy as to her

communications with the sea and with the Allies at Salonika. Our object is therefore to hold Salonika as a base for the Franco-British-Servian armies, to protect the railway from Salonika to Uskub, and to cover the right of the Servian Army by preventing the enemy from any attack on southern Servia. "We shall thus," so the telegram concluded, "be able to liberate the two Servian Divisions who are looking after the railway between Uskub and Vélés, and with these arrangements which events have rendered necessary, the Servian Army will be able to make the best of it by not having to employ all her strength in a general battle." One is a little doubtful as to whether these instructions from Paris and Chantilly will respond exactly to the requirements on the spot.

Venizelos has told Guillemin that it might do something to bring about Greek intervention if the Allies could promise Greece what he calls Greek Thrace, that is the Bulgarian shore of the Ægean Sea. He does not think that this offer will really make King Constantine alter his mind, but it would enable himself to prepare public opinion to veer round in favour of war. So it would seem that appetites are sharpening everywhere.

The British Cabinet, with a supreme effort to bring Roumania and Greece in, have promised that they will send an army of at least 200,000 men to the Balkans.

17th.—Sarrail telegraphs that, according to well-founded information, the English intend to pass the winter at Salonika and will only fight if the Greek frontier is violated. As the Bulgarian troops yesterday seized Vranja, communications with Salonika are interrupted.

We decided this morning that one must not brush aside what Venizelos suggests, and Viviani has telegraphed in this sense, not only to Athens but to London, Petrograd and Rome, so it is quite likely Greece will get the Bulgarian shore on the Ægean Sea.

18th.—Madame Poincaré and I have had a great shock in finding our devoted servant Félix Decori dead in his armchair.

Bratiano has replied to Sir Edward Grey that the promised help of 200,000 men is not sufficient to decide Roumania to

shed her neutrality, and Great Britain has now offered Greece the island of Cyprus if she will join up with us.

Millerand, who has been in close conference with Lord Kitchener, has telegraphed to Joffre from London that they were both agreed as to the importance of sending the British contingent to Servia as quickly as possible. "If two Divisions can be taken from the British troops behind the line, so much the better, but if you risk getting a point-blank refusal from Sir John, please replace with two of our Divisions any two British Divisions south of the Somme, and we will then fix up with the British military authorities how they can relieve these two French Divisions." Such were the instructions to the Commander-in-Chief, and to Viviani the War Minister wired: "Lord Kitchener did not conceal the fact that the tardiness of which we have complained was due to the opposition of Sir John French, and it was to overcome this that he summoned him to London and then asked him to go and see Joffre."

The Government is now considering another method of supplying the expeditionary force to the Balkans through Albania.

Italy has decided to declare war with Bulgaria but is still unwilling to redeem her promise and challenge Germany; her enemy is Austria, and Austria is still Austria.

19th.—Millerand is still in London and, to judge by certain newspapers, especially the *Morning Post*, has to deal with a Cabinet sharply divided in opinion, especially on the question of compulsory service.

Briand is willing to accept the portfolio for Foreign Affairs, but he thinks the Cabinet should be reconstructed on a broader basis and that a General should go to the War Office and an Admiral to the Ministry of the Marine. He does not regard it as possible for Barthou to be a member of the Government as according to Sembat, the Socialist Ministers would then be forced to retire.

Millerand saw Sir Edward Grey yesterday, and the British Foreign Secretary has gone back to the idea that the despatch of British contingents to Salonika should be subject to the entry of Greece into the field. Both Paul Cambon, who was present at the interview, and Millerand protested against this,

and the latter is remaining in London to meet Asquith who was ill yesterday ; Lloyd George favours our views.

20th.—Millerand has returned from London after signing a protocol which leaves the British Government free to fail in their word to us ; he found the British Ministers varying in opinion ; Asquith was ill, Grey was tired, and Lloyd George was busy trying to become Prime Minister. The Cabinet is being a good deal blamed over the Dardanelles adventure, and hence the vexatious delays about sending the troops to the Balkans. Joffre says that the British Government must be severely talked to, as, if the Servian Army is to be saved, the Franco-British force must be quickly on the spot. Sir John French has agreed to send one Division without our replacing it, and while this Division is on its way we will manage to relieve another one which can then start at once.

But Viviani is very much upset about the protocol which Millerand, after a rather biting discussion, signed, and it seems to the Prime Minister something like a disavowal of the statements which he has made in Parliament after agreement with Grey. It will be thought that he has swerved from the truth and he may feel he ought to go. The text, of yesterday's date, runs : " The two Governments consider that one of their chief objects in the Balkan Peninsula is to oppose the opening by the Austro-Germans of a passage to Constantinople. They are consequently agreed as to sending the necessary contingents to make up a force of 150,000 men. If, however, especially at the moment of the landing of the British troops in Egypt where they are going to pick up supplies, a new consideration of the military situation should seem to one or other of the two Governments to be necessary, such further examination should take place agreeably with the two Governments who will come to an understanding as to the despatch of troops." The affirmation is therefore followed by a negation or anyhow by a clause which admits of a revision such as will leave uncertain the final decision.

The King of England is coming in a day or two to Havre and Rouen and asks if I will meet him on the 25th either at Aire or Soissons ; I am of course only too pleased to accept the rendezvous.

21st.—Millerand gives us an account of his stay in London which provoked from Ribot and several of his colleagues the remark that the protocol is equivalent to going back on a promise made.

The Servian Minister, M. Vesnitch, entreats me to ask King George to hasten the expedition of his troops, and meanwhile the Servian troops have gone back on the right of the Vardar above Vélés where they have organised defence works ; the four representatives of the Allied countries have left Nisch by special train for Kralievo whither the Servian Government is likely soon to follow them.

The German and Austrian Press are of course jubilant over Delcassé's departure and read into it the proof of what they call our Balkan fiasco.

Count d'Aunay, a Senator and a devoted partisan of Clémenceau, went to London the other day to get into touch with the people who are setting their face against the Salonika expedition ; he was very coolly received.

22nd.—Viviani has offered the Ministry of Justice to Millerand who in a very dignified way has said that he is quite willing to retire and will always do his best to help us from outside, but he will not accept any other portfolio.

Viviani has sent a long telegram to London to point out to the Cabinet the grave danger of any disagreement between the Allies as to any action and to remind them again how urgently reinforcements are required in the Near East. M. Zaïmis has replied to the British offer of Cyprus ; he says it would be all up with Greece if she were to side with the Allies as nothing now can prevent the Servians being crushed and the Germans joining hands alike with the Bulgarians and the Turks.

23rd.—Millerand says that Viviani is going to sacrifice him, and says that even I am willing to abandon him ; he has been, so I told him, the scapegoat of all the earlier faults of our military administration, but he himself has done a good deal to discourage his best friends by his aloofness and his obstinacy. Our conversation took a sharp turn at one moment but finished up quite amiably although I could not convince Millerand he would be wrong not to accept another portfolio if

Viviani were to have a general shuffle of the Cabinet.

This afternoon a long conference with Viviani, Millerand and Joffre ; the Generalissimo thinks that we should make felt in Greece the strength of the Allies, that we should insist on England sending the troops, and that we should forward cartridges to Russia with 200,000 rifles and spur the Russians to make an appearance in the Balkans through Roumania. The English, however, think it would be difficult to send 10,000 or 13,000 Russians by Archangel, and as they do not seem to wish to take the job over, Millerand is to see if we can ensure the transport ourselves. Viviani then explained to Joffre with a good deal of circumlocution, that the Cabinet was in a critical situation and might, at any moment, be upset or obliged to be reconstituted, in which case the War Minister might be changed. Joffre was asked whom he would recommend if it were decided to appoint a General to the War Office. His reply was that nine Generals out of ten would make very bad Ministers, and that he himself would be sure to muddle things in Parliament. The tenth General he suggested might be someone like Dubail. "What about Galliéni?" Viviani asked. "Perhaps," then a moment's reflection, and then a very distinct, "Yes."

The Tsar has told Laguiche that if we can send the rifles to his army, he would order five Army Corps to proceed to the Balkans to help the Servians, so we must consider the possibility of a landing either at Varna or Burgas or of sending men up the Danube.

So far from Cadorna setting his face against Italian troops going to the Balkans, he telegraphed on the 16th to Salandra that he could let at least an Army Corps share in our undertaking ; the General has also declared that he thinks Italy ought most certainly to declare war on Germany and it is therefore the Government who are responsible for adverse decisions.

Lord Kitchener wholly approves the instructions we have given to Sarrail who is to make arrangements with General Mahon, and the British troops are to be sent to Dorian to support the French right. Kitchener has ordered General

Mahon not to cross the Greek-Servian frontier without first referring to him.

24th.—Venizelos has told Guillemin that a landing of Italian troops in Macedonia would be frowned on by Greece, but might be justified by the necessity of coming to Servia's rescue; an Italian landing at Santi Quaranta would raise a hue and cry and must be avoided at all costs.

Sir Edward Carson has resigned from the Cabinet on account of the delay of British intervention in the Balkans, and public opinion in England is rising against the tergiversations of the Government.

In spite of, or perhaps because of, the difficulties Viviani thinks less and less of retiring; he would very much like to see Admiral Lacaze at the Ministry of Marine, and as Parliament is almost unanimous in wishing to see Millerand out of the War Office, the offer of the Ministry of Justice has again been made to him.

The military situation is becoming more and more critical for the Servians and we have been asked if one of our warships, now at Salonika, may take on board all the deposits and archives of the National Bank.

I left this evening to meet King George and en route I took the opportunity of asking Millerand, who insisted on accompanying me, to make up his mind to accept the proffered portfolio. He said he would only take some other office connected with national defence, such, for instance, as Foreign Affairs. My reply, a very obvious one, was that national defence is the essential duty of all Ministers, but he only met my remark with sulky silence.

25th.—After a night in the train, we motored from Frévent to Cercamps where, in the presence of his whole Staff, I gave Foch the Grand Cross of the Legion of Honour, after which I had an hour's talk with him. He seemed to-day rather restless, like a thoroughbred horse pulling at his bridle. He no longer believes in "rushing" the enemy's defences and thinks we shall need all our resources alike of industry and diplomacy; only when the hour comes he hopes by heavy pressure on a well selected point we may make the enemy's front begin to give way, and then by a series of well and

methodically prepared attacks overcome the mighty obstacle and pass through.

It was bitterly cold and pouring with rain when—an hour late owing to a slight accident on the railway line—I met the King at Ribécourt for an inspection (in deep mud) of some of his brave troops. I was able to make enquiries on one or two of the points which are so disturbing our Government and to impress on His Majesty the gravity of the situation in Servia. He would not bind himself with regard to any of the external problems but admitted that he was rather anxious about domestic politics; his Cabinet is too large and is much split up; Asquith is a tired and sick man. Everyone has his troubles! The King entertained me to breakfast at the Château de Val Vion, the headquarters of his 3rd Army, and in the afternoon there was another little review at Acheux when I gave the Prince of Wales the Croix de Guerre.

I was in Paris by 9 p.m. and had scarcely set foot in the Elysée when Viviani arrived with Briand and Ribot to say he could not reconstitute a Cabinet as everyone, beginning with Jules Cambon and excepting Galliéni and Lacaze, had refused to join it. Ribot wished to be left where he is, and Briand, after first gracefully, deferring to Ribot, agreed to be Prime Minister.

The Italian Army has commenced its offensive eastwards, on the Isonzo front.

The sudden death of Paul Hervieu is a great grief to me. I have kept all his delightful letters, and one will not forget the patriotic use to which he has, in the last year, put his brilliant pen.

26th.—The King of England, with the Prince of Wales, saw something of the French Army to-day; a return visit for the one I made yesterday to his troops. I met His Majesty at Estrées St. Denis and took him to a large open space near by where the three Divisions of the Colonial Corps were drawn up. We then exchanged our closed car for an open one to make an inspection of the line and to watch an admirable march past which suggested a considerable recovery from the effects of the fearful struggle in Champagne.

The inspection over we came back through the Compiègne

forest, more beautiful than ever with its autumn tints, to the Château de Bel Air, now occupied by the General Commanding the XXXVth Corps, where I entertained the King to breakfast ; Joffre, seated on His Majesty's right, from beginning to end of the meal insisted on the necessity of England hurrying her troops to Serbia. In the afternoon the King went with me to the Belleu observation post, south of and above Soissons which since my last visit has been made into a very perfect thing. Some shells whistled over our head to burst on the right of us while the King was noting how fiercely Soissons had been bombarded, and as the evening began to close in I escorted him to the nearest station and returned myself to Paris.

Briand was waiting for me to say that Freycinet and Bourgeois had replied favourably to his overtures and had suggested Clémenceau as a Minister without a portfolio ; Briand and I, however, felt pretty sure that Clémenceau would refuse this now as he refused Viviani last year, for our friend is not one of those to take a back seat.

The British Government has sent Sir Archibald Murray,* Chief of the General Staff, and General Callwell to examine afresh with Joffre the possibility of sending the promised reinforcements to Salonika. When will all this end ? General Murray has already explained his views to our Military Attaché, Colonel de la Panouse, and according to him the situation is different from what it was when Millerand went to London. The Bulgarians have 70,000 men at Uskub and Vélés and 35,000 men at Stroumitza while the combined forces of the Allies, even after the arrival of our 3rd Division, will not exceed 70,000 men. The first British Division from France cannot land in Salonika for a fortnight, and it would seem therefore impossible to re-establish communication with the Servian Army while holding Salonika and the line of communication. Nor will the arrival of the two British Divisions from France do much to alter the situation ; these troops are young, inexperienced, not up to full strength, and with neither guns, nor equipment nor transport for mountain warfare. They will be pitted against troops who know every inch of the

* C.I.G.S. September-December, 1915

country and have been trained for this sort of fighting. It will be very difficult for an offensive to score any success without important reinforcements which are not ready for a rendezvous. This is what we are told, yet the extraordinary thing is that the British General Staff still think it possible to go forward in Gallipoli.

A great demonstration has taken place in Bucharest where an assemblage of 20,000 people clamoured for Roumania to join the Entente; the leaders of the Opposition have made speeches and asked for mobilisation to save Roumania from the danger which Hungarians and Bulgarians are threatening.

Some curious pourparlers have just been exchanged between Great Britain and the Chérif of Mecca; the latter has been promised the Caliphate, and he will lend the British all the help he can against Turkey. An emissary of the Chérif has gone to Cairo to confer with the British High Commissioner.

As the British Admiralty cannot guarantee the transport of the Russian contingent by Archangel, Russia now says this force will be more usefully employed with an army which is to be formed in Bessarabia.

Sarrail telegraphs that the bulk of the Servian Army seems about to be surrounded, and with the forces which he has in hand he is unable to move any further from Salonika.

27th.—M. Tittoni asked to see me as he had a message from his Government; that the moment must be seized to bring in Roumania and that the only way of doing this would be to concentrate immediately Russian troops on the frontier, and that Russia should then say point blank to Roumania, "Are you willing to let us pass and join up with us if we attack Bulgaria? Or would you prefer us to help you to get into Transylvania?" If Russia were thus to offer Roumania her help to realise national aspirations, M. Bratiano would be driven by public opinion to declare war on Austria. As Viviani is still actually in office I have asked him to telegraph this to the Russian Government.

Jules Cambon tells me that as he has no sort of Parliamentary experience he does not care to be Under-Secretary of State at the Quai d'Orsay, but will be willing to remain where he is as Secretary General.

Great Britain, in the same breath with which she tells us of her negotiations—which are perhaps a little inopportune—with the Chérif of Mecca, asks us to confer with her as to delimiting Syria ; this would be the complement to our 1912 agreement, and Georges Picot, now Consul General at Beyrout, will go to London to discuss the matter with the British authorities.

We hear that the Germans have actually shot Miss Cavell, the gallant Englishwoman who so often came to the help of French soldiers.

28th.—I am much distressed at being unable to attend the funeral of Paul Hervieu ; pressure of work is such that one cannot even render the last tribute to a dear friend.

Briand's difficulties are by no means over ; Viviani and Sembat insist on retiring altogether, and I have begged Briand not to let the choice of individuals cause any further delay and simply to make up his Cabinet as he thinks best. Millerand is still at the War Office and Viviani, whose resignation is not yet official, has told Joffre to go to London and persuade the British Government that, from a military point of view, it is quite possible to send 90,000 British soldiers to the Balkans without weakening the front in France and Belgium ; Joffre himself is anxious to go as he finds that Sir Archibald Murray and General Callwell have not the necessary authority to decide anything.

I hear that the Chambre is beginning to show signs of great impatience ; the Session only lasted for a few minutes and was adjourned till to-morrow with a good deal of unrestrained feeling. Viviani says that even if Briand has not formed his Cabinet he will definitely resign before to-morrow's Session.

Late this evening Viviani and Briand came one after the other into my room, the former with his hair in disorder, very red in the face, and looking like an animal at bay, the other with a bad cold in his head, shaken with cough, but otherwise calm and composed. Viviani flung himself into an armchair and began again to rave against Bourgeois, Méline and Freycinet, whom he accuses of playing Clémenceau's game and of plotting against me. I said that I knew these

men too well to have the slightest doubt of their loyalty, but nothing could persuade Viviani, who only replied, "All these old men think of no one but themselves, they forget their country, and are incapable of the slightest self-denial." I insisted that Briand should make up his Cabinet with or without Malvy, and he has promised that he will either have finished his task by midday to-morrow or give it up.

The British troops in Salonika have at last been authorised to march into Servia, and will probably move to Doiran the day after to-morrow.

29th.—King George had a bad accident yesterday when inspecting some troops; his horse reared up and fell back on him, but in answer to my telegram he has sent me word that no bones were broken and he hopes very soon to be all right again.

From Kragujevatz we hear that the officers of the Servian General Staff are more and more depressed; on the north front the Germans have pushed on, and the Timok line, which has been crossed at various points by Bulgarian detachments, has had to be evacuated. The Servian retreat has forced us to give up the idea of using either the Durazzo-el Bassan-Struga or the Santi-Quaranta-Monastir line of communication, and we must now see how Servia can be supplied either through St. Jean de Medua or Antivari.

The Socialist-Radical group has expressed the wish that Malvy should be Minister of the Interior and Freycinet, Bourgeois and Méline have agreed. Briand is still hesitating between Méline and Renoult for the Ministry of Works, but Painlevé will be Minister for Public Instruction, Clémentel for Commerce, and Viviani as Minister for Justice will also become Vice-President of the Council.

At Briand's request, I asked Galliéni, our new War Minister, to come here, and then begged him to leave Joffre a free hand and full responsibility for military operations, as for appointments to commands at the front. He gladly promised this, showed me a very cordial letter he had written to the Commander-in-Chief promising his full support, and he quite agreed that it was very desirable the Council for National Defence should, agreeably with Joffre's own wishes, meet in

my room as often as convenient. A little before midnight, Briand brought me the decrees to sign ; he has filled up his posts, Admiral Lacaze going to the Ministry for Marine and Doumergue continuing to look after the Colonies.

30th.—Guillemin has been received by the King of the Hellenes, who said that his decision to preserve his country's neutrality was fixed and irrevocable. "Having thoroughly considered the matter, I am absolutely convinced that a little country like Greece should stand outside the quarrels of the Great Powers. They say I am afraid of the "spiked helmets." Why should I deny it? Yes, I dread the idea of going to war with Austria and Germany who would swallow up Greece with one mouthful." The King was full of praise for the conduct of our troops, but was very outspoken about England and Venizelos.

On his arrival in London yesterday morning Joffre first had a long talk with Lord Kitchener and then conferred at our Embassy with Asquith, Balfour and Kitchener. In the evening he dined with Kitchener at St. James's Palace and met several other members of the Cabinet. "Joffre's explanations are so clear and to the point," Paul Cambon writes ; "he speaks so authoritatively and with such conviction that he quite obviously left a great impression on the Ministers." Asquith admitted to our Ambassador that although he was personally opposed to the Salonika undertaking, the General had convinced him of the necessity for immediate action and how deplorable would be the effect of any disagreement on this point between the two Governments. "What we have to do," the Prime Minister said, "is to draw the bonds of our alliance tighter still." Joffre handed Kitchener a note, drawn up with much detail, as to the operations in Salonika and Servia ; this was approved at a War Office conference and Kitchener has been authorised by his colleagues in the Cabinet to tell Joffre that the British Government will adhere to his views.

Joffre left London this evening amidst the cheers of great crowds gathered round and in Victoria Station.

31st.—Bratiano does not seem inclined to offer a passage to the Russian troops nor will Russia do anything in the

Balkans until she has in hand the rifles which France and England are going to send her.

Servia is imploring us to show our strength as soon as possible in the Uskub region; the cries of joy which hailed the arrival of our troops have given way to cries of distress.

I have written to Millerand in most affectionate terms to say how sorry I am that, for the moment, I shall no longer be collaborating with him; his reply is couched in a few rather dry words and this chilliness, which, I trust, is only temporary, in an old friend does something to add to the sadness in which events, political and military, are plunging one.

CHAPTER XI

The former Khedive and his intrigues in Switzerland—The Zaimist Ministry defeated and replaced by a Skouloudis Cabinet—Denys Cochin in Greece—Conference with Mr. Asquith, Sir Edward Grey, Mr. Balfour and Mr. Lloyd George—General Galliéni and General Joffre on the conduct of the war—Defeat and retreat of the Servian Army—Kitchener and the defence of Egypt—First Appearance of Bolo Pasha.

NOVEMBER

1st.—For the second time in the war All Saints' Day reminds us that it is the eve of the day on which we specially remember our dead; Madame Poincaré and I have been to the military cemeteries at Bagneux, Ivry and St. Ouen to lay our wreaths of chrysanthemums at the foot of the monuments which have been raised to the memory of the fallen.

Paléologue telegraphs that the Tsar, more and more under the reactionary influence of his Prime Minister, is thinking of dismissing the two or three Liberal Ministers who still form part of the Government, and especially Sazonoff who has the confidence of the Douma. In order to emphasize this step, Nicholas may very likely restore, for the benefit of Goremykine, the title of "Chancellor of the Empire" which Prince Gortschakoff, who died in 1883, was the last to hold.

The Bulgarians, who attacked our *tête de pont* at Krivolak on Saturday, were pushed back before nightfall; we have two battalions and a mountain battery in action.

Joffre has let our Military Attaché in Servia know that a Franco-British force of 150,000 men, will go to Salonika as soon as possible, and that the peculiar duty of the French contingent will be to operate in the Vélés-Istip region and so allow the Servian troops to concentrate their efforts on

Uskub with a view to re-establishing their communications with Salonika. The British troops will hold Salonika and, so to speak, keep the ring for the French. Our Attaché has also been told that *pourparlers* have been started to get Italy to lend a hand through Albania; and that 240,000 French rifles are already on their way to enable Russia to effect an important concentration of her forces on the Roumanian frontier and to bring in Roumania; General Cadorna has been fully informed by telegram of all this.

M. Pascal, our Consul General at Geneva, has let us know of the doings of the former Khedive of Egypt, who is now installed in Switzerland; he has a French actress for a mistress, who exercises great influence over him and who is attached to the Austro-German secret service; she receives a voluminous correspondence from Vienna and Berlin, her letters from France being intercepted.

2nd.—General Maunoury has accepted the post of Military Governor of Paris in succession to Galliéni; he is quite blind as a result of his wounds, and the doctors scarcely think that he will recover his sight, but he will be helped in his work by General Clergerie, and if, as is to be feared, he remains definitely sightless, he will be discreetly advised to retire. Just now Paris is not threatened and Maunoury is worthy of any award. Galliéni, who is evidently going to take us much more into his confidence than Millerand did, tells us about the unhappy incident the day before yesterday at the Butte de Tahure. Our people were exposed to flanking fire from both sides and the asphyxiating gas was sprung upon them, and the gas masks and spectacles, of which the talc had been allowed to deteriorate, were insufficient protection. The War Minister is taking steps to remedy this default at once and, since necessity compels it, he is busying himself about the manufacture of asphyxiating shells. General Sarrail has telegraphed to let him know about the military and diplomatic situation in the Balkans, and on this point the new Ministers have something to say; while Léon Bourgeois does not want to enlarge the limited objective decided on by the British and French Military Staffs nor to increase our expeditionary force, Painlevé would like a great

many more men to be sent out. Admiral Lacaze, however, explains that for the moment we have no more transport available, and within a few days we shall have in Greece and Servia not 60,000 but 72,000 men, and that it will be impossible for the time being to supply any more. The Servian Army's difficulties are increasingly great, as thousands of refugees are following up the retirement.

General Gouraud called to see me before leaving for Italy ; he is still very lame, but he does not get tired so easily and is, he says, quite fit for the journey ; anyhow, whatever he feels, his pluck would never allow him to decline the mission which has been entrusted to him. Colonel Girodon, just returned from the Dardanelles, where he has been Chief of the Staff to General Bailloud, is dead against any retirement from Gallipoli, where our troops are keeping almost the whole Turkish Army busy.

3rd.—M. Jonnart is to go to London to discuss the idea of an independent Arab State, which seems to fascinate the British Cabinet ; we must reserve our rights in Syria, as recognised in 1912, and Jonnart will also deal with the question of Alexandretta, which Delcassé did not touch.

Asquith made a very important speech in the Commons yesterday and said that the question of compulsory service would not arise yet ; he accepted all responsibility for the expedition to the Dardanelles which, he said, must not be broken off, and he stated emphatically that the independence of Servia was considered by the Allies as essential, and that France and England were in complete agreement as to the object in view and the means of securing it. The British High Commissioner in Egypt has told our M. DeFrance that he is very uneasy about the possibility of convergent attacks from the west by the Senussi and from the east by Turks and Germans ; Egypt, he said, must be protected and for this an independent Arabia should be constituted.

4th.—At our Council meeting this afternoon Colonel Girodon and Admiral Lacaze both protested against any retirement from Gallipoli, but Joffre was adamant that he could in no case spare any more men from France where, he once more repeated, the German Army would be beaten.

Galliéni was much of the same opinion, and both pointed to the necessity of incorporating very soon the 1917 class. The Colonies, and especially Indo-China, are to be asked to supply native labour so as to enable a certain number of skilled workmen to go back to the front, and Galliéni is to undertake a new round up of shirkers. He explained to us very clearly the serious consequences if communications between Germany, Bulgaria and Turkey by the Danube remain open, which they will do so long as Roumania does not come in with us; Germany will be able to supply Bulgaria and Turkey with all necessaries, and our only possible riposte will be to establish communications ourselves with the Servian Army by the Vardar.

M. Barrère has again drawn M. Sonnino's attention to the urgency of Italian intervention in the Balkans, and has told him of the agreement between Joffre and the English authorities, as also of the great effort which Russia is preparing in Bessarabia. Indeed, he has left no word unsaid to convince the Italian Minister, and has insisted the more strongly from knowing that Cadorna was favourably disposed. Sonnino, however, has once more replied that he could do nothing for the present and must wait and see what happens on the Isonzo and at the Carso.

Our troops in the Cameroons are doing well and in the latter part of last month occupied Bitam and Minvoul.

Venizelos made a speech yesterday in the Greek Parliament in which he denounced King Constantine's abuse of his powers and the cowardice of his Ministers, and the Zaïmist Ministry has been turned out. It is thought the King will order Parliament to be dissolved, and as no elections can take place during mobilisation, the country, for some months, will be in a state of chaos.

5th.—Paul Cambon, who is here for a couple of days, tells me that Sir Edward Grey, always inclined to peaceful measures, cannot make up his mind to let English troops go to the Balkans, and that on this point Kitchener is at issue with his own General Staff; and that if Kitchener comes back to France to confer with Joffre, it will show that he has not quite made up his mind. In the course of our talk our

Ambassador again said that he did not know how Constantinople had come to be promised to Russia. King George had certainly said one day to Benckendorff, when the latter was a guest at Windsor: "Oh, Constantinople is of course a town which must in the future become Russian." But this remark, which was made during luncheon, in no sense constituted an official promise, which the King anyhow would have had no right to make. When Grey and Nicolson were questioned on the subject they protested that their promise had been subsequent to ours, and that ours had been made on the 5th March and theirs on the 12th. I could only say to Cambon that the mystery remains impenetrable as neither Viviani nor I ever heard a word of the "promise"; one can only suppose that Delcassé had given an undertaking without mentioning it to the Government or myself.

Mr. Witney Warren, a very Francophile American architect, brought Mr. Richard Harding Davis to see me; Mr. Davis, who is alluded to as the American Rudyard Kipling, gave me a letter of introduction from Mr. Roosevelt, and I seized the opportunity of asking a distinguished author to try and let his compatriots know how deeply grateful we are for the generous help we are receiving from the United States.

Clémenceau has already opened fire against the new Cabinet and is aiming specially at Freycinet and Léon Bourgeois; this malevolent attitude has not, however, prevented his being nominated President of the Parliamentary Committees for Military and Foreign Affairs.

The Kaiser has sent a telegram to the Sultan to celebrate the joining up of Turkey and Bulgaria with the Central Empires.

Lord Kitchener will arrive in Paris to-day, but asks that his journey may be kept an absolute and entire secret.*

M. Zaïmis has tendered his resignation to the King, who has not as yet accepted it, and Guillemin thinks that it would be much better for us if Zaïmis were to remain in office, as he has entered into certain formal engagements and he is by way of being a very loyal person.

A Military Mission under an engineer officer, Colonel

* Lord Kitchener was on his way to the Dardanelles.

Refroignéy, is going out to enquire into the difficulties of supplying Servia through the Adriatic, and to make a reconnaissance of the road from Santi Quaranta to Monastir ; Briand is to give the Greek Government due notice of this.

Gouraud telegraphs he has spent a whole afternoon and evening with the King and Cadorna, but was unable to elicit anything definite as to Italian co-operation in the Balkans ; the King is leaving the matter in the hands of his Government, and Cadorna thinks it may be possible to send a couple of Divisions with some Horse Artillery and mountain guns.

6th.—It was decided in Council that another effort should be made to induce the British Government and Lord Kitchener, who is in Paris until to-night, to send, without any further delay, 90,000 men to Salonika ; Kitchener says that anyhow he cannot for the moment take away troops from the Dardanelles, and on this point our Colonel Girodon* entirely agrees with him.

The munitions which Roumania is asking for, will be sent to Russia and remain there till further orders.

Five ships, French or English, have been torpedoed in the last three days between Gibraltar and Cap Ivi, and on board the *Calvados* a battalion of native riflemen have been almost all drowned ; the General Officer Commanding the Army in Northern Africa has drawn our attention to the insufficiency of defence on the Algerian coast.

From Servia come very conflicting stories ; the Servian Minister at Rome telegraphs that the Bulgarian Army, on its way to invade Macedonia through Vélés-Prilep, has been routed by the Servian Army, assisted by French and English detachments, and that the right bank of the Vardar is quite free of Bulgarians. Berlin, however, has quite another version, and the statement has gone out that the Bulgarians have completely defeated some French troops north-east of Prilep, that a great many of our men have been made prisoners, and the rest have been cut to pieces. So far no one here knows the real truth, but anyhow Sarrail has asked Galliéni to increase his strength to four Army Corps, and M. Vesnitch has warned us that the Servians, hard pressed

* Colonel Girodon was detailed to accompany Lord Kitchener to the Near East.

by the Germans and the Bulgarians, have been obliged to retire on the right bank of the Morada.

M. Zaïmis has refused to remain in office and the King has sent for M. Rhallis.

The Chinese Minister has told Briand that the Republic, now four years old, does not respond to the opinion of the country, and there is some idea of resuming the monarchical system.

7th.—I left Paris last night with Joffre for Neufchâteau, and on the way the Commander-in-Chief related to me the conversation which he had had with Kitchener, who met him at Chantilly yesterday. The British War Minister definitely promised that 90,000 men should be quickly sent to Salonika; “there will not be a man short,” he said, “nor a moment lost.” At this present juncture Kitchener does not think that we ought to leave Gallipoli, and orders are being given to make up the Divisions there to full strength. He told Joffre in strictest confidence that the British Government was contemplating a naval *coup de main* at the Dardanelles; both Admiral Guépratte and Admiral de Robeck think it quite possible to bring this off, and Kitchener is hoping that our fleet may be entrusted to Guépratte and co-operate with the British. They would force the Narrows while our ships would help in firing on the forts.

At Neufchâteau, Dubail, who has his Headquarters in the town, was waiting to take us to Toul, but first, in the presence of his Staff, I bestowed on him that most coveted award, the Military Medal. From Toul, where is the 64th Division with its men scattered about in the villages of the Moselle and Meurthe, we journeyed through Bar-le-Duc, where we dropped Dubail, to Avize on the Marne, where was Castelnau, whom I decorated with the Grand Cordon, and then carried off, to dine with Joffre and myself on my train. Pierre Loti has succeeded in attaching himself to Castelnau’s Staff, but the General has to admit that he has little use for the poet, who is allowed to go about at his sweet will and gather material for his pen. If Dubail is keen for another offensive, Castelnau is no less convinced that we must sit tight through the winter and nurse our men and munitions. “We must

make war commercially," he says, "there is a big grocer's bill to be reckoned with." He thinks that a good way to increase our strength would be to dismount three or four of the ten Cavalry Divisions and thus save expenditure in horseflesh and forage.

8th.—Joffre went back last night to Chantilly, and Castelnau, having insisted on my donning a tin hat, took me through Jonchéry, a mere heap of ruins, along the Souain road to where stood till the other day a farm called Wacques, and we saw the trenches from which the 15th (Colonial) and 14th Divisions made their wonderful attack which Castelnau describes as a "wave of heroism." We went over our old lines to the German positions at Bois de la Chaise; one remembered that, after the Battle of Neerwinden, St. Simon was taken over the ground and was struck by the depth and regularity of the enemy's trenches; what would he have said, and written, about such defences as the Blucher trench, which we followed up to the von Tirpitz communication trench, or the Hamburg trench which took us to the salient of the Souain mill, where, before the battle, our men found the Germans at arms' length distance? Then, to the tune of the growling guns, through the former Palatinate trenches and the Magdeburg, we betook ourselves to Souain, all tumbled to pieces, and thence motored north-east to view the scene of Marchand's attack on the Ratisbonne and Austerlitz trenches, where some men showed us the billet improvised in a trench which they call the Place de l'Opéra. The whole place was strewn with relics of the bitter fight—a field of blood and tears, but also a field of glory. With what dauntless courage our soldiers must have been endued to seize and secure those fearfully forbidding positions of the enemy.

My train was stationed at Bussy le Château, and Castelnau, Langle de Cary and Pétain breakfasted with me there. All three Generals regretted, and said so very frankly, that G.Q.G.—the "Young Turks" they call them—should a few months ago have so suddenly proposed an expedition to the Near East. They all three equally agreed that the 1916 class should not be called up till the spring and that, in order to husband our man-power, no offensives, whether general

or local, should be undertaken for some months. All three declared that Millerand had given them to understand that the offensive in Champagne had been decided on by the representatives of the Allies at Calais, that they had not been consulted and simply executed an order. This story, which bears truth on the face of it, does not quite agree with what was told me on the eve of the operations.

9th.—Admiral Lacaze reports that Corfu is a regular base for German submarines, and if this proves to be true we shall seize the island.

According to Colonel Fournier the Servian General Staff is completely demoralised, and they are trying to evacuate southwards the munitions and foodstuffs which have been collected in the two valleys of the Morada, but a large part of them will have to be sacrificed as well as all the railway material. It has been found absolutely necessary to retire south at all costs in the direction of Uskub; Kralievo and Nisch have been evacuated.

Public opinion in London is very excited about Lord Kitchener's visit to the theatre of war in the Near East; the departure of the Field Marshal was kept a profound secret and the War Office officials were very surprised to see Mr. Asquith install himself in the Secretary of State's room.

For the moment Roumanian intervention is out of the question and the best that we can hope is that she will remain neutral; Bratiano has told the Russian Minister at Bucharest that Roumania can only arm when the Russian Army in Bessarabia and the British forces in the Balkans are each 500,000 men strong.

Sonnino so far has promised nothing either to our Ambassador or to General Gouraud and says that if Greece were to enter the Epirus, Italy would have to defend the points necessary to ensure her preponderance in the Adriatic Sea; the Prime Minister, M. Salandra, has said openly that the War Minister does not share Cadorna's favourable opinions, and he himself does not think they ought to suspend altogether their offensive during the winter nor let the Greeks threaten Valona.

After several failures to form a Government, King Con-

stantine has recalled Zaïmis who has again refused to reconstitute a Cabinet because the King wants to dissolve Parliament and to proceed at once to new elections, the results of which would be falsified by mobilisation. M. Skouloudis has accepted the premiership and will resume the portfolio for Foreign Affairs which he formerly held; M. Skouloudis is an honest soul, perhaps a little too old for his job, who left a good impression behind him at the London Conference and who is well disposed to France; there will be little difference in the personnel of the Cabinet except for the addition to it of M. Mikalidakis, who is a Cretan and detests Venizelos. The King, however, has for his close adviser M. Streit, an ardent Germanophile who allows German officers free access to all military departments; these emissaries go about as they please and carry out an active propaganda amongst soldiers and civilians alike. While Germany seems to be redoubling her efforts to enfeeble Greece, the Greek Government is asking France, England and Russia for a further loan of forty million in gold to be floated like the last loan of ten millions, and to be used for mobilisation expenses.

The Servian Government and Army are calling loudly for help; it was apparently thought that prompt action on the part of the Allied troops towards Stroumitza, Shtip and Vélés would have ensured Servian communications with Salonika and it has been a cruel awakening to see the Bulgarians pushing their way westwards towards Prilep; it will soon however be known that French troops are operating with success on the Vardar towards Krivolac and Gradsko.

The permanent Administrative Commission of the Socialist Party* has unanimously adopted an Order of the Day which after denouncing two "citizens" for having on their own responsibility tried to treat for peace with other Socialists belonging to neutral and belligerent countries, set out that "The struggle imposed on the Allies by German authorities must be carried to its logical ending, in other words until German militarism is defeated, so that there may be given to the world the great, and very necessary, lesson of an effort

* Section française de l'internationale ouvrière.

to set up hegemony broken by the resistance of free people.”

10th.—M. Romanos, the Greek Minister, told Jules Cambon yesterday that the Skouloudis Cabinet would continue a policy of benevolent neutrality to the Entente, while M. Skouloudis himself has told our M. Guillemin that to safeguard Greek neutrality and her own frontiers, Greece will be obliged to disarm the Servian troops who are driven on to Greek soil and to intern them; he actually said that he counted on the French Government's help to make the Servians understand the necessity of this. Guillemin replied that he pitied Greece for having to treat an Ally so ungraciously, and he did not know if France and England, who were equally Servia's Allies, would allow Servian troops to be treated differently to their own under the conditions contemplated by M. Skouloudis. To this the Prime Minister blandly replied that the Greek Government had decided that any French or English troops driven back on to Greek territory would be asked to submit to the same procedure. Public opinion in Greece, he said, would never allow a Bulgarian Army to come into the country, and as the Greek Government wished, before all things, to maintain neutrality, and as moreover behind the Bulgarians were the Germans, Austrians and Turks, it would not be possible to allow a free entry for our troops. Guillemin at once pointed out the extreme gravity of such a statement and reminded Skouloudis of the assurances which had been given by his predecessor and by the King himself. It is quite certain that Greece must be told she cannot disown her own promises, and we shall assert our right to defend ourselves, even if it be on Greek territory, against Germans and Bulgarians. We shall let her know that she must no more intern Servians than our own troops, and that we are going to arrange with England to take over the railway from Monastir and on all the lines. Briand has urged the Servian Government and General Staff to hasten the retreat of the Servian Army on to our own lines, and Admiral Lacaze has telegraphed to Admiral Dartiges to ask him how far one can go in bringing pressure to bear on Greece. M. Denys Cochin, who is a great lover of Greece where he has many friends, is going on our behalf to Salonika this evening.

Galliéni telegraphed to Sarrail yesterday to tell him all we know about the Servian retreat and to remind him that his instructions authorise him, on his own responsibility, to do all he can to help them round Vélés.

I went this afternoon to the hospital in the Rue Reuilly where 160 blinded soldiers are being taught massage, music, chair and basket-making, and indeed any trade which they like to take up. The calmness and the cheeriness with which these men, many of them quite young, accept their terrible affliction, passes the bounds of admiration.

11th.—The concentration of Greek troops in Salonika, which was suspended for a few days, has been resumed with feverish energy and all the boats in or near the Piræus have been suddenly requisitioned, while orders have been given to send to Salonika as quickly as possible whatever remained of the 1st Corps in Athens and the 2nd Corps in the Piræus; Guillemin understands that mines will very likely be laid at the entrances of the principal Greek ports, and both he and his British colleague are sure that we must send a squadron to the Piræus and reinforce our ships at Salonika to lend weight to our demands. The British Cabinet has been asked to send out, like ourselves, a naval force, as also to hold over all advances of cash and all facilities for supplies until the situation in Greece clears up.

At the Council of National Defence, Joffre gave his opinion that the Servian Army might still be saved if they would fall back on us more quickly, but Galliéni, who is less of an optimist, would prefer to bring our own Divisions back to Salonika; the Servian Government is again to be urged to insist on their troops coming into our lines, and Sarrail is once more to be urgently asked for his advice. Galliéni has made an excellent maiden speech in the Chambre; he said that he was a simple soldier with no knowledge of politics, and that he had only accepted the portfolio for War out of love for his country and for the cause which we are generally, as well as individually, defending, but he added that his task would be surely doomed to failure unless he could count on the entire support of the Parliament.

12th.—Montenegro, where a good many Servians have taken

refuge, has begged us to send them food, which we are doing, and the Italian Navy has agreed to escort the ships. Guillemain is sure that the contemplated disarmament of troops in Greece is due to the representations of Germany, but that this representation has very likely been made at Constantine's own request; the Cabinet in London decided yesterday that any attempt to disarm soldiers, whether British, French or Servian, on Greek territory would be considered as an unfriendly act. The Army Committee have drafted another resolution in which they set out that as they are unable to obtain satisfactory replies from the Government with regard to the grave situation in the Balkans, they ask that I should set a term to the hesitations and irresolution which are causing them such anxiety. To do this would be to do something quite unconstitutional; I have no more right to address Parliament than Parliament has to address me; if the Ministers are not fulfilling their duties, it appertains to Parliament to pass a vote of want of confidence and notify me of their wishes by an Order of the Day. This new procedure of the Army Committee has for its excuse the feeling akin to alarm in Parliament; but do they really think the Ministers have sat still and folded their arms while the Committee—without knowing anything of the difficulties presented by G.Q.G., England and the Balkans—were pressing them to send troops to the Near East? There is further cause for anxiety to-day with a telegram to hand from Colonel Girodon who has accompanied Lord Kitchener to the Near East and who arrived yesterday at Mudros.

Lord Kitchener promised Joffre that the English troops should be sent without delay to help the Servians, but on his way out he told Girodon of his objections to the Salonika expedition, and said that one ought either to send 400,000 men there or not go at all, nor does he think that the moment has yet come to evacuate Gallipoli. At Mudros Lord Kitchener has seen Sir Charles Monro, Sir William Birdwood, and Sir John Maxwell, and they have all taken note of the imminent move of the Germans on Constantinople whence they will be able to lead the Turks to Syria and Egypt and redouble a propaganda in favour of a Holy War. In the eyes of the

sometime Sirdar there lies here a grave danger for all North Africa, the Suez Canal and India. We are no longer able to forbid this move from Europe, and we must go elsewhere to arrest it. The Gulf of Alexandretta suggests itself as the most favourable place from which to get astride the railway, and in sending troops there it would be possible to ensure the safety of Egypt (which is a *sine qua non*) and, as a result, of all Mussulman Africa. Lord Kitchener has therefore telegraphed to the British Government his proposal to send immediately four Divisions—two from Egypt and two from Gallipoli—to Alexandretta.

This landing at Alexandretta has been for long studied by the section of our National Defence Council, and Augagneur was all in favour of it, while our 1912 agreement with England gave us a free hand in Syria. But Delcassé, always tacitly hostile to any side-show in the Near East, allowed the question to slumber, and to-day the English are going to get ahead of us and secure substantial pledges at our expense for fear of difficulties in Egypt and India.

Meanwhile the representatives of the Allied Armies who conferred together on the 7th July, are to meet again on the 25th November to co-ordinate the activities of the coalition, and the 3rd Bureau have drawn up a memorandum to set out the happenings of the last months.

It was agreed at the last meeting that the joint offensives should be resumed as soon as possible, but it is now recognised that the expected results on the Franco-British front have not been realised, while on the Eastern front the Russian armies have only succeeded in escaping the grip of the Austro-German armies and are maintaining themselves on the line from Riga to the region of Tarnopol. On the Austro-Italian front our Allies have detained facing them about twenty Austrian Divisions and the Italian offensive, despite the intense difficulties of the terrain, has entered on a more active phase since the middle of October. The situation in the Balkans is largely altered by Bulgaria taking the field and the Austro-German attack on Servia's northern front. The memorandum went on to show what had been done in Salonika and Gallipoli, and that in the Trans-Caucasus the Russians

had reached the region of Lake Van, that in Mesopotamia the British forces were within a hundred kilometres of Bagdad, and that the German colonies were pretty well accounted for. The note further recited that in principle really decisive results could only be obtained in the chief theatres of war, the campaign in the Balkans, the Cameroons and Asia Minor being of secondary importance. It would behove therefore the British, French and Belgians to be as active and as strong, and as soon as possible in France and Flanders, the Italians to be likewise in Austria, and the Russians in Russia, the final object being victory over the Austro-German forces. But if a halt has had to be called in France, Great Britain, France, Russia and Italy should, within limits to be prescribed, make every effort in the Balkans. Russia, Italy and Great Britain should carry on their operations on the Italian front, in the Caucasus, and Mesopotamia, while France, Great Britain, and Belgium would complete the conquest of the German colonies. G.Q.G., rather voicing a "*mea culpa*," recognises that "the German attack against Servia has induced us, from not having sooner foreseen this possibility, to come to certain decisions under pressure of force of events." But in the early days of the year the Government and I suggested a despatch of troops to Salonika, a suggestion which was received with curled lip by those whom Castelnau and Pétain call the "Young Turks." What joy heaven has in store for the repentants at Chantilly!

13th.—The Ministers have expressed themselves without circumlocution as quite unwilling, for military reasons, to allow the British to land at Alexandretta as Lord Kitchener proposed; the discussion as to the attitude we should take towards Greece was a much longer affair. Freycinet and Galliéni again repeated that our expeditionary force was gravely threatened by the Greek concentrations, and that it would be well to tell Sarrail to retire on Salonika; Sembat and others, however, would not hear of our beating a retreat just when the Servian Army was trying to join hands with us, and Joffre himself has said that it would be an indelible blot on us if we were to abandon the Servian Army. It was decided to inform Sarrail fully about Greek movements and leave it to his

own judgment as to retiring on Salonika so long as he was sure of keeping open his communications with the sea. In order not to risk our troops being cut off from Salonika by the Greeks, there is to be no firing on the Greek forts nor are the Greek troopships to be interfered with ; an arrangement is to be come to with England and Italy as to the guarantees we should have for our stay in Salonika, and Greece is to be told that her first guarantee must take the form of putting a stop to her quite unjustifiable mobilisation ; the English fleet is not to be sent to the Piræus but is to be concentrated in Suda Bay. During this rather painful deliberation Galliéni remained quite silent and seemed as if he were not paying much attention.

Late in the afternoon Briand came, with Galliéni, Joffre and Graziani, and said Sarraïl had himself telegraphed that he thought it would be a positively dangerous thing to retire on Greece, and that anything like a retreat would be considered a rout ; Galliéni quickly rallied to Joffre's opinion and admitted it was a relief to him not to be obliged to give an order to go back. While we were discussing this point Gouraud, fresh from Italy, came in to say that he believed the Italians would send troops to Albania, but not to Salonika, and that they would require some security for themselves. " L'égoïsme sacré " !

M. Skouloudis has taken this moment to declare that his Government cannot let our reconnaissance party land as it would constitute a violation of neutrality which would give Germany a plea for further asserting herself.

The British Government have turned down Lord Kitchener's Alexandretta plan, but Sir Edward Grey has again spoken to our Ambassador about the Arab State which Great Britain thinks necessary to counterbalance Turkish influence. Sir Edward does not shirk the fact that the Arabs are likely to claim certain points which we consider as Syrian dependencies, and he will leave it for us to set out what concessions we should receive.

14th.—With M. Besnard, Under Secretary of State for Aviation, I left Paris last night and spent this morning at Toul, which, half deserted, still remains within range of the enemy's guns, and is at any moment liable to further bom-

bardments. In the afternoon near Nancy I gave two flags to the Air Force, one for the Aviation and the other for the Aero Station branch, these to replace the solitary colour which so far military aviation had received ; and then went to Dombasle to see the huge Solvay workshops which have furnished eighty-five per cent of our melinite. The works are still exposed to any bombardment, and it would seem that the Germans are going to construct a gun emplacement only fifteen or sixteen kilometres away.

15th.—I was back in Paris early this morning and the first news was that Paul Cambon had told Sir Edward Grey of our objections to the Alexandretta expedition and had asked that the embarkation of British troops for Salonika should be on as early a date as possible, and that the Admiralty should lend us a hand against the submarines in the Mediterranean. Colonel Girodon now telegraphs that, having made a thorough inspection and having made up his mind that the losses would be considerably less than he had been led to believe, Kitchener is no longer setting his face against the evacuation of the Dardanelles but, in order to obviate the moral effect of this, he persists in his Alexandretta scheme which would have the inestimable advantage of guaranteeing the safety of Egypt ; even after having heard the objections raised by ourselves, Kitchener maintains that the defence of Egypt is a matter of interest for all the Allies and that it is impossible to secure this defence in winter on the long line of the Suez Canal while, according to his Secret Service information, the Germans are most certainly contemplating an attack on this side.

Briand has been careful to call the attention of the British Government to the letters exchanged on the 27th January between M. Augagneur and Mr. Winston Churchill in which it was laid down that if there were a question of operations in Syria or Cilicia, a French Admiral would command the Anglo-French naval forces ; should a joint landing take place at Alexandretta the plans would of course be drawn up by the two Governments without infringing the authority of the French Admiral.

M. Venizelos has told Guillemin that as there would be

nothing further from his wishes than to bring about a civil war, he and his friends are not going to stand at the next general elections ; he must wait until events, and the elasticity of the Greek people, furnish an opportunity for his returning with something like *éclat* to political life ; for the moment he feels himself beaten as circumstances have made him the champion of a war which his country refuses to undertake and the King, who is for peace at any price, has scored and, with him, the Germanophile party.

To meet the sullen hostility with which we are confronted, Sir Francis Elliot, the British Minister at Athens, has drafted a Note to be addressed to the Greek Government which quotes the definite assurances of benevolent neutrality which have been given to us and says that, under penalty of blockade, the Allied Governments are going to occupy and administer, for the duration of the war, the town of Salonika with the three railway lines leading out of it, and that they are going to make a search, even in territorial waters, for submarines and their bases. Guillemin would like to suppress the passages about occupation and administration, while M. Skouloudis is renewing his requests for financial help and loans of corn " now," as he says, " that all our misunderstandings have been dissipated " ; the Greek Minister therefore shows us how to exercise a pressure less violent and more effective than what the British Minister proposes.

Galliéni thinks that as they get near Monastir the Servians will outrun their provisions and munitions, and Sarrail is to urge them to speed up their services while he himself is to decide whether or no to occupy Monastir ; the enemy is now in possession of the Belgrade-Nisch-Sofia railway.

Sazonoff has told Paléologue how pleased he will be to see Doumer whom Briand is sending as an Envoy Extraordinary to Petrograd, but the Tsar is emphatic that any naval action in the Black Sea is impossible at this season nor, for the moment, does he see how he can come to the aid of Servia.

Mr. Asquith has delivered a speech in the Commons as to the creation, in the near future, of an Anglo-French Council of War which will meet in France not too far behind the British and French lines, and to which Italy and Russia will, as soon

as possible, accredit qualified representatives ; as this is an idea which has been often expressed by Joffre and always approved by the French Government, Paul Cambon is to thank Mr. Asquith very warmly.

General Ignatieff, the Russian Military Attaché, introduces to me a Russian Military Mission who have come to confer with the French and British Commander-in-Chief, but I cannot wring from these officers anything definite as to armaments and war strength in their country.

16th.—Admiral Lacaze has given orders to concentrate as soon as possible the fleet at Milo, and Joffre will hold at our disposal a battalion of Chasseurs to be sent to Mudros if necessary, in order to ensure Servian supplies ; we have to establish ourselves in Corfu.

The Italian Admiralty are now willing to co-operate with us in searching, not only for Austrian but also for German, submarines in the Mediterranean ; this is anyhow a beginning.

Marcel Sembat is delighted with Italy's decision to land in Albania, while I am rather afraid that the choice of this sphere of operations, evidently induced by purely Italian considerations, may lead to complications with Servia and Greece. The Government is proposing to the Allies that Greece shall be called upon to give the formal guarantees required, and that if her reply is not satisfactory, there should be a naval demonstration ; the Franco-British fleet to operate on the Greek coast would be commanded by Admiral Le Bris. The British Legation in Greece is certain that no mine has been laid in the Bay of Salamine and that we can safely anchor there ; M. Guillemin has cancelled the telegram which he sent us yesterday as to this.

Briand has telegraphed to M. Cochin, who is due at Athens, to tell him to take his cue in any conversation with his Greek friends from the instructions recently sent to our Minister, and to suggest that he should go on to Monastir and say nice things to the Servians.

A telegram has gone to the King of Spain to thank him for his intervention, the effect of which has been to reprieve two Frenchwomen who had been arrested in our occupied area and condemned to death by the Germans.

17th.—Colonel Pénélon says that “ the officers are getting more and more anxious about the war and more especially about the events in the Balkans, and they fear a catastrophe. One of two courses should be followed. Either the Minister must direct the conduct of the war as a whole, in which case he should have near him a real Chief of the Staff, such as Castelnau, or, what I think would be better, Joffre should become Generalissimo of all the French Armies and be responsible for operations in the Near East as well as in France ; it would then be indispensable for him to have some one like Castelnau at his side. You may be sure also that whenever he has the responsibility for operations in the Balkans, he will make no difficulty about sending three or four Army Corps to the Near East.” I could only suggest that Pénélon should make these same remarks to Briand and Galliéni.

Asquith, Grey, Balfour and Lloyd George have come to Paris to confer with Briand, Galliéni, Admiral Lacaze and Albert Thomas.

Ribot has written to thank Clémenceau for a very good article on the Finance measure which was passed yesterday in the Senate, and in his reply Clémenceau expressed himself as always willing to help him but such serious blunders were made in the battle of the Champagne that it was high time the troops should have a commander worthy of them. Ribot thinks this is the beginning of a definite campaign against Joffre and that there are already in the Senate men who scrape up every grievance and every recrimination which come to their ears and that the bitter feeling about the Commander-in-Chief is beginning to be very dangerous. Ribot in Council was very emphatic that the British Ministers, forming as they do the Committee of National Defence, should meet here our own Committee of Defence at the Elysée. I told him that it would be a little difficult for me to look as if I wanted to be present at their debate, but eventually Briand arranged that we should all assemble here at 5 o'clock this afternoon. Mr. Asquith looks rather like a clean-shaven lawyer or perhaps even more the heavy father of classic comedy. Mr. Balfour is very tall, very dry, in appearance and manner, and rather

over-scented. Sir Edward Grey is very short-sighted, but with his slim, upright figure, his aquiline nose and his smooth but rather languid manner, is every inch the aristocrat, while Mr. Lloyd George, who has the head of an artist with his long curled locks, his high spirits, and his joviality, is nevertheless true to the type of democracy. The British Prime Minister, who sat opposite me, got down to business at once ; the 90,000 men promised are to be duly sent to Salonika, and the Division now on the sea will not go to Egypt, while the Division in Egypt will start as soon as possible. The British troops will remain at Salonika to impress the Greeks, and whatever happens they will prevent any Germans or Bulgarians from entering the town ; the Alexandretta project is given up, but the question of the evacuation of Gallipoli will stand over pending Lord Kitchener's report. Freycinet asked if the troops about to sail would make up the 90,000 men or if a Division would have to be taken from France, but as no one could answer that question Mr. Asquith could only reaffirm that anyhow 90,000 men would arrive at the earliest possible moment, but that no addition could be made to these, and that the British troops were not equipped for mountain warfare. Sir Edward Grey was very firm in saying, " However important the defence of Egypt we are quite aware that the final decision would be registered in France, and if absolutely necessary we must sacrifice Egypt to secure victory on the Western front." Galliéni and Joffre thought that with 150,000 men we could defend Salonika and hold off two or three hundred thousand of the enemy. At dinner Mr. Balfour on my right hand told me that they had not enough trawlers to round up the submarines in the Mediterranean and that they were still hoping to force the Dardanelles by a surprise coup ; Sir Edward Grey on my left was very anxious as to what Roumania was going to do and thought we ought to give up Tangier to Spain. I did not say to him, " What about Gibraltar ? " but I pointed out what were Lyautey's very strong objections to our handing over Tangier, but of course this is a question that will have to be considered if Spain should get annoyed by our silence and allow the German submarines to get their supplies there ; the *Verts*

declare, as a matter of fact, that the Kaiser has offered both Tangier and Gibraltar to Spain.

Denys Cochin had a splendid reception yesterday at Athens and the loud and long cries of "Vive la France" cannot have sounded pleasantly in King Constantine's ears.

18th.—Sarraïl telegraphs: "I have seen Lord Kitchener who announced the arrival of the 28th and 26th Divisions and probably the 27th. I told him that these would be insufficient and that I had always asked for four French Army Corps. I could not tell him that, as I can only express a wish and not give an order, the British troops are only available for the second line, but I made him see that Salonika was entirely Greek, that the Greeks only tolerated our presence there, and that if we are going to take over the place and defend it, we ought to have at least 300,000 men." Meanwhile we hear from Paul Cambon that according to a telegram from Kitchener, Sarraïl considers a retreat on Salonika as indispensable and as being extremely difficult if it is not made immediately; Sir Archibald Murray, who is acting as Deputy Chief of the Staff, has told La Panouse the same thing. Galliéni and Joffre persist, however, in thinking that 150,000 men are quite sufficient to defend Salonika, and Lacaze calculates that it will take more than six weeks to send four Army Corps there; Sarraïl's language, moreover, may go far to stiffen Kitchener in his reluctance to adopt the views which are shared by the French and British Governments.

In Council this morning Galliéni reads out a letter from Joffre who writes that he will be short of men between April and July if the 1917 class is not trained for the spring, and cruel as it seems to eat up our French youth, there is nothing to be done but bow to sheer necessity.

The Italian Government has decided to send a Division to Valona and a Brigade to Durazzo, but this double occupation will have no practical value either for the Servians, the British or ourselves; Cadorna has again declared to our Military Attaché that he himself is still willing to send troops to Salonika if his Government will give up the idea of landing on the Albanian coast.

19th.—Our Consul at Rhodes telegraphs: "When the agence

Stéfani says that Italian steamships have been sunk by submarines, these submarines are specified as Austrian but it is certain that two boats at least have been sunk by the Germans, and it is known that German submarines, working in the Ægean Sea, carry either the Austrian or the German, or sometimes the Turkish, flag." Italy is certainly in no hurry to fight Germany.

Cochin was received yesterday by the King and the audience lasted for an hour. Constantine congratulated himself on the good-fellowship between the French and Greek Generals, and said that he would consider it nothing short of murder if the Greek troops were to take any action against the French. He said that the aggrandisement of Servia would not be at all a good thing for Greece, and Cochin suggested that the aggrandisement of Austria would be much worse. The King did not agree with this as he said that the *Drang nach Osten* was no longer through Salonika, and that anyhow Servia was definitely done for. Constantine took the opportunity of making some very unpleasant remarks about the British, but dwelt on his personal sympathy for France while declaring that he wanted to remain neutral and not allow Greek territory to be turned into a battlefield.

Clémenceau, now President of the Army Committee of the Senate, has forwarded me a resolution in which, among other grievances adduced, it is complained that no information having been received from the Government as to the expedition to the Balkans, the Committee is unable to exercise their control. It is also stated that the expedition to the Balkans, undertaken under conditions of unpreparedness and with a force insufficient to attain any military objective, has resulted, as it was easy to foresee, in placing our expeditionary force in a most dangerous situation. The absence of any co-ordination of Allied efforts to withstand an Austro-German and Bulgar-Turk attack and the indecisive attitude of the Greek Army round Salonika were also deplored, and the Government was asked to give an immediate account of the measures taken, in concert with the Allies, to safeguard our expeditionary force and the honour of France. The Committee criticises, protests, reproaches, and deplores, but is careful to say nothing as to

what they would have done had they been in the shoes of the Government nor what they advise the Government to do to-day.

Vice-Admiral Fournier, who has come back from the Dardanelles, tells me that Sir Ian Hamilton has made serious mistakes and that, had the English been better commanded, they might well have succeeded in their last operations.

20th.—Briand read out to us the resolution passed by the Army Committee of the Senate, and one remembers that a little while ago the same Committee urged that not more than 60,000 of our troops should go to Salonika. Freycinet still thinks this is quite enough for us to do and wants the principal weight of the expedition to fall on the British and Italians while Léon Bourgeois considers we ought to increase our contingent. Joffre must be consulted anew but Galliéni has already told Sarraïl that there is no chance of his getting the four Army Corps, and has instructed the General to fall back, without reference to the Government, if he thinks such a step to be right.

After a long talk with Lord Crewe, Paul Cambon is insistent that we ought not to delay any further the despatch of a Note to Greece such as was practically agreed upon at the Allied Conference the other day, and despite Briand's mild objections, this is going to be done.

21st.—Early this morning comes a telegram from Denys Cochin who thinks that the situation is very grave, that Serbia is down and out, and asks if the Government will authorise Guillemin and himself to treat with Greece where very firm language is required but where any preliminary drastic action might lead to disaster. But with this gloomy message there is also to hand a German wireless report which alludes to a Servian victory near Uskub.

Colonel Bordeaux, the brother of the writer, was received the day before yesterday by King Constantine who alluded to Venizelos as a liar and a neurotic. He reaffirmed his desire to remain neutral till the end of the war, but said that he had then every intention of attacking the Bulgarians who are "thorough knaves from the King downwards." Colonel Bordeaux derived the impression of a weak, suspicious man

eager that deference and honour should be paid to him. Briand telegraphed yesterday to Guillemain that the Note must only be handed to Greece after formal instructions had been given by the Powers to their representatives at Athens, and that this instruction was also subject to the completion of our naval concentration.

The Servian attack on the Southern front has made little progress while the right of their Second Army has had to retire on to the Heights of Jelaca ; the troops who evacuated Prilep have gone back towards Monastir while those from Gostivar have headed for Kicevo.

22nd.—Galliéni and Joffre have this morning criticised very sharply Sarrail's inaction. "Had I been there," Joffre exclaimed, "I should have attacked towards Vélés where Sarrail has scarcely anybody in front of him ; in war there is nothing so ignominious as inaction." Galliéni was outspoken as to Sarrail not being a leader in any sense of the word, that he was irresolute, and that Gouraud or Marchand would have attacked, but he did not think the Government could issue a positive order to Sarrail to do so. Joffre told us that there were now 1,249 German battalions in all on this front, 995 facing the French Army, while the English had to deal with 214 and the Belgians with 40. It was true that we had 1,111 battalions afoot, but then the German companies are 350 men strong, thus making the battalion up to 1,000 men, while ours only comprise 800 men. The General has not counted the Territorials or the Landsturm and it is impossible to get more exact figures, but he is adamant that it is impossible for him to spare another man from his front.

Briand has sent a telegram to Rome, London and Petrograd in which regret is expressed that Italy, by sending a Division to Valona and a brigade to Durazzo without making any effort to help the Servians, is only looking after her own interests with no regard for the spirit of the London Agreement. She has not declared war against Germany. She is theoretically at war with Turkey but has scarcely lifted her hand against her ; she has allowed Serbia to be crushed and the Anglo-French troops in Serbia and Macedonia to be threatened without sending a man to their rescue. Briand thinks that

the Allies should send a joint Note to Italy so as to bring the Government to some decision but, just as it had been settled that his telegram should be sent to-morrow, there came a telegram from our Minister at Athens to the effect that M. Skouloudis is much upset by the unexpected arrival of French, English, Russian and Italian battleships in the Milo roadstead. Guillemin said to him, "The presence of the Allied Fleet does not constitute an unfriendly act, and you told me yourself that we should show our teeth. The moment has surely come for the Greek Government to give up shilly-shallying." Skouloudis thereupon calmed down a good deal, but Guillemin does not think that, for the moment, we ought to go any further.

The Italian communiqués report considerable success on the Isonzo front, and an appreciable forward move on the Carso, along the southern slopes of Mont St. Michele and to the south-west of San Martino. Any satisfaction in this quarter is damped by hearing from Colonel Fournier that the Servian situation is well-nigh desperate and that the Uskub attempt is doomed to failure without immediate help from the Allies. If a general retreat occurs on the right bank of the Sitnica, the Servian army will be pushed back on to the Ipek-Diakova-Prizrend line with nothing behind it but some very bad paths to the Adriatic coast; it will then be a matter of abandoning guns and stores to save the infantry from dire disaster. Durazzo and St. Jean de Medua are, we are told, in crying need of flour to prevent the famine which this retreat may well entail.

Rumours grow as to the intrigues being carried on in Switzerland by the ex-Khedive with Bolo as his confederate, and Briand has promised to have the matter looked into.

23rd.—According to a return for which I asked, we had on the 1st October in the fighting line 45,251 combatant officers and 10,058 (so-called) non-combatant, with 2,147,831 combatant men and 139,860 men employed in various branches of the Service; behind the line there were 9453 officers and 307,813 men; in the depôts within the zone of the armies were 1525 officers and 142,403 men, and in the depôts of the interior the ration strength was 1,690,514 of whom, after

deducting absentees, men in hospital, unfit or on special service, there remain 627,813 men available for mobilisation and 190,354 who were already mobilised on that date. It would almost seem as if our resources in man-power might enable us to make still greater efforts in the Near East.

Freycinet at our meeting to-day deplored the splitting up of our forces between Salonika and Gallipoli, to which Galliéni aptly retorted that Anglo-French forces in Gallipoli were keeping 100,000 Turks immobile. Matters of detail were then discussed and a good deal of time seems to be wasted. Staunch old Republican though I am, one cannot resist the feeling that the supreme control of a Commander-in-Chief or a military dictator presents many advantages. Yet things are going worse in Russia than here, and Sarrail telegraphs that the 122nd Division on the night of the 20-21 evacuated, in perfect order, the left bank of the Cerna.

According to Girodon, Lord Kitchener is still very uncomfortable about Salonika and is more and more convinced that the Germans mean to march on Constantinople and then with the Turkish Army swoop down on Egypt so as to capture the whole of the Near East ; he regrets deeply, but without any expression of resentment, his Government's refusal of the Alexandretta scheme.

The Russian Chief of the Staff has now formulated the idea of concentrating an Anglo-French army, of at least ten Army Corps, in the Balkans, which would thrust the Austro-German forces back to the other side of the Danube, make Servia its base of operations and develop an attack towards Buda-Pesth ; meanwhile very strong Russian forces would make themselves felt round Marmaros, Sziget, and nearer Buda-Pesth, thus stretching out a hand to the Allies and helping their offensive. With these concerted activities, the way would be open for the Italians to head for Vienna, while the Servians would protect the rear of the Allied troops against Bulgaria. What a fertile brain this General Officer must possess ! Galliéni is to tell his Intelligence branch to see if there is anything in this ambitious proposal, and anyhow it has been made clear that we cannot retire from Salonika and that we must organise defences for the town.

Guillemin complains, not without reason, about the Allies concentrating a fleet at Milo before handing the fresh Government the loudly-trumpeted and often delayed collective Note. King Constantine said to Kitchener, "You are taking an unfair advantage of your strength, and you will not even tell us why."

The Servian troops have been ordered to retire on to the right bank of the Sitnica, then, after a last stand, to Ipek, Diakova, Prizrend line where guns and supplies will be dropped and an attempt made to extricate what remains of the army through the hills.

24th.—Georges Leygues refuses to accept the mission to Roumania which Briand has asked me to press on him; he does not agree with our policy as to the Balkans and thinks an Anglo-French force of 300,000 men should be sent there.

The Allied Chargés d'Affaires at Athens, with their doyen, the British Minister, as their spokesman, have delivered the collective Note to M. Skouloudis, who wanted to know what exactly was meant by the "maintenance of benevolent neutrality with all its consequences." Did it involve protection against possible danger from enemy forces, or only impossible danger from Greek troops? Guillemin, who was asked to reply, said it simply meant an official confirmation of assurances already given, whereupon Skouloudis promised a prompt reply, the more so because they had only corn for three more days.

Sazonoff has protested against a proposal of Sir Edward Grey that, in order to ensure the goodwill of the Albanians, which we might need to facilitate supplies, we should promise Albania the constitution of an independent State. The idea—which is probably Italian born—rather cuts across our agreement of 26th April, and so far, Italy has been over-disposed to study her own interests although Grey has just been told that the Italian Government will adhere to the agreement of 5th September, 1914, under which no separate peace can be signed by an Ally.

The Servians have had to quit the Babuna pass, and the Bulgarians are nearing Prilep and threatening both Dibra and Monastir.

25th.—Joffre has complained to me among other things of the behaviour of Galliéni's entourage, especially Colonel Boucabeille who seems to want to "run" the war. I smoothed him over as to this as also in the matter of General Pau, who is replacing Laguiche at Russian headquarters, being supposed to communicate with the Government instead of with G.Q.G., but after the meeting of the Defence Council to-day, Ribot told me that the Commander-in-Chief was also rather upset because the War Office would not allow him to issue a paper inviting the troops to subscribe to the new war loan. He has told Briand and myself that what he really wants is to have the general control of the war alike here and in the Near East ; this is wholly within the wishes of Bourgeois and Freycinet, but Briand has not yet been able to discuss the point with Galliéni.

Sir Edward Grey has explained to Paul Cambon that he did not propose to make a cut and dried offer to Italy about Albania ; he was only considering how to ensure Servia being supplied through the Adriatic and he regrets that he did not sufficiently weigh the consequences of the promise he proposed to offer.

The Allied Ministers at Athens have received the Greek reply which sets out that in no circumstances will Greek troops attempt to disarm or intern the forces of the Allies, and that, as regards her relations with the Entente Powers, Greece will "adhere faithfully to the policy of benevolent neutrality. The Greek Government renewed the assurance that the Allies would have every facility for landing their troops and recited the declaration which the Entente Powers made as to restoring at the end of the war any Greek territory occupied during hostilities and as to paying indemnity for damage done ; one or two points which M. Guillemin had made were overlooked, and this may, or may not, be intentional.

The Servian retreat continues, and if, as is to be feared, the Prizrend-Dibra road is cut by the Albanians and the Bulgarians, it will be a frightful calamity for the flocks of refugees, who, flying before the enemy from Kralievo and Mitrovitza where they hoped to find a refuge, are making their painful way to Prizrend where they will no longer be able to find food

or shelter. For several days past, M. Boppe has seen emigrants streaming into this town mixed up with the wounded and footsore Servian soldiers as well as thousands of Austrian prisoners who had been detailed to repair the Dibra road.

Kitchener, completing his visit to the Near East and having paid a visit to the King of Italy, is to arrive at Marseilles to-morrow evening.

The King of Montenegro is starting for Scutari to welcome the Commander-in-Chief and troops of the Servian Army ; he evidently wishes to make it clear that Albanian Scutari is a dependency of Montenegro, but meanwhile demoralisation and depression are spreading in the little kingdom of the Black Mountain.

King Constantine has now told Guillemin that if we want to take Greek territory as our base of operations and make use of the country to go in and out of it as we please, then he will withdraw his own troops from the frontier and our enemies might thus force their way through and do all the harm they can to us.

26th.—German submarines, coming no doubt from Trieste and Pola, are daily multiplying in the Adriatic and the Mediterranean, and both British and French steamships have been attacked.

M. Paschitch and the Servian General Staff have left Prizrend and are on their way through the mountains to Scutari ; M. Boppe and his Allied colleagues are journeying, mostly on foot, by Andréievitza and Podgoritza.

Sir Edward Grey has now bowed to Sazonoff's objections and dropped the idea of an Italian protectorate in Albania.

Before leaving the Near East, Lord Kitchener has drawn up a plan to evacuate entirely the zone north of the Gallipoli peninsula and collect the troops in the islands of Imbros, Tenedos and Mitylene ; he will tell the British Cabinet frankly that it is with great regret that he has come round to this idea both because the despatch of all available reinforcements to Salonika renders it impossible to resume the offensive in the Dardanelles and because, the expedition to Alexandretta having been turned down, he cannot get astride

the road by which the German and Turkish armies may move on Egypt.

M. Jean Dupuy, the director of *Le Petit Parisien*, has brought Mademoiselle Emilienne Moreau to see me; she is the young girl who remained at Loos during the German occupation, succoured some wounded English soldiers there, and shot a couple of Germans with her own hand.

General Callwell* has come here to confer with our military authorities about the defence of Salonika, and Sir Edward Grey is hoping that Galliéni may be able to go himself to London to see Lord Kitchener.

The reorganisation of the Turkish army has been energetically pushed on by the Germans and there are now fifty-two Divisions instead of forty afoot.

27th.—Montenegro is daily becoming more irritable about Russia, and Italy's inaction is viewed with scarcely less bitterness; at Cettigne, Montenegrins and Servians declare that France alone has fulfilled her duty as an Ally, and that had it not been for France, England would herself have left the Balkans in the lurch. In Servia itself, however, we are not regarded so favourably and are evidently included in the rising feeling of resentment against the Allies generally; so to parry this it has been decided to offer Servia our services to reconstitute and re-equip her army; M. Boppe will be asked to stay with the Servian Government wherever they may choose to reside. The Allied Ministers have handed M. Skouloudis an aide-mémoire in which, in order to guarantee our own security, there is demanded the retreat of the Greek troops from Salonika and the outskirts, a free hand for ourselves with regard to the railways and roads to the frontier, the right of hunting down and destroying enemy submarines, as well as their supply bases, and lastly the right to go on board ship in territorial waters. M. Skouloudis, as usual, replied, "Tell me that this is a positive demand, and I will yield to force." But he will not let the Germans think that he is willingly facilitating the work of the Allies; Guillemin is to be authorised to use the words "positive demand," but with the rider that all our requirements are in harmony with

* D.M.O. at the War Office.

the principles which Greece at first gladly accepted. Briand hears—I think through Prince George of Greece—that there is no agreement between Greece and Bulgaria and that the Bulgarians are very likely to advance on Cavalla.

Sazonoff, versatile as ever, has now said that he will agree to an Italian protectorate over an enlarged Albania if France and England were of the same opinion and Briand tells us that his agents in Switzerland have sent him the text of a commercial agreement drawn up last April between Italy and Germany.

We have opened a modest credit of 400,000 francs with the Montenegrin Government, and we have asked London to help in the same way.

General Micheler has written to Dubost urging that Joffre's command should be enlarged; and that more attention should be paid, and more troops sent, to the theatre of war in the Balkans, as, he is sure, in France the lines will not be pierced either by the Germans or ourselves. But who is conducting the war? Joffre is beginning to get impatient, as Briand has not yet been able to decide the delicate question of supreme command. If Joffre were appointed "General in Chief of all the French Forces," he would take Dubail, as "adjoint" and Inspector General of the front, with Pellé to look after the troops abroad, and some other General to see to the forces in France. It seems a hybrid sort of arrangement, and Galliéni has not mentioned it yet.

Sarrail has decided to bring back all French troops from Servia into Greece.

28th.—At the Trocadero to-day there has been a very largely attended and very moving demonstration in honour of Miss Cavell, the English nurse who was condemned to death at Brussels by the Germans for having helped Belgian soldiers to get away, and who has been mercilessly shot at dawn; Ferdinand, Buisson, Severine and Painlevé all delivered speeches, the last a very remarkable one.

The French ship *Amora* and the British ship *Strabo* were sunk this morning north-west of Tunis by submarines, while a merchant ship, the *Harmonie*, which had just landed provisions at St. Jean de Medua, was attacked in that port,

happily without success, first by a submarine and then by Austrian aeroplanes.

29th.—Lord Kitchener came to see me this morning soon after his arrival here ; he has not changed his opinion, and for him the vital and immediate question is the safety of Egypt, which can only be ensured either in Egypt itself or in the Gulf of Alexandretta. Egypt may be attacked in January by 200,000 Turks and a German Division, and has only 20,000 men there, of whom most are rather indifferent Indian troops, while the men who could be brought from Gallipoli are tired out. There are a certain number of Divisions ready in England, but they could not be sent to Alexandria in time, and the British War Minister thinks it may be indispensable to bring away some of the British troops at Salonika. I asked him what would happen if we were attacked, and the reply was that the Germans could not possibly get there before the spring, whereas they could be at the doors of Egypt in the winter, and indeed, from April onwards the heat itself would render Egypt invulnerable. “ If, however,” I asked again, “ the Germans and Turks were to fling themselves on Salonika, are you not afraid of the effect of a Franco-British defeat in Greece and Roumania ? ” “ That is a matter of politics,” came the quick answer, “ but from the soldier’s point of view we cannot remain at Salonika if we want to defend Egypt, and if we lose Egypt, we lose the war. That is the opinion I am going to give my Government, and if they do not share it I cannot accept the responsibility of the situation.” Kitchener added that he still thought it possible to land in the Gulf of Alexandretta and that a British naval officer had been there lately and had reported there was so far no organised defence. I could only say that both the Government and the Commander-in-Chief would most carefully consider the Field-Marshal’s views, but that the British Government had promised to send 90,000 men to Salonika.

Italy, according to M. Barrère, who is for the moment in Paris, apparently wishes to fight with as little risk as possible, and her signature to the declaration about a separate peace is not an immediate prelude to her declaring war on Germany. It is apparently true the Convention was signed between the

two countries just before Italy threw down the glove to Austria, but the Convention affected persons and properties, and Sonnino recognised that it was drawn up in view of war.

General Jilinsky, whom the Tsar has sent to G.Q.G., came to breakfast this morning and spoke more than cheerfully about the morale of the Russian Army, but no general offensive can be resumed until the question of rifles is solved ; Russia has already received 400,000 rifles, but the American orders will not begin to materialise until December.

Another telegram from Sarrail as to the defence of Salonika and the employment of our troops in the Near East presents a series of problems difficult to resolve without determining as to the future control of the war. A General in supreme command is a crying necessity. Galliéni, however great his military worth, is a member of the Government and shares the collective responsibility of the Cabinet, and is also obliged to explain himself to Parliament and to the Committees. If, therefore, he were to be in supreme command, he would risk being able to exercise the necessary strategic independence and would also entail the Government's responsibility for any operations in the field. Moreover, if we wished to obtain the lead with the Coalition, the authority of General Joffre and his influence over the Allies would be of the greatest help to us, and I have told Briand that I think we ought to fix up this matter with Galliéni at the earliest possible moment.

30th.—Freycinet, who went to breakfast yesterday at Chantilly, tells us that the Generalissimo has rather got his knife into Galliéni, who, he thinks, wants to bully him ; but, Freycinet added, Joffre's grievances are a little vague and seem to arise rather from his general anxiety, and what he really wants is to have command of all the French forces in the field.

CHAPTER XII

General Plan of G.Q.G.—Joffre Generalissimo of the French Armies—
Difference of Opinion between Kitchener and the British Cabinet—
Military Conference of Allies at Chantilly—Pourparlers with the British
Government—Servian retreat and famine—King Constantine and the
Defence of Salonika—Sir Douglas Haig replaces Sir John French—The
Year finishes in a fog of uncertainty.

DECEMBER

1st.—As Freycinet advised, I asked Joffre to come and see me before the meeting of the Council of Defence this morning, when he told me of his little difficulties with the War Minister, which he said would be over when the question of command was settled; he is quite ready to have either Dubail or Castelnau beside him as the Government may prefer.

At the meeting Ribot explained that with the growing expenses of the war, it would be impossible, whatever the result of the loan now being subscribed, to carry on without further funds after June 1916; the Government must therefore take the responsibility, in agreement with the Commander-in-Chief, of fixing the artillery programme and not leave to the Parliamentary Committees power to make any alterations or changes in it. Joffre is to get into direct touch with Albert Thomas and give us a new, precise and exhaustive programme which will, after close scrutiny, become an instrument of the Government and not subject to any proposals in Parliament.

Our War Minister, as regards Gallipoli, goes further than Kitchener and is in favour of total evacuation, while Joffre also thinks it will not be possible to hold on long to Cape Helles. On the other hand, after further and serious con-

sideration, it was resolved that we must remain at Salonika, ask Great Britain for further reinforcements, bring up the whole force to 300,000 men, and, in view of activities—sooner or later—in the Balkans, keep this base so as to preserve Greek neutrality and bring in Roumania.

Sarrail has asked for general instructions as to his retreat ; shall he keep out his advance parties ? Galliéni would like him to withdraw altogether to Salonika, but Joffre thinks he might hold on to the northern positions. This little difference of opinion gives me just the opportunity of saying how impossible it will be for the Government to deal with questions of this sort so long as there is not a Commander-in-Chief singly responsible for operations in the field.

The Army Committee of the Senate is greatly influenced by Clémenceau as to the evacuation of Salonika, and Briand was asked whether he thought it could easily be carried out. "Very easily," was the reply, "and almost under German protection, as it is precisely what King Constantine has proposed."

With regard to General Alexieff's plan of some joint move on Buda-Pesth, Joffre does not think it possible to feed ten Army Corps in the Balkans, and that anyhow the Allied forces should first pick up what remains of the Servian Army. He considers that if the force in the Balkans is brought up to between 150,000 and 250,000 men it will be quite sufficient to give the enemy serious trouble, and nothing will induce him to alter this estimate.

At the end of the morning's work Briand put the question of supreme command to Galliéni who admitted that he would like to see unity of control in the hands of the War Minister ; Briand and I both suggested that this would expose him, as a member of the Government, to questions in Parliament, which it would be difficult for him to answer. Galliéni at once saw the point, raised no objection to placing Joffre in full command and only thought Castelnau would be the best man for him to have at his side.

Joffre has unfolded to us the proposals which he is going to make to Commanders-in-Chief of the Allied Armies at Chantilly on the 5th December ; there is nothing particularly

novel in them, and the gist is that the result of the European war can only be found in the principal theatres, France and Russia, to which—so as not to offend the susceptibilities of an ally, Italy must be added—the Balkans and Asia Minor being only secondary scenes of action. We can neither get contact with our adversaries in their own territories nor have we available men and transport to carry on a distant war on very difficult terrain and with maritime communications; further the Germans have only started their new operations with new help from Bulgaria, and we could only have used this theatre of war had we in our turn been able to get Greece and Roumania to join up with the Servian Army before their reverse. Anyhow no important result could have been obtained here unless we had been backed up by Russian activities in Galicia. The memorandum, which ran on broad lines, concluded with a strong recommendation as to the entire evacuation of Gallipoli and the confession of a total inability to perceive any danger for Egypt. As regards the Alexandretta expedition, if impossible at the moment, it is not to be altogether discarded, and finally it was admitted that the programme to be submitted to the Coalition “has the grave drawback of leaving to the enemy the initiative for a relatively long period of time, and this delay will enable them to develop their gains in the Near East and will increase their prestige and influence in neutral countries. To snatch from them this advantage the Allies must be able to attack in force and on all the fronts; this is for the moment quite impossible, and it would be a grave error to attempt any general offensive without having effected all the required preparations.”

Joffre therefore has in mind a war of attrition which must be chiefly carried out by our allies, England, Russia and even Italy, and he has therefore compared our respective efforts up to now. France has set afoot ninety-seven Divisions, not including the troops detailed to protect the Colonies, and the equivalent in infantry of thirty-seven Territorial Divisions; since the first months of the war we have had 2,500,000 men in the front line, an effort at least equal in proportion to that of Germany. England has so

far only built up fifty-three Divisions, and having only been able to equip a limited number of units at the beginning of the war; she has still available considerable resources of man-power. Russia has large resources in man-power, and as soon as she has been able to arm sufficient of them, she will be able to reconstitute 112 Divisions and easily keep up each Division to sixteen-battalion strength. Italy, who came late into the fight, has, with a population equivalent to ours, only put thirty-six Divisions into the field; her resources are superabundant, but she only proposes to employ some of them to furnish new units.

2nd.—Briand has telegraphed to London that we are not disposed to evacuate Salonika and that we beg our ally to come round to our views. “We do not think that the agreement made with General Joffre in London as to the immediate despatch of 90,000 British to Salonika can be questioned. Lord Kitchener’s journey seems to have created uncertainty in the mind of the King of Greece. His illusions, as to the possibility of our deciding to evacuate Salonika, a notion which is only an echo of the King’s own wishes and certainly those of Germany, still remain. At this moment therefore we are meeting with resistance on the part of the Greek Government, and these delays tend to place us in an untenable situation the outcome of which may be disaster or a re-embarkation. . . . The Greek reply is not satisfactory, containing too many reservations and equivocations, and in default of an immediate and positive answer to the aide-mémoire handed by M. Guillemin to M. Skouloudis, pressure should be brought to bear by a naval demonstration for which due preparations have been made.”

This telegram had scarcely left when there came two from Paul Cambon to say that the Cabinet had decided on the evacuation of Salonika under certain conditions; agreement with France, the Greek Army to put up sufficient defence to prevent enemies entering their country; strong defence works for Salonika. At a meeting hurriedly convened it was decided that Briand should go to London as quickly as possible and stand firmly by our opinion.

There ensued at our morning meeting a long discussion as

to who should be Joffre's Chief of Staff; the majority preferred Castelnau, but Sembat and Malvy thought this might have a bad effect on the Left, and Guesde added that the country would think Sarrail was being put under Castelnau's orders. The bright thought of Pétain occurred to one or two, but, as too often happens, nothing was settled and Briand is to ask Joffre in my room this afternoon to make his own choice.

In the afternoon Joffre came himself, his face beaming with satisfaction, having brought Castelnau along with him. Castelnau expressed himself as more than willing to accept the post provided he was Joffre's choice and had not been designated from outside; he will therefore repair to Chantilly with three Staff officers, and Dubail will command the Armies of the Centre. The Belgian and Artois groups will be directly attached to G.Q.G. on account of Belgian and British questions which daily occur, Joffre saying that later, if large operations are undertaken, he will very likely put Castelnau in charge. To all this Galliéni has fully agreed, only stipulating that Joffre should dismiss as soon as convenient a certain number of the "Young Turks" who are with him.

For the last two or three days, and particularly this afternoon, silly stories have been current in Parliament. In the Senate, Clémenceau is responsible for the clumsy joke that I am going to get myself awarded the Croix de Guerre, while in the Palais Bourbon there is an even more malicious and mendacious report that before the Government left Bordeaux, I tried to negotiate an armistice with Germany. War is the mother of heroism, but is she also the parent of imbecility?

Italy has signed the London agreement as to no separate peace, but she has still not broken with Germany.

3rd.—M. Romanos has suggested a very subtle scheme on behalf of M. Skouloudis; we are to leave Salonika under the protection of the Greeks, but we are to promise not to return. So King Constantine proposes our flight as a means of safety for his troops, and in order to persuade us to accept this humiliation he says that our Army will have to deal with

530,000 of the enemy without counting the Turks, and that the Servian Army is now reduced to 40,000 men. These figures of course are a bit of German bluff, and the proposal is not worth discussion, especially as Joffre persists that the town can be protected with a fifty kilometres line in front of the heights.

Admiral Lacaze is still anxious about the Greek batteries which command the Salonika roadstead, and we shall ask the British Government to join in telling the Greeks we consider this threat as an unfriendly act, and that if it continues we shall take a Greek island as a hostage.

After our meeting Ribot remained to tell me that he did not expect to get more than ten milliards out of the loan, and that the Government was in bad odour in Parliament; Clémenceau has said to him, "Make me Prime Minister and I will get through the German lines even if I leave 500,000 men there."

Meanwhile in this morning's *Homme Enchaîné* Clémenceau says in so many words that Clementel has proposed in Council I should be given the Croix de Guerre and he reproaches us all for dawdling over such nonsense, while our soldiers are sacrificing their lives. I wrote to him that he had again been the victim of a hoax, that nobody in my presence had ever suggested so absurd an idea as that I should have the Cross; "had such a suggestion," I added, "been put forward I should have been angrier even than you are. The anxiety due to your patriotism does not warrant your supposing that I am a less ardent patriot than yourself or that at so grave a moment I could think of anything else than the safety of the country."

The British War Committee has again declared in favour of leaving Salonika, and Lord Kitchener said that he will not take the responsibility for disaster and if evacuation is not decided upon he will resign. Briand will start to-morrow for Calais, where he is to see Kitchener, Balfour, Asquith and Grey.

4th.—Denys Cochin came yesterday to tell me of his experience in Greece and has repeated his story to-day to the Council; he was very strong on the greeting which had

been given him, the flagged houses, the enthusiastic crowds, the decision to confer on him the title of "Athenian citizen," and so forth. The people are certainly more favourable to us than is the King; Cochin even thinks that had it not been for Lord Kitchener's visit Constantine would have been obliged to follow the wishes of his subjects. No doubt Cochin is mistaken, but Kitchener's action is not to be denied. The King said to Cochin, in speaking of the Field-Marshal: "He is a charming man and pleased me very much." "I would like to know," our compatriot replied, "what one ought to do in order to be so amiably judged by Your Majesty." "Well," said the King, "the Field-Marshal understands the situation perfectly, and said to me that England is fighting the Germans and Austrians, and that he thought a bullet fired on any others was a bullet wasted." The Queen, Cochin thought, was not altogether comfortable about Germany and the issue of the war; she spoke of "this useless butchery," and laid all the responsibility on Edward VII who, she declared, had, from sheer jealousy, been the means of setting Europe on fire. She asked Cochin about his children, and when he told her that the son had been killed, and the daughter was a nun, she muttered, "A nun, I don't like that. It's contrary to nature." Cochin declared that nothing would induce the Greek soldiers to attack us, but he thought nevertheless we ought to re-embark because, in his opinion, there was nothing more for us to do in the Balkans, a summing up which fairly startled us.

Joffre is not after all going to form the three Groups of Armies into two; Langle de Cary will, provisionally, assume the command of the Centre Group.

Monastir is occupied by the Austrians and Bulgarians, and the contradictory, and often fantastic, reports which come to us from Athens and Bucharest are almost beyond imagination; in a chaos of contradictory news it is not easy to unravel the truth. King Nicholas of Montenegro still flatters himself he can put up a fine stand if he gets food for his troops, while the Allied representatives at Cettigne warn us that it is imperatively necessary to victual the little kingdom which is over-run with refugees and Servian troops.

Sazonoff supports our desire to hold on to Salonika.

5th.—Before our usual 9 a.m. meeting Viviani told me of the Calais conference which the English Ministers had asked for in the hope of arranging that their troops should quit Salonika ; Kitchener was so strong about it that an hour had to be given for him to consult with Asquith and Balfour apart, and they finally agreed that their people should neither leave at once nor by themselves. But Briand tried in vain to persuade our Allies to accept Salonika as a base of operations and was aggrieved at Kitchener putting his tenure of office into the scales. Lloyd George, who disfavours evacuation, was indisposed and did not come to Calais ; Grey, who shrewdly foresees diplomatic dangers inherent in retiring, was the other absentee. Kitchener refused to look at Joffre's memorandum on the defence of Egypt. " I know, I know," he said, " he has taken an optimist view of it ; I don't want to read it." After a discussion which went on for hours, Asquith drafted a rather ambiguous note, the precise text to follow ; the gist of it was that the English hold to their close alliance with us as being absolutely essential, but could not make any pronouncement about future operations. As, however, they felt themselves obliged to act upon the advice of their General Staff, who did not think it possible to remain in Salonika with 150,000 men, the British Government was of opinion that preparations should be made for quitting. The note added, in rather equivocal phrase, that we might let Greece know we were going on with the occupation, and there were one or two points about the safety of the troops, but on re-reading the text one saw that this occupation was only provisional, and really a prelude to evacuation. Our meeting was greatly perturbed ; Sembat and Albert Thomas were emphatic that we should tell the British we intend to remain at Salonika and that this declaration, if bluntly presented, would bring their Government round. Briand feared, however, that it would mean a general break-up. Freycinet, backed up by Galliéni himself with some very subtle suggestions, insisted that we ought to leave, while Ribot and Méline, believers as they were in the expedition, were resigned to the same opinion, in default of British

co-operation. Cochin thanked Briand for throwing full light on the responsibility of the British and for discharging us of the same in the eyes of history, whereupon Sembat acidly remarked that it was not a question of writing history, but of making it. My only contribution to the conversation was that we might ask Russia to join with us in a last representation to our Ally across the Channel, and this was agreed upon.

This afternoon I put in an appearance at the Trocadero for the Touring Club function ; Dubost and Deschanel were with me, the one foaming with rage against England, the other even gloomier than usual.

6th.—Pénélon, much flustered, came to say that Castelnau had told Etienne, a former War Minister, that Joffre had forbidden him to bring his own Staff officers to G.Q.G. ; Joffre is very much annoyed as he never forbade anything of the sort, and now says that he does not want to have Castelnau with him. I asked Etienne to come and explain this to me, and I gathered from him that the whole story was invented by one of the " Young Turks," who resent Castelnau's advent to G.Q.G., and either through jealousy or spite, set a match to the fire ; Castelnau never complained of anybody or anything, and says he is willing to serve wherever and however he may be asked to do so.

Paul Cambon telegraphs that the military and naval officers who accompanied the Ministers to Calais stated yesterday that there was perfect agreement between the military and naval authorities of the two countries as to the evacuation of Salonika, and that this version of the situation will be generally accepted.

Colonel Fournier reports that the Servian Army having abandoned all its rolling stock except the mountain batteries, will have to be entirely reorganised and that it might be better to bring away the débris by sea and try and straighten out things on one of the islands of the Ægean Sea.

Sarrail has had no difficulty in bringing in our troops who were holding Cherna, Krivolac, and the outskirts, and although Monastir is occupied by Austro-Bulgarian patrols, the railway line from it is not cut, the station being still in the hands of the Greeks.

7th.—There is a storm in a teacup over the reorganisation of the High Command, and the Left is displaying hostility towards Castelnau ; Conbes and Bourgeois, however, champion the General, and Briand is to say again to Joffre that he can choose whom he pleases and must not allow himself to be influenced by anyone.

The liaison officers have brought me the minutes of the military conference which took place yesterday at Chantilly, at which were present Sir John French, Sir Archibald Murray, Sir William Robertson, Sir Henry Wilson, Generals Jilinsky and Ignatieff for Russia, General Porro, Chief of the Staff to the Italian Army, with representatives of the Belgian and Servian Armies ; Joffre, Pellé, Huguet, Billott and Doumayrou represented France. Pellé read out the French Note of the 5th December, at which Sir John remarked that the proposed plan ought to be submitted to the British Government ; Joffre, Jilinsky and Porro agreed that the Allied Powers should hold themselves ready to withstand any enemy attack with their own available means, and that in case of an attack directed against one Power, all the others should render every assistance possible. French agreed to this, merely adding that the political situation of England necessitated constant changes with regard to their war strength in France.

General Murray explained why England was obliged to evacuate Salonika, but, replying to a pointed question of Joffre, he recognised that the defence of the place might be ensured by an expeditionary force of 150,000 men set down on a restricted perimeter between the Vardar and the Gulf of Orfano and barring the entrance of the Chalcidique. French and Murray both insisted on evacuation, while Jilinsky and Porro held a contrary opinion, but one must remember that neither of these two had a single soldier in Salonika ; Colonel Stephanovitch said that the Servian Army left in the lurch would be absolutely destroyed, but if reconstituted with the help of the Allies would soon be able to resume the offensive.

Meanwhile Lord Kitchener is devoting himself to the defence of Egypt ; the regiments and squadrons from the Dardanelles are being reconstituted at Alexandria and in the

camp near the pyramids; there are 24,000 Australians at Cairo and 10,000 more expected within a month; and the idea is to send three more Divisions to Egypt, of which two will be taken from here; work has been begun on the new defence line east of the Canal and the single railway line between Zagazig and Ismailia is to be doubled.

General Mahon has telegraphed to the War Office that four Bulgarian Divisions were preparing an attack on Hudova, Cepeli, and Kosturino, and that a German force was starting from Demir Kapu to strike a blow at our troops; Sarrail has spoken no word of this impending trouble, which is probably a chimera of General Mahon's brain. Yesterday our troops were still holding the Vardar, and we had only Bulgarians facing us, the Austro-Germans being opposite the Servians and Montenegrins north and east of Montenegro; we are sending a warship to Durazzo to embark 700 Austrian officers who are prisoners of war.

8th.—Boudenoot tells me that in the Senate there is a vague sense of uneasiness which finds expression in various attacks against the Government and the President. Sometimes the latter is reproached for exercising personal influence, and sometimes blamed for not doing so sufficiently. But what does it matter? I shall continue to do my best and let people say what they please.

9th.—The Greek Foreign Minister states that, according to his information, a German and a Bulgarian regiment have entered Monastir. Our movement of retreat is being pursued, but under less satisfactory conditions, as the English have given way on our right and uncovered our troops on their left; to-morrow we shall be at the frontier. A German wireless has announced that ten British guns have been taken, and Kitchener, having heard some of this news yesterday, has come to Paris to arrange with the Government here as to what steps should be taken.

The Italian Government cannot undertake to supply the Servian Army either through Durazzo or through St. Jean de Medua, and at the moment the Austrian Fleet holds the upper hand in the Adriatic, so much so as even to endanger the transport of the Italian troops. "One cannot create

torpedo-boats and submarines by royal decree," was M. Sonnino's tart comment to M. Barrère.

The Tsar has telegraphed personally to King George to beg him to champion our views about Salonika, but what can the King do apart from his Government? Nothing or next to nothing, as he told me himself.

10th.—Kitchener and Grey agreed yesterday with Briand, Galliéni and Joffre as to the necessity of defending Salonika, and without committing themselves to the future, they have for the moment acted upon the evidence before them. They both came to breakfast at the Elysée, and I found Grey just the same as ever, a man of highest principle and splendid loyalty; Kitchener is always to me the great soldier, a noble character with a will of steel, but just now he is quite obviously hypnotised by Egypt though, like his colleague, he is very glad that we have come to a provisional agreement.

The Agence Wolff publishes a telegram saying that the capture of Monastir has produced indescribable enthusiasm at Sofia; the schoolchildren have made a great demonstration outside the German Legation, and the Minister told them that the victory of Bulgaria was a source of rejoicing for every child in Germany, and was regarded by everybody as a German conquest.

Bappi does not think the Servian troops can be sent anywhere else than to Montenegro or Albania for their reorganisation; for ten months the Servian soldier has suffered very greatly and borne himself very bravely, and if he finds himself exiled in some region unknown to him, he may lose hope. Colonel Fournier, however, feels sure that if the Servian Army is reorganised in Albania, it will be very difficult to get them away as the roads are so bad for wheel traffic.

11th.—Joffre has telephoned to Briand that he has decided to make Castelnau his Chief of the Staff, the only title which conforms to the decrees as to large units and field service; General Pellé is to be Chief of the Staff for the Near East, and General Janin for the Armies here, Joffre retaining the personal command of the latter. Galliéni raises the objection that the title "Chief of the Staff" for Pellé and Janin is

contrary to regulations, and Joffre must be told this.

A Russian Mission under Admiral Roussine, composed of military and naval officers, has been introduced to me by the Russian Naval Attaché; the Admiral speaks coolly of the rifles and heavy guns which Russia will have at the end of next year, and says that in the spring the Russian Army will still be short of cartridges.

The Allied Ministers asked M. Skouloudis yesterday to give the French and English Generals a free hand for their retreat on to Greek territory and for the organisation of lines of defence; the King has decided to send the Vth Greek Corps from Salonika to the East frontier. It transpires that only 100 Uhlans, and not a German regiment, entered Monastir with the Bulgarians, so the capture of Monastir and all that district is, contrary to Greek hopes, entirely Bulgarian work.

The German wireless tells of a great speech which the Chancellor delivered in the Reichstag when he paid a glowing tribute to the King of Bulgaria, reproached the Entente with using violence towards Greece, and said that a solid bridge was now built between the Empires of the Centre and the Balkans and the Near East, and that when the war was over this bridge would no longer resound to the tramp of battalions on the march but would serve for the work of civilisation.

The Italian Government has just arranged the transport of a contingent to Valona and will then turn their attention to Servian supplies, but at the same moment M. Paschitch has warned Boppe of the insuperable difficulties of supplying the Servian Army in Albania for any length of time, and asks that the troops shall be sent to Salonika as soon as they have been rescued from sheer hunger with food stuffs through St. Jean de Medua.

12th.—We learn from a *Vert* that the Italian Minister at Bucharest has telegraphed to his Government that a Roumanian General has been deputed to deliver a letter from his Sovereign to the King of Italy; the august writer explains in it that he wishes to be a people's King, that he would like—despite his family ties—to enable his country to realise popular ambitions, but that Roumania is much handicapped

by her geographical position and cannot join the Allies in the field without her eyes well open; the King of Roumania would like to know, if the case should arise, what help Italy would give. Thus a "conversation" was opened, and it is to be hoped that Rome will pursue it.

King Constantine, in the course of an audience yesterday, told M. Guillemin with many expletives that he considered Venizelos responsible for having brought the Allied troops to Greece, that never, never should he hold office again, and that he (the King) would rather take a ragpicker out of the street and make him Prime Minister. The Greek Government also has told Sarraïl that our defence works round Salonika will provoke lively protests and that the Greeks will not evacuate the place; however, the Vth Corps, now in the Langaza region, which has to be fortified, is under orders to move eastwards.

Charles Humbert came to me with a story about the Russian Military Attaché not being able to get spectacles from a French optician, but his real motive was to let me know that Germany is employing a former mistress of the Khedive, who is a friend of the mistress of Lenoir, son of the publicity agent, to try and buy *Le Journal*. Humbert thinks he is going to show these people up and has something up his sleeve which he does not tell me, so I could only advise him to put the matter into proper hands.

Clémenceau has published another attack on the Ministers and cheerfully predicts that my time is up. I am, as often before, accused of exercising personal influence while I have neither the right nor the means to do a single thing, and can only devote my hours to my country's service, trying to co-ordinate the work of the Ministers and the Soldiers and to make good any mistakes which are brought to my notice. How can one reconcile this wilful blindness and arrogance with Clémenceau's splendid patriotism?

13th.—We have agreed with the British to show our confidence in King Constantine's promises by breaking up the naval force at Milo; the Greek Government replies to this friendly gesture by telling the station-master at Salonika

to send to the Serés-Drama section all the rolling stock available in the town. Joffre, who is following carefully events there, and is in close touch with Sarrail, has telegraphed to the War Minister to beg him to obtain from the Greek Government the withdrawal of this step.

Joffre has sent us a report of the conferences at Chantilly last week; there was entire agreement that no decision could be secured except in the two principal theatres, and that concerted offensive action, in as large strength as possible, should be set afoot as soon as proper arrangements could be made, the only point of discussion being as to the methods and approximate date for such action which could scarcely be before the spring. There was also no difference of opinion as to the immediate evacuation of Gallipoli, the urgent necessity for fortifying Salonika, as also for the defence of Egypt, but the last with a smaller force than Lord Kitchener had suggested. The only bone of contention was as to the maintenance of our expeditionary force at Salonika, both French and Murray strongly sustaining Lord Kitchener's view. Joffre, on the other hand, supported by the representatives of Russia, Italy, Servia and Belgium, was at pains to show that the abandonment of Salonika would mean a serious set-back, that the prestige of the Allies, now inactive on the principal fronts, would be destroyed in the Near East, and that Germany would be free to pursue her Imperialist policy. And while Russia insisted on our remaining at Salonika, Italy let it be known that if we retired from there, she would be obliged to evacuate Albania, where she has just landed.

M. Guérin has again been allowed by the Germans to look after the feeding of the people in the invaded regions, but again also the German Government has entrusted him with still more delicate matters, and notably that of an exchange between the hostages who may have been taken in the Departments of the North, with some of the German functionaries in Alsace whom we have had to intern.

Briand has asked Joffre to find out whether Sarrail really thinks he can hold Salonika, but Joffre rather dislikes putting the question so bluntly and proposes to send Castelnau there

to get full information. If this is done there is sure to be an outcry in Parliament, and the Left will say that Sarrail is being put, by the Commander-in-Chief and by the Government, under the orders of Castelnau.

14th.—Clémenceau has given away, almost to a man, our fighting strength in Salonika, and Charles Humbert has started a violent campaign against our Aviation services; people really seem to be forgetting that we are at war and are regaining their appetite for indiscreet gossip; a good many Ministers are quite justifiably complaining about these indiscretions. The censorship, at one time perhaps too strict, now seems to let people say what they like.

Galliéni has told us that Pellé and Janin cannot be termed Chiefs of the Staff and can only be called Staff Officers. The whole command vests with Joffre, and under his direct orders with Castelnau, whereas with the title proposed Pellé would really have charge of the war.

The Finance Minister is more and more unhappy about the Parliamentary situation; the Cabinet he thinks is threatened, and he puts me on my guard against the formation of a Clémenceau Ministry; it would be a most dangerous thing, he insists, and would be like a penny chucked into the air without knowing on which side it would come down. Clémenceau has put on paper that he is determined to break Joffre, although nobody knows whom he would put in his place.

Our Salonika Divisions have retired without too much trouble to the south of the Lake of Doiran.

The famine has begun at Scutari for the Servian refugees and for the troops, and M. Boppe is begging for the necessary victuals; it is almost impossible, however, to send supplies through St. Jean de Medua or Bojana, and Sonnino is asking that the wretched people should be brought to Durazzo or Valona. But unless we hurry up they will die of hunger before they embark.

15th.—I went with Painlevé and Albert Thomas to see the working of an enormous machine which has been designed to smash up wire defences. It is a steam car which lays down heavy rails in front of it, passes over them, and then picks

them up. These rails form huge polygons and their sides can easily crush wire entanglements, climb up and cross trenches, all in a straight line ; the steering is very difficult. The car will be armour-plated and carry machine guns. Painlevé and Thomas think much of the invention, but G.Q.G. think it scarcely practical and that it will be easily put out of action.

Our naval base at Lemnos is to be transferred to Mitylene when Cape Helle is evacuated ; the English have agreed to this, but our Admiral Gauchet dislikes the idea as likely to give rise to great inconveniences. Guillemin, however, thinks the attitude of the Greek Government is very suspicious ; no promise made by them or the King has been kept, and our Minister would like the fleet to remain at Milo and that no coercive measures should be dropped or relaxed without the official opinion of the Allied Ministers on the spot.

Lord Kitchener has told Galliéni in confidence that he expects an Austro-German attack on us at Salonika, and that the Greek General Staff, with or without the consent of the Government, are parties to this. Happily the information of the Intelligence branch of the service is not always infallible.

16th.—A long discussion this morning as to the high price of necessaries and the necessity of England sending us frozen meat for the civil population as well as the Army ; we may also arrange to subsidize the co-operative butchers' shops in Paris so as to bring down prices.

Léon Bourgeois wants Galliéni to go to the front sometimes with Joffre to see how things are going and take a look at our organisations for defence ; Colonel Driaut, a deputy who is in command of chasseurs north of Verdun, has given a fright to the Army Committee by telling them that there were no continuous second lines in that part. I have begged the War Minister to mention this to Joffre, as if perforce we are for the time being immobilised, we must anyhow be proof against a German assault.

The Tsar, in the course of an audience at Petrograd, told Doumer that he intended to send us some Russian units who would be armed with our regulation rifles and whose establish-

ments would be completed by French officers ; one brigade could go by Archangel in the first fortnight of the New Year, and about 40,000 men per month would follow. Almost too good to be true.

The Greek Government continues—as Guillemin puts it—to make fun of us, and the answers which Sarraïl gets from Skouloudis are laughable ; the King is in bed and inaccessible, but anyhow the Greek Army has left Salonika.

17th.—The fleet at Milo has been broken up in agreement with England but contrary to the opinion of the Allied Ministers ; one can only say that it can be reassembled if necessary. Constantine is really ill ; the doctors thought they must take away the tube he has had in his side since his last illness, but the wound, instead of healing, has suppurated again.

Sarraïl reports that the British plans for organising defences are changed every day and as yet nothing has been done. Joffre is asking Kitchener to let Castelnau take the whole matter in hand, fix the positions and allocate the men, the British General to take orders from him ; Castelnau could afterwards go to Athens and see the King.

Mr. Gordon Bennett called this afternoon, and I was able to thank him for the sympathy which the American papers show us day in day out. “ France,” he said, “ is fighting for the liberty of the world, and I only hope the United States will soon break off relations with Germany and Austria.”

18th.—General Pellé sent the day before yesterday a telegram, on behalf of Joffre, to our Military Attaché in Rome, in which he alluded in very warm terms to the successful speech of M. Bissolati, the Socialist member. Galliéni is going to ask Joffre to see that his officers stick to their military duties and do not meddle with politics.

Skouloudis wants France and England to lend Greece 10,000,000 francs in gold ; the answer is that Greece shall have the money when our troops are immune from any attack.

On account of the very bad transport facilities in Albania, it is thought that the force intended to go overland from Scutari to Durazzo may either be unable to get there ahead of the

Bulgarians, or may find themselves held up on the road, and to save the 30,000 or 40,000 men at Scutari the only way will be to embark them as soon as possible at St. Jean de Medua, ship them to Durazzo and thence let them go to the place where the troops are to be reorganised. Hunted from every quarter, the unfortunate Servians seem to be at bay, but the Crown Prince remains cool and confident even in these tragic hours.

Sir John French has resigned the command of the British Armies in France and Flanders ; he will be created a Viscount of the United Kingdom and will have command of the Home Troops. He is to be succeeded by Sir Douglas Haig, until now commanding the 1st Army ; Sir Douglas, who is Scotch by origin, has the reputation of being an officer of outstanding merit ; he is much smarter and better-looking—and has much better manners—than his predecessor.

The Austrian wireless of to-day is to the effect that in the last battle of the Isonzo the Italians had 70,000 casualties, that the Austrians were holding all the positions they had taken, and that south of Cenic they had driven the Montenegrins out of the last strip of Bosnia.

19th.—The *Gazette des Ardennes*—the paper which the Germans circulate in the invaded country—devotes the issue of the 19th to Clémenceau's article against me about the Command of the Armies.

King Constantine, when talking to Guillemin about Venizelos and the Ministers said : “ You are dealing with rascals who are simply playing with you. You will only manage them by putting fear into them ; they would, if they could, hand you over to the Germans.”

20th.—André Tardieu, Henri Laredan and one or two others dined here to-night. Tardieu, who insisted on leaving G.Q.G. the other day, to go into the trenches, was overcome there with cold, remained unconscious for thirty hours, and the doctors only just managed to pull him round. He is as brilliant and delightful as ever ; he is sure the war will last two more years and thinks it was pure folly to go on with the Champagne fighting when it was seen we could not take the second lines.

Sir John French called to say good-bye ; he does not at all like leaving France, and thinks the Germans have no more "bite" and have lost all their spirit of attack. Perhaps he would be less sure about this, if he were remaining at the head of the British Army.

Doumer had scarcely left Petrograd two days ago when Sazonoff told Paléologue that he was sure neither the Emperor nor the military authorities had promised, even in principle, to send us a monthly contingent of 40,000 men ; General Pau, who has just gone to Russia at the head of our military mission, will proceed at once to G.Q.G. there, and find out exactly what was said to Doumer. Any promise must be put down in black and white, and so far the only definite promise has been that of a brigade.

The Germans are busier than ever with intrigues in Morocco, and Lyautey has had great difficulty in disposing of a wealthy native, one Abd el Malek, who declared himself the champion of German-Turkish activities, and proved himself a very astute propagandist.

The communiqués are no less monotonous than usual, but Death continues to take his fearful toll, and the fighting, however desultory, is deadly in result.

Joseph Reinach said to me to-day that Clémenceau wanted to be the Gambetta of the war, but is now resigned to be only the Rochefort.

21st.—Galliéni, being unable to go to Chantilly, has written to Joffre about the second line defences for Verdun, and has received a rather tart reply that the Commander-in-Chief is quite willing to retire if he does not enjoy our confidence, but he cannot put up with the Government getting information from his officers. The one thing needful, however, is to put Verdun in a proper state of defence.

It would seem that the telegram over Pellé's signature which upset Galliéni so much was a copy of one of the Agence Stefani's reports which the Press Bureau at G.Q.G. had sent to our Military Attaché in Rome. But why should there be a Press Bureau for Foreign Affairs at G.Q.G. ? Surely there is one at the Quai d'Orsay.

Laguiche, while paying his tribute to Pau's great reputation,

does not like being put under him and wishes to resign.

The King of Montenegro is contemplating a separate peace or an armistice with partial demobilisation and, so we hear, would even be willing to hand over to Austria, Mont Lovcen, which dominates Cattaro, in exchange for Albanian Scutari; meanwhile the King is receiving monthly allowances from England and France.

The Chinese Minister here has told Jules Cambon of the approaching coronation of Yuan Chi Kai as Emperor, and gave him to understand that thereafter China would take sides with us in the war.

22nd.—Tittoni actually introduced to Briand the other day the subject of a so-called rectification of the Alpine frontier and of our giving Breil to Italy; the French inhabitants of Saorge and Fontan had somehow got wind of the idea and had protested vigorously against it. Briand told Tittoni, rather too vaguely for my liking, that he had not sufficiently studied the matter, and as soon as I saw the telegram he sent to Barrère I asked him to inform the Council of the Italian Ambassador's astounding suggestion. Public opinion would be outraged just now at the bare idea of giving up a French cantonment, and Tittoni's mental alertness may be unhealthily stimulated by Briand's promise to give his "favourable consideration" to the point.

Sarrail is asking for supplies for Salonika.

23rd.—Fleuriat* has written rather a strong letter to Briand as to the state of anarchy in which the British Government is at the moment; the weakness of Asquith, the unpopularity of Grey, the masterfulness of Kitchener,—who took the "Great Seal" with him to the Dardanelles for fear of somebody being put in his place while he was away.

From Russia come reports of Rasputin's renewed sinister influence; and that the Empress is hourly becoming more and more unpopular, her German origin being freely commented on. Laguiche, who has not yet resigned, reminds us that when arranging for the transport of the Russian brigade here, we must not forget their baths, or their tea, which form part of their military equipment.

*First Secretary of Embassy in London.

We scored yesterday a considerable success at Hertmannsweillerskopf ; to-day we have had a terrible set-back and more than 1200 men are missing. Did our people push on too far, or were they taken by surprise with a counter-attack? I can get no authentic information.

24th.—Sazonoff has written to Paléologue that on account of the extension of its front the Russian Army has only a limited number of trained men available to send abroad, that there can be no question of our getting 40,000 per month, but as a proof of their desire to do their utmost, a brigade, as a tentative measure, will be forwarded to us unless the severity of the winter should prevent navigation; the brigade to be armed and supplied, and partly officered here.

Joffre has telegraphed to Kitchener to try and secure unity of command for us at Salonika.

25th.—A truly mournful Christmas Day. The Servian troops are to be sent provisionally to Corfu to refit; Briand wanted this to be done at Valona, but Italy has definitely refused. The old King of Servia has arrived at Brindisi on board an Italian torpedo boat.

Lord Kitchener has replied to Joffre that the question of unity of command at Salonika must be referred to the Cabinet and that he will do this at their next meeting.

Briand hears through the Spanish Embassy that the Court Martial at Magdeburg has confirmed the sentences on Lieutenants Delcassé and Hervé, who have appealed to the Supreme Court; he has telegraphed to the Spanish Embassy in Berlin to give due notice to the German Government that if the French officers cease to enjoy the ordinary régime for officer prisoners of war, two German Lieutenants, of whom Lieutenant von Bissing is one, will be at once shut up in a fortress and subjected to the régime there.

26th.—Briand is meeting with difficulties on all sides and came here with Admiral Lacaze to say that while the Italians object to Valona being used for the Servians, the English are equally unwilling to agree to Corfu, although our squadron at Malta have made all arrangements for anchorage there. It is finally decided that the Servian Army shall be taken on small vessels to the Brindisi or Tarento roadstead, and there

transhipped to larger vessels for Biserta, there to be refitted and reorganised and then sent to Salonika.

27th.—Pénélon tells me that Joffre is in no way disturbed by the report that the Germans may attack in the north with twenty or thirty Divisions ; he feels quite able to deal with this lot, and is only anxious as to whether they will use some new gas.

Clémenceau uses bitter words this morning as to Castelnau going to Salonika, for which of course he holds me responsible. The General has, however, returned here through Athens, where he was more than well received. The King said to him : “ You must trust me. I am not German either by origin or education, or in my sympathies ; on the contrary, my sympathies are rather with France. But my people and I alike, wish to remain neutral, and nowadays neither Kings nor Governments, but the people, decide as to war.” Constantine once more declared that England was responsible for the war, a statement which Castelnau proved to him to be absolutely baseless.

General von Emmich, known in Germany as the conqueror of Liège, has been buried with every manifestation of honour, all the Princes attending the funeral. It appertains to Germany thus to celebrate the violation of Belgium.

28th.—The Cabinet in London have agreed to Lord Kitchener’s proposal that a French General shall be in supreme control at Salonika, but on condition that this shall not be Sarrail ; and that Sarrail, like General Mahon, shall come under the orders of the new Chief. Joffre quite smiled on this idea, and would like to send Lyautey or Franchet d’Espérey, but Painlevé and Léon Bourgeois warmly opposed it, protesting that it was not for the English to select our Generals. The British Government will therefore be thanked for their consent in principle, but told that Sarrail will remain in command of the expeditionary force.

Briand tells us of negotiations in London as to the constitution of a great Arab State, so dear to the wishes of our English friends but with which the question of Syria is bound up. The British Government, represented by Sir Arthur Nicolson, fully admitted our authority in Alexandretta, Adana

and Cilicia, but in return wanted the sovereignty of the Sultan of Mecca to be recognised. France, having only the right to name the Governor, this would give the Sultan charge over the Mussulman and Christian folk, neither of whom wish to be dependent on him. The English also want to carry a railway to Haifa; in other words to compete with the Alexandretta line. I am not myself greatly enamoured of the notion of a federated Arab State and am doubtful as to its effect on our own African colonies, but we have gone rather too far for any withdrawal of our consent.

Joffre is very much upset about another of Clémenceau's articles in which he and Castelnau are very roughly handled while Sarrail is held up as a victim. These persistent attacks are really making the Generalissimo ill, but he has, however, circulated confidential letters to his senior commanders in which he explains the reasons for the initial success and subsequent failure which attended his last operations, especially in Champagne.

29th.—Went with Galliéni and Briand this morning to Chantilly, where our leading Generals were assembled with Haig, who told me in so many words that he considered himself as being under Joffre's orders. It was good to learn that the second line of defences for Verdun were completed as elsewhere, except above Berry au Bac and that third lines were being constructed.

In the subsequent discussion on gas Haig assured us that his gas mask was perfect. Joffre dissented from this, saying that it hindered a man's breathing and bluntly said that G.Q.G. must make up their minds what sort of mask they wanted so that he could speed up the orders he was placing.

Dubail told us about the mishap in the Alsace fighting; the 152nd Regiment seems to have moved too quickly down the Hartmannswillerskopf slope; they did not man the German trenches in sufficient strength, and the Colonel did not send up, for the counter attack, the battalion which General Serret had advised him to put in.

At breakfast Sir Douglas Haig said to me: "When you gave me the plaque of the Legion of Honour you told me to wear it on my right breast; General Langle de Cary and

General Foch wear it on their left. Why?" I said the reason was because they were not only Grand Officers but had the Grand Cordon, and when breakfast was over, after a word aside with Briand and Joffre, I said to Haig: "Now please put your plaque on your left breast, for I am making you a Grand Cross of the Legion of Honour." The Commander of the British Armies is fully deserving of this promotion and he seemed very pleased.

M. Zaharof, a Greek by origin who has lived for a long time here or in England, has put several millions of francs at the disposal of Venizelos.

30th.—At our meeting Malvy disclosed the attempts to bring about a premature peace which can be traced to certain small sections of the Socialist Party, and certain working class organisations. Yesterday, however, the Socialist Congress passed by a large majority a resolution to the effect that Germany was responsible for the war and Guesde and Sembat assured us that in future anyone adopting pacifist measures would be turned out of the Party. A good deal would be done to arrest this pernicious propaganda if the price of victuals could be lowered and arrangements are to be made with the co-operative butcheries to reduce the price of meat by twenty centimes a kilo.

Paul Cambon tells me that Lord Kitchener—whom Asquith and Lloyd George wanted to dispose of and whose portfolio Lloyd George covets—has come back to London and is a more popular hero and more trusted by the people than ever; Grey is ailing increasingly.

31st.—Here comes the end of a year which the future may pronounce as the most terrible if not the most critical of the war.

King Peter has just left Brindisi for Salonika; he kept himself aloof from all the Italian authorities and only told the Servian Minister at Rome, whom he sent for, that he considered the dignified thing was to remain silent as to the unforgettable affronts to which he had been subjected by the agents of the Italian Government.

The British Cabinet has very handsomely modified its answer about Sarraïl, who will therefore remain at Salonika,

and Clémenceau will have to eat his words.

Briand wants to create a diplomatic organisation with periodical sessions—to take place at Paris—of the Allies, much on the lines of the military conference over which Joffre presided in December. London and Petrograd have accepted the idea, but there is no reply as yet from Rome. If the project materialises, will it do anything to bring about unanimity in our decisions and greater rapidity in our actions? One can only hope so. But a conference is far from being the same thing as unity of command.

On the eve of the New Year, Joffre has addressed a General Order to the troops, and his manly words will appeal alike to soldiers and civilians.

The year closes without any ray of the dawn of victory. But that dawn must rise. Victor Hugo was right to say that on the day when the light of France is extinguished, dusk will have set in over the whole world.

THE END

INDEX

- Adriatic, Italian anxiety, 97; probable operations, 101
- African troops, 159
- Aircraft troubles, 200; of inferior quality, 234
- Aisne flooded, 11; effect on reserve Division for Soissons, 13
- Albert, King of the Belgians, at Houthem, 78; at Loos, 179; visits French troops, 198; and Russian retreat, 199; meets Joffre, 200
- Alexandretta, British landing, 287; project given up, 293
- Algerian coast exposed, 278
- Alsace and suspects, 16; restitution, 40; the command in, 75; continuous fighting, 174; Poincaré's visit, 184; French territory once more, 187; new offensive suggested, 242
- America, *Lusitania* torpedoed, 99; Bryan resigns, 129
- Anniversary of German ultimatum to Belgium, 179
- Archbishop of Paris, and peace, 25
- Argonne, heavy fighting, 162; our losses, 167; further losses, 172; asphyxiating gas, 172; another reverse, 219; German heavy guns, 224; more fighting, 235
- Armaments shortage, 94
- Arras, a dead city, 9; Hotel de Ville in ruins, 9; result of offensive, 100; advance to Loos, 102; no decisive result, 103; lack of munitions, 110; further fighting, 120; complete failure of operations, 137; trouble in Council, 139; attempt to break through, 235; attack begins, 238; not a complete success, 239; attack checked, 240
- Artois, costly operations, 122; heavy casualties, 140
- Asquith visits Sir John French, 122; opinion about unity of control, 125; meets Delcassé at Calais, 155, 158; deputises for Kitchener, 281; trouble over dual control, 290; equivocal note about evacuation, 314
- Aubigny, Foch visits President, 8
- Augagneur as Minister of Marine, 7; opinion about Dardanelles, 18, 22, 58; anxiety about Mediterranean, 21; and Pierre Loti, 23; British action in Egypt, 67; question of Naval command, 96; shortage of submarines, 188; afraid of failure in Dardanelles, 222
- Austria and Italy, 60, 61, 65, 67; threat to Serbia, 113; question of harvest, 139
- Balkans, an offensive suggested, 5, 74; necessity for Allied agreement, 155; suggested attack, 189; Allies must intervene, 232
- Bassee, La, 59; British attack, 66
- Beatty, Sir David (later Earl) fight off Bay of Heligoland, 19
- Belgian neutrality, 48; Guards at Ypres, 87
- Belgians, King of, *see* Albert, King of the Belgians
- Belgium, relief work, 75; and French troops, 137; King in command, 145
- Berchtold, Count, resignation, 15
- Bernstein, German Socialist discusses peace, 194
- Bertie, Lord, *see* Bertie, Sir Francis
- Bertie, Sir Francis, meets Poincaré, 2; returns from Bordeaux, 17; and Mr. Lloyd George, 28; acts as interpreter, 28; and French wounded, 80; peerage conferred, 126; opinion concerning Constantinople, 203, 224; and Greek integrity, 251

- Bikanir, Maharajah of, meeting with Poincaré, 17
- Bois le Prêtre, Poincaré's visit, 127
- Bourges, artillery practice, 165
- Brest Litovsk to be evacuated, 208
- Briand at the Elysée, 2; and the Near East, 2, 5; suggested as leader of Government, 153; asked to succeed Delcassé, 261; to be Prime Minister, 266; difficulties over his Cabinet, 269; chosen to go to London and Calais about Salonika, 310, 312
- British support for Joffre, 125; troops without rifles, 130; more troops needed in France, 143; Commander-in-Chief should co-operate with the French, 149; failure of move in the Dardanelles, 193; troops for the Balkans, 260; troops also needed for Servia, 261; compulsory service, 261, 275; Government fail to keep their word, 262; public opinion against official delay, 265; extravagant hopes in Gallipoli, 268; Cabinet ministers in Paris, 292; Cabinet confusion, 327.
- Bulgaria, Duc de Guise visits the King, 17; treatment of Allies, 26, 59, 82; and Turkey, 54; feeling about Greece, 69, 86; some intimidation of, 81; position with regard to Constantinople 102; resentment about Turkey, 111; treatment of Allies, 122, 134; and Rome, 136; relations with Germany, 180; and Greece, 184; preparations for war, 198; agreement over Turkey, 207, 229; a difficult situation, 221; doubtful co-operation, 223; resentment over a loan, 231; effect of mobilisation, 232; and Sir Edward Grey, 237; mobilisation considered an offence, 239; mobilisation continues, 240; Russian ultimatum, 252; an attack on Servia, 254; attack carried out, 259; war declared, 259; war with Italy, 261; strength of the army, 267; an early reverse, 273, 278; a strong push westwards, 282; threatening Monastir, 300
- Caillaux on tour in South America, 17
- Cameroons, French success, 230; French troops doing well, 276
- Canadian troops for France, 12; poison gas experience, 87
- Carden, Admiral Sir Reginald, and the Dardanelles, 42; and the Greek fleet, 79
- Carson, Sir Edward, his resignation as a protest, 265
- Castelnau and the Central army, 132; receives Poincaré, 147; a great military success, 239; he pushes on, 240; active measures, 244; loses a third son, 250; to receive Grand Cross of the Legion of Honour, 252; decorated with the Grand Cordon, 279; as Chief of Staff, 311; hostility to his appointment, 315; to assist in Salonika, 324
- Cavell, Nurse, shot by the Germans, 269, 304
- Censorship too slack, 322
- Champagne, operations in, 1; heavy fighting, 10; a fresh attack, 37; shortage of munitions 43; attack developing, 44; a fierce struggle, 50; Lord Kitchener and the struggle, 50; the results here, 61; failure of operations, 63; offensive only part of general plan, 66; our casualties, 66; Joffre supports the offensive, 68; Joffre's position, 71; G.Q.G. and Champagne, 81; further operations, 206; enemy artillery, 209; new plan of attack, 218; fresh attack begins, 238; many prisoners, 239; in touch with German last line, 240; further success, 245; final results only poor, 253; full results not achieved, 286
- Chérif of Mecca and Great Britain, 268
- Child victims of German shells, 179
- Chinese Republic not a success, 279; Monarchy to be restored, 327
- Churchill, Winston, and the Dardanelles, 18, 21, 41, 46, 71; views about Egypt, 67; Naval operations, 72; in Paris, 98; criticised by French generals, 144
- Clémenceau, complaint about idle troops, 18; and Japan, 30, 58; opposes Millerand, 30; attacks Army Committee of Senate, 31; and Poincaré, 34; criticises the

- Government, 64; accuses ministers, 93, 104; abused by President Loubet, 102; attacks Joffre, 123; and the High Command, 130; attacks the Pope, 138; and the Government, 153; his opinion about Roumania, 154; attacks Joffre, 195; bitter abuse of Joffre, 218; pungent article about the Government, 254; abuse of Delcassé, 254; opposes Salonika expedition, 257; attacks the new Cabinet, 277; complains of lack of official information, 295; attack on Poincaré, 311, 320; indiscreet revelations, 322
- Commercy, shells on, 2
- Constantine, King, telegram from Prince George of Greece, 102. *See under Greece*
- Constantinople and the Dardanelles, 2; Russian aims, 63; Greek anxiety, 70; position of the Allies, 73; Russia's claim, 253; Germans to be kept out, 262; pressure by Germany, 285; Russia gives her views, 277
- Croix de Guerre, 88
- Cyprus promised to Greece, 261
- d'Annunzio, Gabriele, at Genoa, 98; patriotic speeches, 106
- Danube and Roumanian front, 112; German attack repulsed, 257
- Dardanelles, attack on, 18, 21, 41, 42, 71; discussion concerning, 46; Italy and the attack, 57; attack on Narrows, 67; forts damaged, 72; German defence work, 75; further attacks, 89; fresh troops needed, 90; General Bailloud, 93; heavy fighting, 95; General d'Amade's report, 118; bad news, 127; effect on Bulgaria, 136; Joffre on the offensive, 144; Kitchener does not send more troops, 159; success essential, 167; Joffre's difficulties, 176; Sarraill to go, 176; he is disinclined, 181; Joffre's objections, 182; further operations suggested, 189; Joffre can spare no troops, 191; failure of British move, 193; failure to take Turkish positions, 204; trouble over reinforcements, 200; support to Russia, 225; water scanty at Gallipoli, 225; Sarraill's report, 232; troops to be diverted to Salonika, 237; France will support, 244; troops in excellent condition, 247; British Cabinet blamed, 262; Naval attack, 279; Kitchener approves evacuation, 289; offensive to be dropped, 302
- Delcassé and Ferdinand of Bulgaria, 17; troops for Serbia, 32; and Venizelos, 36; opinion of torpedo warfare, 37; about Constantinople, 52; Italian problems, 61, 72, 77; Prince George of Greece, 80; concerning Russian ambitions, 83; position of Greece, 103; his son a prisoner in Germany, 107; Russian problems, 108; concerning Bulgaria, 136; Constantinople, 138; meeting with Asquith at Calais, 155, 158; the Dardanelles problem, 173; his view of Servian aims, 198; visits King Albert, 207; greatly worried about his son, 231; to go to London, 245; health troubles, 246; withdraws his resignation, 246; lack of initiative, 249; abused by Clémenceau, 254; he resigns, 255; his son is imprisoned, 256; German Press delighted at resignation, 263
- Deschanel, Paul, elected President of Chambre, 11
- d'Espérey and Poincaré, 2; opinion of the Balkans problem, 5
- d'Harcourt, Colonel, returned by Germans, 171
- d'Oissel, General, Commander in Belgium, 178
- Dubail General and Eastern armies, 132; nicknamed "The Assassin," 134; meets King Albert, 200; suggested for War Minister, 264
- Dunkirk, bombed, 7; for France or England, 59, 68, 72; shelled, 90; attacked by long range gun, 93; bombarded, 103; soldiers' graves, 163; daily destruction, 179; as a fortified area, 188
- Duparge, General, and Poincaré, at Cagny, 100
- Egypt must be protected, 275, 286, 289, 293; Kitchener's anxiety, 305; fear of attack, 305; France sees no danger, 309; Kitchener devotes himself to the problem, 316

- England and new armies, 20. *See also* British
- Fleet, British, and Chanak, 67
- Foch, General, at Cassel, 8, 78; the fighting in Champagne, 63; and Neuve Chapelle, 65; relations with Joffre, 120; with the Northern army, 132; opposes military consultations, 142; Vimy Ridge, 143; advises delay, 157; meets Millerand and Poincaré at Bergues, 178; an attack at Arras, 235; he starts an offensive, 239; receives Grand Cross of Legion of Honour, 252; invested with Grand Cordon, 265; advises delay till better prepared, 265
- Foumier, Admiral, returns from Dardanelles, 296
- France and Russian alliance, 27; total troops in War area, 40; defective guns, 82; dealings with Belgium, 137; blamed for Russian failure, 138; question of unity of control, 145; now at maximum military strength, 182; as to asphyxiating gas, 194, 204, 219, 228; heavy casualties, 228; protest to Bulgaria, 237; question of poison gas, 274; details of fighting forces, 298; great need of money, 307; threatens reprisals for indignities to officer prisoners, 328
- France, Anatole, and Battle of Soissons, 13
- Franchet d'Espérey, General. *See* d'Espérey
- French, Sir John, at St. Omer, 8; dealings with Joffre, 64, 68, 72, 74; War casualties, 66; visited by Asquith, 122, 158; trouble over unity of control, 125; claims independence of action, 144; does not approve a defensive campaign, 146; friction with Joffre, 158; the command in France, 196; to find troops for Servia, 262; he resigns the Command, 325; a peerage conferred, 325; says good-bye to Poincaré, 326
- Freycinet, Poincaré calls on him, 35
- Galliéni, Command in Alsace, 6; relations with Joffre, 59; as War Minister, 264; makes an excellent maiden speech 284; attacks Sarraill, 297; and the supreme Command, 304; friction with Joffre, 306; advises the evacuation of Gallipoli, 307, 314
- Gallipoli, fighting begins, 149; evacuation considered, 293; strong demand for abandonment, 309
- Garibaldi, Bruno and Costante, both killed, 7
- Garibaldi, General, relations with Poincaré, 31; and Italian Monarchy, 57
- Gas, poison, 194, 204, 219, 228
- Gasparrì, Cardinal, discusses peace, 25
- George, King, and Constantinople, 83; and Italy, 86; Italian question again prominent, 90; his chef is in Alsace, 185; telegram to Poincaré, 248; journey to Havre and Rouen, 262; meets Poincaré, 265; inspects British troops in the mud, 266; inspects French troops in the fighting line, 266; an accident while inspecting troops, 270
- George, Lloyd, opinion about the Near East, 27; and the Triple Entente, 29; considers a collective loan, 28; and Japanese troops, 30; trying to become Prime Minister, 262; not in favour of evacuation of Salonika, 314
- George, Prince, *see* Greece
- German success at Soissons, 13; aeroplanes, 14; influence in Russia, 19; declaration of War zone in the Channel, 36; decision to "torpedo at sight," 36; treatment of prisoners of war, 42, 45, 59; torpedo warfare, 47; pressure in Greece, 58; violation of rights, 59; concerning prisoners, 68; bread horrible, 81; internal conditions, 81; insult to Italy, 123; prisoners in Italy, 140, 160; superior artillery, 158; dealings with Roumania, 160; and with Bulgaria, 180; resources in man power, 197; still no declaration of war with Italy, 198; further brutal outrages at sea, 201; celebrations over Russian defeats, 217; Hindenburg a national hero, 217; considers war with Italy, 227;

- submarines in Adriatic and Mediterranean, 302; cruel treatment of French officer prisoners, 328
- Ghensi, M., and his book, 2
- Goeben* in the Black Sea, 76
- Gouraud, General, and Poincaré, 95; seriously wounded, 153; choice of successor, 154; Poincaré visits the invalid, 160; now a convalescent, 217; opinion of new offensive off Dardanelles, 217; on active service again, 275; and the King of Italy, 278; returns to Paris, 288
- Greece and the Allies, 58, 65, 80, 86; Prince George of Greece, 69, 80, 85, 102; Prince George and the Allies, 103, 111, 117; Greece and the Dardanelles, 79; dealings with Bulgaria, 69, 86; question of Constantinople, 70, 81; relations with Turkey, 82; and with Bulgaria, 184; Venizelos returns to power, 198; treatment of Allies under Venizelos, 201; effect of mobilisation on Bulgaria, 243; Prince George leaves for Athens, 258; fear of Servian defeat, 263; defeat of new Government, 276; Greece asks for a loan, 282; question of Servian troops, 283; British pressure, 284, 285, 290; mobilisation to stop, 288; the King remains in bed, 324; a loan wanted, 324
- Grey, Sir Edward, and Poincaré, 36; and Colonial troops, 42; informed of the Dardanelles, 47; and about Constantinople, 51; relations with Italy, 68, 71, 83; and with Bulgaria, 70, 82; the question of Spanish neutrality, 87; Bulgarian trouble, 111; also with Roumania, 114; communications with Russia, 197; friction with Bulgaria, 237; warned about delay in Servia, 245; his fatal hesitation, 247; serious effect of the delay, 248; Venizelos is restless, 250; Sir Edward changes his mind, 261; far too slow for vital decisions, 276; suggests a neutral Arab State, 288, 329; would sacrifice Egypt if necessary, 293; offer to Albania, 300; he withdraws the offer, 301; ill-health, 331
- Grodno captured by Germans, 195
- Guise, Duc de, dealings with Ferdinand of Bulgaria, 12; starts for Sofia, 17
- Haig, Sir Douglas, receives Legion of Honour, 8; to take Command in France, 325; places himself under Joffre, 330; given Grand Cross of the Legion of Honour, 331
- Hamilton, Sir Ian, and the Dardanelles, 128, 174; fails to take Turkish positions, 204; question of Sarrail's Command, 221; objection to withdrawal of troops, 244; lands at Salonika, 249; is blamed for mistakes, 296
- Heligoland, Bay of, Naval battle, 19
- Hertmannsweilerkopf, success and reverse for our troops, 328, 330
- Hervieu, Paul, sudden death, 266, 269
- Hirschauer, General, Director of Aviation, 14
- Holland and Germany, 72
- House, Colonel, sent by America to Europe, 12
- Humbert, General, and Poincaré, 115
- Ibanez, Blasco, Illustrated History of the War, 9
- Ill-health of troops, 62
- Irish Members of Parliament send delegation, 91
- Italy, Hospital in Paris, 31; requires a loan, 31; dealings with the Allies, 31, 56, 60, 70, 71, 72, 77, 81, 87; soldiers in French ranks, 57; the Dardanelles question, 57; a new frontier, 60, 84; position of Austria, 60, 61, 65, 67, 77; friction with Germany, 62; and with Russia, 75, 84, 86; question of intervention, 83, 84, 87; relations with the Holy See, 85; agreement with Allies, 89; the King's thanks, 92; Italy and the Allies, 95; the Mediterranean question, 97; the Government resigns, 105, 106, 107; war declared on Austria, 115; and on Germany, 120, 139, 140, 159; trouble with Servia, 130; belief as to origin of War, 146; her army is active, 155; short of

- munitions, 184; war with Turkey, 189; more trouble over Serbia, 193; question of munitions for the Allies, 208; war with Germany, 227; declares war on Bulgaria, 261; declaration of war with Germany, 264, 295; offensive on Isonzo front, 266; intervention in the Balkans, 276; Admiral to search for submarines, 291; not yet declared war on Germany, though fighting, 297, 311; cannot assist Serbia, 317; relations with Albania, 321; heavy Italian losses, 325
- Japan, offers of co-operation, 26; troops in Europe, 30; question of intervention in Europe, 58; relations with Russia in Far East, 197; to support Russia with arms, 203
- Joffre, the operations in Champagne, 1; dealings with Russian Commander-in-Chief, 3; at the Elysée, 5; opposes operations in Near East, 5; requires more munitions, 6; forms a reserve army 15; another offensive in Champagne, 15, 68; criticised in Senate, 18; complains of interference, 20; an expedition to Serbia, 31; question of reserves, 35; hints of resignation, 35; complains of old rifles, 43; friction with the British Commander-in-Chief, 50, 64, 68, 72, 74; trouble with Galliéni, 59, 63; question of British troops, 68; the Western Front, 69; trouble with the Government, 69; anticipations of success, 68, 71; General Pütz, 75; his views of Italy, 82; in charge at Arras, 103; he is attacked, 117; relations with General Foch, 120; too optimistic, 120; public complaints, 123; re-organises his Command, 132; question of British troops, 132; Kitchener opposes further offensive, 132; his failure in Arras, 137; new Commands, 141, 143; the Arras failure, 143; British help, 143; suggests a further offensive, 146; urges unity of control, 149; meets Kitchener at Calais, 155, 158; objects to new plans, 181;
- complaints from his Generals, 185; he is restless at complaints, 190; preparing for further fighting in Champagne, 191; relations with General Sarrail, 192; the control of English troops in France, 195; Kitchener in agreement, 196; expects to get through in September, 197; question of Dardanelles troops, 206; postpones new offensive, 210; further advance, 212; the Italian Front, 218; his plans known to Germany, 222; relations with the Government, 233; general Orders to troops, 233; offensive begins, 238; it is not successful, 239; consults his Generals, 243; shortage of ammunition, 244; states that he is satisfied, 251; visit from Kitchener, 254; in trouble with his Staff, 255; favours operations in Balkans, 259; the position of Greece, 264; meets King George, 267; he goes to London, 271; fresh attacks, 292; needs more men for spring offensive, 294; shortage of troops, 297; friction with Galliéni, 306; greater powers, 308; expects a war of attrition, 309
- Jouchéry, now a heap of ruins, 280
- Jusserand, Ambassador to Washington, 12
- Kaiser and Queen of Greece, 89
- Khedive (ex) of Egypt in Switzerland, 274, 298, 320
- Kipling, Rudyard, praise of French troops, 210
- Kitchener, Lord, promises reinforcements, 8; 28 British Divisions, 12; the Belgian coast, 20; the Champagne offensive, 50; to meet Joffre, 59; his visit delayed, 67; with the War Minister, Millerand, 72; meets the British Commander-in-Chief, 72; question of Dunkirk, 72; opposes the offensive, 132, 144; his views about Italy, 144; opposed by Sir John French, 146; meets Joffre at Calais, 155, 158; the Dardanelles question, 159; he agrees to military co-operation, 195; states that he is satisfied, 196; goes to Calais, 221; will Serbia be attacked, 234; the

- Dardanelles again, 244; opposition to Salonika operations, 254; visits Joffre, 254; he warns Joffre, 255; he requires troops for Egypt, 259; in conference with Joffre, 271; on the way to the Dardanelles, 277; refuses to remove troops from Dardanelles, 278; his opinion of Gallipoli, 285; the landing at Alexandretta, 287; uncomfortable about Salonika, 299; returns from Near East, 302; decides to evacuate Gallipoli, 302; threatens to retire, 312; agrees to defend Salonika, 318
- Kovno captured by Germany, 198
- Lacaze, Admiral, goes to Ministry of Marine, 271; reports that transport is limited, 275; suggests Corfu as base for submarines, 281
- Laguiche, General, as Military Attaché to Russia, 3
- Legion of Honour appointments, 8, 129
- Lemberg abandoned by the Russians, 146
- Lemnos Naval Base to be transferred, 323
- Leon Gambetta* is torpedoed, 90
- Linge trenches, visited by Poincaré, 186; German attack repulsed, 186; needless sacrifice of life, 191
- Lloyd-George, *see* George, Lloyd
- Loans to Allies, 29, 30
- London, Zeppelins attack, 123, 126
- London Congress, Russian comments, 38
- Loti, Pierre, and Poincaré, 22, 71; and King of the Belgians, 71; Turkey and France, 117, 118, 119, 124, 146; to visit Alsace, 180; goes to Alsace with Poincaré, 184; his many toilette accessories, 184; comments on Castelnau's Staff, 279
- Lusitania*, torpedoed, 99, 104; German pride and delight in the crime, 104; Roosevelt's campaign against Germany, 105; American Government content with a protest, 105; the American Note to Germany, 106
- MacDonald, Ramsay, and the Germanophiles, 38
- Marne, Battle of, report on, 76
- Maternity Home shelled by Germans, 3
- Maud'huy, General, Advanced Headquarters at Aubigny, 8; takes charge in the Vosges, 76; the troops in the Vosges, 116; at Gérardmer, 184
- Maunoury, General, wounded, 61; question of his successor, 63; now blind, 88; blindness confirmed, 274; appointed Military Governor of Paris, 274
- Medical service in the army, 195
- Mediterranean Command, 18; Italy's concern, 69; position of Spain, 87
- Messimy, Lt.-Colonel, and Parliament, 14; Minister of Marine in 1914, 16; strong letter to Poincaré, 16; wounded in Alsace, 175; letter to Poincaré, 176; still invalided, 184
- Metzeral captured by French, 164
- Military reports not accurate, 103
- Millerand returns from Bordeaux, 6; Battle of Soissons, 13; sees Kitchener, 18; in Council, 19; opinion about the Near East, 26; friction with Clémenceau, 30; prerogative of the Government, 34; reticence as to troops, 40; concerning unity of Command, 51, 74; and Galliéni, 63; question of armaments, 64; too secretive, 64; and Kitchener, 72; success in Chambre, 75; Battle of the Marne, 76; position of America, 89; War Office attacked, 94; trouble over armaments, 94, 98, 106; the Parliamentary Committee, 100; the Army Committee, 110; friction with Joffre, 120, 125; the various Military Commands, 129; he is opposed in the Chambre, 130; also in the Council, 140; relations with Poincaré, 141; a vote of censure, 145; stubborn action, 148; Viviani's distress, 148; attacked by Humbert, 151; his resignation not desirable, 151; his duties to be divided, 152; again attacked in Chambre, 159; attitude to Joffre's demands, 161; question of artillery, 162; Minister and Parliament, 171; Joffre's objections, 181; further attack, 183; attacked by Socialists, 187; he refuses information, 190;

- Kitchener agrees to co-operation, 195; question of using poison-gas, 219; he meets Kitchener at Calais, 221; a new offensive, 240; against the abandonment of Gallipoli, 257; he opposes Kitchener's request for troops, 259; in conference with Kitchener, 261
- Milo Roadstead, battleships here, 298; fleet dispersed, 320
- Monastir Railway, 283; Sarraill to occupy district, 290; Servians retreat here, 297; threatened by Bulgaria, 300; occupied by Austria and Bulgaria, 300; also by Germany, 317
- Montenegro, the King is active, 107; question of Servian refugees, 285; King goes to Scutari, 302; irritation with Russia, 303; loan suggested from France and England, 304; driven out of Bosnia, 325; a separate peace, 327; King goes to Salonika, 331
- Morel, Lucie, visited by Poincaré, 221
- Morocco and Spain, 80; satisfactory news, 164; German intrigues, 326
- Moscow, public demonstrations, 216; fighting with stones, 225
- Mussulmans and Turkey, 55; and Albania, 61; their loyalty to France, 97
- Naval Convention signed, 101
- Nicholas, Grand Duke, on the Russian Front, 3; the Balkan Peninsula, 36; agrees to send troops, 41; opinion of the attacks in Chambre, 43; question of Turkey in Europe, 54; problem of the Catholics, 66; greatly aged, 67; Roumanian trouble, 79; he is opposed, 145; dissatisfaction with Allies, 149; the difficulty of covering vast distances, 150; in disgrace, 202; public protests, 207; considered a dreamer, 217; he is still confident, 225; his dismissal not understood in France, 227; his authority over the troops was good, 227
- Pau, General, at Bucharest, 47; his mission to Petrograd, 52; returns from Russia, 79
- Pétain, General, in the Black Country, 78; success at Arras, 102, 115; visited by Poincaré, 157; he favours delay, 157
- Poincaré and Millerand, 14; Lt.-Colonel Messimy, 16; the Archbishop of Paris, 25; a dinner at the Elysée, 16; the Maharajah of Bikanir, 17; Prince Youssouppoff, 19; dealings with Pierre Loti, 22; question of the Near East, 27, 29; Lloyd George, 28; visits General Pau, 29; the Italian Hospital in Paris, 31; receives General Garibaldi, 31; the Army of the Vosges, 32; trouble with Clémenceau, 34; the *Homme Enchaîné*, 39; question of Belgian neutrality, 48; the Crown Princess of Germany, 76, 85; Sir Henry Wilson, 78; with King Albert, 79; an Easter Egg from Germany, 79; the Tsar of Russia, 84, 86, 87; Prince George of Greece, 85; the King of Italy, 88; he visits the Front, 88; the King of Spain, 90; the Irish deputation, 91; the King of Italy, 95; M. Bourgeois, 96; the new Portuguese Minister, 98; position of Prince George of Greece, 102; trouble with Delcassé, 107; question of artillery shortage, 108; General Humbert is busy, 115, 133, 140; he visits the War zone, 116; attitude of King of Italy, 117, 119, 121; activities of Pierre Loti, 124; Verdun, 126; trouble over Servia, 131; he visits the munition works, 133; M. Margaine calls, 135; an unofficial uniform, 135; co-operation of the General Staffs, 139; Viviani and Millerand call, 141; visit to Chantilly, 141; he visits the Front, 147; inspects African troops, 159; decorated by King of Italy, 160; advises against hasty action, 183; visits Alsace, 184; lack of military information, 190; message from King George, 195; his fifty-fifth birthday on 20 August, 195; position of Japan, 197; the King of the Belgians, 198; visits Dijon, 215; visits Hotchkiss establishment, 219; meets Johan

- Bojer, 241; telegram to Tsar, 248; he loses a devoted servant, 260; meets King George, 265; with the blinded soldiers, 284; meets Emilienne Movau, 303; attacked by Clémenceau, 311; receives the Russian mission, 319; says good-bye to Sir John French, 326
- Poincaré, Madame, and the troops, 108
- Poison gas over Ypres, 87; new German "Shell T," 87; question of retaliation, 87; ours is inferior, 165; gas at Tahure, 274
- Pope, His Holiness, suggests exchange of prisoners, 4; question of St. Sophia, 64; position of Russia, 64; trouble with Clémenceau, 138; and Cardinal Amette, 249
- Portugal and France, 98; effects of revolution, 157; becomes a Republic, 121
- Prisoners to be exchanged, 4; treatment in Germany, 42
- Pütz, General, does good work, 6; in Roosbrugge, 78
- Przemysl, captured, 70; evacuated by Russians, 128
- Red Cross, 75
- Rheims, bombed by Germans, 86; further damaged, 147
- Ribot and the Budget, 125; his illness, 127; position of Serbia, 131; the Bank of England, 136; financial difficulties, 138; the export of gold, 152; pleads for economy, 164; more financial troubles, 166; a loan from America, 203, 222; suggests a perpetual loan, 219; Russian finances, 229; threatens resignation, 242; opposes further expenditure on munitions, 245; loan to Russia, 252; he is short of funds, 307, 312
- Rifles, British shortage, 20
- Riga, Russian troops threatened, 286
- Roosevelt and French position, 45; suggests declaration of war by America, 201
- Roumania and Austria, 15; and the Allies, 26, 95, 101; position of Russia, 95, 109, 110; her claims on the Allies, 107; position of the Triple Entente, 112; importance of the Danube, 112; trouble with Servia, 139; diplomatic hesitation, 151; relations with Germany, 160; position of the Allies, 172; trouble over Russia, 175; the Allies, 201; position of Greece, 230; popular approval of the Allies, 268
- Rousset, Colonel, and the Balkans, 5
- Russia, suggested separate peace with Austria, 4; unable to resume fighting till April, 15; German influence, 19; a French alliance, 27; loans from America, 29, 30; some reverses, 32; evacuation of Eastern Prussia, 37; Constantinople, 52, 53, 55, 83; position of the Pope, 64; the fighting in Champagne, 66; Italian problems, 75, 86, 87; troops in the Carpathians, 83; offensive here proves a failure, 89; problem of Roumania, 95, 109, 110; corn supplies, 97; strength of the reserves, 106; news not reassuring, 109; military situation less critical, 114; heavy defeats, 128; France blamed for Russian failure, 138; Lemberg abandoned, 146; unrest among the working classes, 155; financial troubles, 167; problem of Roumania, 175; shortage of rifles, 176; retiring before the Germans, 181; not able to advance, 188; internal troubles over the retreat, 189; Naval victory in Gulf of Riga, 202; Court intrigues, 203; trouble over Grand Duke Nicholas, 207; enormous losses, 212; protest against the Empress as Regent, 213; military changes, 214; General d'Amade's mission to Russia, 215; terrible casualties, 217; revolution feared, 217; the Tsar takes command, 218; effect on superstitious peasants, 219; position of Constantinople, 223; Rasputin at Court, 224; public attack on Empress, 225; anarchist agents, 226; further reactionary trouble, 257; transport difficulties, 264, 268; in need of rifles, 264, 272; Tsar's troubles with his ministers, 273; Russia cannot help Servia, 290; further retreats, 299; new pro-

- posals for joint attack, 299; great shortage of rifles, 306; still hopes of renewal of attack, 323; Rasputin is active, 327
- Salonika, a suggested landing 1; French force to assist, 6; which troops for this attack, 28; rejoicings, 58; importance of position, 240; British Government not keen, 243; vital importance diplomatic or military action, 248; situation clearer, 251; disembarkation of troops, 255; British troops to go to Servia, 270; Salonika to be held, 274; claimed by Allies for duration of the war, 290; British troops to remain, 293; difficulties of occupying Greek territory, 294; cannot retire now, 299, 310; British wish to evacuate, 310; Kitchener threatens to retire, 312; Sir John French insists on evacuation, 316; protest by Greek Government, 320; to be fortified, 321; Castelnau sent to report, 321; attack expected, 323; shortage of supplies, 327
- Sarrail, General, and Joffre, 72; suggested as Commander-in-Chief, 128, 135; attacked by Joffre and Dubail, 168; not inclined to go to Dardanelles, 181; attacked by Joffre, 192; military situation in Near East, 192; the Verdun report, 192; to force the Dardanelles, 194; suggestions for attack, 211; to go to Near East and report, 213; the Dardanelles report, 232; no belief in success on French Front, 253; arrives at Salonika, 258; to hold it as a base, 260; Kitchener's views, 264; he wants more men, 278; he is to help the Servians, 284; left a free hand, 287, 296; he objects to a retreat, 288; attacked by Galliéni, 297; opposed by Kitchener, 329; ordered to hold on, 308
- Sazonoff and the Habsburg Monarchy, 4; the Austrian offensive, 15
- Scutari, Montenegro advance, 146; occupied, 151; starving Servians, 322
- Servia and the Allies, 32, 61; position of Italy, 130; Dalmatia, 131; what about Roumania, 139; French support, 175; not satisfied, 180; more trouble, 188; Italy not satisfied, 193; Delcassé and Servian aims, 198; fear of Germany, 201; terms of an agreement, 213; British and French assistance, 234; possible German attack, 234; troops to be sent, 241; critical situation, 252; attack expected, 256; Russian help doubtful, 258; attack by Bulgarians, 259; British troops to help, 261; difficult military position, 265; army in danger, 268; British troops to go, 270; General Staff depressed, 270; Timok line evacuated, 270; rush of refugees, 275; demoralisation, 281; prompt action needed, 282; troops on Greek soil, 283; army in critical position, 295; food needed for civilian population, 298; Babuna Pass evacuated, 300; refugees in danger, 301; feeling against Allies, 303; army abandon stores, 315; troops to be sent to Italy, 319; refugees starving, 322; to go to Corfu, 328
- Smith-Dorrien, Sir Horace, and Legion of Honour, 8
- Socialists and Russian support, 39; party restless, 187; more conciliatory, 194
- Soissons, attack on enemy, 10; and a retirement, 11; details of battle, 13
- Soukhomlinoff, Russian War Minister, 3; replaced, 151
- Spain and Morocco, 80; the new frontiers, 85; question of Tangiers, 87; intervention to save two women, 291; offered Tangier and Gibraltar by the Kaiser, 294
- Submarines, trouble between Germany and Greece, 236; fear of German submarines at Salonika, 243; German boats in Adriatic and Mediterranean, 302, 304
- Suvla Bay, English landing, 188; position in danger, 204; British Fleet, 288
- Switzerland and the Allies, 75
- Syria, importance to France, 269, 275, 288

- Tangier, the control important, 91 ;
 German submarines, 293
- Torpedo warfare, 36, 47
- Trentino, Military position, 136
- Triple Entente, 28 ; question of loans, 29
- Tsar the, *see under* Russia
- Turkey, position in Europe, 54, 83 ; dealings with Greece, 82 ; Bulgarian concern, 111 ; Italy ready for war, 189 ; trouble with Bulgaria, 207, 229
- U.S.A. and supply of provisions, 37 ; public opinion against Germany, 42 ; American citizens attacked, 47
- Vauquois, success at, 65
- Venizelos, relations with Serbia, 32 ; the Bulgarian position, 36 ; he resigns, 58 ; new Greek Government, 81, 85 ; the Greek elections, 133 ; Finance Minister at Athens, 166 ; regains power, 194 ; accepts office, 198 ; the new Cabinet, 201 ; a defensive treaty, 223, 227 ; the Bulgarian Government, 230 ; question of French support, 231 ; a possible attack on Serbia, 234 ; German submarines, 236 ; urges a landing at Salonika, 240 ; Hamilton's advance, 249 ; French reassurance, 250 ; expresses his satisfaction, 251 ; opposed by King Constantine, 252 ; resignation forced, 254 ; relations with the King, 260 ; opposes landing of Italian troops, 265 ; attacks King Constantine, 276 ; abused by the King, 296 ; blamed by the King, 320 ; financed by M. Zaharof, 331
- Verdun, visited by Poincaré, 126 ; a fortified area, 188 ; to be defended, 326
- Vimy Ridge fight, 133, 143 ; French success, 244 ; but not held, 256
- Viviani and President, 1 ; the Near East, 2 ; relations with Joffre, 5 ; his view of French aims, 39 ; the Army Council, 44 ; about the Champagne fighting, 46 ; the Government, 141, 148 ; Joffre is difficult, 142 ; words with Millerand, 148 ; suggestion of an enlarged Cabinet, 152 ; attacks on Millerand, 159 ; General Sarraill's position, 170 ; Millerand again, 172 ; difficulties with his Cabinet, 119 ; he is worn out, 184 ; attacks on Millerand, 187 ; forcing the Dardanelles, 193 ; he blames Millerand, 196 ; a firmer stand, 202 ; Dardanelles again, 229 ; complains of Delcassé, 239 ; further trouble with Millerand, 263 ; Cabinet difficulties, 266
- Wales, Prince of, at St. Omer, 8 ; receives the Croix de Guerre, 266 ; with the French troops, 266
- War, the cause of the war, 56
- Warsaw, the struggle for the district, 172 ; abandoned by the Russians, 184
- Wilson, President, protests against torpedo warfare, 36 ; relations with the Kaiser, 104 ; reply to Germany, 131
- Wilson, Sir Henry, and Poincaré, 78
- Witte, M. de, and his Germanophile friends, 4 ; his death, 63
- Wounded, the, their terrible plight, 220, 222, 284
- Youssouppoff, Prince, and Poincaré 19
- Ypres occupied by British, 78 ; Queen Elizabeth, 79 ; poison gas used, 87 ; Poincaré pays a visit, 178 ; fighting, 235
- Zaharoff, M., finances Venizelos, 331
- Zeppelins over Paris, 68 ; Sir Francis Bertie protests, 80 ; raid over London, 123, 126



~~31083~~
ST. CATHARINES PUBLIC

DC 385 .A63 v.6
Poincare, Raymond, Presid 010101 000
The memoirs of Raymond Poincar



0 1163 0217840 9
TRENT UNIVERSITY

DC385 .A63 [v.6]
Poincare, Raymond, Pres. France
The memoirs of Raymond
Poincare

DATE

ISSUED TO

96263

96263

